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Abstract 
The UK and Spain are paradigmatic examples of plurinational democracies that have 
sought to use political decentralisation as a means to manage the autonomy and secessionist 
aspirations of the states’ national minorities. The existence of vociferous independence 
movements in Scotland and Catalonia pose a serious challenge to the constitutional integrity 
of the UK and Spain, but while both states remain intact – at least for the time being – 
autonomy arrangements have come under increased strain. In light of this, this thesis 
examines the evolution of territorial politics in the UK and Spain, with particular focus on 
debates on autonomy and secession in Scotland and Catalonia. It investigates the limitations 
of existing autonomy arrangements, sketches potential scenarios for the future terrain of 
territorial politics and ultimately offers some possible avenues for future reform. 
The theoretical framework is informed by the theories of liberal nationalism, 
multinational federalism and power-sharing, principally consociationalism. In this vein, the 
thesis seeks to make at least two principal contributions. First, a theoretical contribution as 
relates to further developing and refining the theory of multinational federalism, specifically 
examining how its theoretical underpinnings can be translated into political reality. Second, 
the thesis seeks to make an explanatory contribution to improve the understanding of the 
accommodation of national minorities within plurinational contexts, paying particular 
attention to the design of autonomy models.  
Taking stock of autonomy arrangements in the UK and Spain, the thesis demonstrates 
the limited nature of existing autonomy models and the necessity of reform to better 
accommodate national minorities as well as hold the existing states together. Drawing upon 
normative and empirical debates, I discuss a number of potential reforms to achieve a more 
coherent and accommodative autonomy model and posit three possible scenarios for the 
future development of territorial politics in both cases: recentralisation, reformulation and 
disintegration. 
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1. Chapter One: Introduction  
This thesis is about territorial autonomy and secession in plurinational states.1 
Reconciling the increasingly vociferous demands from national minorities for self-
government with the aspirations of host-state governments to hold existing states together 
remains one of the most intractable challenges encountered by plurinational democracies in 
the twenty first century. As a result, territorial autonomy has been increasingly promoted as 
a means of diversity management; enabling national minorities to manage their own affairs 
and conserve their national identities and cultural heritage, while the extant borders of the 
state remain unaltered (Keil and Anderson, 2018: 89). Yet, while autonomy is often 
promoted, and in the case of some states conceded as a necessary arrangement to prevent 
territorial disintegration, secessionism has not been entirely abated. From the United 
Kingdom (UK) to Spain, Iraq to Papua New Guinea, secessionism abounds in states 
throughout the world.  
Scotland and Catalonia are oft-cited examples of territorial movements seeking 
enhanced self-government within plurinational, multilevel states and remain at the forefront 
of current debates on secession in the real world as much as in academia. Alongside other 
sub-state entities such as the Basque Country, Flanders and Quebec, Scotland and Catalonia 
are typically described as the ‘usual suspects’, that is, a group of sub-state entities often 
compared as sources of movements for self-government and/or independence. To offset 
aspirations for independence and to meet demands for self-government, decentralisation 
projects were enacted in Spain and the UK in the late 1970s and 1990s respectively. These 
decentralisation processes set in train a series of changes that have not merely altered the 
political and electoral landscapes of the sub-state territories themselves, but engendered the 
evolution of the states into multilayered, asymmetric polities in which devolution and 
decentralisation continue to evolve. In fact, and much to the chagrin of state elites which 
saw decentralisation as a settlement rather than a project of continual change, both the UK 
and Spain have become prominent sites for experiments in constitutional and territorial 
reform. In 2018, both are in a state of constitutional flux.  
Scottish independence, framed as a once in a generation opportunity to recast 
Scotland’s relationship with the rest of the UK, was rejected in the 2014 referendum in which 
                                                 
1 Chapter Two provides a detailed analysis and discussion of the main concepts in this thesis.  
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55% of the huge electoral turnout (85%) voted against the Scottish National Party’s (SNP) 
constitutional preference for independence (McHarg et al 2016). Paradoxically, however, 
despite losing the referendum, the SNP triumphed in the 2015 general election, winning all 
but three of Scotland’s seats and was re-elected to government in Scotland in 2016, albeit 
two seats short of a majority (Anderson 2016a). As Mitchell (2015: 90) put it, ‘within days 
of the referendum it had become clear that the SNP would not adopt the political equivalent 
of the foetal position common after a traumatic defeat.’ This was evidenced by the rapid 
growth in party membership which reached more than 100,000 only six months after the 
referendum and became all the clearer in the aftermath of the referendum on the UK’s future 
membership of the European Union (EU), when the SNP-led Scottish government, 
supported by the Scottish Greens, called for a second independence referendum.2  
In the EU referendum, voters in Scotland registered an overwhelming affirmative vote 
to remain in the EU (62%), but the majority vote to leave in England (53%), not only 
illuminated the profound divergences in territorial politics and constitutional visions within 
the UK, but spotlighted the impotence of the Scottish minority in the face of the more 
Eurosceptic English majority. Notwithstanding predictions that EU withdrawal would 
precipitate a spike in support for independence, the figure has yet to reach and remain steady 
at 50%. Independence, however, remains the constitutional preference of the Scottish 
government. Plans for a second referendum have been placed on hold in the aftermath of the 
results of the 2017 general election in which the SNP lost 21 seats, but the incumbent 
Scottish government remains committed to a second independence referendum, particularly 
in the face of the overwhelming vote in Scotland to remain in the EU (McHarg and Mitchell 
2017). The UK government has not ruled out transferring power to the Scottish Parliament 
to hold a second referendum but given the near-death experience of the union in 2014, is 
unsurprisingly hesitant in doing so anytime soon. Withdrawal from the EU poses an 
indisputable risk to the continued existence of the UK in its current form, but while the 
secession of Scotland is not inevitable, there is nothing guaranteed about the future 
constitutional integrity of the UK. As Anderson and Keil (forthcoming) posit, ‘the tectonic 
plates of British politics are shifting and the UK’s once strong and stable constitutional 
edifice is beginning to crack.’  
The agreed referendum between the Scottish and UK governments has been held up 
                                                 
2 In September 2018, SNP membership reached 125,000 and the party became the second largest party in the 
UK.  
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by the Catalan sovereignty movement as an example to emulate. Nonetheless, while pro-
independence parliamentarians and civil society activists have consistently pressed the 
Spanish government to reach a negotiated solution on an independence referendum, the 
latter has firmly rejected this offer, citing the indivisibility of the Spanish state – as 
expounded by the Constitution – as one of several impediments to facilitating the secession 
of an Autonomous Community (AC). Much like Scotland, support for independence in 
Catalonia was a historically marginalised option, but has steadily increased over the last few 
years. There are numerous reasons behind the growth of independence, not least the 
intransigence of the Spanish government and other (Spanish) political elites to take seriously 
Catalan demands for constitutional change, including Statute and fiscal reform and 
ultimately a referendum on Catalonia’s place within Spain (Dowling 2017).3  
In the context of the failure of concerted efforts on the part of the Catalan government 
to secure support for a negotiated referendum, in 2014 and 2017 unofficial referenda were 
organised, albeit the former was rebranded a ‘participation process’ as a result of the 
litigation of the Spanish Constitutional Court (TC). The 2017 referendum, however, went 
ahead despite the judgments of the TC. An overwhelming majority voted in favour of 
secession (92%), but the result was nothing short of a contested mandate, marred by the 
heavy-handed reaction of the national police (Guardia Civil) to disrupt the vote (Cetrà et al 
2018).  
In June 2018, the Partido Popular (Popular Party – PP), having been in power since 
2011, was ousted from government after a vote of no confidence triggered by a series of 
damaging corruption scandals. The PP was replaced by the largest opposition party, the 
Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party – PSOE) and its 
leader, Pedro Sánchez, became Prime Minister (PM) (Margulies 2018). Yet, while Sánchez 
has sought to appear much more conciliatory than his conservative predecessor and 
championed dialogue with the Catalan government as a first step to reconciling differences 
and resolving the unfolding territorial crisis, much like Rajoy, he remains firmly opposed to 
the celebration of an independence referendum. Instead, the PSOE government advocates 
territorial reform as a potential solution to the so-called ‘Catalan crisis’, but it remains to be 
seen whether any change short of an independence referendum is too little too late for a 
majority of Catalans.  
                                                 
3 For more on the reasons behind the growth in independence see Muñoz and Tormos (2014) and Serrano 
(2013).  
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The cases of Scotland and Catalonia demonstrate the continued struggle of minority 
nations in the twenty first century. Evidently, a number of reasons contribute to the rise of 
secessionist movements, one of which is the insufficiency of autonomy models to abate 
minority nations from pursuing the more radical secession option.4 The inability of minority 
nations to secure, and the unwillingness of host states to concede models of autonomy in 
which minority nations are not merely accommodated, but sufficiently empowered and 
officially recognised remains a pertinent concern for minority nations, especially within 
plurinational states. This is the main topic of this thesis.  
The crises unfolding in the UK and Spain illuminate some of the challenges 
encountered by host states in attempting to forge a stable equilibrium between the aspirations 
and demands of minority and majority societal groups. The proliferation of pro-autonomy 
and pro-independence movements does not render the objective and existence of 
plurinational states obsolete, but recent events in Scotland and Catalonia evince the 
widening gap between the roles these minority nations currently play and the roles they 
expect and wish to play. In this regard, it is not only plurinational states that seem to be in 
trouble, but the future existence of minority nations, too. In the parlance of Gagnon (2014), 
both minority nations and their plurinational hosts reside in ‘an age of uncertainty’.  
Recent events in Scotland and Catalonia underline Gagnon’s assertion. They show that 
while much has been done to move power away from the centre and provide national and 
regional minorities with a political and legislative arena to protect and preserve their 
ethnonational diversity, this has yet to completely satisfy the self-determining aspirations of 
minority nations and thus quench their potential thirst for secession. The aim of this thesis, 
therefore, is to map and explain the development of territorial politics in both Scotland and 
Catalonia, taking stock of the autonomy arrangements already in place, examining the 
efficacy of such arrangements in accommodating and meeting the demands of the minority 
nations and ultimately asking what else could be done to ensure the development of a more 
coherent, accommodative and empowering autonomy model. 
This thesis originates from two main sources, one intellectual and one personal. The 
first puzzle relates to the rise of secessionism in Scotland and Catalonia and the efficacy of 
autonomy arrangements in accommodating national minorities and thus abating 
secessionism. Both Scotland and Catalonia are powerful sub-state territories, yet in recent 
                                                 
4 For more on the rationale behind secession see Pavković and Radan (2007).  
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years disenchantment with the host state and thus support for secession has steadily 
increased. For this reason, this thesis examines the rise of secessionism in both cases and 
how central governments have responded to this. It examines the merits and limitations of 
these approaches and at the same time seeks to discover whether a more coherent and 
efficient model of autonomy for minority nations in plurinational states can be designed and 
what sort of arrangements this would entail.   
This thesis is also shaped by a personal interest in both cases. As a Scot who 
predominantly grew up in autonomous Scotland and spent five years working and studying 
in Catalonia, I have spent most of adult life in the context of intense discussions on territorial 
politics and the status of these territories within the UK and Spanish states. I left Scotland 
for Catalonia in 2011, only a month after the election of a majority SNP government to 
Holyrood and the increasing prospect of a referendum on independence. In Catalonia, the 
prospect of a referendum seemed a remote possibility, but similar to Scotland, and more 
vociferously so, there was (and continues to be) enhanced debate over the future of Catalonia 
within the Spanish state. These evolving debates were not new in either case, but in an era 
of heightened awareness of minority rights, sparked my interest in why successful and liberal 
democratic states such as the UK and Spain struggle to meet the demands of minority nations 
seeking to offset their vulnerability as culturally distinct sub-state territories within larger 
states.  
 
1.1 Research Questions 
This thesis explores the development of territorial politics in Scotland and Catalonia, 
paying particular attention to debates around autonomy and secession. It begins by 
addressing a basic question: to what extent can plurinational states accommodate diversity? 
More specifically and applied to the case studies, the main research question is: 
How have the UK and Spain managed demands from Scotland and Catalonia for 
enhanced autonomy and secession, to what extent are these strategies effective in meeting 
these demands and eschewing secession and are there alternative strategies that would 
better meet these demands while preventing state dissolution? 
The normative assumption that undergirds this question relates to how democratic 
states deal with ethnonational diversity and ensure the accommodation, empowerment and 
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recognition of such minorities within the parameters of the extant state. The question is 
multifaceted and thus requires a combination of normative/theoretical studies with empirical 
research in order to be sufficiently answered. For this reason, several sub-questions also 
guide the study: 
How have the UK and Spain responded to demands in Scotland and Catalonia for 
autonomy and secession? 
How effective have existing autonomy arrangements in the UK and Spain been in 
accommodating, empowering and recognising Scotland and Catalonia’s ethnonational 
diversity? 
Are there other mechanisms that may be employed to ensure the development of a 
more coherent model of autonomy for Scotland and Catalonia? 
Each sub-question is answered through the different sections in Chapters Four and 
Five which examine the cases of Scotland and Catalonia separately, and examined through 
a comparative lens in Chapter Six. Chapters Four and Five begin with the first sub-question. 
Drawing upon secondary literature, these chapters discuss how demands for autonomy and 
secession in Scotland and Catalonia have been managed by central states, from both a 
historical and contemporary perspective. These chapters also provide a detailed discussion 
on more recent debates on autonomy and secession in both cases, beginning with the election 
of the SNP in Scotland in 2007 and the increasingly pro-sovereignty platform endorsed by 
Convergència i Unió (Convergence and Union- CiU) after re-winning power in the 2010 
Catalan election.  
 The second sub-question is one of the principal foci of Chapters Four and Five. To 
answer this question, I examine existing autonomy arrangements through the prism of merits 
and limitations. To this end, I draw upon interview data, document analysis and the academic 
literature, identifying several benefits and shortcomings of extant arrangements in managing 
demands for autonomy and secession. In this vein, the ‘effectiveness’ of existing autonomy 
arrangements is examined in line with the theoretical framework laid out in Chapter Three, 
specifically drawing upon the theories of liberal nationalism and multinational federalism, 
with particular emphasis on the key themes of accommodation, empowerment and 
recognition.  
The final sub-question is divided into two parts in each chapter. This begins by 
examining the future terrain of territorial politics in each case through the prism of the main 
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political parties active within the sub-state electoral systems. Taking into account the 
different territorial perspectives endorsed and advanced by the main parties, three scenarios 
are sketched for both cases: recentralisation, reformulation and disintegration. Bearing this 
in mind, the penultimate sections of Chapters Four and Five draw together the preceding 
analysis as well as the theoretical framework and analyse potential routes to ensure the 
development and institutionalisation of a more coherent, accommodative and plurinationally 
sensitive model of autonomy. In this vein, this section draws upon both the normative and 
empirical dimension of the study, seeking to build on the existing theory of multinational 
federalism while further deepening existing knowledge of the autonomy and secessionist 
movements in Scotland and Catalonia and the territorial strategies employed by the UK and 
Spanish governments.  
 
1.2 Contribution 
This thesis specifically contributes to the evolving scholarship of territorial politics, 
particularly with regards to sub-state territories and plurinational states.5 The first 
contribution lies in the examination of the merits and limitations of autonomy arrangements 
in both countries. Although not a research lacuna, analysing the development of these 
autonomy arrangements vis-à-vis Scotland and Catalonia, bolstered by interview data from 
parliamentarians in Edinburgh and London, Barcelona and Madrid, helps shed light on the 
efficacy of current arrangements. As identified by Kraus (2015: 74), while territorial 
autonomy remains politically relevant and for many constitutes a moral good, the heating 
up of long-standing tensions in sub-state entities like Scotland and Catalonia necessitates a 
deeper examination of the effectiveness of institutional arrangements. Basta and Simeon 
(2015: 321) underline a similar point, illuminating ‘the need for a deeper case study-based 
understanding and interpretation of how particular communities and political elites conceive 
of institutional arrangements of autonomy’. This thesis does just that. Doing so allows for 
the exploration of themes and nuances unique to each case, but also enables a comparative 
discussion on those characteristics shared by both the UK and Spain in respect of the 
normative and institutional merits and limitations of autonomy arrangements and what this 
means for existing structures in plurinational states with vociferous autonomy and 
secessionist movements. From a methodological point of view, this thesis offers a detailed 
                                                 
5 On territorial politics more broadly see Detterbeck and Hepburn (2018). 
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perspective of the limitations of current autonomy arrangements as described by those 
political elites which function within them.  
A second contribution of this thesis relates to further examining the experience of the 
management of national minorities in plurinational states, specifically developing the theory 
of multinational federalism. For Swenden (2006: 290), ‘how to manage multinational 
polities is among the most complex and fascinating questions that should concern the 
community of social scientists.’ In line with this, this thesis contributes to the growing 
literature on this ‘complex and fascinating’ phenomenon. In addition, it seeks to build on 
and further develop the theory of multinational federalism by adding empirical flesh to its 
theoretical bones. Burgess (2012a: 182), heralds multinational federalism as an innovative 
political model designed to alleviate some of the most pressing tensions and problems 
encountered in plurinational contexts. Yet, while an advocate of multinational federalism, 
Burgess (2012b: 42) notes that one of its biggest pitfalls is the inability to successfully 
translate it from a normative theory to empirical reality: ‘we know what some of its 
properties are…it remains unclear and uncertain just how far we can take this concept in 
order to translate it into practical reality’. In light of this, this thesis seeks to contribute to a 
better understanding of how this translation may be achieved, identifying the limitations of 
existing autonomy arrangements and seeking to rectify these to create a more coherent and 
accommodative model of autonomy.   
Third and drawing on the last point made above, this thesis also aims to use the data 
gathered from interviews and documents as well as the subsequent themes that emerged 
from the analysis to suggest and evaluate ways in which current autonomy arrangements 
could be reformed and improved to increase their effectiveness as tools of accommodation. 
To this end, I examine the future terrain of territorial politics in Scotland and Catalonia and 
the UK and Spain. Drawing upon the different visions espoused by political elites in each of 
the cases under study, I shine light on the evolutionary nature of territorial politics as well 
as the challenges and opportunities for both minority nations and plurinational states in the 
twenty first century. At the same time, I seek to offer a clearer picture of the options available 
in crafting autonomy arrangements in what remains a volatile and somewhat hostile political 
environment. This, as will be further elaborated in the Conclusion, is important to help better 
understand and respond to recent developments in the UK and Spain, but may also offer 
lessons and implications for other well-established plurinational and multilevel states as well 
as newly emerging ones, too.  
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1.3 Methodology, Research Approach and Design 
This thesis is a qualitative research project that seeks to fuse theoretical and empirical 
work on autonomy strategies. The main objective is three-fold: to analyse the strategies of 
Spain and the UK as relates to responding to demands for autonomy and secession, to 
evaluate the merits and limitations of the autonomy models institutionalised to manage the 
aforementioned demands and to examine whether other mechanisms could be employed in 
order to better meet the demands from Scotland and Catalonia for accommodation, 
empowerment and recognition. To do so, this thesis draws upon process tracing, a case study 
approach and a comparison of these cases. This section proceeds as follows: first, I will 
define my case selection, then discuss the research approach and methods of the study. This 
will be followed by a discussion of the methods of analysis used – elite interviews and 
document analysis – before concluding with some brief notes on fieldwork.  
 
1.3.1 Case Selection  
Case selection, particularly for small N research projects, is an important task for 
researchers that eschews the random sampling approach undertaken when conducting large 
N cross-case analysis (Seawright and Gerring 2008). This study adopts a case study and 
comparative case study approach as its broad research design (Yin 2014), whereby the two 
cases – the UK and Spain – were selected based on the ‘most similar systems’ approach 
(Przeworski and Teune 1970). The most similar method has increasingly become the most 
common approach for small N research in political science, enabling the researcher to study 
a limited number of highly similar cases in which the common characteristics of the different 
cases can be controlled to reduce the number of potential explanations (Della Porta, 2008: 
214).  
Seawright and Gerring (2008: 294) posit that, ‘choosing good cases for extremely 
small samples is a challenging endeavour’. As already mentioned above, Spain and the UK 
are part of a genus of plurinational states with sub-state movements demanding enhanced 
autonomy and independence, but I have chosen in this thesis to focus only on two of these 
cases. The similarities and differences of the UK and Spain – which make the comparison 
plausible, worthwhile and insightful – are discussed below, but prior to looking at these, it 
is important to justify the choice of only two cases. The UK and Spain were chosen as these 
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are considered the best cases to explore ‘causal inference’ as relates to the development of 
autonomy systems in plurinational states (ibid: 296). This relates not only to the 
entrenchment of autonomy arrangements in both cases, but how these have been used to 
manage growing levels of secessionism. Both cases are the most current examples of 
plurinational states in Western liberal democracies wrestling with secessionist movements. 
Referenda have occurred in other states, such as Canada, whereby Quebec held referenda on 
independence in 1980 and 1995, but independence remains a marginalised option and 
discussions vis-à-vis secession in Quebec are relatively absent from current political debates 
(Bélanger et al, 2018: 4). For this reason, Canada was dismissed as a case study in this thesis, 
although this does not mean that future comparison with Canada, albeit in a more historical 
approach, is completely futile. 
In addition, pro-independence nationalist parties hold the reins of power in Scotland 
and Catalonia and have done so for significant periods of time in both cases. In Quebec, the 
pro-independent Parti Québécois (PQ) was elected to power in 2012 but lasted only 18 
months in office and subsequently lost the 2014 provincial election (Maioni 2014). In the 
most recent elections held in October 2018, the PQ was relegated to third place, winning 
only 17% of the vote and 10 seats (Gould 2018).6 In Flanders, Belgium, a pro-secessionist 
party, the New Flemish Alliance (N-VA), was elected to office in 2014, but was also 
discounted as a case study given the very low support amongst the public for secession (see 
Popelier 2015).  
A final consideration that helped inform the choice of the two case studies relates to 
empirical politics and recent scholarship. Recent events in Catalonia and Spain underline 
the heightened discussion of autonomy and assuaging support for secessionism in both 
cases. The UK and Spain thus stand out as cases ripe for analysis, particularly in the wake 
of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, which has reignited calls for a second referendum in 
Scotland, and the ongoing territorial turmoil in Catalonia whereby support for a referendum 
and independence itself remains historically high.7 In so doing, this thesis will therefore 
contribute to the emerging new knowledge on these events and what this means for the future 
evolution of territorial politics in both cases.  
At the same time, comparing only two cases from the broad genus of plurinational 
                                                 
6 In the 2014 election, the PQ won 32% of the vote and 54 seats (Maioni 2014).  
7 In the most recent polling published by the Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió (CEO) in November 2018, 47.2% of 
Catalans would vote in favour of independence, while 43.2% would vote against.  
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states is not uncommon and more recent scholarship has often focused on only two cases 
(see Basta 2017; Cetrà and Harvey 2018; Convery and Lundberg 2017; Keating and Laforest 
2018). Basta compared Canada and Spain, Cetrà and Harvey and Convery and Lundberg 
examined the UK and Spain, while Keating and Laforest focused on Canada and the UK. 
Similar to the abovementioned research, in analysing only two cases this thesis provides a 
richer, more in-depth examination of the evolution of territorial politics in the UK and Spain 
as well as a detailed analysis of the limitations of extant autonomy arrangements, how these 
can be modified to improve existing arrangements and where the constitutional future for 
Scotland and Catalonia lie beyond 2018.  
Comparing Spain and the UK is not novel and is in fact a common comparison in the 
academic literature (Alonso 2012; Cetrà and Harvey 2017; 2018; Convery and Lundberg 
2017; Guibernau 2006; Keating 1996; Swenden 2006). The two states have much in 
common: Spain and the UK are economically developed European liberal democracies with 
constitutional monarchies; both countries are plurinational states with at least one 
territorially distinct community with an active independence movement; they are multilevel 
states with asymmetrical decentralised systems and finally, in neither case is there a 
constitutionalised right to independence.  
In spite of these mutual features, a number of differences between both cases are also 
evident, not least, the acknowledgement and recognition of the UK as a plurinational state 
compared with the lack of consensus and predominantly mononational interpretation that 
prevails in Spain. Second, the UK’s flexible and codified constitution contrasts with the 
rather rigid Spanish Constitution. In addition, while decentralisation in Spain was rolled out 
to eventually create 17 ACs, this is not the case in the UK in which the largest nation, 
England, has no sub-state executive or legislature. Devolution affects only 15% of the UK’s 
population. There are also differences in the nationalist and pro-independence movements 
active within those sub-state units which demand recognition as separate political 
communities. Both Scotland and Catalonia are the most active and well-known 
independence movements in the world today, but while the independence issue has been 
around in Scotland for several decades, albeit in various guises, the Catalan nationalist 
movements’ support for independence is a recent conversion. In this regard, another notable 
difference between both cases is the willingness of the UK government to work with the 
Scottish government to facilitate the holding of a referendum compared with the complete 
refusal of the Spanish government to engage with the issue. The abovementioned similarities 
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thus render comparison between the two cases a credible task, but an examination of the 
differences and thus the diverging outcomes in the cases as relates to the management of 
demands for future autonomy and independence also make the case for comparison an 
interesting endeavour.  
 
1.3.2 Research Approach and Methods 
Examining the evolution of territorial politics, more specifically the dynamics of 
continuity and change in federal political systems, relies on several approaches including 
historical institutionalism (see Broschek 2008) and process tracing (see Falleti 2008). This 
thesis is a small N comparative study, which as well as drawing upon within-case analysis 
of case studies and a comparative approach, also uses historical institutionalism and process 
tracing to track and analyse the historical processes at work in Spain and the UK vis-à-vis 
the development of autonomy arrangements and evolution of these states’ territorial 
trajectories. Historical institutionalism is an approach primarily rooted in political science 
which, ‘focuses on how institutions…structure action and outcomes’ (Schmidt, 2010: 10). 
The development of institutions and territorial trajectories does not occur within a political 
vacuum, thus not only is an understanding of history essential, but so too is awareness that 
actors and institutions are mutually related (Lecours 2005). As Steinmo (2008: 127) attests, 
‘behaviour, attitudes and strategic choices take place inside particular social, political, 
economic and even cultural contexts’. Actors, then, are agents with the power to guide the 
direction of political systems, albeit ‘they are students of political history whose ideas and 
attitudes are products of their own past experiences and their own interpretation of events’ 
(Convery, 2016: 7).  
 Historical institutionalism is used in this thesis to identify critical junctures and long-
term processes as relates to the evolution of territorial politics in the UK and Spain. Critical 
junctures refer to major transitions in institutional contexts that shape future politics and 
policy formation (Collier and Collier, 1991: 27). For Pierson and Skocpol (2002: 693), 
historical institutionalism is an indispensable approach for the identification of critical 
junctures while simultaneously highlighting the ‘overarching contexts and interacting 
processes that shape and reshape states, politics, and public policymaking’. In order to better 
understand the historical dimensions of territorial politics in the UK and Spain, as well as 
what this will mean for these states’ future territorial trajectories, the historical 
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institutionalist approach draws upon a combination of single and comparative case studies 
and process tracing.   
At the core of this study is a comparison between two cases. This thesis thus employs 
a small N study comparative study using within-case analysis and methods particularly 
suited to this type of analysis, namely process tracing (George and Bennett 2005).  Gerring 
(2004: 342), defines a case study as ‘an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of 
understanding a larger class of (similar) units’ in which the term unit represents a spatially 
confined phenomenon, such as a state or sub-state territory. Case study research is a central 
component of social science inquiry, which facilitates the investigation of contemporary 
phenomena in the real-world context (Yin, 2014: 16-17). George and Bennett (2005: 19) 
identify several benefits to case study design, including high levels of conceptual validity, 
the identification of causal mechanisms, the ability to capture complex phenomena 
succinctly and the incorporation of a multiplicity of perspectives in a holistic manner.  
This thesis is predicated on a ‘structured, focused comparison’ method of analysis in 
which the researcher asks the same questions in each of the cases that are being compared 
(George and Bennett, 2005: 69). As discussed by George and Bennett (ibid), this method of 
analysis borrows from both statistical and case study methods. From the latter, it borrows 
the practice of asking several general questions for each case that is ‘carefully developed to 
reflect the research objective and theoretical focus of the inquiry’ (ibid: 69). At the same 
time, the single case-study approach lends to it the process of elaborating the historical detail 
of the case under study: ‘the method is “focused” in that it only deals with certain aspects of 
the historical cases examined’ (ibid: 67). 
Chapters Four and Five adopt a single case-study approach, while Chapter Six 
represents a comparative design, in which the different autonomy strategies of the UK and 
Spanish states, the limitations of these autonomy models and what could be done to 
overcome identified shortcomings, are compared. The use of single case study and 
comparative methods not only enables the collection of rich and in-depth data, but also better 
facilitates a proper understanding of the context of the cases under study. This is particularly 
important in this study given the necessity of comparing strategies and institutions, which 
do not occur in a political vacuum. A thorough and detailed knowledge of both the historical 
and contemporary context of each case is thus essential and better achieved by the level of 
description provided for by a case study approach.  
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The use of a case study and comparative case study approach thus provides this thesis 
with the richness and thick description offered by these methods, although this does not 
counter one of the oft-cited limitations of case study designs, that of limited probabilistic 
generalisation. However, as discussed by Gerring (2007: 248), limited generalisation does 
not entail no generalisation, particularly if the case shares some similarities with a larger 
population of cases. In this regard, case studies not only contribute to theory building, as is 
the case in this thesis vis-à-vis the theory of multinational federalism, but can potentially 
possess significant external validity rendering findings applicable to other cases. This will 
be further developed in the Conclusion to this thesis when mapping out the implications of 
the study for other cases and avenues for further research.  
Process tracing is used to trace the evolution of the strategies employed by successive 
Spanish and UK governments with regards to the establishment and implementation of 
autonomy regimes. In recent years, process tracing has become an increasingly popular tool 
in political science, capable of empirically demonstrating the causal mechanisms influencing 
certain observed outcomes (George and Bennett 2005). Vennesson (2008: 224) defines 
process tracing as ‘a research procedure intended to explore the processes by which initial 
conditions are translated into outcomes.’ Process tracing is thus a powerful and flexible 
analytical tool that allows for the identification of intervening causal processes and enables 
a systematic analysis of the political and social phenomena under study.  
 
1.3.3 Methods of Data Collection  
This section discusses the principal methods used for data collection: interviews and 
document analysis. It provides a brief overview of the choice of these research methods but 
will not discuss in detail how I carried out the data analysis; this will follow in the next 
section. For King, Keohane and Verba (1994: 46) data collection, ‘refer[s] to a wide range 
of methods, including observation, participant observation, intense interviews, large scale 
sample surveys, history recorded from secondary sources, randomised experiments, 
ethnography, content analysis and any other method of collecting reliable evidence.’ Data 
for the analysis in this thesis is based on a multiplicity of primary and secondary sources, 
including elite interviews, party political publications and academic scholarship. The use of 
more than one data collection approach is considered important to corroborate the findings 
of the thesis, thus further substantiating the validity of the study (Eisner, 1991: 110). This 
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triangulation is achieved through combining insights from the academic literature and elite 
interviews with analysis of documents, which not only eschews a unidimensional approach 
to data analysis, but further adds depth to the research per se (Mason 2002). I draw upon the 
secondary literature by historians and political scientists to provide the historical background 
to the case studies as well as examine the evolution of nationalist mobilisation in Scotland 
and Catalonia, the rise of the independence movements in these territories and how the UK 
and Spanish governments have sought to manage these challenges through autonomy 
arrangements.  
Interviews have increasingly gained traction as a prominent tool for data collection in 
qualitative research (Rubin and Rubin 2005), particularly in political science (Mosley 2013). 
In this thesis, I conducted semi-structured elite interviews with politicians and political party 
representatives in the UK and Spain.8 I consider the use of these in-depth interviews a 
valuable method in contributing to original knowledge as it enables the collation of different 
perspectives from ideologically distinct political parties with diverging and in some cases 
opposing constitutional visions. The data collected from interviews helps to deepen existing 
knowledge and research on accommodation strategies as well as contributes to further 
elaborating on theoretical approaches to the topic.  
The use of elite interviews is an effective method, particularly when combined with 
process tracing, which enables researchers to garner fine-grained, reliable and valid data to 
follow in detail the factors (such as actions or decisions) that constitute events (Tansey 
2007). In the words of Beamer (2002: 86), ‘elite interviews offer political scientists a rich, 
cost-effective vehicle for generating unique data to investigate the complexities of policy 
and politics’. I adopted the semi-structured approach in order to facilitate an open-ended 
conversation in which participants were free to share their viewpoints and interpretations on 
the questions being asked. Semi-structured interviews are usually the favoured approach in 
elite interviews as they maximise the validity of responses, provide rich description to help 
inform data and context and because elites are often put off by a list of closed-ended 
questions (Harvey, 2010: 202). This semi-structured approach thus allowed interviewees to 
talk freely about specific topics, albeit I guided these conversations using a list of questions 
and themes to ensure that the main topics I wanted to cover were discussed. In this regard, 
interviews were also tailored to each participant’s profile, such as expertise on certain topics 
                                                 
8 The profiles of interviewees will be discussed in the next section. 
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or in some cases, questions related to information the interviewee had previously said or 
written in published documents. Given that interviews were used to gain information related 
to the particular perceptions of parliamentarians and other political party representatives of 
autonomy models as well as to gain unique insights into their political parties’ current and 
future approach to the topic of territorial politics, I employed purposive and snowball 
sampling techniques. I began by using a purposive sampling strategy to identify key 
interviewees in different political parties (see below). As the initial previously arranged 
interviews progressed, snowball sampling was also used as some interviewees 
recommended other potential interview partners.  
Document analysis ‘is a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents 
– both printed and electronic (computer-based and Internet-transmitted material)’ (Bowen, 
2009: 27). As a data analysis method, document analysis has long been a central component 
in qualitative research, particularly in case study approaches. It serves several important 
functions in the development of qualitative research including: providing background, 
context and supplementary data, posing additional questions for the researcher to investigate 
and as a tool to verify and corroborate the findings of a study (ibid: 29-30). In this thesis, 
document analysis serves all three functions detailed above and was also used to match what 
was said in interviews with data published in other contexts. In this vein, document analysis 
was a particularly valuable tool in the triangulation of data collected from interviews and 
the secondary literature. Documents can include an array of different sources, but in this 
thesis mainly refers to political documents, which includes manifestoes, reports, press 
releases, blog entries and articles written by different party representatives in newspapers. 
 
1.3.4 Fieldwork and Data Analysis 
The initial stages of research covered the existing scholarship associated with the UK 
and Spain. This involved reading and analysing scholarship straddling both historical and 
political disciplines related to the evolution of the nationalist movements in Scotland and 
Catalonia, the rise of independentism in both territories as well as the general development 
of territorial politics in the UK and Spain. After engaging with existing scholarship and prior 
to undertaking interviews, I started to collate other primary sources for the document 
analysis method. While I did not necessarily begin to analyse in detail these documents 
before conducting interviews, I read a number of different documents – including party 
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speeches, press releases and blog entries – which also helped with the identification of 
themes to be the subject of interviews, as well as specific people whom I would be interested 
in interviewing.  
All interviewees in Catalonia and Scotland were contacted via email. Given my 
interest and previous knowledge of the topic, I had already compiled a list of potential names 
that I would like to interview for the thesis. The advice and suggestions of other academic 
colleagues was also used as well as names I came across from my initial reading of primary 
documents. I sought to interview candidates who are the party representative on 
constitutional issues, those parliamentarians who serve as members of committees that deal 
with the topic under study and those that have, for example, written newspaper articles or 
blog posts on the same or related topics. Although I did not consider the topic under study 
to deal with any controversial topics, the fact that interviewees are political elites in the 
public eye, I guaranteed all interviewees anonymity. I am aware that given the numerical 
differences between parties, for instance some political parties have very few seats in 
parliament, that this might lead to some interviewees being recognisable, even though names 
have not been used. This, however, was raised with all interview partners and none objected 
to being identified as a representative of the party.  
All in all, 37 interviews were conducted for this thesis (21 in Scotland and 16 in 
Catalonia). I spoke to representatives from all political parties represented in the Scottish 
and Catalan Parliaments, as well as a few representatives from the House of Commons in 
the UK and Spanish Congress and Senate. In Scotland, I also interviewed two former shadow 
Secretaries of State for Scotland. Speaking to politicians representing all parties was 
considered an important task to maintain balance and better understand the nuance of party 
political debates about constitutional and territorial politics. I managed to interview almost 
all the people I had hoped to interview but was unsuccessful in securing interviews with 
representatives from the Scotland Office or the Rajoy government in Spain. I did, however, 
have interviews with representatives of the same parties in the Scottish and Catalan 
parliaments and these interviews, which both lasted around 80 minutes, provided me with 
useful information and valuable insights into the party’s policies and priorities vis-à-vis 
autonomy, independence and territorial politics.  
I carried out 21 interviews with politicians in Scotland in February/March 2017 (see 
table one), and 16 interviews in Catalonia in April/May 2018 (see table two). Fieldwork for 
Catalonia was initially planned for November 2017 and then February 2018, but given the 
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suspension of Catalan autonomy, I postponed these trips until April 2018 when at least some 
of the dust from the political upheaval in the aftermath of the suspension of Catalan 
autonomy had settled. In Scotland, most interviewees were Members of the Scottish 
Parliament (MSPs) but also included 2 serving Members of Parliament (MPs) in 
Westminster as well as two former MPs. In Catalonia I interviewed 12 members of the 
Catalan Parliament, two members of Congress and two Senators.9  
Table One: Interviews in Scotland 
Party Number of Interviews 
Conservatives 1 
Greens 2 
Labour 6 
Liberal Democrats 2 
SNP 10 
Total 21 
 
One issue that I encountered in Catalonia, but not in Scotland, was the role of 
‘gatekeepers’ defined as ‘a person who stands between the data collector and a potential 
respondent’ (Lavrakas, 2008: 299). In Scotland, most potential interview candidates 
responded personally to their emails or had their assistants arrange a meeting with me. In 
Catalonia this was also the case for most interviewees, but in the case of Ciutadans (C’s) 
and Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), the secretaries of the parliamentary groups 
took charge of arranging these meetings.10 In the case of the latter, the secretary was very 
forthcoming in arranging several interviews (including re-scheduling a last-minute 
cancellation), but for C’s, the party secretary was insistent that I be able to interview only 
one-party representative. In the cases where only one-party representative was interviewed, 
I have sought to make more use of different party documents to bolster arguments and 
corroborate findings. 
                                                 
9 I have used the acronym MP for all interviewees except Senators. The only interviewees from the Congress 
were from PDeCAT, but, as is practice in the academic literature, I have used the same MP acronym.  
10 I switch between the Catalan Ciutadans and the Spanish Ciudadanos depending on context. 
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Table Two: Interviews in Catalonia 
Party Number of Interviews 
Catalunya en Comú- Podem 2 
Ciutadans 1 
CUP 1 
ERC 4 
JxCat 2 
PDeCAT 3 
PSC 2 
PP 1 
Total 16 
 
Interviewees were free to choose the time and location of the interviews. Most 
interviews took place in the Scottish and Catalan Parliaments, but others were conducted in 
constituency offices in various locations in Scotland and Catalonia. In both cases, I found 
most interviewees were very generous with their time, with most interviews lasting between 
30 and 90 minutes. In Catalonia, I offered interviewees a choice of three languages: English, 
Catalan and Spanish. Three interviews were conducted in English, one in Spanish and the 
remainder in Catalan. Being able to speak both Catalan and Spanish was evidently a 
significant advantage and thus increased my potential pool of interviewees, not just those 
who felt comfortable speaking in English.  
As with all research projects and particularly given my interest in the topic straddles 
both academic and personal spheres, I have sought to be reflective and critically reflect 
throughout this process of inquiry. It is important, therefore, to offer some reflections on my 
role as a researcher whilst conducting this research. I have attempted to be as objective as 
possible during my research. I am aware of the fact that my personal background and beliefs 
will have an influence on my work, but have sought to offset any potential bias and maintain 
balance through engaging with political representatives from all sides of the debate. This 
approach not only helped eschew or indeed counteract any potential bias but simultaneously 
aimed to better understand and explain the nuances of the existing and ongoing debates vis-
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à-vis autonomy arrangements in both cases. At the same time, and in line with established 
practice for conducting semi-structured interviews, I used a list of open-ended questions 
which ensured that each interviewee was responding to the same set of questions, albeit had 
enough space to explain their views in more detail as well as cover topics not included in 
my interview schedule. This was important as it not only allowed me to learn more about 
certain aspects related to the research, but provided further detail in answering the research 
questions.  
Data analysis was performed in an iterative manner, ‘meaning there is repeated 
movement back and forth between raw data (narrative text), codes, categories and plausible 
explanations that emerge’ (Suter, 2012: 351). The philosophy that undergirds an iterative 
process of data analysis facilitates a flexible approach whereby analysis is an ongoing 
process which involves going through the data several times to generate categories. At the 
same time, the iterative method was also applied to data collection whereby themes that 
emerged in interviews, as well as specific comments, were referred to in later interviews to 
elicit comments from other interviewees to develop what could potentially be an emerging 
theme. I transcribed each interview and I decided to translate all interviews conducted in 
either Catalan or Spanish into English at the point of transcription. Interviews were analysed 
and coded according to key themes and sub-themes and were ultimately matched and 
compared with other primary documents. This is a key aspect of the iterative process 
whereby I oscillated between interview data and primary and secondary sources as different 
codes and concepts emerged from analysis.  
 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of seven chapters, including an Introduction and Conclusion. 
Chapter Two discusses several concepts that underpin the study of autonomy in plurinational 
states, as well as discusses the importance of these concepts in the contexts of the UK and 
Spain, Scotland and Catalonia. This chapter looks at the oft-discussed elusive concept of 
nationalism, drawing upon historical and philosophical debates relating to states, nations 
and nation-states. In addition, this section also features an important and detailed discussion 
on the concepts of minority and majority nationalisms, their relevance for this thesis and a 
definition of ‘plurinational state’. This chapter also focuses on the typical tools employed 
by governments – whether mononational or plurinational – to deal with diversity and 
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vociferous minority groups that seek a refashioning of state structures along decentralised 
lines. In this vein, four main strategies are presented on a continuum, ranging from 
assimilation to integration, accommodation to separation. As this thesis is mostly concerned 
with the latter two strategies, I provide a detailed discussion of the different methods of 
accommodation, namely devolution and federalism. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion on secession. It examines the conceptual confusion that surrounds the term and 
discusses the working definition employed in this thesis. 
 Chapter Three presents the theoretical framework undergirding this study and situates 
the concepts discussed in Chapter Two within the theoretical debates surrounding 
accommodation strategies within plurinational states. The chapter focuses on the theory of 
liberal nationalism which seeks to reconcile democracy and nationalism through challenging 
the traditionally monist interpretation of liberalism. To complement the discussion on liberal 
nationalism, this chapter also examines the theory of multinational federalism. The 
multinational federal model represents an institutional blueprint of the liberal nationalist 
theory and seeks to put into practice many of the propositions advocated by liberal 
nationalists in order to marry the concepts of liberalism and nationalism and provide 
institutional structures that accommodate, empower and protect minorities. Multinational 
federalism is not without its flaws, thus after a discussion of these, the thesis concludes with 
examining theories of power sharing. Drawing on the literature of comparative politics and 
conflict studies, the theoretical framework seeks to further bridge these two literatures to 
develop a more holistic approach to the management of ethnonational diversity in 
plurinational contexts.  
Chapters Four and Five examine the historical, contemporary and future evolution of 
territorial politics in the UK and Spain, with sole focus on the territories of Scotland and 
Catalonia. Each chapter begins with a historical overview of territorial politics in each case 
before examining in detail the development of debates on autonomy and secession over a 
specific time frame. In Scotland this period begins with the election of the SNP and Alex 
Salmond as First Minister in 2007 until 2018, whereby the party remains in power under the 
leadership of Nicola Sturgeon. In Catalonia, the period starts a few years later in 2010 with 
the election CiU (which had been out of power since 2003) until 2018. As a result of 
disagreements over territorial and constitutional politics, CiU was dissolved in 2015, but 
Junts per Catalunya (Together for Catalonia – JxCat) one of its successor parties remains in 
government headed in Parliament by President Quim Torra. These case studies then examine 
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the merits and limits of extant autonomy arrangements, before mapping out the potential 
scenarios of the future terrain of territorial politics in both cases.  
Chapter Six is a comparative chapter which compares the development and experience 
of territorial politics in both cases. It examines the strategies employed by both states to 
manage and accommodate the autonomy and secessionist aspirations of the pro-
independence governments in Scotland and Catalonia. The chapter then draws upon several 
themes from the analysis in the preceding case studies to compare the limits of autonomy in 
both cases and how these can be offset and improved to ensure the entrenchment of a more 
coherent, accommodative and plurinationally sensitive autonomy strategy. This chapter 
concludes with a discussion on three potential scenarios for the future development of 
territorial politics in the UK and Spanish states. Interestingly, the three potential ways to 
address territorial issues in both cases are the same and straddle the broad categories of: 
recentralisation, reformulation and disintegration. This is followed by the Conclusion, which 
provides an overview of the study, illuminates the implications of the research and discusses 
the limitations of the thesis and possible avenues for further research.  
In the next chapter, I develop and define the main concepts undergirding this thesis.  
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2. Chapter Two: Conceptual Outline 
2.1 Introduction  
In recent decades it has become increasingly accepted that cultural diversity in liberal 
democratic states is a growing and permanent phenomenon. The culturally homogenous 
nation-state ideal – venerated in the past by so many liberal democracies – has been seriously 
challenged by territorially concentrated sub-state minorities, cultural groups, indigenous 
peoples and immigrants (Kymlicka 2007). This increasing political assertiveness, including 
vociferous demands for recognition, self-government and independent statehood, has led to 
important debates on minority rights and diversity management in the international arena. 
These debates have ushered in greater awareness of minority concerns, as well as a marked 
shift in official responses from states towards national minorities and cultural differences.  
This chapter outlines the main concepts underpinning this study. Before presenting the 
theoretical framework in Chapter Three, it is important to provide some conceptual 
clarification of the core terms of this thesis; namely nationalism, democracy, territorial 
autonomy and secession. The chapter begins with the phenomenon of nationalism, defining 
the key terms associated with the debate: nation, state and nation-state. Additionally, it looks 
at the development of plurinational states with particular focus on the evolution of majority 
and minority nationalisms. Secondly, the term democracy is defined. Here, I examine both 
minimalist and maximalist definitions of democracy and, important for this thesis, explore 
the relationship between democracy and diversity. The final sections of this chapter analyse 
the concepts of territorial autonomy and secession. I do not intend to exhaust all existing 
definitions related to these concepts, but seek to provide a working definition which from 
my point of view retains the most important characteristics of these terms.  
 
2.2 Nationalism  
2.2.1 Nation, State, Nation-State and Nationalism 
Nationalism has been and remains a potent force in the contemporary world. The 
voluminous literature on this multifarious phenomenon straddles the disciplines of political 
science, sociology, history, geography and anthropology. Academic contributions have not 
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only charted the influence and impact of nationalism on specific cases but have equally 
sought to define this polysemic concept, alongside the kaleidoscope of expressions 
pertaining to the topic: nation, state and nation-state.  
Theorists of nationalism have, over many years, explored, defined, detailed and 
interpreted several avenues related to the topic. Scholars, such as Benedict Anderson, Ernest 
Gellner, and Anthony Smith, have championed particular understandings of what 
nationalism entails, including their own interpretations of key terms, as well as debates 
concerning its origins. The academic literature recognises the Janus-faced nature of 
nationalism, situated between ethnic and civic conceptions (Brown 1999; Brubaker 1996; 
Smith 1991). Renan (1990) is one of the scholars most associated with this paradigmatic 
approach. His coining of the nation as ‘a daily plebiscite’, underlined the civic (French) 
nature of the nation, to be contrasted with the ethnic (German) conception, related to ‘blood’ 
and ‘soil’. Some scholars, however, acknowledge that nations are neither exclusionary civic 
nor ethnic, but in fact a hybrid of both (Brown 1999; Keating 2001).11  
Ernest Gellner distinguishes between a cultural and voluntaristic approach in his 
tentative definition of a nation. According to Gellner (1983: 7), a nation comprises people 
who ‘share the same culture’ and ‘recognise each other as belonging to the same nation’. A 
nation, then, requires a person to not only accept a shared common culture (defined as a set 
of ideas on behaviour and communication), but moreover necessitates recognition of their 
mutual belonging by other members of the nation. Nationalism is thus construed as 
‘primarily a political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be 
congruent’ (ibid: 1). For Gellner (ibid), ‘ethnic boundaries should not cut across political 
ones’ and therefore the rulers of a nation should belong to the same ethnic group as those 
being ruled.  
Benedict Anderson, akin to Gellner, shared an equally modernist approach to 
nationalism. Anderson (2006: 6), however, attached no importance to the issue of ethnicity, 
instead arguing that the nation was an ‘imagined political community’. The nation is 
imagined because most members ‘will never know most of their fellow members, meet 
them, or even hear them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion’ (ibid).  
                                                 
11 Keating (2001: 6) points out that these are two ‘ideal types’, ‘normative and value-laden’ and consequently 
must be considered in an abstract and conceptual rather than concrete manner.  
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Anthony Smith defined the nation in relation to ethnies.12 A nation is thus construed 
as ‘a named political community possessing an historical territory, shared myths and 
memories, a common public culture and common laws and customs’ (Smith, 2002: 15). 
Whereas Gellner and Anderson argue that nations are modern constructs, Smith contests that 
nations are pre-modern entities, formed around an ethnic core, rooted in historical myths, 
symbols and history. A nation is thus, ‘first and foremost a community of common descent’, 
where national identity is ascriptive rather than voluntary (Smith, 1991: 11). Smith sees 
nationalism as ‘an ideological movement’ combining elements of the cultural, political and 
social ambits (ibid: 71). 
 In his discussion on nationalism, Smith draws upon the ethnic and civic dichotomy, 
identifying ethnic nationalism as according membership based on ascriptive criteria, i.e. 
ethnic origin, and civic nationalism as based on voluntary association. At the root of civic 
nationalism is the idea that ‘people and territory belong together’ (ibid: 9). The civic nation 
is built around historic myths and symbols, with emphasis on the homeland and civil society; 
membership is open to anyone who wishes to share these values, irrespective of ethnic 
origin. Ethnic nationalism, on the other hand, narrows membership of the nation by basing 
it on genealogical descent; emphasis is placed on ethnic distinctions, common ancestry, 
historical myths, shared history and a vernacular language. There is, however, no clear-cut 
distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism insofar as all nationalisms contain varying 
degrees of ethnic and civic elements (ibid: 13). 
The nation-state is a conjunction of two separate terms, and having defined ‘nation’, I 
shall now turn to the concept of ‘state’, before concluding this discussion with an 
examination of the concept ‘nation-state’. Max Weber (1919:1) famously defined the state 
as ‘a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of 
physical force within a territory’ [italics in original]. The state therefore is conceived as a 
political entity exerting control over several ambits of the territory, particularly 
administrative institutions. According to Birch (2007: 14), a state ‘is a legal entity possessing 
sovereign independence, having unfettered control over its own territory, defining its own 
citizenship rules, and equal in international law to all other states’. States, as a result, differ 
from nations in that they are essentially political entities, whereas nations are inherently 
                                                 
12 Smith (1991: 13) defines an ethnie as ‘a named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared 
historical memories and one or more common elements of culture, including an association with a homeland 
and some degree of solidarity, at least among elites’.  
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ethnic or cultural communities.  
The amalgamation of ‘nation’ and ‘state’ results in the ‘nation-state’. The nation-state 
is an entity which combines the ethnic and civic sense of the nation with the ultimate political 
authority of the state. For Keating (2001: 27), ‘the nation-state represents a concentration of 
authority within territorial boundaries and the imposition of common values upon the 
society. Its essence is the claim to sovereignty, that is, to ultimate authority within a 
territory’. In a similar vein, Guibernau (2000: 989) underlines the power and ‘use of force’ 
imbued in the nation-state, noting that it seeks to unite all citizens in a common national 
project by means of cultural and linguistic homogenisation. The nation-state is a relatively 
modern phenomenon which emerged from the ashes of the French Revolution to replace the 
small principalities, city-states, empires and tribal communities which had been heretofore 
dominant in the European political space (Keating, 2001: 2). In the twenty first century, 
however, the nation-state model is no longer limited to (Western) Europe and has been 
exported all over the world to become the recognised ‘unit of political power, par 
excellence’ (Guibernau, 1996: 57).  
 
2.2.2 Majority and Minority Nationalisms and Plurinational Solutions 
In addition to dividing nationalism into ethnic and civic dichotomies, academic 
analysis of nationalism in different states has also identified the existence of minority and 
majority nationalisms (Gagnon et al 2011; Lecours and Nootens 2009). These nationalisms 
differ, however, in that while the latter ‘legitimise[s]/consolidate[s] the established order’ of 
the state, the former ‘challenge[s] it’ (Nootens, 2015: 38). For Lecours and Nootens (2011: 
10), majority nationalism ‘consists in the articulation of a national community that usually 
has its core within the majority group and/or within the representations of the state’s national 
identity as that group sees it (notably through the elites)’. This is manifest, they note, in a 
number of diverse ways including through ‘education systems, military service, wars, and 
colonialism; political practices, traditions, and institutions; and the use of myths and 
symbols’ (ibid: 11). Gagnon (2011: vii) develops this further, noting that ‘the protagonists 
of majority nationalism most often drape themselves in patriotic discourse to protect existing 
nation-states and to oppose all other expressions of nationalism’. Such nationalism, he 
posits, can be found in Canada, France and Spain while its minority counterpart can be 
located in sub-state territories like Scotland and Catalonia (ibid).  
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In contradistinction to national majorities, national minorities are ‘groups that formed 
functioning societies, with their own institutions, culture and language, concentrated on a 
particular territory, prior to being incorporated into a larger state’ (Kymlicka, 2001a: 72). 
Kymlicka divides national minorities into two sub-categories: stateless nations and 
indigenous peoples.13 Scotland and Catalonia, alongside other sub-state territories such as 
Flanders and Quebec, are often held up as clear, paradigmatic examples of stateless nations, 
thus it is important to provide a concrete definition. Requejo (2013: 31), in a similar vein to 
Kymlicka, defines such nations and movements as: 
Territorially concentrated collectives with a basic national identity that does not 
coincide, at least for a significant number of their members, with the national 
identity of the majority group of the polity. These collectives display 
distinguishing features, such as a different history from the rest of the state, a 
specific language, a different religious culture etc. Some of them may even have 
been independent powers in the past. They also express a will to be recognised 
as a different collective and a clear desire for self-government.  
 
Minority nationalism, much like its majority counterpart, embodies a political 
dimension. However, whereas majority nationalism is used to legitimise the state and its 
established order, minority nationalism challenges these assertions, instead propounding 
national rights including, but not limited to, demands for internal and/or external self-
determination (Seymour 2004). Akin to majority nationalisms, minority nationalisms are a 
variegated phenomenon. On the one hand, some minority groups seek only a political voice 
and representation in (autonomous) governmental institutions, firmly within the confines of 
the already established state. On the other hand, some minorities champion territorial 
independence, seeking to establish a separate, independent state. Minority nationalist 
movements of both persuasions described here can be found all over the world, from Europe 
to North America, Asia to Africa.  
Historically, minority nationalists have been characterised as bulwarks to modernism. 
Parekh (2011: 38), for instance, argues that national minorities were often the subject of 
stigmatisation, primarily by enlightened liberal thinkers who saw them as ‘backward groups, 
tribal, closed, custom-bound, anti-modern, driven by ethnic nationalism and an obstacle to 
progress’. Today, however, this is not a widely-accepted opinion. Scholars such as Kymlicka 
(1995), Keating (2001) and Requejo (2005) posit that, contrary to the view described by 
                                                 
13 The literature on minority nationalism interchanges between the terms minority nations, stateless nations, 
nations without states and peripheral nations.  
28 
 
Parekh above, modern national minority movements tend to be champions of democratic 
principles, endorsing a multidimensional identity and representing a civic nationalist 
movement, with a focus on territorial self-government as opposed to genealogical purity.  
The UK and Spain are plurinational states which have sought to accommodate and 
manage their internal ethnonational diversity through territorial autonomy.14 A plurinational 
state is taken as a state in which there is more than one national group, recognised as a 
distinct community with self-governing aspirations whose members endorse a 
multidimensional, rather than mutually exclusive, sense of identity (Keating 2001). It is 
important to distinguish a plurinational state from a multi/pluricultural one. The two differ 
in that in both there may be several cultures and/or language groups, yet in the latter such 
groups do not identify themselves as distinct national communities. Switzerland is a case in 
point. While it is a culturally and linguistically diverse country, with, for example, four 
official languages, it remains a mononational state (Dardanelli 2008).  
Scotland and Catalonia are two minority nations located within plurinational 
democratic states. Spain, however, presents some problems when defined as plurinational. 
Whilst there is extensive scholarly opinion that Spain constitutes a plurinational state, the 
Spanish Constitution itself endorses only a weak commitment to its internal pluralism. 
Article Two of the Constitution, for instance, guarantees self-government to the different 
nationalities and regions of the Spanish state, yet concomitantly declares ‘the Constitution 
is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, the common and indivisible 
homeland of all Spaniards’. In other words, there is only one recognised nation: Spain. 
The UK stands in contrast to Spain in that firstly, it has no codified constitution and 
second, there is relative ease at the recognition of the UK as a plurinational state. The UK is 
a union-state comprised of four distinct nations: Scotland, England, Wales and Northern 
Ireland (Rokkan and Urwin 1983). The variegated historical processes which led to the 
different unions between the four countries have been relatively hospitable to the 
plurinational makeup of the state, albeit tensions remain and have occasionally flared up 
                                                 
14 The term plurinational as opposed to multinational will be employed in this thesis. A plurinational 
democracy is one in which there are ‘separate national groupings’ whose members may have more than one 
national identity, identifying, for instance, with their national community (Scotland) and the state (UK) 
(Keating, 2001: 27). A multinational state is also used by authors (particularly from Canada) in lieu of 
plurinational. However, the conception of a multinational state does not necessarily recognise, at least to the 
same extent, the overlapping identities which exist with sub-state communities in plurinational states (McGarry 
and O'Leary 2009; Keating 2001; Requejo 2001). For this reason and with reference to the cases examined 
here, plurinational is deemed the most appropriate term.  
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over time. Scotland, for instance, is not only considered a nation, but a nation with a right to 
self-determination. Successive British PMs including those vehemently opposed to 
devolution, such as Margaret Thatcher and John Major, conceded a right of (external) self-
determination to the Scots. Keating (2015a: 187-188), however, qualifies this unionist 
approach to Scottish self-determination. He observes that such concessions are ‘a typical 
case of British pragmatism’ underlined by ‘a statement of rather intransigent unionism’. The 
Scots may pursue and ultimately gain territorial independence but until they do so they must 
remain under the auspices of Westminster and on dictated terms. The UK may very well be 
a plurinational state, but a plurinational culture is lacking.15 
 
2.3 Democracy 
2.3.1 Defining Democracy 
The voluminous literature on democracy is testament both to its relevance in the 
modern world as the most prevalent and celebrated form of government, as well as the 
difficulties encountered in defining exactly what democracy is. Democracy is a venerable 
concept in political science and according to W. B. Gallie (1956) is an ‘essentially contested 
concept’ imbued with several meanings. 
Democracy in its pre-modern sense is inherently associated with the participatory form 
of government practiced by the Ancient Greeks in the polis. For the Greeks, democracy was 
essentially ‘rule by the people’, exercised in small city-states (Birch, 2007: 109). The 
Greeks, however, despite exporting the idea of democracy, had very limited practical 
conception of what this form of rule entailed. Athenian democracy, for instance, was 
considered viable in only small communities, whereby communitarian values took 
precedence over individual rights and the right to vote was limited to a small minority of 
adult males.  
The archetypal democracy outlined above stands in stark contrast to modern versions 
of democratic governance. Modern democracy is rooted in the writings of political 
philosophers such as John Locke, John Stuart Mill and Jean Jacques Rousseau. These 
enlightened thinkers emphasised values such as individual rights, fundamental freedoms, 
                                                 
15 This point will be further developed in Chapter Four.   
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equality of participation and representation and separation of powers; principles which have 
over time transmuted into ‘meta-values’ for democratic rule (Requejo, 2001: 1). Most 
modern democracies are deemed ‘representative’ and/or ‘liberal’, as opposed to the direct 
democracy exercised by the Greeks (Birch, 2007: 110). As explained above, defining 
democracy has a long and, at times, convoluted history and a range of definitions, both 
minimalist and maximalist, have been expounded by numerous scholars. It is to these 
definitions we now turn.  
Lipset and Lakin (2004: 19) define democracy as: ‘an institutional arrangement in 
which all adult individuals have the power to vote, through free and fair competitive 
elections, for their chief executive and national legislature’ [emphasis added]. The authors 
offer an avowedly minimalist conception of democracy, which considers the fundamental 
ideals underpinning it to be: inclusiveness (‘all adult individuals’) and contestation (‘free 
and fair competitive elections’). In essence, the authors consider elections to be the crux of 
democratic rule, whereby adult citizens have the freedom to elect political representatives, 
hold them to account and remove them from office should they fail to deliver on their 
electoral promises. Scholars defending a minimalist conception of democracy are often 
criticised for focusing on merely one component of democratic politics – elections – and 
thus failing to encompass other fundamental political and civil liberties. Hence, other 
scholars provide a more substantive maximalist definition of democracy which shifts focus 
from the political sphere to include other non-political, yet equally essential liberties such 
as social and economic freedoms.  
Robert Dahl (1971; 1989; 2015) is one of the most prominent scholars who has defined 
democracy in maximalist terms. Dahl (1971: 9) considers democracy an ‘ideal system’, a 
hypothetical, utopian ideal yet unachieved. Instead, he employs the term ‘polyarchy’ to 
describe the imperfect real-world form of democracy. Dahl develops a maximalist 
conception of democracy through enumerating various rights and liberties which he 
considers essential for democratic rule. He (2015: 85-86) details six characteristics which 
underpin truly democratic states: 
1. Elected officials  
2. Free, fair and frequent elections 
3. Freedom of expression 
4. Access to alternative sources of information 
5. Associational autonomy 
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6. Inclusive citizenship  
These six attributes represent a substantial definition of democracy which contrasts 
with the aforementioned minimalist conception. Dahl, in a similar vein to those scholars 
advancing a minimalist definition, avers that regular competitive elections are essential in a 
democratic system. However, he attests that other components such as constitutionally 
guaranteed civil and political liberties must also be the fundamental building blocks of any 
democratic edifice. Citizens, besides having a right to vote, equally have an absolute right 
of fundamental freedoms including freedom of speech, expression and association.  
Before proceeding to the relationship between diversity and democracy, this section 
offers a brief insight into democracy in the UK and Spain. The two states are democratic 
countries, with Spain being the most recent convert to democratic rule (the transition began 
in the late 1970s). In both states, there is a firm commitment to democratic principles and 
the decentralisation projects in each country have advanced their commitment to deepening 
democracy. In Spain, the division of the state into 17 ACs, each with a regional government 
and legislature was part of the wider democratisation project pursued in the wake of the 
death of dictator, General Francisco Franco. Political decentralisation and democracy in 
Spain are thus construed as ‘mutually reinforcing’ (Colino and Hombrado, 2015: 184). The 
devolution project in the UK equally sought to broaden the scope of democratic politics, 
bringing government closer to the people and ensuring the Scots, Welsh and Northern Irish 
had representation in their own territories as well as the Westminster Parliament in London 
(Bogdanor 2001).  
 
2.3.2  Between the Majority and the Minority: Democracy and Diversity 
The modern conception of the nation-state and its subsequent acceptance as the most 
dominant form of political organisation evolved alongside the development of modern 
democracy in the aftermath of the French Revolution (Loughlin, 2011: 44). Democracy, 
thus, has come to be defined in statist terms, whereby majority communities, as opposed to 
minority nations, are the principal actors in traditional democratic theories. Kymlicka 
(2001b: 19) and Requejo (2010: 149) argue, therefore, that traditional theories of democracy 
are ill-equipped and consequently flawed when attempting to manage issues of diversity. 
Both scholars consider liberal democratic assumptions developed in the eighteenth and 
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nineteenth centuries, including the monist conception of the demos and the idea of a 
culturally neutral nation-state, as unsuitable for the ethnically and culturally plural societies 
of the twenty first century. 
Alexis de Tocqueville (1969 [1835]) in his analysis of American democracy 
illuminated what he considered an inherent danger in democratic systems: ‘the tyranny of 
the majority’. Minority factions, it was noted, could easily be outvoted, yet a majority faction 
in possession of unbridled power posed a perennial threat to democratic society, able to 
dominate the political process and impose its opinion on minority communities. The 
problem was summed up years earlier by James Madison (1961 [1787]: 323) who wrote, ‘it 
is of great importance in a republic not only to guard a society against the oppression of its 
rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of another part.’ 
Tocqueville, considering his concern for minority rights, argued that while majority 
rule may be the essence of democratic governance, minority rights must equally be 
safeguarded from infringement by a majority faction. To achieve a balance between majority 
rule and minority protection, Tocqueville, emulating Madisonian principles, advocated the 
legal entrenchment of minority rights. In the twenty first century, minority rights are legally 
ensconced in the realms of domestic and international law insofar as the protection of 
minority rights is considered ‘the telos of modern constitutionalism’ (Sisk, 1996: 67). 
A vigorous re-examination of accommodative principles in democratic states has 
ensued as a result of increasing awareness of ethnonational diversity and the importance of 
accommodating and recognising this. This involves not only a tacit acceptance of cultural 
and ethnic diversity, but an explicit commitment to respect, celebrate and protect the basic 
rights of minority groups. Within the academic literature there is an ongoing debate about 
the relationship between democracy and diversity, with scholars on both sides of the debate 
able to produce ample empirical evidence to strengthen their claims. As McGarry and 
O’Leary (2015: 15) note, ‘for every Switzerland, Canada, Belgium and India, there is at least 
one Austro-Hungary, Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Pakistan.’   
John Stuart Mill (1958 [1859]: 230), famously contended that a single national identity 
was necessary for democratic governance to take root.16 He argued that diversity inhibits 
processes of democratisation in ethnically diverse societies and thus democratic stability can 
only function in relatively homogenous societies. Other scholars, however, have taken 
                                                 
16 See also Barro 1999; Jensen and Skaaning 2012; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972.  
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exception at this received wisdom. They posit that while pluriethnic and plurinational 
societies may entail and engender more challenges, and thereby render the development and 
consolidation of democracy more difficult, diversity does not prevent democratic principles 
from taking root. Fish and Brooks (2004) and Fish and Kroenig (2006), for instance, show 
that ethnic heterogeneity does not necessarily destabilise democracy. Fish and Kroenig 
(ibid) posit that while ethnic heterogeneity is a challenge, the assumption that diversity 
imperils democratisation or the achievement of peace does not hold true.17  
From the inception of democratic rule in Greece, democracy has been a permanently 
evolving project. In the context of the twenty first century, globalisation and increasing 
societal heterogeneity have necessitated changes to traditional democratic ideals. As Keating 
(2001: 166) notes, ‘there are new political spaces beyond the state, whether above, below or 
alongside, and these are the loci of new democratising pressures’. The increasing presence 
of ‘new’ political voices demanding recognition and accommodation within liberal 
democratic frameworks has brought democratic ideals under the scholarly microscope and 
has resulted in the distinction between two forms of liberalism: liberalism I and liberalism 
II. The former is concerned with traditional democratic assumptions and basic freedoms, 
while the latter champions collective rights (in addition to individual rights) and promotes 
recognition, respect and the accommodation of minority groups (see Taylor 1994; Walzer 
1994).18 
Liberal democratic theories, in view of their conservative roots, have tended to 
disdainfully dismiss claims from minority nations for increased autonomy or secession. 
Some accuse minority nationalists of promoting policies antithetical to democratic ideas. 
Horowitz (2003), for instance, condemns minority nationalists as seeking to create a new 
state in which other minorities would be oppressed. Kymlicka (2001b) and Requejo (2011a), 
however, challenge this notion. Kymlicka (2001b: 18) argues that while national minorities 
may advocate secession from an already established democracy, they tend do so within a 
democratic framework, seeking to create a new state committed to modern democratic 
principles. This line of argumentation is furthered by Requejo (2011a: 14), who posits that 
the real problem vis-à-vis illiberal notions is not national minorities, but states and majority 
communities, which in true Jacobin fashion unfairly treat national minorities and try to 
inhibit their self-determination aspirations.  
                                                 
17 See also Bunce 2005; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hoeffler 2012.  
18 This will be further developed in Chapter Three. 
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Not all minority nationalist movements are secessionist, and state governments, in an 
attempt to prevent autonomist movements pursuing this more radical alternative, utilise 
different measure of autonomy as a mechanism to prevent territorial breakup.19 Territorial 
autonomy, nonetheless, whilst it is instituted to meet national minority demands and/or abate 
secessionists, equally enhances democratic legitimacy. For instance, it involves the diffusion 
of power from the central government to sub-state components, thus providing ‘an excellent 
check on central despotism’ (McGarry and O’Leary, 2015: 38). In addition, through moving 
government closer to the people, autonomy arrangements widen the possibility for 
participation, ensuring that all members of society, whether belonging to the majority or a 
minority community, can effectively participate (Smith, 2014: 17). Furthermore, territorial 
autonomy overtly challenges majoritarian assumptions because it recognises the existence 
of several demoi within the state (Requejo and Caminal, 2011: 5). Territorial autonomy then, 
not only has the ability to placate secessionists, but moreover is construed as an instrument 
of democratic reform.  
In sum, understandings of democracy have shifted from a strong focus on 
majoritarianism to an overt concern with minority rights and pluralism, to the extent that 
‘for a regime to be considered democratic today, it also must protect the rights of individuals 
and minorities’ (Plattner, 2010: 84). Nonetheless, according to Requejo (2011b), the 
conceptual and normative ‘timbers’ of modern democracies are ‘still too straight’: 
democratic states have yet to embrace a suitable model of governance to adequately 
accommodate the range of identities, ethnicities and cultures which may exist within a 
polity. States have made progress in dealing with the new agenda of issues introduced by 
national pluralism, but a mismatch remains between democratic ideals and institutional 
realities. Much work remains to be done.  
 
2.4 Managing Diversity 
In terms of identity, language, culture and religion, almost all states in the world today 
are considered ethnically and culturally diverse. Governments have, in response to such 
diversity, developed numerous strategies to temper this unprecedented challenge, ranging 
from draconian and undemocratic measures – genocide, ethnic cleansing and coercive 
                                                 
19 A detailed discussion on territorial autonomy and secession will follow. 
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assimilation – to more liberal, integrative and accommodative public policies, including 
territorial autonomy and consociationalism. Whereas accommodative repertories accord 
respect and recognition to cultural differences, albeit in different ways, those that eliminate 
diversity seek to reinforce a homogenous ethnic identity (McGarry et al, 2008: 42). Figure 
one lays out responses to managing diversity on a continuum, from assimilation (where 
homogeneity is prioritised), to secession, where a particular part of a state secedes to form a 
separate, sovereign, independent state.20 
 
Figure One: State Responses to Diversity 
 
  Assimilation      Integration     Accommodation            Secession 
 
Source: Own elaboration, based on McGarry et al, 2008: 41-91.   
 
The history of most modern states, democratic or otherwise, is peppered with 
systematic attempts by governments to eliminate national diversity and foster a culturally 
homogenous ideal: a mononational state in which all citizens share a singular national 
identity, speak the same language and participate in the common public institutions of the 
state. As discussed in the previous section, liberal theorists have traditionally venerated the 
homogenous nation-state ideal, often in the name of political stability and modernisation. 
John Stuart Mill, for instance, considered minority groups as bulwarks to modernisation and 
vehemently argued in favour of their absorption into the dominant majority. In the words of 
Mill (2010 [1861]: 300): 
Nobody can suppose that it is not more beneficial to a Breton, or a Basque of 
French Navarre, to be brought into the current ideas and feelings of a highly 
civilised and cultivated people to be a member of the French nationality, admitted 
on equal terms to all the privileges of French citizenship, sharing the advantages 
of French protection, and the dignity and prestige of French power  than to sulk 
on his own rocks, the half-savage relic of past times, revolving in his own little 
mental orbit, without participation or interest in the general movement of the 
world. The same remark applies to Welshman or the Scottish Highlander as 
members of the British nation. 
 
                                                 
20 The primary strategies examined in this chapter are non-violent responses by states. For this reason, genocide 
and ethnic cleansing are not featured on the continuum in figure one.  
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Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the predominant idea that both 
state and nation should coincide resulted in intense inimicality towards sub-state collectives 
seeking status as a ‘nation’. Genocide and ethnic cleansing, universally recognised as the 
most brutal methods in eliminating diversity, have been carried out by states uncomfortable 
with their heterogeneous makeup (O’Leary 2011). In addition, liberal governments, overt in 
their aim of rejecting diversity and eradicating difference, have sought to impose uniformity 
on the state as a whole (Caminal, 2011: 240). In recent years, however, governments have 
opted for other coercive yet less violent methods, such as forced cultural, religious and 
linguistic assimilation. Modern history, as a result, is replete with examples of state-
sponsored programmes adopted to erode competing senses of nationhood and assimilate 
minority groups into the dominant majority (Kymlicka, 2007: 20).  
Nowadays, however, conventional wisdom dictates that coercive assimilation is 
unjust, illiberal and ineffective. Instead, liberal and democratic diversity management tools, 
such as territorial autonomy, are considered more humane and efficient in dealing with 
minority demands, while at the same time ensuring the political stability and territorial 
integrity of existing states (Keil and Anderson 2018). Discussions on the management of 
diversity have become part of the wider academic, political, social and legal debate on 
minority rights, and minorities – be they national, linguistic, cultural or religious – are 
afforded protection at both international and national levels, including the United Nations 
(UN), Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and Council of Europe. 
 
2.4.1 Assimilation and Integration 
This thesis is primarily concerned with accommodation and secession strategies, but 
before delving into what these repertoires entail, this section provides a short discussion on 
the other strategies displayed in figure one, assimilation and integration.  
Assimilation is one of the least tolerant responses a government may employ in dealing 
with its internal pluralism. The principal objective of assimilation is to efface cultural 
differences between different groups, whereby a minority group is encouraged (or forced) 
to relinquish its cultural identity in return for assimilating into the dominant culture (Gordon 
1964). This can happen in two ways: the fusion method, whereby two or more communities 
merge together to create a new culture or through acculturation, which involves one 
minority group adopting the prevailing culture of an existing community (McGarry et al, 
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2008: 42). 
Forced assimilation has come to be predominantly considered unjust and ineffective 
in that rather than achieving cultural homogenisation, it breeds contention, provokes 
destabilisation, heightens ethnic identities and encourages secession (ibid). In the twenty 
first century, some states continue to engage in assimilationist policies. Neither Spain nor 
the UK endorse assimilation policies vis-à-vis the national minorities in their states, but 
assimilationist practices related to religion in the case of the UK and language in Spain are 
features of the chequered tapestries of UK and Spanish history. In the UK this relates to the 
discrimination and assimilation of Roman Catholics in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries (McGarry and O’Leary 1993), while in the case of Spain refers to the unbending 
and repressive policies of the Franco dictatorship, particularly towards Catalonia 
(Hargreaves, 2000: 28).  
Integrationists, according to McGarry et al (2008: 41), ‘promote a single public 
identity conterminous with the state’s territory’. Integration therefore, akin to assimilation, 
seeks to engender a homogenous identity in the public sphere, but in contradistinction to 
assimilationist practices does not advocate the eradication of cultural differences. These 
differences, however, are to be limited to the private realm. Group identities, save the 
principal public identity of the state, are not recognised by public institutions (O’Leary, 
2013: 17). There are different processes of integration as well as different attitudes towards 
integrationist policies. Kymlicka (1995: 36), for example, considers integration an 
appropriate policy for voluntary migrants (those who choose to move countries) because it 
eases their learning of the language and the adoption of the cultural values of the state. 
Integrationist policies, however, are considered inappropriate and inadequate for sub-state 
minorities which strive to maintain their cultural and political autonomy. 
In spite of the popularity and adoption of integrationist approaches amongst liberal 
democracies, however, it is not without its problems (McGarry et al 2008). Integrationist 
policies may appear fairer and more democratic than the assimilationist approach, yet it is 
important to note that whilst this may be true, integration still involves a partial assimilation 
of minorities. Minorities are free to participate in public life and to share in the collective 
culture, traditions and identity of the state, but pluralism is only accepted insofar that it 
remains private. As Parekh (1998: 8) notes, this model of integration combines ‘a 
monocultural public realm with a multicultural private realm’, whereby diversity is only 
tolerated provided that it remains behind closed doors. This means, therefore, that the official 
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culture of the state is institutionalised and thus imbued with more value, power and prestige 
than minority cultures practiced in the private realm which become marginal, peripheral and 
consigned to remain in the shadow of the dominant culture. Integrationist policies may not 
seek to eradicate diversity, but in the same vein as assimilation projects, they advocate a 
mononational agenda where only one culture and one identity exist in the public realm; 
uniformity is prized over diversity.  
 
2.4.2 Accommodation 
Assimilation seeks to achieve an ethnically homogenous state and integration, despite 
allowing the existence of diverse cultural practices in the private sphere, values uniformity 
in the public realm. Accommodation, on the other hand, differs from both these approaches 
insofar as it permits diversity in both the public and private spheres. This section, therefore, 
examines the different strategies under the accommodation heading employed by 
governments to manage diversity in pluriethnic, plurinational and/or plurilingual states (see 
figure two). In line with this, I begin with a discussion related to the concepts of territorial 
and non-territorial autonomy, before focusing on the concepts of federalism and political 
decentralisation.  
Accommodation involves the adoption of some form of autonomy which ensures the 
transfer of certain powers from a central authority to lower level entities (Wolff and Weller, 
2005: 11). Such autonomous measures, ranging from federalism to quasi-federalism, 
political decentralisation to non-territorial autonomy, stand out from assimilationist and 
integrationist measures in that they are designed to address the needs and aspirations of both 
minority and majority communities (Hannum, 2004: 395). In essence, accommodation 
provides ‘limited self-rule’ for minority communities (Lapidoth, 1997: 3) whilst 
concomitantly satisfying the majority community’s preoccupations vis-à-vis secession and 
political stability (Benedikter, 2009: 10).  
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      Figure Two: Forms of Accommodation 
 
Source: Own elaboration, based on Lapidoth 1997 and Tkacik 2008.  
 
Before discussing the different terms as relates to mechanisms of accommodation, it 
is worthwhile underlining what autonomy means. Lapidoth (1997: 3) defines autonomy as 
‘a means for diffusion of powers in order to preserve the unity of a state while respecting 
the diversity of its population’. In a similar vein, Ghai (2000b: 8) writes that autonomy is 
‘[a] device to allow ethnic or other groups claiming a distinct identity to exercise control 
over affairs of special concern to them, while allowing the larger entity those powers which 
cover common interest’. Autonomy, therefore, grants national minorities powers of internal 
self-determination to develop the economic, social, cultural and political spheres of their 
communities. Institutional representation and control over certain public policies, however, 
remain within the framework of the existing state, where the state government continues to 
legislate on non-devolved matters (Hannum 1996; Heintze 1998).  
There is broad agreement in the academic literature that one of the strengths of 
autonomy, both as a concept and a strategy, is its flexibility (Hannum 2004; Keating and 
Gagnon 2012; Suksi 1998; Tkacik 2008). Autonomy, then, is taken to be a ‘multifaceted, 
polyvalent concept’ (Basta and Simeon, 2015: 320) and ‘an encompassing category without 
a rigid definition’ (Keating and Gagnon, 2012: 2). In this thesis, autonomy is construed as 
an overarching framework within which territorial autonomy and non-territorial autonomy 
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are core components.  
The academic literature distinguishes between both territorial autonomy and its non-
territorial alternative (Basta et al 2015; Lapidoth 1997; Malloy and Palermo 2015; Nimni 
2008; Suksi 1998; Tkacik 2008; Wolff and Weller 2005). It is worth noting, however, that 
while, as is the case in this thesis, these terms are often examined separately – important 
here for the sake of terminological clarification – it is not uncommon for states to employ 
both territorial and non-territorial autonomy to manage ethnonational diversity. Belgium, 
for instance, is a case in point (see Dalle Mulle 2015).  
Territorial autonomy has become increasingly viewed as an umbrella term to refer to 
the spectrum of mechanisms which liberal democracies can employ to accommodate 
territorially concentrated minorities. Federalism and political decentralisation – institutional 
strategies employed to accommodate minorities and deter secession – can be found in a 
whole range of liberal democracies, including, inter alia, Canada, Belgium, Italy, Spain and 
the UK (Bauböck, 2001: 19). With regards to the semantic properties of the term, the 
territorial aspect refers to the geographical condition that a minority group seeking some 
form of territorial autonomy inhabits a delineated area of the state in question. Autonomy 
denotes the desire for independent decision making in certain policy spheres. Territorial 
autonomy, then, involves a transfer of power to the sub-state level whereby a minority group 
constitutes a majority in a specific territorial region.  
Non-territorial autonomy, as the titles suggests, does not require the territorial 
concentration of a minority group. Political powers, typically over cultural and functional 
affairs, are devolved to minority groups which reside within the parameters of a given 
territory, but do not necessarily constitute a majority in any specific area. Non-territorial 
autonomy bestows collective rights upon members affiliated with a particular cultural group 
irrespective of their place of residence in the territory. This group is in turn viewed as a 
‘single public body’ empowered to exercise control over devolved competences for those 
inhabitants of the territory who identify with that group (Nimni, 2008: 11). Non-territorial 
autonomy, in contrast to its territorial counterpart, does not endow dispersed minorities with 
far-reaching autonomous powers.  
Nimni (2013: 1) defines non-territorial autonomy as ‘a generic term that refers to 
diverse practices and theories of minority community empowerment and self-determination 
that does not entail exclusive control over territory.’ In contrast to territorial strategies, 
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which apply to all inhabitants of a territory regardless of their ethnic or cultural affiliation, 
non-territorial autonomy appertains only to those members identifying with a specific 
minority group irrespective of where they reside within the region or country. 
In the academic literature, non-territorial autonomy is divided into three types: 
personal, cultural and functional (Suksi 2015; Tkacik 2008). Personal autonomy is primarily 
grounded in the ‘personality principle’ whereby the collective group rights of a minority ‘are 
transferred to an individual’ (Heintze, 1998: 22). In this vein, personal autonomy is seen as 
the personal choice of an individual to choose to be recognised as a member of an ethnic, 
cultural or linguistic group and to utilise provided services, such as correspondence with 
state authorities in minority languages, in his/her engagement with society. Cultural 
autonomy, on the other hand, involves the establishment of special bodies to administer 
control over those cultural, linguistic or religious ambits which have been transferred to 
them. Finally, functional autonomy implies the transfer of legal authority over one or a few 
state functions to a minority group which becomes responsible for the self-management of 
this matter (Tkacik, 2008: 371).  
According to Lapidoth (1997: 174-175) territorial autonomy is ‘an arrangement aimed 
at granting a certain degree of self-identification to a group that differs from the majority of 
the population in the state, and yet constitutes the majority in a specific region’. Benedikter 
(2007: 42) formulates his definition of territorial autonomy by focusing on legislative 
powers, noting that territorial autonomy ‘requires the existence of a regional parliament with 
a minimum power to legislate in some basic domains as well as an independent elected 
executive which implements this legislation in the given autonomous area.’ Based on these 
conceptualisations, the working definition used in this thesis takes territorial autonomy as 
an institutional arrangement involving both a regionally elected legislature and 
government, exercising limited self-rule over a particularly defined geographical area. 
Territorial autonomy is ‘limited self-rule’ in that sub-state governments are only permitted 
to implement policies in specific policy areas. In addition, whilst territorial autonomy is 
normally demanded and thus given to a certain group which constitutes a majority in the 
‘particularly defined geographical area’, it is important to note that it applies to all 
inhabitants of the territory regardless of their identification with the group on whose behalf 
the arrangements were implemented. 
A pantheon of scholars has contributed to discussions on territorial autonomy and the 
numerous institutional mechanisms it embraces. Most of these discussions have focused on 
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federalism, but a growing literary industry has emerged related to political decentralisation, 
with particular emphasis on devolution. The range of scholarly contributions will be 
examined in further detail below, but here it is worthwhile drawing attention to the works of 
Ronald Watts (1998; 2008), particularly his discussion of ‘federal political systems’. Watts 
(2008: 8) describes ‘federal political systems’ as: 
A broad category of political systems in which…there are two (or more) levels 
of government thus combining elements of shared-rule (collaborative 
partnership) through a common government and regional self-rule (constituent 
unit autonomy) for the governments of constituent units. This broad genus 
encompasses a whole spectrum of more specific non-unitary forms, i.e. species 
ranging from “quasi-federations” and “federations” to “confederacies” and 
beyond. As in a spectrum, the categories are not sharply delineated but shade into 
one another at the margins. 
 
For Watts, ‘federal political systems’ is a necessary term to be differentiated from 
‘federalism’ and ‘federation’ in order to illuminate the increasing number of hybrid polities 
which fail to comfortably fit within established categories such as ‘unitary state’, 
‘federation’ or ‘confederation’.21  
Minority groups demand self-government for a variety of reasons, primarily to have 
their sense of difference recognised and institutionally enshrined, protect them from unjust 
assimilation, and to provide them with legal and institutional apparatus to make policy in 
those fields which are devolved (Rothchild and Hartzell, 1999: 259). It is worth bearing in 
mind, however, that while state governments may employ rhetoric and institutional 
measures to demonstrate their commitment to meeting minority demands, such mechanisms 
are simultaneously used to encumber national minorities. In adopting territorial autonomy, 
central governments not only attempt to placate minorities and deal with the ‘problematic 
periphery’, but furthermore seek to maintain their own dominance and protect the stability 
and integrity of the state (Kraus, 2015: 85).  
As figure two shows, governments seeking to accommodate national minorities and 
avoid territorial breakup have different institutional strategies to do so and a growing 
constituency has developed in favour of flexible and fluid forms of territorial governance. 
Having defined territorial autonomy, as well as identifying some of its principal rationales, 
I now continue with a detailed discussion of two of its main forms: federalism and political 
                                                 
21 In this thesis, Watts’ ‘federal political systems’ is considered synonymous with territorial autonomy, but 
detailed discussion will be limited to those categories relevant to the selected case studies, i.e. federalism and 
devolution.  
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decentralisation.  
 
2.4.2.1 Federalism and Federation 
There seems to be general consensus amongst political scientists that defining 
federalism is no mean feat. According to Henig (2006: 4), despite the outpouring of 
academic work on conceptualising federalism, there remains ‘no universally accepted 
definition’. This is further substantiated by Burgess (2006: 1) who points out that, ‘while 
such a thing as federal theory does exist, there is, as yet, no fully-fledged theory of 
federalism’ (see also Palermo 2018). Davis (1978: 3) identified the Latin root of federalism 
as foedus taken to mean, inter alia, ‘covenant’, which is also lexicographically connected to 
the term fides, translated as ‘faith’ and ‘trust’.22 Federalism has thus come to represent 
different forms of human association, combining ‘union’ and ‘autonomy’, underlined by 
principles such as cooperation, consent, partnership, mutual recognition and respect 
(Burgess, 2006: 113).  
One of the most important conceptual discussions which has featured in the scholarly 
literature is between the terms ‘federalism’ and ‘federation’, a debate most widely associated 
in its early stages by Preston King (1982) and in later years by Watts (1998; 2008) and 
Burgess (2006). King (1982: 74) argued that federalism was to be taken ‘philosophically or 
ideologically rather than institutionally’ and discussed federalism as a normative and 
philosophical notion of envisioning shared rule and regional autonomy. For King, (and 
hence Burgess and Watts) federalism represents a normative idea with a set of guiding 
principles to accommodate unity and diversity, thus ‘perpetuating both union and non-
centralisation at the same time’ (Watts, 2008: 8). Federation, in turn, is considered ‘a 
tangible institutional reality’ (Burgess, 2006: 285), where a combination of self-rule and 
shared rule ensures the accommodation and participation of both central and sub-state elites 
(see also Elazar 1987). Watts (2008: 8) defines a federation as:  
[A] compound polity combining constituent units and a general government, 
each possessing powers delegated to it by the people through a constitution, each 
empowered to deal directly with the citizens in the exercise of a significant 
portion of its legislative, administrative, and taxing powers, and each directly 
elected by its citizens. 
                                                 
22 Burgess (2000: 13) acknowledges that foedus means covenant, but may also be interpreted as ‘agreement’, 
‘bargain’, ‘compact’ and ‘contract’.  
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King’s discussion of federalism and federation remained at an abstract level, yet 
comparative analysis by both Burgess and Watts has helped to develop and enrich its 
empirical relevance. This triumvirate of scholars, in light of King’s (1982: 76) oft-quoted 
dictum that ‘although there may be federalism without federation, there can be no federation 
without some matching variety of federalism’, has illuminated and developed the normative 
and empirical nuances concerning federalism and federation as distinct, separate concepts. 
Federalism and federation, therefore, are interpreted as two sides of the same coin; 
federalism may exist without a federation, but there can be no true federation without the 
guiding principles of federalism. Indeed, this is a particularly important point when 
discussing the UK and Spain – classic cases of decentralised states with federal traits without 
a clear commitment to federalism.  
Daniel Elazar stands alongside figures such as Burgess, King and Watts, as a leading 
authority of intellectual importance in federal debates. In line with the etymological origins 
of federalism, Elazar purported federalism as a covenant based on a contractual relationship 
between the central government and its sub-state units, summed up in his well-known 
epigram ‘self-rule plus shared rule’ (Elazar, 1987: 12 [italics in original]). For Elazar, 
federalism necessitates autonomous infrastructures for sub-state units, but equally requires 
a unifying project to which all constituent components of the state can contribute. In so 
doing, diversity is both managed and respected, whilst power is ‘non-centralised’, that is, 
distributed among different national and sub-state centres (ibid: 34). In Spain and the UK, 
there is a strong emphasis on the ‘self-rule’ aspect depicted by Elazar, yet this has been 
developed at the expense of shared rule. As will be further developed in Chapters Four and 
Five, these states have built out but failed to build in.  
As discussed supra, neither the UK nor Spain are fully-fledged federations. In the case 
of the former, the decentralisation project initiated in the late 1990s took the UK down a 
federal path, but the absence of shared rule has inhibited any moves towards federation. In 
Spain, on the other hand, there is ongoing debate concerning whether the polity constitutes 
a federation (Requejo 2017; Sala 2014).23 The evolutionary nature of federalism, as 
identified in the UK and Spain, resonates with Carl Friedrich’s innovative, yet often 
overlooked, conception of federalism as a dynamic process as opposed to a political system 
frozen in time. For Friedrich (1968: 7), ‘federalism should not be seen only as a static pattern 
                                                 
23 This will be further developed in Chapter Five.  
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of design, characterised by a particular and precisely fixed division of powers between 
governmental levels’. Instead, he construed federalism as an evolving pattern, a flexible 
institutional approach in constant motion, able to evolve and adapt to shifting circumstances 
within the federation (Friedrich, 1963: 591). 
 Friedrich’s fluid conception of federalism, like all federal theories, is not without its 
conceptual pitfalls (see Burgess, 2012a: Ch 5). Yet, despite being oft-consigned to the 
theoretical wilderness, Friedrich’s understanding of federalism as a process merits further 
analysis in light of federal political systems, like Spain and the UK as well as other emergent 
federations which empirically support his federalisation theory, such as, Bosnia. In both 
Spain and the UK there is an identifiable form of creeping federalisation, thus Friedrich’s 
conception of federalism proves pertinent for this study.  
The conceptualisation of federalism and federation is, like the development of 
territorial autonomy itself, an ongoing process. Despite conceptual differentiation, however, 
it is possible to identify characteristics which underpin federations, in both classical 
examples (such as the USA, Germany and Switzerland) and other plurinational federations 
(Canada and Belgium). In essence, a federation is a state divided into regional polities where 
sovereignty is divided between both central and regional levels of government. Regional 
units are generally symmetrical in status and power with both autonomous and shared 
competences entrenched in a written constitution.24 Moreover, there is some form of 
intergovernmental relationship between the different levels of government, typically in the 
form of a territorially representative second chamber. Federations are thus a form of 
territorial governance which embrace Elazar’s (1987: 2) combination of ‘self-rule plus 
shared rule’ and involve a significant redistribution of political power throughout the entire 
state. By contrast, devolution is a form of asymmetrical territorial governance applied only 
to certain units in a territory, chiefly based on the notion of self-rule with limited 
opportunities for meaningful shared rule.  
 
                                                 
24 In Canada, India and Belgium notable examples of plurinational federations, forms of asymmetrical 
federalism prevail. Watts (2008: 125-130) distinguishes between two forms of symmetry: political symmetry 
(which applies to all federations and refers to attributes such as territorial size, population and economic 
character) and constitutional asymmetry (special provisions provided for specific constituent components of 
federations). The definition referred to here in relation to Canada, India and Belgium, is the latter (see Tarlton 
1965).  
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2.4.2.2  Political Decentralisation 
Decentralisation is a term often bandied around in the academic literature and is 
typically seen as an umbrella term that encompasses the different mechanisms used to shift 
power and resources away from the central government towards sub-state levels of political 
organisation. Treisman (2007) classifies numerous dimensions by which decentralisation 
takes place, including political decentralisation, administrative decentralisation and fiscal 
decentralisation. While various terms have been used in the UK on debates on 
decentralisation, including inter alia, ‘home rule’, ‘devolution’, ‘devo-max’ and 
‘independence-lite’, this section will focus on the term devolution. 
Devolution is rooted in the Latin word devolvere, which translates as ‘rolling back’ or 
‘rolling down’. It involves a vertical transfer of political authority and legitimacy from a 
central government to a regional or local authority which accordingly gains independent 
decision-making powers over at least one policy area. According to Bogdanor (2001: 2), 
‘Devolution involves the transfer of powers from a superior to an inferior political body’, 
continuing that, ‘more precisely, devolution may be defined as consisting of three elements: 
the transfer to a subordinated elected body, on a geographical basis, of functions at present 
exercised by ministers and Parliament’ [italics in original]. Devolution, then, involves the 
conferral of considerable powers in a limited number of policy areas to sub-state 
parliaments, which, despite their legitimate status as democratically elected bodies, remain 
legally subordinate to the supremacy of the central parliament.  
Both federalism and devolution are used by governments to address similar issues of 
ethnic and cultural diversity, yet there are significant differences between these approaches. 
Firstly, devolution ensures that ultimate power, that is parliamentary sovereignty, remains 
with the central authority. Power, therefore, is not constitutionally divided, as is apparent in 
a federation, but is merely devolved, thus ensuring the supremacy of the central parliament 
remains unabridged; power devolved is power retained (Watts 2007).25  
Secondly, devolution is lop-sided in that its focus is primarily on self-rule rather than 
a combination of self-rule and shared rule. Devolved legislatures have powers to legislate 
and enact laws on specific policy areas, yet there is no institutional structure (such as a 
                                                 
25 This is exemplified in the Scotland Act 1998, which, in spite of granting law-making capabilities to the 
Scottish Parliament, equally sought to safeguard the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and ensure 
Westminster retained the power to legislate on devolved areas, although in principle it accepted that this should 
not be done. 
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territorially representative second chamber) of the central state to bind these territories in a 
common project. Federations not only create sub-state parliaments, that is, ‘build out’, but 
they simultaneously seek to ‘build in’ through a territorially representative second chamber 
(Simeon, 2015: 115). Devolution builds out but fails to build in. Power and subject briefs 
are thus devolved but not coordinated, shared or divided. 
Thirdly, one of the most distinctive features of devolution is its asymmetrical approach 
to peripheral territories. Whilst federalism is applied to the entire territory, devolution is an 
institutional arrangement that can be designed, tailored and implemented to the needs and 
aspirations of selected territories of a state. The UK’s model of asymmetrical devolution is 
a case in point, where devolution, in responding to the different territorial demands in each 
constituent nation, was implemented to different degrees (Jeffery, 2009: 93).  
Finally, devolution is not legally enshrined to the same extent as federalism and 
consequently is afforded weaker legal protection. Whereas federations are usually 
established by a constitution, a devolved settlement can be enacted by an ordinary Act of 
Parliament, subject at any time to amendment, suspension or repeal (Agranoff, 2004: 19). 
Nonetheless, as Leyland (2013: 152) notes, there is some form of constitutional protection 
for devolved settlements, in that Acts of Parliament for devolved systems become de facto 
constitutions for the devolved nations.26  
Territorial autonomy is an attractive option for both sub-state minorities and central 
governments. It provides the former with a measure of self-government to reflect, protect 
and develop their sub-state identities, traditions and heritage. For the latter, it presents a 
democratic and workable alternative to more radical options such as assimilation or 
secession. I now discuss the latter concept, drawing on scholarly debates in political science 
and constitutional and international law.   
 
2.4.3  Secession 
Secession in established democracies is a rare occurrence (Dion 1996).27 Huntington 
(1972: vii), wrote that, ‘the twentieth century bias against political divorce, that is, secession, 
                                                 
26 It is also worth noting that in the UK, proposals to establish devolved legislatures were endorsed by the 
electorate in referendums in all three constituent nations, thus making them politically difficult to be abolished. 
27 In this thesis, as in the academic literature, (territorial) independence, separation and secession are used 
synonymously. 
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is just as strong as the nineteenth century bias against martial divorce’. In the twenty first 
century, scepticism and inimicality towards secession remains just as strong and is often 
seen by governments as a radical and unpopular option to be largely avoided or conceded 
only as a remedy of last resort. Anderson (2013: 344) notes, for instance, that secession is 
viewed negatively and writes of the ‘chaos, schism, fragmentation and instability’ that states 
often envision regarding ceding territory to national minorities. Granting sub-state 
minorities territorial independence is therefore an institutional response which remains 
highly contested, in addition to being conceptually underdeveloped and theoretically 
incomplete.  
The discussion of secession presented here draws upon literatures relating to both the 
academic and legal discussion of secession. This booming literature is testament to the 
different theories which seek to examine the normative challenges secession poses, but also 
to the different routes, processes, justifications and consequences of secessionist politics.28  
Notwithstanding this extensive literature, there is not, as yet, consensus among scholars on 
an exact definition of secession. Some academics and legal theorists posit permissive 
definitions which in Sartorian terms conceptually stretch the phenomena under study 
(Anderson 2013; Dahlitz 2003; Haverland 2000; Radan 2008). Others strictly define 
secession, narrowing its application to only a few cases (Crawford 2006; Hechter 1992; 
Kohen 2006).29  
Kohen (2006: 2) writes that the increase in UN membership from 51 at its inception 
in 1945 to 191 in 2006 is essentially rooted in two state disintegration processes: 
decolonisation and secession.30 Although for some scholars this two-fold explanation stands 
true, others, such as Radan (2008) and Anderson (2013), consider decolonisation a process 
of secession rather than a separate, distinct phenomenon. For Radan and Anderson, 
decolonisation, akin to secession, ensues from a transfer of sovereignty from one power to 
another (in this instance, from the colonial power to the colonised territory) and the creation 
of a new state. It is this transfer of sovereignty, they conclude, that in effect creates a new 
state. Secession, thus, is interpreted as an inclusive concept encompassing processes of 
decolonisation. 
                                                 
28 The normative debate on secession is further developed in Chapter Three.  
29 On permissive and restrictive definitions of secession, see Pavković 2015.  
30 At the time of writing, current UN membership stands at 193 countries. The most recent state to join was 
South Sudan in 2011. 
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Both Radan and Anderson widen the application of secession as a descriptive term, 
yet this permissive approach is endorsed by other scholars who extend further still the scope 
of what secession is. Haverland (2000) and Dahlitz (2003) contend that secession need not 
entail the establishment of a new state, as seceding groups can ‘join or become part of 
another sovereign state’ (Dahlitz, 2003: 6). In essence, Haverland and Dahlitz enlarge the 
concept of secession by including irredentism, a separate phenomenon which involves an 
ethnic group joining with the same ethnic group in another territory, as a type of secession. 
This theoretical position, however, is not extensively endorsed. Horowitz (2011: 156), 
disapproves of this conflation, astutely observing that ‘irredentism involves subtracting from 
one state and adding to another state, new or already existing; secession involves subtracting 
alone.’  
In contrast to the permissive approach discussed above, other scholars define secession 
in such restrictive terms that only a few cases are considered as ‘pure’ secessionist acts. 
Crawford (2006: 375), for instance, argues that the break-up of a state can only be termed 
secession when a state is created ‘by the use or threat of force without the consent of the 
former sovereign’. Mutually agreed separations, such as that between Norway and Sweden 
in 1905, would consequently not count as secession. Indeed, Bangladesh, which seceded 
from Pakistan in 1971 after a violent struggle, is, following Crawford’s criterion, the only 
‘successful’ case of secession (ibid: 391). On the other hand, Hechter (1992: 277) proposes 
an equally narrow definition of secession, but, in diametric contrast to Crawford, believes 
pure secession only occurs ‘when a highly effective state permits a secessionist territory to 
withdraw from its embrace’. Intriguingly, then, for Hechter, Bangladesh fails to qualify as 
secession owing to the ineffectiveness of the Pakistani state; Norway’s secession from 
Sweden in 1905 is, however, considered a successful secession (ibid).  
Before progressing to the working definition of secession used in this thesis, it is 
helpful to consider the legal position of secession in the international and national systems. 
There is general consensus in the academic literature that international law is hesitant to 
regulate the creation of new states via secession and to actually define exactly what secession 
is (Anderson 2013; Buchanan 2003; Crawford 2006; Kohen 2006; Mancini 2008; Pavković 
2015). Crawford (2006: 390) cautiously notes that secession ‘is neither legal nor illegal in 
international law’, reiterated by Anderson (2013: 343), who highlights that secession 
remains a ‘moot point’ in the international arena. Outside of the context of decolonisation 
or unjust annexation, international law is devoid of an explicit definition of secession. The 
50 
 
guiding document with regards to secession in international law is the UN Declaration on 
Friendly Relations. Article One, after being revised in 1995, states that the UN continues:  
To reaffirm the right of self-determination of all peoples, taking into account the 
particular situation of peoples under colonial or other forms of alien domination 
or foreign occupation, and recognise the right of peoples to take legitimate action 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to realise their inalienable 
right of self-determination. This shall not be construed as authorising or 
encouraging any action that would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the 
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States 
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples (United Nations 1995).  
 
Self-determination is thus conceived as a legal right applied to all peoples, not merely 
a political right or limited to those under colonial rule. In view of the UN declaration, 
secession is thus seen by some scholars (Cassese 1995; Raiç 2002) as legally permissible, 
albeit under very specific circumstances. Under international law, secessionist groups ‘must 
be the victim of discrimination’ by the host state before they can legally secede (Pavković 
and Radan, 2007: 238). In domestic systems, however, where a right to secession can be 
constitutionally enshrined, secessionist groups, provided they meet the stipulated procedural 
requirements, can seek to secede in the absence of discriminatory practices.  
Most national constitutions do not grant an unambiguous constitutional right to secede. 
There are very few empirical examples of a constitutional right to secede. Ethiopia and St 
Kitts and Nevis are notable exceptions.31 Article 39 of the Ethiopian Constitution enshrines 
an unconditional right of secession for minorities, provided that certain procedural 
prerequisites such as a majority vote in a referendum are achieved (see Bihonegin 2015). 
Similarly, the Constitution of St Kitts and Nevis entrenches a secessionist clause, but differs 
from Ethiopia, in that only one constituent part of the state – Nevis – can secede. In order to 
secede, the Island of Nevis must have a two third majority of parliamentarians in favour of 
a secessionist referendum, as well as a two thirds majority by the electorate in the vote itself. 
In 1998, a referendum on the secession of Nevis was held but failed to meet the required 
two third majority in favour (see Veenendaal 2015).  
The case of Canada is also important in debates on the constitutionalisation of 
secession. Whereas the cases above have an explicit right of secession, Canada is a less 
conclusive example. In Quebec, two separate referenda have been held and lost on Quebec 
                                                 
31 Historically, the Constitutions of the former USSR and the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
entrenched secessionist clauses.  
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sovereignty (1980 and 1995).32 Following the second referendum, the Supreme Court of 
Canada, under instruction from the federal government, deliberated on the future possibility 
of a unilateral secession by Quebec. In 1998, the Court delivered its now famous Reference, 
which, despite denying Quebec a unilateral right to secede, delineated procedural steps 
which concede to all provinces the right to territorial independence, provided a ‘clear’ 
majority of the electorate vote in favour of a ‘clear’ referendum question on secession 
(Supreme Court of Canada 1998).  
Here, I have outlined some examples of a constitutionalised right to secede, but it is 
important to note that most states refrain from detailing provisions and procedures 
concerning secession. In lieu of enshrining a right of secession, many states actually 
accentuate the indivisibility of the state; Article Two of the Spanish Constitution is a lucid 
example. There is thus significant debate and discussion regarding a precise definition of 
secession. Taking into consideration the plethoric amount of scholarship surrounding the 
conceptualisation of secession, the working definition in this thesis takes secession as the 
process by which a specific part of a given territory withdraws from an already existing 
state to establish a separate, independent and sovereign state. From this definition, it is 
worthwhile illuminating three important features:  
1. Secession is a process normally preceded by a referendum, plebiscitary elections, 
and/or parliamentary vote.  
2. Secession involves the withdrawal of a part of the territory with the aim to 
establishing a separate state; decolonisation and irredentism are phenomena that, 
whilst intricately linked to secession, are conceptually different. 
3. Secession can be politically negotiated, constitutionally sanctioned or unilaterally 
declared. 
The discussion of secession is particularly important given that in Spain and the UK 
there are active secessionist movements which champion territorial independence for their 
respective territories. A referendum on Scottish independence was held in 2014, the result 
of an agreement between the UK and Scottish governments to work together to facilitate the 
holding of a referendum and respect its outcome. Yet, as will be developed in Chapter Four, 
despite the rejection of independence in the 2014 referendum, the independence issue is far 
                                                 
32 In 1980, circa 40% voted in favour of secession. In 1995, the result was much closer, just over 49% voted 
to secede.  
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from settled. Historically in Spain, it has been the Basque rather than the Catalan 
independence movement that has dominated headlines and academic research. In recent 
years, however, the Catalan independence movement and its annual demonstrations in 
favour of independence and the right to vote in a referendum, have gained significant 
prominence. Since 2014, successive Catalan governments have attempted to hold official 
referenda on independence, notwithstanding the refusal of the Spanish state to legislate or 
even engage with the issue. Attempts to hold a referendum, most notably in 2014 and 2017, 
were struck down as ‘unconstitutional’ by the Spanish TC, but as is the case in Scotland, 
support for independence remains historically high.  
 
2.5  Conclusion 
The accommodation of ethnonational diversity is an issue that has challenged and 
continues to challenge plurinational democracies. In recent years, as demands for 
accommodation have increased, the issue has acquired growing salience, both in the real 
world and academia. In this chapter I sought to clarify some of the key concepts 
operationalised in this study. I began with a discussion of nationalism, discussing a number 
of key terms before examining the concepts of majority and minority nationalism and 
plurinationalism. How states and majority communities interact with minorities has become 
an increasing area of focus in an era of heightened interest in accommodation, but majority 
nationalisms continue to be imbued by a legitimacy that is often denied to their minority 
counterparts. Contrary to the argument that minority nationalist movements are backward 
and illiberal, it is clear, and particularly with reference to the Scottish and Catalan 
movements, that these movements do not threaten fundamental democratic values. Basic 
freedoms, peace, individual rights and mutual respect are some of the guiding principles of 
many minority nationalist movements, underlining the pacific and democratic nature of their 
national projects.  
The discussion on democracy demonstrated the multifaceted nature of democracy, 
defined in both narrow and broad terms. Additionally, I have discussed how since the early 
twentieth century, democratic states have been challenged, both in theory and practice, with 
regards to the accommodation of ethnonational diversity and how democratic theories have 
evolved, at least to a certain extent, to take into account the increasing importance of 
accommodating rather than eradicating cultural, ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity. 
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The four strategies laid out on the continuum in figure one spotlight the range of 
responses available to plurinational states to manage ethnonational diversity. The discussion 
heretofore has shown that each strategy responds to such a complex issue in a variety of 
ways. Essentially, there are two attitudes a government may take regarding diversity: a 
positive stance, whereby there is clear recognition and accommodation of ethnonational 
diversity, or a negative approach, including the negation, suppression and eradication of 
minority peoples’ sense of difference. Governments which perversely see heterogeneity as 
a threat to the state often elect illiberal and baleful policies to eliminate cultural and ethnic 
differences. On the other hand, states at ease with the diverse makeup of their population 
seek to accommodate such diversity through institutional apparatus, or, in very few cases, 
facilitate the secession of a constituent part of the territory. As has been shown, however, 
secession is, more often than not, considered a means of last resort.  
In the next chapter, I present the theoretical framework underpinning this study.  
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3. Chapter Three: Theoretical Framework 
3.1 Introduction 
Having discussed and defined the concepts of nationalism, democracy, territorial 
autonomy and secession in the previous chapter, I now turn to examining the interplay 
among these concepts in the context of the debate on accommodating diversity in 
plurinational democratic states. As has been shown in Chapter Two, plurinational states have 
a range of options to accommodate and manage diversity. Yet, despite the conferral of self-
government institutions, secessionism continues to feature high on the political agenda of 
certain national minorities and is thus a challenging issue for central governments to manage. 
This thesis, therefore, is primarily interested in how the plurinational states of the UK and 
Spain have managed demands from their national minorities for enhanced autonomy and 
secession, the benefits and shortcomings of the approaches employed hitherto, primarily 
focused on the models of autonomy rolled out for both Scotland and Catalonia, and how 
these models could be expanded and improved with regards to other institutional means to 
better respond to the autonomy-enhancing and secessionist demands from national 
minorities. In order to do so, a detailed understanding of how these concepts interact at a 
normative and institutional level is necessary.  
As discussed in Chapter Two, there is an ongoing debate among political theorists 
regarding democratic principles (individualistic and communitarian) and the growing reality 
of ethnonational pluralism. This discussion runs parallel to, and often intertwined with, the 
debate on diversity and democracy, more specifically and relevant for this thesis, the 
challenges diversity poses to the deepening of democracy in plurinational states. This 
chapter, therefore, begins by examining the theoretical discussion concerning the 
reconciliation of democracy and nationalism, primarily the theory of liberal nationalism. 
Historically, political philosophers, scientists and theorists have viewed democracy and 
nationalism as competing, not complementary forces, involved in ‘a tug of war between 
reason and passion’ (Gellner, 1971: 149). In recent years, however, an intellectual debate 
has developed among those scholars who have taken exception at the monist interpretation 
of liberalism and have forged a new, more sensitive approach – liberal nationalism. Liberal 
nationalism, despite being a mostly intellectual endeavour, has seen some of its main 
concerns translated into political reality through the theory of multinational federalism. 
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Following an examination of liberal nationalism, I therefore, analyse the theory of 
multinational federalism, underlining its strengths in relation to accommodating diversity 
while giving equal consideration to some of its shortcomings, including a detailed analysis 
of the issue of secession in plurinational states.  
The third section of this chapter discusses several theories of power-sharing. Neither 
of the cases under study in this thesis are considered examples of power-sharing systems, 
albeit consociationalism was institutionalised in Northern Ireland as part of the Good Friday 
Agreement (GFA) signed in 1998. Analysing how power-sharing methods have been used 
in other states to accommodate and manage diversity may prove a useful endeavour in 
developing some key lessons for the UK and Spain, particularly in how these states manage 
demands for enhanced autonomy and secession, while deepening democracy and promoting 
and fulfilling the requisites of ‘plurinational justice’ (see Kymlicka, 2001a: Ch 5). The 
penultimate section of this chapter outlines the overall design of the theoretical framework, 
in particular how this research seeks to build upon the existing theory of multinational 
federalism to ensure the development of a more coherent and accommodative model of 
autonomy.   
 
3.2 Liberal Nationalism: From Oxymoron to Political Reality?  
Liberal nationalism has become the principal theory to reconcile the two commonly 
held mutually antagonistic phenomena: liberalism and nationalism. The predominant view 
regarding these two concepts has been one of hostility, whereby the ‘inclusive’ nature of 
liberal democratic principles is contrasted with an understanding of nationalism as an 
‘exclusive’ doctrine (Helbling, 2009: 1). Kedourie (1966: 109) considered liberalism and 
nationalism as ‘antagonistic principles’, whereas more recent scholarship has been less 
scathing, seeing them as necessary but ‘uneasy companions’ (Kelly, 2015: 348). For Nodia 
(1992: 3-4), liberal democracy ‘has become a term linked to adjectives like “good”, 
“civilised”, “progressive”, “rational’ and so on, while nationalism is associated with 
“backwardness”, “immaturity”, “barbarism”, “irrationality” and the like’.  Arguing against 
the academic grain, Nodia posits nationalism and liberal democracy as sharing an intrinsic, 
intimate connection: ‘the idea of nationalism is impossible – indeed unthinkable – without 
the idea of democracy…the two are joined in a sort of complicated marriage, unable to live 
without each other, but coexisting in an almost permanent state of tension’ (ibid: 4).  
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For Nodia, what is irreconcilable is not, as so many others have argued, the joining 
together of liberal democratic principles and nationalism, but the separation of these 
concepts. He argues that nationalism is an essential component of democracy and given that 
both are anchored in ideas of collective identity and sovereignty, they are mutually 
reinforcing rather than contradictory phenomena. This is a similar position taken by those 
theorists who have sought to broaden the traditionally restrictive interpretation of liberalism 
as a doctrine in favour of individual, as opposed to group, autonomy. For Patten (1999: 4), 
‘liberalism is, first a foremost a doctrine of individual freedom or autonomy’ and it is this 
tenet that in the last few decades has been the focus of much scholarly debate (Haas 1997; 
Kymlicka 1995; 2001; Margalit and Raz 1990; Miller 1995; Requejo 2005; Spinner 1994; 
Tamir 1993; Tully 1995; Young 1990).  
Political theorists examining the relation between democracy and nationalism often 
begin in the nineteenth century, citing debates between eminent philosophers such as Lord 
Acton, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville. Although the debate 
on challenges of accommodating diversity can be identified in political thought of centuries 
past, the unparalleled levels of deep diversity found in countries throughout the modern 
world present a significant challenge for liberal democracies and democratic theory. 
Consequently, the debate on diversity, and in particular the themes of identity, difference, 
culture and self-determination, have in recent decades become a veritable growth industry 
within political science. The conventional principles of liberalism have been dubbed ‘too 
restrictive’ from both a normative and institutional viewpoint in managing the cultural 
pluralism and the deep diversity characteristic of the twenty first century (Gagnon, 2010: 
32).  
Scholars, such as Alain Gagnon (2010) Dimitros Karmis and Wayne Norman (2005), 
Will Kymlicka (1995), Ferran Requejo (2005) and James Tully (1995) have identified an 
incongruence between the traditional tenets of liberal theory and the reality of liberal politics 
in democratic societies. Traditional understandings of liberalism, in equating homogeneity 
with political stability and focusing on individual autonomy at the expense of collective 
rights, thus require ‘updating’, brought in line with the plural, diverse and heterogeneous 
reality of the twenty first century (Gagnon, 2010: 32). This extant gulf between liberal theory 
and political reality has been the subject of a large corpus of research which has examined 
the capacity of liberalism to manage diversity and protect and promote cultural differences. 
Liberal nationalism has, therefore, come to represent a more contemporary polycentric 
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approach to the diversity debate, a theory which reconciles nationalism and democracy, 
combines individual rights with collective group rights and promotes equal respect, 
tolerance and acceptance for the cultures and welfare of other ethnonational groups.  
Yael Tamir is widely credited with expanding the debate on minority rights by 
combining liberalism and nationalism in an encompassing theory. According to Tamir 
(1993: 14), liberal nationalism is an attempt ‘to “translate” nationalist arguments into liberal 
language’, providing a theory that would ‘capture what is essential to both schools of 
thought’ (ibid: 35). Essentially, what liberal nationalists sought to do was institutionalise ‘a 
politics of recognition’ (Taylor 1994) and provide a principled case for the inclusion of 
minority rights, including respect for and accommodation of national cultures and 
languages.  
Walzer (1994), in response to Taylor’s discussion on the politics of recognition, 
illuminated two ways of interpreting democracy: liberalism I and liberalism II. Liberalism I 
is the traditional liberal stance with a strong universal commitment to individual rights, a 
sense of non-discriminatory equality and absolute neutrality on the part of the state. 
Liberalism II, on the other hand, builds on some of the same principles as liberalism I, but 
with a stronger focus on a commitment to the survival and flourishing of a particular culture. 
In liberalism II, the idea of a neutral state is debunked and self-government for national 
minorities is considered a fundamental component. Although liberal nationalism itself does 
not essentially draw upon Walzer’s distinction between the two different forms of liberalism, 
the principal claims made by liberal nationalists are consonant with those scholars promoting 
a liberalism II approach.  
Tamir (1993: 9) succinctly defines liberal nationalism as ‘predicated on the idea that 
all nations should enjoy equal rights’, whereby the combination of specific cultures with the 
universality of human rights, results in a pluralistic, open, and tolerant societal environment. 
She (ibid) further notes that liberal nationalism ‘derives its universal structure from the 
theory of individual rights found at its core’, concluding that, ‘if national rights rest on the 
value that individuals attach to their membership in a nation, then all nations are entitled to 
equal respect’. Liberal nationalism, then, upholds some of the integral components of 
liberalism I – individual autonomy and the universality of human rights – but goes much 
further in advancing collective group rights in order to ensure the distinct cultures, identities 
and languages of ethnonational minorities are recognised, respected and accommodated, that 
is, advancing the main components of liberalism II. Whereas in the traditional interpretation 
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of liberalism the focus is primarily on the individual, liberal nationalism sees people as both 
individuals and members of a wider community. Tamir (ibid: 13) writes that liberal 
nationalism seeks to find ‘a midway position able to encompass the nationalist belief that 
individuals are the inevitable products of their culture, as well as the liberal conviction that 
individuals can be the authors of their own lives’. In short, liberal nationalism revolves 
around the themes of minority rights, identity, cultural membership and self-determination, 
providing ‘a set of guidelines for how liberal democracies should accommodate those groups 
which see themselves as ‘nations’ and which seek rights of national recognition and self-
government’ (Kymlicka, 2001a: 41).  
For Kymlicka (ibid: 39), writing in the early 2000s, the debate on liberal nationalism 
was such that there already appeared to be ‘an emerging consensus’ on the importance of 
respecting and protecting minority rights, cultural and national pluralism, and self-
government. He (ibid: 39-40) summarises the theory of liberal nationalism in five points: 
1. It does not impose a form of national identity on any person.  
2. It allows for the public expression of ethnonational diversity which may include 
opinions which question the official culture or organisation of the state.  
3. Membership of the national community is not defined by ethnicity, race or religion. 
Instead, it is open, tolerant and anyone who wishes to join is free to do so.  
4. It endorses a thin conception of national identity to allow for the existence of multiple 
identities. 
5. It is non-aggressive in that it is respectful towards diversity and does not seek to 
undermine the self-government institutions of other national groups.  
From the five elements chronicled above, respect for and recognition of ethnonational 
differences and support for self-government are central issues to the debate on liberal 
nationalism. The principal demand of liberal nationalism is the promotion and protection of 
national cultures and languages. In outlining this approach, liberal nationalists have 
illuminated tensions between traditional tenets of liberalism and political reality. Three 
principal notions with which liberal nationalists have taken exception – the purported 
neutrality of the state, the dismissal of cultural membership and the disparaging opinion of 
self-determination – are discussed below. 
The issue of neutrality, intrinsically linked to the debate on nation-building, has 
featured prominently in the debates raised by liberal nationalists. The idea purported by 
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liberalism I –  that the state acts as a ‘neutral mediator’ or ‘honest broker of individual 
interests’ (Tamir, 1993: 141) – has been derided by liberal nationalist scholars as an 
‘illusion’ (ibid: 145), a ‘myth’ (Requejo, 2011a: 16) and ‘manifestly false’ (Kymlicka, 
2001a: 23). Proponents of liberalism I argue that the state should adopt a ‘hands-off 
approach’ (Carens, 2000: 8) and remain ‘neutral with reference to language, history, 
literature [and] calendar’ (Walzer, 1994: 100-101). The recognition of cultural particularities 
are deemed inappropriate and to undermine the liberal commitment to equal citizenship and 
individual autonomy. Culture, then, is to be treated in a similar fashion to religion, something 
which citizens can practice in their private lives, but which is not the concern of the state.  
Liberal nationalists, contrary to this view, argue that liberal democracies cannot be 
neutral. Having a system of equal rights does not ensure universality across the state, but 
serves to imbue the cultural choices of the national majority with higher value than 
minorities. In this way, neutrality towards minority nations maintains a system of inequality, 
whereby the majority group is able to ‘fashion the state in their own image’, including the 
choice of language, flags, symbols and public holidays (Patten, 2014: 1). Walzer (1994: 100-
101), for instance, argues that the USA is a prime example of a ‘culturally neutral’ state 
because there is no constitutionally recognised official language. Kymlicka (2001a: 24-25), 
however, cogently demonstrates this to be untrue, arguing that while there is no 
constitutional commitment to an official language, the US government promotes English as 
a common language; immigrants in certain age categories are required to learn English and 
employment in governmental positions requires applicants to speak English. English is the 
de facto lingua franca of the USA. The laissez-faire approach to the cultures of national 
minorities is, from the viewpoint of liberal nationalists, untenable. It implicitly values the 
majority culture, meaning that those minorities who do not identify with the majority culture 
do not have the same opportunities to express their own cultural beliefs (Tamir, 1993: 145). 
Consequently, liberal nationalists advocate the promotion of all national cultures found 
within the borders of a state.  
Very few would deny that liberalism as a political theory has not paid enough attention 
to the importance of culture and cultural belonging for citizens. It is a truism that culture 
has, more often than not, featured in such debates as a secondary issue, considered, as was 
noted above, a private matter and not for discussion or display in the public sphere. It has 
been argued, however, that operating on the liberal assumption that democracies were quite 
simply nation-states whereby the political community was coterminous with the cultural 
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community, liberal theorists have failed to fully explore the significance of culture and 
individual membership of a cultural community (Máiz, 2004: 65-66).  
For liberal nationalists, culture is a crucial component in an individual’s life, 
fundamental to their development as both rational, autonomous individuals and as members 
of a wider community. Margalit and Raz (1990) describe membership of a cultural 
community as integral to a person’s wellbeing, underlining that it provides a sense of 
belonging and identity which furthers the liberal concern for individual freedom. This is 
reiterated by Kymlicka (2001a: 47-48), who sees culture as an essential element for self-
definition and self-respect. Kymlicka (ibid), thus makes the argument that given culture 
provides a social context for individuals, with space to express and develop their own 
identities, which is in turn recognised and respected by the state, it ought to receive public 
recognition by the state and be included as a central tenet in liberal democratic theory. In 
short, concern for culture and identity are consonant with the traditional liberal principles of 
freedom and equality.  
According to Taylor, misrecognition of (cultural) identity is harmful to the self-respect 
of individuals. He (1994: 52) notes, ‘it becomes very important that we be recognised for 
what we are. If this is denied or set at naught by those who surround us, it is extremely 
difficult to maintain a horizon of meaning by which to identify ourselves’. For liberal 
nationalists, then, diversity itself is considered a valuable asset worth protecting and 
promoting in liberal states. Not only does diversity enrich societies and different ways of 
life, but moreover it is a precondition to the development of individual freedom that is at the 
heart of the liberalism debate; protecting minority cultures is consistent with liberal values. 
Tamir also endorses this line of argumentation. She believes that collective group rights are 
essential in providing cultural background in which individuals are free to thrive and 
exercise agency as autonomous beings. Emphasising ‘the importance of belonging, 
membership and cultural affiliation’, Tamir (1993: 6) interprets an individual’s cultural 
environment as a necessary condition for such individuals to become rational, self-
governing human beings.  
The central tenet of liberal nationalism as discussed at the beginning of this section is 
that nationalism is not always to be understood as something ‘bad’ and as such ought to be 
accommodated within a liberal democratic framework. For Tamir, nationalism is not always 
about political ends, although these are prevalent and important, but also cultural ones. In 
this sense, the importance of culture and identity for individuals who are embedded within 
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a specific cultural context, necessitates self-determination in order to ensure that individuals, 
both as autonomous agents and group members, are able to freely express, celebrate, 
promote and protect their culture and national identity. National self-determination is 
described as a process through which ‘individuals seek to give public expression to their 
national identity’ (ibid: 90), and is justified by Tamir (ibid: 73-74) in six points: 
1. Membership in a nation is an integral component of personal identity.   
2. Individuals seek to preserve their national identity and so it is justifiable to grant 
them rights to be able to do so. 
3. Individuals should be afforded the opportunity to freely express their national 
identities in both public and private spheres. 
4. A shared public space in which the identities of all individuals are accepted allows 
such individuals to develop in an arena free from oppression, repression or stigma. 
5. Having a communal domain and public institutions to represent the cultural or 
national community of the individuals gives expression and meaning to their sense 
of identity.  
6. The national group needs to be recognised as an autonomous source by members of 
the group itself as well as other non-members. 
Liberal nationalists treat national identity as key to the autonomy, self-respect, self-
worth and well-being of an individual. Self-governance, therefore, is hailed by liberal 
nationalists as a fundamental right of individuals (as representatives of a national 
community) if they are to achieve the above. If membership of a national community is 
essential for individuals, this in turn justifies their claims to self-government. It is here that 
a clear tension with classic liberalism can be identified. Liberalism I is fully comfortable 
with the idea that individuals have a right to govern themselves. Liberal nationalists, 
nonetheless, extend this argument highlighting that individuals can only be free if they 
control their own lives and destinies, and given that their national identity is linked to a 
wider cultural community, self-determination must be equally available for collectives. As 
Kymlicka (1995: 151) attests, granting national minorities self-determination is not illiberal 
and is in fact ‘a plausible extension of our existing democratic traditions’.  
Self-determination, as championed by liberal nationalists, takes the form of political 
arrangements, including a space within which decisions concerning the welfare and well-
being of the national collective are taken by individuals identifying with that collective. 
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Essentially, this means unfettered control for the minority group in certain ambits, free from 
the interference or unbridled domination of the majority group with whom they share a state. 
Such political arrangements may take the form of ‘national institutions’, ‘autonomous 
communities’ ‘or the establishment of federal or confederal states’ (Tamir, 1993: 75). In 
providing spheres of autonomy to minority groups, minorities are given accommodation, 
protection and recognition, all of which are required to preserve their cultural and national 
distinctiveness. In addition, these structures are important in engendering a sense of trust, 
fairness and equal respect among the different groups resident within the state (Kymlicka 
1995). States and nations, however, do not have an absolute right to secession. Tamir (1993: 
150) stresses that whereas not every nation is guaranteed a separate state, they can be 
guaranteed a political space within which they constitute a majority and have control over 
specific political functions.  
Liberal nationalists, although to varying degrees, see the institutionalisation of 
territorial and/or non-territorial autonomy as the solution to ensure that minorities are 
included within the apparatus of the liberal democratic state. According to Kymlicka (1995: 
3), such political arrangements ‘typically take the form of devolving political power to a 
political unit substantially controlled by the members of the national minority, and 
substantially corresponding to their historical homeland or territory’. To prevent minorities 
from being alienated from the public sphere, which occurs because states cannot be neutral, 
and to ensure that cultural and national identities of minority groups are promoted and 
protected (essential for the promotion of individual autonomy), liberal nationalists thus 
promote the institutionalisation of autonomous structures for national minorities. These 
forms of territorial autonomy ensure limited self-rule for national minorities, including 
significant control over important policy areas, often linked to the national and cultural status 
of the collective. Tamir (1993: 151), accentuating her earlier point that not all nations can 
have their own independent states, proposes ‘modest solutions such as local autonomies [or] 
federative or confederative arrangements’ to ensure that all nations have equal national 
rights. Kymlicka (2000: 189), develops this further by promoting ‘multinational federalism’ 
as the best tool to protect minorities, giving them governmental control over a specific 
territory in which they form a majority.33  
 
                                                 
33 The theory of multinational federalism is developed later in this chapter. 
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3.2.1 The Shortcomings of the Liberal Nationalist Approach 
The task undertaken by Tamir and others – to rehabilitate nationalism within a liberal 
framework – was no mean feat. Liberal nationalism, however, is not without its critics 
(Ignatieff 1993; Gaebler 1995; Greenfield 1994; Levinson 1995; Patten 1999; Vincent 
1997). Yet, while these criticisms often focus on specific skeins of thought within the theory, 
most critics acknowledge the difficulty and ingenuity of the project as a whole. Liberal 
nationalism is, according to these scholars, theoretically compelling, but is generally 
undermined by insufficient empirical evidence.  
Most studies of liberal nationalism, including the seminal work by Tamir, have been 
philosophical and normative endeavours rather than empirical studies. Their empirical 
relevance has thus been called into question, with many critics of the theory lamenting the 
lack of real-life solutions to combat the issues raised by the theory. Tamir (1993: 117) herself 
acknowledged the lack of coherence with modern politics at the time of writing, noting that 
‘recent versions of nationalism’, which around 1993 involved violent nationalist clashes in 
Eastern Europe in the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the genocide 
campaigns wreaked upon Bosnia and Rwanda, ‘seem to lend little credence to the liberal 
nationalist position’. She (ibid) continued, ‘a cursory glance at the surrounding reality could 
easily lead to the conclusion that liberal nationalism is a rather esoteric approach’. It is 
unsurprising, therefore, that scholars have questioned the validity of the theory when the 
practical reality of nationalism at the time seemed to undermine some of liberal 
nationalism’s main tenets.  
An additional critique, although very much intimately linked with the 
abovementioned, relates to the scholars who have driven the liberal nationalist project. 
Burgess (2006: 130), for example, writes of the ‘Canadian School of political thought’ that 
has engaged with issues of, inter alia, liberalism and nationalism. He identifies key figures 
to include Alain Gagnon, Will Kymlicka, Charles Taylor, James Tully, alongside others 
much more specifically associated with the liberal nationalist project, including David 
Miller and Yael Tamir. While contributions from the abovementioned authors have 
indisputably helped advance theories of liberalism vis-à-vis issues of diversity, identity and 
cultural pluralism, and indeed have ‘set the agenda for normative reflection’ on many of 
these issues, they have often failed to engage with political reality (Choudhry, 2008: 142). 
In the Canadian context, for instance, where the lion’s share of these theoretical approaches 
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have been developed, there is no shortage of theoretical discussions regarding Canadian 
multinationalism and more specifically the myriad of issues concerning Quebec, such as 
recognition, accommodation and the thorny issue of secession. Yet, as pointed out by Keil 
(2013: 38-44), there is a clear identifiable lacuna of research which adequately engages with 
the reality of the Canadian sphere; debates have tended to remain normative. McRoberts 
(2001b: 694) nicely encapsulates this dilemma noting, that ‘multinationalism has become 
no less than an important and influential Canadian school of political thought. Yet, 
contemporary political life in Canada shows little trace of these ideas’. The same indictment 
could easily be applied to the theories of liberal nationalism and multinational federalism. 
Despite their normative value, they often ‘face considerable difficulties in practice’ 
(McGarry and O’Leary, 2007: 190). 
In addition, while liberal nationalists are committed to some form of autonomy for 
minorities, and indeed scholars such as Kymlicka are very vocal regarding the 
accommodation of minorities, they say very little about the practicalities of including 
minorities in the political system. Stepan (1999), for instance, argues that territorial 
autonomy and the overrepresentation of minorities in central institutions are necessary 
institutional responses to the accommodation of minorities. For Stepan, liberal nationalism 
is correct to seek to marry individual rights and collective rights in a plurinational polity, but 
he emphasises the importance of ensuring individual rights are protected and minorities are 
given significant levels of autonomy in order to protect and promote their culture, as well as 
contribute to the decision-making processes of the central state. 
Before discussing some of the other proposed institutional responses to managing 
ethnonational diversity, I will first examine the theory of multinational federalism. 
Multinational federalism encompasses many of the concerns of liberal nationalists into the 
institutional organisation of the state, with particular focus on the use of territorial autonomy 
to accommodate the demands of minority groups in multinational states.   
 
3.2.2 Squaring the Liberal Nationalist Circle? The Theory of 
Multinational Federalism 
The intellectual debate on accommodating diversity, managing difference and 
sustaining and deepening democracy has expanded discussions on models of political 
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organisation in plurinational states. For liberal nationalists, such a model must ensure the 
recognition and accommodation of diversity, the institutionalisation of self-government and 
the acceptance and promotion of a fluid interpretation of identity. Multinational federalism, 
as discussed by a range of scholars, most of whom are associated with the Burgess-identified 
‘Canadian school of political thought’, represents an institutional blueprint that, although 
not flawless, translates many liberal national concerns into feasible institutional 
mechanisms.  
Norman (2006: 87-88) defines multinational federalism as a model of political 
organisation whose intention is ‘to accommodate the desire of national minorities for self-
government, principally by creating a province (or provinces) in which one or more minority 
groups can constitute a clear majority of citizens and in which they can exercise a number 
of sovereign powers’. Despite the name, political systems that employ multinational 
federalism ‘are not all federations in the technical sense, but they all embody a model of the 
state in which national minorities are federated to the state through some form of territorial 
autonomy’ (Kymlicka, 2002: 30). In this sense, the UK and Spain are clear examples since 
varying forms of territorial autonomy have been conferred upon the distinct national 
communities within these polities. It is important, however, to differentiate multinational 
federal political systems from their mononational counterparts, given that in the latter the 
division of the state into regional units does not correspond to any concerns related to 
ethnonational pluralism or demands from minority groups for internal self-determination 
(Kymlicka, 2001a: 97-101). Furthermore, while multinational states implicitly recognise the 
existence of a demoi, in mononational states power is dispersed among a singular demos, 
the majority of whom subscribe to a single overarching concept of national identity, that of 
the state (Seymour and Gagnon, 2012: 2).  
The right of self-determination is at the centre of the liberal nationalist debate. 
However, while all liberal nationalists support the principle of internal self-determination, 
whereby national minorities are given some form of institutionalised autonomy, not all 
scholars advocate the inclusion of a right to external self-determination, that is, secession.34 
Moreover, even when a right to secession is advocated it is generally not expressed as a 
universal right. Tamir (1993: 150), for example, argues that while all nations should be 
                                                 
34 It is worth noting, however, that while liberal nationalists advocate autonomy and self-government over 
secession as a mechanism to accommodate national minorities, when this fails, and there is no democratic and 
workable alternative, secession must not be inhibited by the state (see Kymlicka 2001a; Norman 2006).  
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entitled to some form of political autonomy, ‘it cannot be ensured that each nation will have 
its own state’. Similarly, Nielsen (1998: 120), another scholar who champions an unqualified 
right to self-government for nations (or in Nielsen’s parlance ‘encompassing cultures’), 
writes that ‘the doctrine that every nation should have its own state is both impractical and 
dangerous’. Not all national minorities, however, advocate external self-determination 
(Sorens 2012). As Norman (2006: 74) contests, ‘secession is rarely the preferred form of 
political autonomy for national minorities in democratic states’. Consequently, multinational 
federalism is promoted as a preferable and workable alternative to territorial independence, 
whereby nations are justly recognised, are given a number of autonomous powers and 
through the establishment of shared rule mechanisms are able to influence decisions made 
at the centre.  
As will be developed in the following section, one of the key problems with 
multinational federalism is not only developing it to resemble a fully-fledged theory, but 
also to overcome the general descriptive nature of the term. Notwithstanding this critique, 
several scholars have successfully identified some of the principal elements of multinational 
federalism. Kymlicka (2001a: Ch 6) illuminates the importance of recognising the 
ethnonational plurality of the state, institutionalising self-government for national minorities 
and the promotion of asymmetrical arrangements to ensure the just recognition of the 
plurinationality of the state in legal, institutional and societal spheres. In a similar vein, 
Gagnon (2001), Norman (2001) and Patten (2001), posit that recognition of diversity in the 
public sphere, including the possibility of multiple, overlapping identities and self-
governance for minority groups, are critical normative values to undergird multinational 
federations. Gagnon (2010: 1-3), argues, for instance, that ensuring the above as well as an 
asymmetrical design of the state, bolsters political stability and strengthens democracy 
within the plurinational state. Similarly, Requejo (2005: 45-46) has illuminated the 
importance of asymmetry in plurinational states, arguing that the absence of asymmetrical 
features undermines any juridical or constitutional recognition of difference. He believes 
that asymmetry is crucial and demonstrative of a plurinational state’s commitment to a 
politics of recognition, and thus respect for the different peoples, languages, cultures and 
religions that exist within the state. Indeed, in a more recent publication, Requejo (2015: 
163) points out that asymmetry is the norm among plurinational states in the twenty first 
century, ‘there are’, he contends ‘no cases of clearly symmetrical plurinational federations’ 
(see also Zuber 2011).   
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Multinational federal political systems recognise that the constituent nations that form 
part of the state have both a right to sustain their distinct cultures as well as a right to self-
government. In this way, the model of multinational federalism in accommodating, 
promoting and recognising diversity, in institutionalising plurinationality and in providing 
self-government institutions to minority groups can implement many of the fundamental 
principles identified by liberal nationalists (Máiz, 2004: 75). Multinational federalism is 
seen as being able to contribute to and even achieve the task undertaken by liberal 
nationalists – to reconcile the phenomena of nationalism and liberalism – and according to 
Kymlicka (2002: 31) is able to tame, domesticate and pacify sub-state nationalist forces. 
Burgess (2006: 129), despite tempering the language used by Kymlicka, generally agrees 
with this assertion, noting that while multinational federalism is not a panacea to all 
problems encountered by plurinational states (a point I will return to shortly), ‘it alone 
displays the hallmark of a constitutional commitment … to channel and canalise 
[nationalism] in forms of peaceful, deliberative discourse where claims can be put on the 
table, recognised, examined, discussed, negotiated and ultimately answered’. Máiz (2004: 
64) argues along the same lines, suggesting that multinational federalism, in committing 
itself to promoting peace and stability, individual and groups rights, democracy, economic 
prosperity and equality, thus ‘supports the possibility of [a] peaceful, politically complex 
but economically cohesive and culturally enriching coexistence’.  
Nevertheless, while multinational federalism has received increased academic 
attention in recent years (Burgess and Pinder 2007; Gagnon 2010; Keil 2013; Requejo 2005; 
Seymour and Gagnon 2012), the term remains both ‘descriptive and contested’ (Keil, 2013: 
29). In addition to this, despite the theory’s commitment to promoting diversity, recognising 
difference, protecting minorities and thus deepening democracy, it is not a panacea to the 
many intractable challenges that evolve in plurinational states.  
 
3.2.3 The Problems of Multinational Federalism 
Multinational federalism constructs states using many of the theoretical foundations 
developed by liberal nationalists related to issues of pluralism, tolerance, protection and 
respect. Very few would deny that multinational federalism is a cleverly designed 
institutional approach to accommodating diversity, managing different nationalities and 
recognising and legally protecting minorities. The discussions pertaining to liberal 
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nationalism that developed in the 1990s and more recently those on multinational 
federalism, have, however, been overwhelmingly descriptive. Nevertheless, scholars such 
as Michael Burgess, Alain Gagnon, Soeren Keil, Wayne Norman and Ferran Requejo have 
sought to further develop the theory of multinational federalism and imbue it with analytical 
value. These scholars have drawn upon numerous examples of plurinational states including, 
inter alia, Belgium, Bosnia, Canada and Spain in order to demonstrate what multinational 
federalism and federation means. However, despite the valiant efforts of such esteemed 
political scientists, multinational federalism largely remains a descriptive term. For Burgess 
(2012b: 42), the concept of multinational federalism is ‘highly problematic’, because 
although ‘we know what some of its properties are…it remains unclear and uncertain just 
how far we can take this concept in order to translate it into practical reality’. Keil’s work 
on Bosnia (2010; 2013) has attempted to further develop our understanding regarding the 
empirical reality of multinational federalism. He argues that while it is a truism that 
multinational federalism ‘remains a mainly descriptive term’, there are certain features 
immanent to a multinational federal political system that can be identified and help deepen 
our understanding of the theory in general (Keil, 2013: 43). Keil (2010: 78-79) identifies 
such features as: 
1. Federalism in plurinational states is undergirded by liberal values concerned with 
preserving diversity, ethnonational justice, equality of opportunities and trust 
between different national groups and the state.  
2. Multinational federalism is a voluntary organisation.  
3. Federalism and democracy are mutually reinforcing in a multinational federation. 
4. Multinational federalism’s concern with recognition, autonomy and participation 
should be reinforced using elements of consociationalism.  
5. A multinational federation must be inclusive. This means providing institutional 
apparatus for minorities as well as promoting a commitment to and identification 
with the state as a whole. 
The features detailed above demonstrate the intimate connection between many of the 
normative principles discussed by liberal nationalists and the theory of multinational 
federalism. Among the genus of political models, multinational federal political systems 
stand out for their commitment to accommodating diversity, developing democracy and 
furthermore empowering political collectives. According to Burgess (2015a: 182), 
multinational federation is an important political model because it seeks to ‘confront the sort 
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of challenges that are extremely difficult for political systems to process peacefully’. 
However, while multinational federal political systems do exist, the viability of the concept 
of multinational federalism remains under the spotlight. This is because, as pointed out by 
McRoberts (2001b: 711), ‘while many states are multinational in their composition very few 
of them actually function as multinational states’. Indeed, Burgess (2015a: 183) draws upon 
examples such as Malaysia, Nigeria, Russia and Spain to illustrate the many ‘conceptual and 
theoretical pitfalls and problems’ inherent to the terms ‘multinational federation’ and 
‘multinational democracy’.  
 
3.2.3.1 Managing Secession 
An issue, which in the parlance of Burgess would straddle both theoretical and 
empirical pitfalls, is the question of secession. Liberal nationalists advocate using territorial 
autonomy to accommodate the self-determination demands of national minorities, providing 
apparatus to enable them to not merely survive, but flourish, protect and promote their own 
interests and sense of self. Through using territorial autonomy, which as the previous chapter 
attests comes in various guises, liberal nationalists believe that minority groups can properly 
function and develop within the already defined parameters of existing states. However, 
while liberal nationalists support a decentralised design for plurinational states, there is 
ongoing debate among such theorists and scholars regarding secession.  
Secession is an indisputable challenge in plurinational states and there seems to be 
general agreement that most, if not all, plurinational federal political systems ‘live in the 
shadow of secession’ (Keil and Anderson, 2018: 96). Indeed, according to Pavković and 
Radan (2007: 14), all attempts (both failed and successful) at secession in the last century 
have taken place in plurinational states. As aforementioned, not all federal political systems 
encounter the issue of secession, particularly because many of the core problems found in 
these plurinational states are different from their mononational counterparts. For liberal 
nationalists, plurinational states should be designed in such a way that the very idea of 
secession is not only discouraged, but seen as unnecessary (Máiz, 2004: 74-75). This 
emanates from the one of the central tenets of liberal nationalism that minority nations are 
able to achieve just recognition and accommodation within a properly designed and 
functioning plurinational state so that little has to be gained from pursuing secession. For 
Kymlicka (2000: 215): 
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Relatively little would change if Flanders, Scotland or Quebec were to become 
independent states. In traditional nation-states, where all decisions are made in 
forums where the dominant group forms a majority, and where all public 
institutions throughout the territory of the state operate in the majority language, 
secession would involve radical changes. It would entail dramatic changes in the 
distribution of power between majority and minority, and in the language of 
schools, media, courts, government services, and in national symbols. In 
multinational federations, however, the self-governing national minority already 
has its language used as the main language of public institutions, it already has 
its symbols adopted at the sub-state level, and already is the dominant group in 
its self-governing territory. As a result, national minorities gain comparatively 
less by seceding from a multinational federation than they would be seceding 
from a traditional nation-state. There is relatively little that an independent 
Flanders or Quebec could do which they cannot do now as self-governing regions 
within Belgium or Canada.  
  
The point articulated by Kymlicka above relates to the issues of citizenship and loyalty 
in plurinational states. Given the different peoples resident within a plurinational polity, the 
architecture of the state must not only ensure that the minority identities of its citizenry are 
protected, recognised and respected, but moreover, that some form of allegiance or loyalty, 
concomitant with the identity of the state is also fostered (Máiz, 2000: 43).35 For Karmis and 
Norman (2005: 17), nurturing the different identities and loyalties of the citizens to both 
their regional units and the federal state as a whole is critical to ensure that multinational 
federalism is not a mere staging post to territorial independence. However, while there is 
broad agreement amongst liberal nationalists that multinational federations are preferable to 
granting each minority group an independent state, there is ongoing debate regarding the 
moral justification of a right to secede in liberal democracies and whether such a right should 
be constitutionalised.  
While it is a truism that liberal nationalists advocate territorial autonomy to 
accommodate minority nationalists and their self-determination demands, some scholars 
have broadened these debates to include discussions on external self-determination. 
Territorial autonomy, argue liberal nationalists, should be designed in such a way as to 
discourage secessionism, but this, contend some, cannot always be guaranteed. Kymlicka 
(2002: 31) writes, for instance, that plurinational states cannot assume that the 
institutionalisation of some form of self-government for minority groups will guarantee that 
plurinational federal political systems ‘will stay together in perpetuity’. Indeed, Kymlicka 
(2001a: 113) has identified one of the principal paradoxes of multinational federalism: ‘the 
                                                 
35 For a more detailed discussion on the issue of citizenship and loyalty in plurinational states see Keil (2013: 
47-48). 
72 
 
very success of [multinational] federalism in accommodating self-government may simply 
encourage national minorities to seek secession’, continuing that ‘secession becomes more 
conceivable, and a more salient option, even with the best designed federal institutions’.36 
While Kymlicka is relatively open concerning the ‘dangers’ of self-government 
apparatus within a plurinational federal political system being used to gain independence, 
most scholars, even those in favour of constitutionalising a right to secession, believe that a 
properly designed plurinational system should be constructed in such a way as to dissuade 
would-be secessionists. Norman (2006: 175) notes, however, that while such plurinational 
political systems should be designed to discourage secessionism, ‘when this is not 
successful’, the state in question should allow ‘for the possibility of secession in accordance 
with norms of democracy, justice and rule of law’. Nonetheless, this is not a widely held 
view among all scholars associated with the liberal nationalist brand. As Gagnon (2015: 
148-149) puts it, ‘even for scholars who are sensitive to the issues generated by contexts of 
deep diversity, there is a general reluctance to endorse a fully-fledged multinational 
approach founded on an external right of self-determination’.  
In the philosophical debates that have occurred since the 1990s, theories of secession 
have generally been categorised under two headings: ‘remedial right theories’ and ‘primary 
right theories’. In the former category, are situated scholars such as Allen Buchanan (1991; 
1995; 1998; 2003; 2013) and Anthony Birch (1984) whose ‘just cause’ theories of secession 
take a cautious and constrained approach towards the issue. For these scholars, there is no a 
priori right to secession. Secession may be mutually negotiated between the secessionist 
territory and the state, but any right to secede from a ‘just’ state can only be defended if 
related to a series of conditions which focus on injustice suffered by the seceding territory 
at the hands of the parent state. Secession is a remedy of last resort. 
Primary right theorists, on the other hand, consider secession as a fundamental right 
belonging to specific groups. There are two principal variants of primary right theories: the 
ascriptivist (nationalist) theory and the associative (plebiscitary/choice) theory. The 
ascriptivist camp, which justifies the right of secession based on certain features of an 
encompassing group (for instance, a nation), is associated with several liberal nationalist 
scholars, such as Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz (1990), David Miller (1995; 1997) and 
Kai Nielsen (1993; 1998). For these philosophers, nations, owing to their legitimacy as 
                                                 
36 The ‘paradox of autonomy’ will be discussed in the next section. 
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political subjects, are important in providing context for the identities of those who make up 
the collective, and are thus endowed with a right of secession. Those ascribing to an 
ascriptivist interpretation of secession, however, argue that while under the auspices of this 
theory all nations are entitled to their own state, not all nations are required to exercise this 
right; autonomy is often enough for a nation’s desire to exercise its right to self-
determination. As such, while those ascribing to an ascriptivist interpretation of secession 
advocate the institutionalisation of a general right to secession, they do not believe that all 
groups entitled to such a right would necessarily choose to secede, nor that such a decision 
should be taken lightly; certain conditions and qualifications are attached to the primary 
right.37  
The second group, those ascribing to the associative theory of secession, endorse a 
voluntary justification for secession. These scholars, which include Harry Beran (1984; 
1987; 1998), David Copp (1998), Daniel Philpott (1995; 1998) and Christopher Wellman 
(1995; 2005), view the state as a voluntary association of which citizens are free to enter and 
thus free to leave. Associative theories of secession differ from the aforementioned remedial 
and ascriptive theories because the seceding territories do not have to demonstrate that they 
are the victims of any injustice (as in the remedial rights theory) nor do they have to have a 
special claim to the territory they inhabit or be required to share common culture, history 
and language with their fellow secessionists (as in the ascriptive theory). Instead, a 
territorially concentrated group need only demonstrate that a majority of the members of a 
specific geographically located collective are in favour of secession, either through a 
referendum, plebiscitary elections or a decision taken in a representative institution. As with 
those advocating an ascriptive right to secede, associative theorists also adjoin certain 
caveats to the theory, such that the seceding territory is able to perform the previous political 
functions carried out by the state or that the previous state’s ability to continue to function 
is not undermined by the secession.  
Having given a brief overview of the principal theories of secession that dominate the 
academic literature, it is important to situate these theories in the debate on liberal 
nationalism, multinational federalism as well as the wider debate of this thesis on the 
accommodation of diversity in plurinational democracies. Earlier in this chapter, I detailed 
                                                 
37 Examples of such conditions include, but are not limited to, the minimisation of harm to third parties 
(including the parent state); the new state must be politically and economically viable and new minorities 
created as a result of the secession must not suffer at the hands of the new majority. 
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the differences between liberalism I and liberalism II, whereby the former focuses on a 
commitment to individual rights while the latter extends this focus to include consideration 
of collective freedoms. Requejo and Sanjaume (2015) extend and consolidate the established 
typology of secessionist theories detailed above, illuminating the theories which fall under 
the liberalism I and liberalism II categories. In addition, the authors draw attention to more 
recent theories of secession by other liberal nationalists whose discussions on secession have 
bridged the main tenets of liberalism I and II.  
According to Requejo and Sanjaume (ibid: 110), remedial right theories are herded 
under liberalism I since they display the hallmarks of individualism, universalism and 
statism. They point out, for example, that despite Buchanan’s acknowledgement of the 
importance of nations, his requirement that the burden of proof lies with minorities illustrates 
the bias of the theory in favour of the state. Ascriptive and associative theories, on the other 
hand, are seen as developing and endorsing some of the principles underlined by liberalism 
II. While neither ascriptive or associative theories are without their problems, the 
understanding that individual and collective rights are mutually reinforcing as well as, in the 
case of ascriptive theories, the acknowledgement of the importance of culture and identity, 
align them with those endorsing a liberalism II position.  
Since the initial debate begun by Buchanan in the 1990s, more recent theories of 
secession primarily concerned with plurinational democracies have emerged. These 
consider issues such as ‘ethnocultural justice and minority self-government as crucial 
elements of state legitimacy’ and are thus included ‘in the list of just grievances legitimising 
secession’ (Perez and Sanjaume, 2013: 6). These theorists, which include Alan Patten (2002) 
and Michel Seymour (2007), blend arguments from both remedial right theories and primary 
right theories, and thus liberalism I and II, viewing secession as a remedy of last resort, but 
simultaneously widening the justifications to defend a secessionist approach, sensitive to the 
importance of respect, recognition and accommodation of diversity in plurinational 
democracies. 
Michel Seymour (2007) subscribes to the ascriptive understanding of nationhood, 
arguing that the importance of nations in providing a context for identities and self-
development in turn renders them entitled to a special right of self-determination. For 
Seymour (ibid: 396), all nations should have a general primary right to internal self-
determination, that is, ‘the right to develop itself economically, socially and culturally and 
to determine its own political status within the encompassing state’. However, while 
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Seymour, in contrast to Buchanan, believes that nations are unique and essential to the 
development of a person’s culture and individual well-being, he concurs with Buchanan that 
secession is a remedial right, to be pursued only if a certain group has suffered injustice. In 
line with his support for plurinational democracies and thus liberalism II, Seymour (ibid: 
411) broadens the original injustices identified by Buchanan (such as infringement of human 
rights or unjust annexation) to include the accommodation of national diversity; minority 
nations have a right to secede if the parent state ‘fails to grant them internal self-
determination’.  
Alan Patten (2002) also offers a middle ground approach between remedial and 
primary right, particularly associative, secessionist theories. Patten’s approach 
fundamentally disagrees with the associative theory detailed above, contending that ‘we 
cannot conclude that a democratic mandate won by a national minority generates a right to 
secede’ (ibid: 566). He posits that secession cannot take place from a just (in Patten’s 
parlance, ‘perfect’) state because no democratic conditions have been violated. Instead, his 
criterion to justify secession follows those set out by Buchanan, with particular focus on the 
infringement of minimal justice, as well as the ‘failure-of-recognition’ clause proposed by 
Patten. He opines that in plurinational states, in which citizens often endorse a bifurcated 
sense of identity, the democratic state must seek to prioritise and accommodate these 
different identities, including the conferral of self-governing powers. The failure of the state 
‘to introduce meaningful constitutional arrangements that recognise the distinct national 
identity of (some) members of the secessionist group’, would thus justify this group’s claim 
to secession (ibid). In a similar vein to Seymour, Patten’s theory concerns plurinational 
states, in which different and at times competing notions of identity exist. To illustrate his 
point, he even draws upon both cases under study in this thesis, demonstrating that different 
conceptions of identity are a fact of life in plurinational states and thus secessionist theories 
must take such facts into consideration (ibid: 564).  
 
3.2.3.2 The Paradox of Autonomy 
As alluded to earlier, one of the prominent paradoxes of multinational federalism is 
that ‘the very same institutions that appear to be able to calm secession, reduce or eliminate 
the possibility of conflict and manage diversity, might actually work in the opposite intended 
direction’ (Anderson, 2010: 131). This ‘paradox of autonomy’ has generated considerable 
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research in the academic literature (see Anderson 2004; 2010; Cederman et al 2015; Erk and 
Anderson 2010; Lustick et al 2004; McGarry and O’Leary 2007; Saideman et al 2002), but 
the debate remains inconclusive.38 With scholars on both side of the debate able to draw 
upon ample empirical evidence to substantiate the various secession-inducing and secession-
preventing hypotheses, the paradox remains ‘one of the central conundrums of federal 
theory’ (Cameron, 2010: 115).  
On one side of the debate are situated a group of scholars who posit that autonomy 
alleviates ethnic divisions, mitigates (violent) conflict, removes contentious issues from the 
political agenda, appeases peripheral nationalists and thus maintains the territorial integrity 
of the state (Bermeo 2002; Brancati 2009; Ghai 2000a; Gurr 2000; Hechter 2000; Kaufman 
1996; Lustick et al 2004; Stepan 1999; Wolff 2009a). Drawing upon plurinational, 
pluricultural and plurilingual states such as Belgium, Canada, India and Switzerland these 
scholars posit that autonomy structures have provided minorities with extensive self-
government, helping to alleviate ethnonational grievances between minority and majority 
communities and have abated, although not completely prevented, secessionism. Building 
on the success of these cases, proponents of autonomy thus herald autonomy as an effective 
tool of conflict resolution, crucial to securing peace and establishing and consolidating 
democracy in countries throughout the world, such as Bosnia, as well as ongoing 
conversations in countries like Myanmar. 
On the other side, however, are a number of academics who caution against this 
optimism. In their view, autonomy freezes ethnic identities, fosters opportunities for 
conflict, whets the appetite of would-be secessionists and ultimately provides institutions 
that make secession much easier to achieve (Brubaker 1996; Bunce 1999; Cornell 2002; 
Dorff 1994; Hale 2004; Roeder 2010; Snyder 2000). The historical case of the former 
Yugoslavia as well as the cases of Colombia, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Sudan lend credence to 
the perverse effects of autonomy as espoused by these authors.39 Moreover, the cases under 
study in this thesis demonstrate that rather than abate secessionism in the UK and Spain, 
autonomous structures may have contributed to bolstering confidence in going it alone.  
The inconclusive nature of the paradox alongside the cascade of opposing results 
generated by research of the puzzle have shown that there appears to be no single formula 
                                                 
38 In the academic literature, the paradox is more commonly known as ‘the paradox of federalism’ (Erk and 
Anderson 2010).  
39 For more on this, see the discussion on the paradox of autonomy in Keil and Anderson (2018: 95-99). 
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to accommodate diversity, manage difference and ensure stability of the political system. 
Relevant to this thesis, however, is a discussion about under what conditions autonomy 
works well not only to prevent secession, but to provide institutional apparatus to 
accommodate, empower and recognise national minorities.  
Erk and Anderson (2010: 6) identify several dimensions which they believe could ‘tip 
the federal balance in the secession-inducing or secession-preventing direction’, including 
‘the will and capacity’ of sub-state units to secede and ‘the overall design of the federal 
system’. On the former, the authors note that whereas a lack of self-rule increases the will 
to secede but hinders capacity, under federal arrangements the capacity to secede increases 
(because of extensive self-governing powers and structures) but owing to such 
accommodation, the political will to do so is often markedly reduced. Institutional design is 
also important and relates to factors such as boundaries, number of federal units, the division 
of competences, representation of minorities in central institutions and the inclusion of 
secession clauses in the constitution. Erk and Anderson argue that the division of the federal 
state into multiple units, as opposed to just two or three, the design of the electoral system 
(proportional over majoritarian) and the role of the judiciary in constitutional matters affect 
the success of autonomy in inducing or preventing secession.  
McGarry and O’Leary (2009: 20) share a similar line of argumentation and further the 
debate by identifying certain features that they believe ‘are conducive to the success of 
plurinational federations’. Such features include the inclusion of minorities at the centre 
through shared rule mechanisms, the division of the state into more than two federal units 
and the development of power-sharing, namely consociational, institutions and devices 
(ibid). In this regard, McGarry and O’Leary posit that states must move beyond self-rule 
mechanisms and instead institutionalise shared rule as well as power-sharing devices to 
ensure better accommodation of minorities within the state. This, as will be further 
developed in the proceeding section, is particularly pertinent in an examination of the UK 
and Spain which have focused on the development of self-rule at the expense of other shared 
rule mechanisms.  
The discussions thus far, with a focus on liberal nationalism and multinational 
federalism, has underlined the importance ascribed to the accommodation of diversity in 
plurinational states. This, as has been argued, is not merely important in relation to providing 
institutional apparatus to decrease the potential attractiveness of territorial independence, 
but is equally important in meeting the requisites of plurinational justice, including a model 
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of autonomy that empowers rather than contains minorities. In this vein, increasing the 
presence of national minorities in central state institutions and engendering a more inclusive 
style of government are hailed as important mechanisms imbued with the ability to satisfy 
minority and majority concerns vis-à-vis accommodation and abating the threat of secession 
for the later. A central premise of this thesis, therefore, is that plurinational states must move 
beyond self-rule structures – albeit, these are a necessary starting block – to institutionalise 
a more effective and appropriate set of institutional measures, modelled on power-sharing 
systems. Such moves would work to further deepen and entrench democracy, foster inter-
group cooperation and cohesion and prevent territorial disintegration.  
The proceeding section of this chapter analyses a range of power-sharing theories that 
are used to address the many contentious issues that pervade divided societies, paying 
particular attention to consociationalism given its pedigree in debates on stabilising divided 
societies. The rationale behind this is twofold. In drawing upon power-sharing theories, 
some of which are accompanied by a range of real-life examples, we are able to move the 
debate beyond abstract discussions and add to the analytical value of these theoretical 
endeavours. Second, liberal nationalists have often failed to fully explore the inclusion of 
minorities in the architecture of central government. This is not to deny the importance that 
some scholars have assigned to developing effective methods of shared rule for minority 
groups, as identified by Kymlicka and others above. However, in analysing other theories 
and mechanisms used to address diversity issues and manage competing nation-building 
projects, it may be possible to counter some of the identified shortcomings of multinational 
federalism, paying particular attention to the secession issue. There is a certain element of 
truth in Kymlicka’s (2000: 207) assertion that it is wrong to measure the success of 
plurinational states in accommodating and recognising diversity by the absence of 
secessionist movements. However, it is also true that ‘the prevalence of secessionist 
movements suggests that contemporary states have not developed effective means for 
accommodating national minorities’ (Kymlicka, 2001a: 92).  
 
3.3 Theories of Power-Sharing 
So far in this chapter I have examined the theories of liberal nationalism and 
multinational federalism as well as some of the thorny issues inherent in adopting a 
multinational federal approach, such as managing secessionism and the paradox of 
79 
 
autonomy. The liberal nationalist approach provides an interesting argument for the 
marriage of the concepts of liberalism and nationalism, underlining Isiah Berlin’s (1980: 
355) prophetic statement that ‘no political movement today, at any rate outside the western 
world, seems likely to succeed unless it allies itself to nationalist sentiments’. However, 
while liberal nationalists have predominantly focused on territorial autonomy, it is important 
to widen the debate and examine other institutional approaches used to accommodate 
minorities within plurinational contexts. Indeed, some scholars have already argued that 
territorial autonomy in combination with power-sharing arrangements, which involves 
ethnonational groups having influence over decisions made at the central level, are more 
effective in accommodating diversity, alleviating grievances and helping to increase their 
sense of self and security within the parameters of the extant plurinational state (Cederman 
et al 2015; Cordell and Wolff 2016; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Wolff 2009a). 
Power-sharing, contends Esman (2004: 178), ‘is an inherently accommodative set of 
attitudes, processes, and institutions, in which the art of governance becomes a matter of 
bargaining, conciliating, and compromising the aspirations and grievances of its ethnic 
communities’. There are a number of different theories under the heading ‘power-sharing’, 
including, consociationalism, centripetalism, power-dividing and complex power-sharing. 
These theories, while they differ in their prescriptions, share a similar aim: ‘to craft 
institutions which facilitate the (re)building of trust between groups and in the institutions 
by which they govern themselves and which consolidate democracy and stability within a 
divided society’ (Yakinthou and Wolff, 2012: 6). This commitment to minority inclusion 
and constructive management has made power-sharing ‘the international communities’ 
preferred remedy for building peace and democracy’ (Rothchild and Roeder, 2005: 3).  
 
3.3.1 Consociationalism   
Consociationalism is a power-sharing strategy that ensures the representation and 
participation of all major societal groups in government.40 It is most closely associated with 
the work of Arend Lijphart (1968; 1969; 1977; 2002; 2004) and more recently John McGarry 
and Brendan O’Leary (2004; 2006; 2016). Consociationalism is the most widely applied 
                                                 
40 There is a debate between what has been termed ‘corporate consociationalism’ and ‘liberal 
consociationalism’. The nuances of the debate are not important for the discussion here, although it is worth 
noting that the main scholars discussed here – Arend Lijphart, John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary – identify 
themselves as liberal consociationalists. For more information on the debate see McCulloch (2014).  
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power-sharing model, found in numerous places, inter alia, Belgium, Bosnia, Burundi, 
Northern Ireland and Switzerland. In being so widely applied, it is also, therefore, the most 
widely criticised. Its proponents, however, argue that such critiques do not detract from the 
efficacy of consociationalism in managing ethnic tensions and resolving political disputes. 
McGarry and O’Leary (2006: 43) write, for instance, that the success of consociationalism 
is such that it is ‘one of the most influential theories in comparative politics’, while for Wolff 
(2011: 37), it remains the most appealing approach because it ‘is a truly … democratic 
strategy of conflict management in divided societies’.  
Lijphart’s initial engagement with the concept of consociational democracy drew upon 
the pillarised political system of his native country, the Netherlands. The Dutch system, 
divided along ideological and religious lines – Catholic, Protestant, Socialist and Liberal – 
was interpreted by Lijphart (1968: 112) as a system designed to accommodate different 
groups, ensuring a segmented but stable democracy. In subsequent works, including his 
oeuvre, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration, Lijphart extended the 
consociational approach beyond the Netherlands and engaged with more fragmented 
societies, including Belgium, Cyprus, Lebanon, Malaysia and Northern Ireland. Lijphart’s 
consociational theory is undergirded by two principal characteristics: grand coalition and 
segmental autonomy, and two secondary attributes: proportionality and minority veto. 
Together, these elements provide a model to ensure ‘the best kind of democracy that can 
realistically be expected’ in deeply divided societies (Lijphart, 1977: 48).  
One of the primary foci of the consociational model is elite cooperation, whereby 
representatives from each societal segment share executive and decision-making power in 
grand coalitions at the centre (ibid: 25-26). In deeply divided societies, often characterised 
by feelings of animosity, fear, mistrust and suspicion, cooperation at the elite level is 
considered key to ensure a collaborative, consensual and trustworthy democratic 
environment. Moreover, in involving all societal groups at the centre, consociational 
democracy guarantees all groups a stake in the political decision-making apparatus, thus 
preventing the perils of majoritarianism and dampening secessionist aspirations (McGarry 
and O’Leary, 2016: 251).  
The second attribute of consociationalism refers to one of the primary tools 
championed by liberal nationalists, ‘self-rule’, or in Lijphart’s parlance, ‘segmental 
autonomy’. Autonomy may take the shape of both territorial and non-territorial forms and 
should be designed to ensure that each minority group has a significant measure of control 
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over its internal affairs, thus enabling them to institutionalise and secure their sense of 
distinctiveness (Lijphart, 1977: 42). In giving minority groups power to make policies in 
those areas that they consider critical for their own self-preservation, ‘the contentiousness 
of politics at the centre’ is lowered, stability maintained and opportunities for intercommunal 
conflict markedly reduced (Yakinthou and Wolff, 2012: 5). 
Proportionality is the third characteristic of a consociational democracy. This ensures 
that the groups present in the executive are proportionally represented not only in parliament 
and government, but also in other key public institutions such as the civil service, judiciary, 
police and military. In addition, whilst Lijphart supports proportionality at an institutional 
level, he also advocates for the proportionality principle to be applied to both public 
resources and budgetary expenditure (Lijphart, 1977: 38). Moreover, consociationalists 
favour a proportional voting system to ensure than the share of seats a party receives is 
commensurate with the share of support given by the electorate. There is debate among 
consociationalists over which electoral system is best, Lijphart (2004), for instance, suggests 
the adoption of a proportional list system, whereas O’Leary (2005) favours a proportional 
preferential system, such as the Single Transferrable Vote.41  
Finally, consociationalism affords minority elites a veto power to protect their most 
vital interests from being adversely affected by executive decisions. The veto is described 
by Lijphart (1977: 37) as a ‘potential weapon’ that gives minorities ‘a complete guarantee 
of political protection’. Lijphart acknowledges that the mutual veto is open to criticism, 
given that it may be employed to obstruct democratic procedures and political deadlock may 
ensue. He argues, however, that such critiques must be tempered by the fact that possession 
of the veto is often enough to give minorities a sense of security and thus prevent its use. 
Additionally, Lijphart points out that it is a mutual veto; it can also be turned against a 
minority who use it.  
Notwithstanding the enthusiasm and popularity of the consociation model, it is one of 
the most critiqued theories, often by scholars in the centripetal camp who despite sharing 
the same concerns as consociationalists, advocate alternative mechanisms to manage 
ethnonational divisions. Donald Horowitz, the most famous proponent of the centripetalist 
approach, is an indefatigable critic of consociational democracy. He believes that the 
theory’s reliance on elite cooperation is ‘extremely dubious’, while the overall approach is 
                                                 
41 For more on electoral design and power-sharing systems see Reilly (2002) and Wolff (2005).  
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‘motivationally inadequate’ (Horowitz, 2002: 20-21).42 Lijphart (2002: 40), himself, 
provides a neat summary of many of the critiques of his consociationalist theory: 
1. It is not entirely democratic. 
2. Its ability to work in practice is flawed. 
3. It fails because it does not provide incentives to ensure moderation in the behaviour 
of societal groups. 
4. Its focus on autonomy does not remove the secessionist issue from the agenda and 
could even precipitate a slippery slope to secession and/or partition. 
5. It reinforces rather than weakens differences, including the reification of ethnic, 
linguistic and/or religious identities. 
6. It is a model created in the west more suited to European and North American 
societies than divided multiethnic states in other parts of the world. 
Many of these critiques are rebuked by Lijphart in the chapter cited above (ibid: 41-
46) and have been equally rebuffed by other consociational scholars (see O’Leary 2005: 8-
12). While it is beyond the brief of this chapter to analyse the intricacies of such critiques, it 
is worth noting that the most common response by consociationalists is that consociational 
democracy, although not without its flaws, is the most realistic response to ensuring 
democratic politics in a divided society. Societies torn apart by such conflict have to be 
rebuilt and through advocating elite cooperation and engendering a consensual and 
collaborative environment, consociational democracy is touted as the conflict-resolving 
strategy capable of doing this. As detailed in Chapter Two, governments, whether of an 
authoritarian or democratic hue, have numerous tools at their disposal when it comes to 
managing ethnonational diversity. For consociationalists, then, the institutionalisation of a 
consociational democracy prevents the use of undemocratic alternatives, including sustained 
conflict, genocide, forced expulsion or imposed partition. As O’Leary (2005: 9) contends, 
the choice is often not between consociational arrangements or a majoritarian democracy, 
but between ‘consociational democracy and no (worthwhile) democracy at all’. 
 
                                                 
42 For a full list of Horowitz’ critiques of consociationalism see Horowitz (1985; 1991; 2002). See also Reilly 
(2001).  
83 
 
3.3.2 Other Theories of Power-Sharing 
Consociationalism, given its popularity and success in several countries in all corners 
of the world, is often held up as the prototypical model of power-sharing. Other theories, 
nonetheless, have been developed by scholars as a reaction to the focus on consociationalism 
and while they share the same concerns – managing diversity, preventing further conflict 
and stabilising the political system – they offer alternative strategies for how these aims are 
to be achieved. In this section, I focus on three alternative theories of power-sharing: 
centripetalism, which eschews focus on elite-representation and instead encourages 
cooperation among ethnic communities; power-dividing, which, akin to centripetalism, 
favours weakening ethnic pillarisation and promotes cross-community support by replacing 
ethnic divisions with economic and cultural interests, and finally, complex power-sharing, 
which is a hybrid model of power-sharing that promotes moving focus beyond one specific 
strategy and advocates combining different mechanisms from the abovementioned theories.  
Centripetalism rejects the elite driven approach advocated by consociationalists and 
instead seeks to ‘depoliticise ethnicity’ in order to ensure a stable, cooperative, 
accommodative and moderate political system in which no community enjoys a privileged 
status (Reilly, 2016: 280).43 Donald Horowitz (1985; 1991; 1993; 2002) and Benjamin 
Reilly (2001; 2002; 2006; 2016) are the scholars most closely associated with the 
centripetalist approach. These scholars support moving focus away from the periphery and 
towards the centre (thus reducing the salience of ethnonational differences) and incentivising 
politicians into endorsing broader, centrist and more moderate policy platforms. The former 
is achieved through the organisation of political parties along multiethnic as opposed to 
solely ethnic lines as well as the formation of pre-election, multiethnic coalitions, while the 
latter comes as a result of a preferential, majoritarian electoral system.  
The power-dividing approach, advocated by Donald Rothchild and Philip Roeder 
(2005; see also Roeder 2005; 2012 and Rothchild 2008), is presented as an alternative 
approach to both consociationalism and centripetalism.44 These scholars posit that power-
sharing approaches are unequivocally essential in securing short-term peace and stability in 
divided societies, but owing to their focus on ethnicity, whether as a characteristic of 
differentiation (consociationalism) or as a less salient but still important factor 
                                                 
43 Centripetalism is also known as the integration(ist), integrative or incentives approach.  
44 This is also known as the multiple majorities approach (Roeder 2012). 
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(centripetalism), fail to secure an enduring, long-term strategy. The power-dividing 
approach is thus presented as ‘a strategy that avoids the monopolism of any single mode of 
representation’, whereby no ethnonational identity is privileged above another and power is 
dispersed both horizontally and vertically so that it is not concentrated in the hands of the 
few (Roeder, 2012: 68). Power-dividing does not support the institutional recognition or 
privileging of any ethnonational groups and instead advocates extensive human rights bills 
to protect all individuals irrespective of ethnic origin, mother-tongue or religion. The 
creation of different civil society and private spheres so that no one ethnonational group 
dominates (i.e. creating ‘multiple majorities’) and the institutionalisation of a presidential 
and bicameral system so as to ensure an effective set of checks and balances on the 
government, is considered essential. 
So far, I have examined three separate yet overlapping approaches to power-sharing 
in ethnically diverse societies. In more recent years, however, several scholars have pointed 
out that power-sharing models need not be limited to one overarching approach (Kettley et 
al 2001; O’Leary 2005; Weller 2008; Weller and Metzger 2008; Wolff 2007; 2009a; 2009b; 
Wolff and Cordell 2016). Instead, power-sharing models should be more ‘complex’, that is, 
involve a range of varying approaches in order to achieve the best arrangements for the 
societal groups involved. Weller (2008: xiii-xiv) defines complex power-sharing as: 
A solution where there is a complex layering of public authority, both 
horizontally and vertically. This will include autonomous structures. This is 
matched by the application of consociationalist techniques such as governmental 
power-sharing, guaranteed parliamentary representation for the minority, veto 
rights for ethnic communities or ethno-territorial entities, the granting of 
minority rights and agreements on the transfer of economic resources. In 
addition, there is an element of international involvement in the negotiation and 
implementation of the settlement, and in post-conflict governance.  
  
The complex power-sharing approach builds upon the limitations of other power-
sharing strategies by using a broad range of conflict ameliorating mechanisms. The scholarly 
orthodoxy has tended to remain focused on the consociation-centripetalism dichotomy, yet 
as the power-dividing and complex power-sharing methods show, there are other 
arrangements available to respond to, sometimes more effectively, the challenges posed by 
ethnic conflict and political stability.  
In sum, there are several theories of power-sharing which akin to the liberal nationalist 
approach and theory of multinational federalism, seek to manage, promote and protect 
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diversity by democratic means in divided societies. One of the striking features of power-
sharing approaches is the emphasis on some form of territorial self-governance as a solution 
to the self-determination demands of minority groups. While this is also at the heart of the 
liberal nationalist approach, and thus is a fundamental feature of multinational federalism, 
the continued existence of secessionist groups in plurinational states alongside the 
intensification of demands for territorial independence has led to the questioning of the 
effectiveness of territorial autonomy on its own to provide a viable solution to the self-
determination aspirations and self-governance demands of minorities. It is becoming 
increasingly evident, therefore, as the theory of complex power-sharing illustrates, that to 
achieve a stable, just and democratic political system, bolstered by an accommodative and 
empowering model of autonomy, territorial autonomy should be combined with other 
management mechanisms such as power-sharing arrangements. This would ensure minority 
groups in plurinational contexts are not only (institutionally) recognised and accommodated, 
but moreover can meaningfully participate in the decision-making and political processes of 
central institutions.  
 
3.4 Forging a Coherent Model of Autonomy 
In a similar vein to a number of studies examining the existence and development of 
minority nations in plurinational states in the twenty first century, this research project 
started with a basic line of enquiry: to what extent can plurinational states accommodate 
their internal diversity? In recent decades, the locus of power has shifted away from national 
states both upwards to supranational bodies and downwards to sub-state units (Keating 
2008). Minority nations, however, in spite of their increasing presence and prominence, 
currently ‘live in an age of great uncertainty’ (Gagnon, 2014: 94). This uncertainty is a result 
of ‘the fate of minority nations always brought into question by their predicament, namely 
how to coexist with other minority nations and/or how to coexist with the majority nation in 
one state’ (Burgess, 2015a: 181). Scotland and Catalonia are cases in point.  
In only a short number of years, the political landscapes of Scotland and Catalonia 
have been radically altered. Since the near-death experience of the union in 2014, the UK 
has continued to experience an existential crisis about the future direction of the three-
hundred-year-old union. Impelled to articulate a positive vision of the historic political 
partnership, pro-union supporters only narrowly managed to secure a majority vote against 
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secession. Despite need and desire for a significant period of constitutional calm, the 2016 
vote to leave the EU has reignited constitutional debate and poses a further threat to the 
union’s already continuing frailty. In Catalonia, constitutional turbulence has permeated 
relations between the Spanish and Catalan orders of government for more than a decade. 
The stalemate over holding a referendum, the intransigent approach taken by the Spanish 
state and ultimately the unilateral route pursued by the Catalan government, have polarised 
and impeded effective dialogue on constitutional debate. As a result of such developments, 
both Scotland and Catalonia, as well as their host states, are navigating unchartered 
constitutional waters. In light of this, it has become more imperative than ever before to look 
beyond extant models of autonomy to muster more effective, efficient, insightful and 
imaginative normative and institutional solutions to the accommodation of national 
minorities within plurinational states.  
This thesis, therefore, taking into account both normative and institutional 
considerations, discusses the development of a model tailored to the specific nuances of the 
Scottish and Catalan cases. This would not only require a firm commitment to territorial 
autonomy, but would concomitantly involve support for the accommodation, empowerment 
and recognition of national minorities. As the following chapters will show, recent 
developments in Scotland and Catalonia necessitate further thinking on this issue but 
simultaneously present a fortuitous opportunity to redress some of the limitations of extant 
autonomy models. In both cases, minority nations complain of a democratic deficit, the 
paucity of partnership vis-à-vis treatment as co-equal members of the state, the lack of 
commitment to further decentralisation and central governments’ intransigence and/or 
unwillingness to discuss, negotiate and respect the self-determining aspirations of national 
minorities. At the same time, it is equally important to address some of the principal 
concerns of the majority community, particularly those related to the tyranny of the minority 
and the lack of commitment and loyalty from the minority nations towards maintaining the 
stability and integrity of the state.  
On the normative level, the analysis contributes to the evolving intellectual debate 
about the accommodation and empowerment of minority nations in plurinational states. 
Previous research on territorial autonomy has tended to focus on institutional arrangements, 
that is the empirical reality of constitutional design, rather than the normative ideas that 
undergird such a system. It is a truism that analysis of institutions and the organisation of 
powers are valuable avenues of research, but at the same time, normative ideas, principles 
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and values must also be examined in order to fully comprehend the operation of plurinational 
federal political systems. It is for this reason, as was discussed in Chapter Two, that scholars 
such as Burgess (2006; 2012a) have insisted on unpacking the meaning of federalism and 
federation as terminologically intertwined yet separate concepts. This thesis thus follows 
suit, examining the institutional reality of constitutional design (such as autonomy, 
constitutions or power-sharing arrangements), as well as devoting attention to the numerous 
principles that buttress the plurinational, multilevel political system. In this vein, analysis of 
what may be termed a plurinational culture, that is, the values and principles that undergird 
and guide majority-minority relations, is crucial.  
The development of a plurinational political culture and commitment to the principles 
and values that underpin it is but one approach in the constitutional toolkit to accommodate 
ethnonational diversity in plurinational contexts. While the analysis in the proceeding 
chapters seeks to underline the importance of engaging in a more plurinationally sensitive 
way of thinking, due consideration of the institutional practices of the cases is also important. 
The implementation of a truly plurinational federal model, as discussed earlier, is considered 
key to ensure the empowerment of minority nations, eliminate the institutionalised 
dominance of majority communities while equally protecting the territorial integrity of the 
extant state. Autonomy is indisputably a powerful tool in the management of diverse and 
divided societies, but in silos it has failed to fully empower minority nations or maintain 
stability in the overarching state. It is imperative, therefore, that autonomy is considered and 
ultimately used in conjunction with other management mechanisms, as discussed in this 
theoretical framework, to ensure a more coherent, effective and flexible model for the 
accommodation of national minorities in heterogeneous plurinational states, including the 
UK and Spain.   
The theoretical framework that has been developed in this chapter will be used to 
analyse the two cases of the UK and Spain, specifically focusing on Scotland and Catalonia. 
First, I examine the plurinational credentials of the UK and Spain, with particular reference 
to the historical dimension of debates on diversity in these states and the competing 
nationalist projects within them. From this discussion, the theoretical debate on 
accommodating and respecting diversity – as advanced by liberal nationalist scholars – will 
then be considered, including analysis of how the UK and Spain have sought to 
accommodate the diversity of their states within a liberal democratic framework. Here, focus 
is on the main institutional tool endorsed by liberal nationalists: territorial autonomy. In both 
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cases, varying territorial arrangements have been rolled out over different periods of time in 
an attempt to accommodate the self-determination aspirations and demands of minority 
groups, as well as impede the secessionist tendencies held by some members of the national 
community. As will be developed, however, autonomy has not pacified all members of 
groups calling for secession and, in line with the paradox of autonomy discussed above, may 
have even contributed to increasing and intensifying the demands of pro-secessionist parties 
in both cases. To better understand the nuances of each case, each chapter unpacks the 
different autonomy arrangements in both the UK and Spain in relation to Scotland and 
Catalonia and analyses what exactly has or has not worked in relation to these self-
governance tools and secessionism. Finally, drawing upon the discussion on other methods 
used to manage competing nationalist projects and accommodate diversity, each chapter 
concludes with a discussion on potential future scenarios for territorial politics in these states 
as well as possible routes for reform to build on and improve existing arrangements. As this 
framework has shown, autonomy is but one tool in a congeries of mechanisms advocated to 
deal with diversity. It is important therefore, to examine the current flexibility of the 
autonomy settlements in each case and explore mechanisms other than those that have been 
used to address ongoing issues related to the accommodation of national minorities in 
plurinational states.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
I began this chapter analysing the theory of liberal nationalism. This theory, advocated 
by a number of scholars, many of whom developed their research with reference to Canada, 
sought, and successfully so, to move beyond some of the central and most restrictive tenets 
of traditional liberal thought and instead bring its principal assertions in line with the reality 
of a world that is becoming more diverse. It is undeniable that liberalism endorses, first and 
foremost, a doctrine of individualism, but the explosion of cultural, ethnic, linguistic, 
national and religious diversity that has taken place in recent decades has intensified 
demands from such groups for some form of accommodation and recognition of their 
ethnonational diversity. The theory of liberal nationalism, in spite of its shortcomings, has 
helped translate many ethnonational concerns into liberal parlance. In addition, through 
advocating the use of autonomy to protect and promote ethnonational differences, liberal 
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nationalism has moved the liberalism debate from a limited, individualist and statist 
understanding of diversity to a more open, tolerant, respectful and sensitive conception of 
ethnonational pluralism.  
Multinational federalism is promoted by some liberal nationalists as the best model to 
translate many of the concerns and proposals of liberal nationalists into institutional reality. 
As Requejo (2015: 169) contends, ‘plurinational democracies…by definition involve 
tensions between different national collectivities’, and so the use of multinational federalism 
is considered the most apt in providing minorities with self-government institutions while 
keeping them firmly within the parameters of existing plurinational states. Developing a 
theory of multinational federalism has been no mean feat and while there has been increased 
interest in identifying some of its principal traits and demonstrating how these can be 
institutionalised into modern-day plurinational democracies, lamentably a gap remains 
between the theory and political reality of plurinational democracies. This must not lead to 
the conclusion that multinational federalism, or plurinational states in general, are 
unworkable, but serves to underline the work that remains to be done to ensure the full 
accommodation, protection and recognition of national minorities in plurinational 
democracies.  
It is clear, then, that despite the support for territorial autonomy emanating from the 
liberal nationalist school, it alone cannot address the many issues innate to plurinational 
contexts. Thus, institutional measures used to accommodate minority groups must go 
beyond the measures of autonomy discussed heretofore. Section three of this chapter, 
therefore, drew upon discussions related to power-sharing mechanisms, with specific focus 
on consociationalism. Much like the theory of multinational federalism, power-sharing 
theories are concerned with addressing issues of diversity and managing competing nation-
building projects within divided societies. Emphasis, however, is not solely on autonomy, 
but on the inclusion of minorities in the architecture of government and developing a more 
consensual approach to politics that facilitates partnership between and among majority and 
minority communities.  
 Building upon the conceptual and theoretical discussions in Chapters Two and 
Three, the next chapter focuses on the first empirical case study: Scotland.   
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4. Chapter Four: Scotland 
‘[The United Kingdom]…is a 
strange union, full of historical 
paradoxes, curious 
conventions and bizarre 
practices’ (Burgess, 1995: 
182-183). 
 
‘History never stands 
still…The evolution of our 
constitution has been 
continuous over the last 300 
years…and it will continue to 
evolve over the next 300 years, 
too’ (Interview with Labour 
MSP 3). 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Scotland’s constitutional journey has undergone intense transformation in recent 
years. This is evidenced in the re-establishment of the nation’s Parliament in 1999, the rise 
of the SNP to the party of government in 2007 and the holding of an independence 
referendum in 2014. The inception of union in 1707 initiated a long-standing policy of 
accommodating the national distinctiveness of Scotland, including the development of 
various autarchic institutions and the acceptance and recognition of a multilayered 
conception of identity, all of which have contributed to sustaining a distinct sense of 
Scottishness and a degree of political separateness from the rest of the UK (Mitchell 1996). 
This sense of political separation was given institutional status in 1999 with the re-
establishment of a law-making parliament in Edinburgh, dominated in its first two sessions 
by the pro-union Labour Party. The election of an SNP minority government in 2007 brought 
constitutional issues to the fore of the political debate both in Edinburgh and London and 
initiated a new phase in the history of the Scottish Parliament and the nation’s constitutional 
trajectory. More than ten years later, the SNP remains in government and Scotland’s future 
constitutional status, notwithstanding the rejection of independence in 2014, remains fluid.  
This chapter examines the development of territorial politics in Scotland, paying 
particular attention to the model of autonomy rolled out in Scotland since 1999. Of particular 
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interest is the SNP’s time in office and how the autonomy-enhancing and independence-
seeking demands and strategy of the SNP have been managed within the extant autonomy 
framework. The chapter begins with a detailed historical overview of the evolution of 
Scottish demands for self-determination, including how successive UK governments have 
dealt with these demands in the context of the UK’s traditional policy of accommodation. 
Next, it provides a detailed summary of the development of politics vis-à-vis the ‘Scottish 
question’ over the period in which the SNP has formed the party of government in Holyrood. 
Viewing the accommodation of Scottish demands for self-determination primarily through 
the prism of self-rule, section four examines the devolution arrangements rolled out since 
1999 and analyses their efficacy in accommodating the UK’s plurinational diversity and 
managing secessionist demands. Drawing upon the distinct and contested visions of the 
various political actors in Scotland, the chapter then turns to examining the future terrain of 
constitutional politics vis-à-vis Scotland and the UK. In line with the theoretical framework 
set out in Chapter Three and the analysis in the previous section, section six examines what 
else may be done in order to move beyond the limited focus on self-rule, particularly in the 
context of achieving a more coherent and accommodative model of autonomy.  
 
4.2 The Context of Political Partnership 1707-2007 
At the opening of the Scottish Parliament on 12 May 1999, after a 292-year hiatus, 
SNP veteran Winnie Ewing declared, ‘the Scottish Parliament adjourned on the 25 March 
1707 is hereby reconvened.’ By this date in 1707, Scottish parliamentarians had approved 
the ratification of a number of articles which voted the Scottish legislature out of existence. 
In line with The Union with Scotland Act 1706 passed by the English Parliament, the latter 
legislature transmuted into the new British Parliament. Scotland was no longer a sovereign, 
independent state, but together with England and Wales, formed part of the new Kingdom 
of Great Britain (McLean and McMillan 2005).  
The union of 1707 sought to incorporate rather than assimilate the Scottish population. 
A new sovereign state was created, but while change was effected at the centre, the distinct 
and separate pre-existing cultural nations of Scotland and England continued to exist. As 
Paterson (1994: 4) attests, the institutional and cultural specificity afforded to Scotland as a 
consequence of the Act of Union fell short of the requisites of independent statehood but 
demonstrated that Scotland was ‘far more than a mere province.’ The tripartite system of 
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church, law and education, which was retained in the aftermath of 1707, is often illuminated 
as the latent marker of the existence of Scottish distinctiveness post-1707. This ‘holy trinity’ 
demonstrated that while the union united the Kingdoms of Scotland and England politically, 
there was significant room for the Scottish nation, culture and identity to exist and flourish.  
The existence and development of autarchic Scottish institutions in effect created what 
Kellas (1989) termed ‘the Scottish political system’. The relative ease at which the state 
dealt with distinct Scottish institutions, culture and nationalism, led to the entrenchment of 
distinctiveness and as such the perpetuation of Scotland and Scottishness (Mitchell, 2014: 
10). Unlike majority nationalism in Spain, the ideology of union has never sought to foist 
uniformity across the constituent nations. Instead, it fostered an amicable environment and 
political framework in which the duality of national consciousness, that is being both 
Scottish and British, could exist (Smout, 1986: 238).  
From the mid to late nineteenth century, territorial politics became an increasingly 
troublesome issue on the British political agenda.45 A congeries of different nationalist 
organisations emerged, such as the National Association for the Vindication of Scottish 
Rights and the Scottish Home Rule Association, championing varying (constitutional) 
reforms, including, but not limited to, a devolved Scottish legislature (Mitchell, 2014: 90). 
‘Home Rule all round’ was the slogan under which Scottish and Welsh Liberals coalesced 
in support of the creation of Scottish, Welsh and even English regional parliaments and 
assemblies. It is important to note, however, that while there was increasing pressure from 
the peripheral nations for some sort of regional devolution, talk of securing a parliament as 
a stepping stone to independent statehood was all but absent. In fact, as Cameron (2010: 77) 
notes, while Scottish home rule was championed as ‘due recognition of Scottish “feeling” 
or identity’, it was equally advanced as the best remedy to strengthen the union and maintain 
the supremacy of the UK Parliament.  
The SNP was established in 1934 as a result of the merger of two previously 
established political parties: The National Party of Scotland and the Scottish Party.46 While 
the former was more left-leaning and composed of gradualists and fundamentalists, the latter 
was a more right-leaning organisation fully committed to devolution and sceptical of full 
                                                 
45 This was primarily a result of the increasingly vociferous discussions on Irish home rule (see Kendle 1989). 
46 The National Party of Scotland was established in 1928; the Scottish Party in 1932.  
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independence (Finlay, 2009: 22-23).47 In the wake of the establishment of the SNP, the party 
was caught between a constitutional rock and a political hard place: was the organisation to 
present itself as a pressure group committed solely to the issue of Scottish self-governance, 
or was it to become a fully-fledged political party which would engage with socio-economic 
policies as well as the constitutional issue? In the end, the latter position prevailed, but the 
party’s policy on devolution was far from clear. An independent Scottish state was the raison 
d'être of the SNP, but even this was interpreted fluidly (Hepburn 2009). Some understood 
support for self-government to mean the establishment of a devolved Scottish legislature 
within the UK, while for others it was exclusive support for independence.  
Until 1970, the SNP failed to gain any seats at a general election, albeit the party 
managed to score some by-election successes, including the election of Winnie Ewing in 
1967 to represent Hamilton, what had been Labour’s safest seat in Scotland (Mitchell 2017). 
From the 1970s on, the electoral strength of the SNP continued to grow (the party won 11 
seats at the October 1974 general election) which not only posed a serious challenge to 
Labour’s electoral hegemony in Scotland, but brought the Scottish question and the issue of 
home rule to the fore of British politics. Reliant on SNP support as a result of electoral 
arithmetic, in 1978 the minority Labour government under the leadership of James 
Callaghan legislated to hold a referendum in Scotland (and Wales) on the establishment of 
a devolved legislature. In Scotland, just over 51% voted in favour of a Scottish Parliament, 
but a last minute amendment to the legislation calling for a qualified majority (40%) of 
registered voters to vote ‘yes’ for the referendum to pass erected what would come to be an 
intractable hurdle for devolution supporters. In the aftermath of the referendum, the SNP 
tabled a vote of no confidence in the Labour government. In the subsequent general election, 
Margaret Thatcher was elected PM and the Scotland Act repealed.  
Thatcher endorsed a vociferous anti-devolutionist stance which not only dismissed 
decentralisation, but represented a reinterpretation of the ‘old-style pluralist unionism’ that 
had historically undergirded the Conservatives’ traditional approach to territorial politics 
(Mitchell, 2014: 170). Thatcher presented herself as an instinctive unionist, but displayed 
very little understanding or regard for the plurinational nature of the UK or for the historical 
                                                 
47 Fundamentalists support a ‘big bang’ approach to independence, championing independent statehood and 
nothing else. Gradualists, on the other hand, promote devolution as a ‘stepping stone’ to independence. One 
interviewee posited that this debate has become largely marginalised within the party itself since ‘we are all 
gradualists now’, but pointed out that ‘the fundamentalist thread continues to run through us [the SNP]’ 
(Interview with SNP MSP 6).  
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recognition and accommodation of Scottish political aspirations (Kidd 2008). In her 
memoirs, for instance, she argued that while: 
They the Scots have the undoubted right to national self-determination…what 
the Scots (nor indeed the English) cannot do…is to insist upon their own terms 
for remaining in the union, regardless of the views of the others. If the rest of the 
United Kingdom does not favour devolved government, then the Scottish nation 
may seek to persuade the rest of us of its virtues…but it cannot claim devolution 
as a right of nationhood inside the union (Thatcher, 1993: 624). 
 
The Scots, conceded Thatcher, had a right independence, but did not have the right to 
demand constitutional accommodation short of secession; there was no halfway house 
between the constitutional status quo and secession. Thatcher’s successor, John Major, 
despite appearing much more cognisant of and sensitive to territorial politics and respecting 
Scottish distinctiveness, subscribed to the same interpretation. In a 1993 government White 
Paper on Scotland, Major, by then PM, made this clear noting that ‘no nation could be held 
irrevocably in a union against its will’, but while the Scots were entitled to push for 
independence, constitutional change in the form of a devolved legislature was off the table 
(Scottish Office, 1993: 5) 
Thatcher and Major’s overtly hostile attitudes towards devolution not only failed to 
chime with the increasingly pro-devolution Scottish electorate or political elite but jarred 
with the Scottish interpretation of the union as a renegotiable pact (Keating, 2009: 19). This 
was further evidenced in the publication of A Claim of Right for Scotland by the Campaign 
for a Scottish Assembly (CSA) in 1988, which dismissed the sovereignty of parliament as 
promulgated in the extant constitutional order and instead proclaimed Scottish popular 
sovereignty as its foundational principle (Dudley Edwards, 1989: 18).48 The Claim of Right 
asserted that ‘within the United Kingdom the Scots are a minority which cannot ever feel 
secure under a constitution which, in effect, renders the treaty of union a contradiction in 
terms, because it makes no provisions for the safeguarding of any rights or guarantees’ (ibid: 
19). It proposed the creation of a Constitutional Convention, composed of political parties 
and civil society organisations, to devise a blueprint for a Scottish legislature (ibid: 44).  
The Claim of Right was supported by 58 of Scotland’s 72 MPs, seven of its eight 
MEPs, 59 of the 65 local authorities, as well as a number of civil society organisations, 
                                                 
48 The Claim of Right was the third such Claim which had been published in Scotland. The others being in 
1689 and 1842. 
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including trade unions and ecclesiastical bodies (Mitchell, 2014: 236). The Claim of Right 
and ensuing Scottish Constitutional Convention (SCC) were dismissed by the Conservative 
government, but this merely ostracised the party in Scotland and in effect created a policy 
around which opposition parties in Scotland could effectively coalesce (Stewart, 2009: 
212).49 The SCC held its first meeting on 30 March 1989 and in November 1990 published 
Towards Scotland’s Parliament, a first draft of proposals for the establishment of a Scottish 
Parliament (SCC 1990).  
In 1995, the SCC published its final report Scotland’s Parliament, Scotland’s Right 
and presented it to the Scottish people as a blueprint for the establishment of a Scottish 
Parliament. The report proposed the creation of a Parliament with 129 MSPs elected using 
the Additional Member System (AMS) with responsibility for a wide array of competences 
and tax-varying powers (SCC 1995). The Conservative Party dismissed the proposals, but 
they were endorsed by Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the SNP. In the 1997 general 
election, Major, once again, pursued an anti-devolution stance, but the Conservatives 
spectacularly lost the election and returned no MPs from either Scotland or Wales. 
The New Labour government elected in 1997 held referenda in Scotland and Wales 
on devolution, with majorities in both territories returning affirmative votes in favour of the 
establishment of devolved legislatures.50 Tony Blair was a phlegmatic devolutionist, but the 
New Labour approach to devolution built upon the ‘tartanisation’ of the Party that had 
occurred as a direct consequence of the growing popularity of the SNP in the 1970s (Geekie 
and Levy 1989). The New Labour approach stood in contradistinction to the previous 
Conservative governments’ strategies. The union, considered inviolate and sacred to 
Thatcher and Major, was not to be abandoned, but adapted.  
Devolution, however, ‘was not necessarily about responding to demands for Scottish 
autonomy’ (Interview with former Labour MP 1). Instead, it was predicated upon ‘a 
combination of economics, electoral calculations and perceptions of political advantage’, 
designed to strengthen the union and cement Labour’s electoral dominance (Dorey, 2008: 
                                                 
49 The SNP after initial hesitance also ruled out participation in the Convention. It believed the Labour Party 
would dominate and thus the independence issue would become marginalised.   
50 In Scotland a two-pronged referendum took place in which 74.3% supported the establishment of a 
parliament, while 63.5% voted in favour of it having tax-varying powers. The referendum on Welsh devolution 
was held on the same day, 50.3% voted in favour a Welsh Assembly, although the Assembly, unlike the 
Scottish Parliament, had no legislative or tax-varying powers. In Northern Ireland, a referendum was held in 
1998 on the Good Friday Agreement (GFA). 71% voted in favour of the GFA and the re-establishment of 
Stormont, Northern Ireland’s devolved assembly.  
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203). In a similar vein, a Conservative interviewee attested that ‘devolution is and remains 
a unionist device not a nationalist device. It is designed to make the union stronger not to 
break it apart’ (Interview with Conservative MSP). A similar argument was advanced by 
Nationalist interviewees who argued that while devolution may well be a ‘stepping stone’ 
to independence, it was institutionalised to maintain Labour’s dominance in Scotland: 
‘Westminster would never instinctively want to devolve powers…they saw it [devolution] 
simply as a way of buying off secessionists’ (Interview with SNP MSP 1). George 
Robertson’s oft-cited, yet improvident remark that devolution would ‘kill nationalism stone 
dead’ underlines this notion (Watt 2011).  
Blair, as was highlighted above, was sceptical at worst and lukewarm at best with 
regards to devolution and in a similar fashion to Thatcher and Major never explicitly denied 
the right of independence to Scotland. In his memoirs, he underlined his reluctance to 
devolution arguing that: 
It is a dangerous game to play. You can never be sure where nationalist sentiment 
ends and separatist sentiment begins. I supported the UK, distrusted nationalism 
as a concept, and looked at the history books and worried whether we could get 
it through. However, though not passionate about it, I thought it inevitable. Just 
as the nation-state was having to combine with others in pushing power upwards 
in multinational organisations to meet global challenges, so there would be 
inexorable pressure to devolve power downwards to where people felt greater 
connection. We didn’t want Scotland to feel the choice was status quo or 
separation. And it was a central part of our programme for Scotland (Blair, 2010: 
251). 
 
Blair differed from both Thatcher and Major in that he believed there was a halfway 
house between the status quo and independence and considered devolution essential to 
ensure the continuation of the union. The implementation of devolution legislation 
indisputably marked a significant shift from the previous approaches of the Conservative 
administrations, but while shrouded in the language of decentralisation, democratisation and 
modernisation, it was ultimately concerned with ensuring Labour dominance in the 
periphery and institutionalising the centralised organisation of decentralised structures.   
As demonstrated above, the growing salience of the SNP from the 1970s onward 
introduced an important dynamic into the Scottish and British party systems that persists 
until today. As Hepburn (2011: 1) notes, ‘Stateless nationalist and regionalist parties 
(SNRPs)’, such as the SNP, ‘have become a permanent feature of the European political 
landscape’ (see also Lynch 2009), precipitating processes of reform in state-wide parties to 
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adapt to the new devolved polity context. In the UK, all three state-wide parties – Labour, 
the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats – have had to adapt in terms of party 
organisation and policymaking, to name just two, in order to better fit and manage the new 
institutional reality of devolved legislatures with politically active SNRPs (see Convery 
2016; Detterbeck and Hepburn 2018; Fabre 2008; Fabre and Swenden 2011; Hopkin 2009; 
Hopkin and Bradbury 2006; Swenden and Toubeau 2013). This territorialisation of state-
wide parties has engendered a number of changes and challenges for the UK’s state-wide 
parties, albeit predictions of the demise of state-wide political representation are premature. 
As Detterbeck and Hepburn (2018: 135) note, [state-wide] parties must now adapt and 
respond to several loci of decision-making at different territorial levels, to compete with 
nationalist and regionalist parties, and to accommodate the territorial interests of the regional 
electorate’. 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Audickas et al (2017). 
 
The first election to the Scottish Parliament, held on 6 May 1999, saw Labour maintain 
its status as Scotland’s largest party. With a total of 56 seats (see figure three), Labour was 
unable to form a majority government and entered into coalition with the Liberal Democrats. 
Following the 2003 election, Labour was once again returned as the largest party, albeit 6 
seats fewer than in 1999 and re-entered coalition with the Liberal Democrats. During both 
terms, the SNP remained the largest opposition party, although in 2003 the party returned 
only 27 MSPs, eight fewer than in 1999. In terms of legislation, both sessions of Parliament 
showed continuity with Labour policies in Westminster (Keating and Cairney 2009), but the 
Scottish Executive did exercise its new found political autonomy and introduced flagship 
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policies, including free personal care for the elderly, the abolition of up-front tuition fees for 
Scottish-domiciled and non-British EU students and the smoking ban.  
The initial experience of devolution in Scotland (and Wales) was ‘relatively quiet’ owing 
to the political congruence between the devolved administrations in Holyrood and Cardiff 
Bay and the central government in Westminster (Trench, 2008: 15). This resulted in a 
significant level of ‘organisational cohesion’ and ‘programmatic congruence’, and thus 
reduced opportunity for conflict between the centre and the periphery (McEwen et al, 2012: 
323). While in Wales there was an almost immediate conversation about an increase in the 
powers and competences of the Welsh Assembly, there was relatively little debate about 
constitutional issues in Holyrood. The 2003 election campaign featured some chatter on 
constitutional issues, but it was the re-election of Alex Salmond as SNP leader in 2004 and 
his election as First Minister in 2007 that brought the topic to the fore.  
The next section further charts the development of territorial politics in Scotland 
beginning with the SNP’s election to office in 2007.  
 
4.3 2007 – 2018 Chartering New Territory  
4.3.1 2007 -2011: Challenging Devolution, Challenging the Union 
The third election to the Scottish Parliament on 3 May 2007 was a historic event in the 
history of Scottish politics. For the first time in over half a century, albeit by the narrowest 
of margins, Labour lost its crown as Scotland’s governing party. The SNP, a party ‘often 
ridiculed, patronised and caricatured by opponents’, was transformed from a fringe party of 
protest to the party of government (Hassan, 2009: 1). Talks to form a coalition with the 
Liberal Democrats ultimately failed and the SNP subsequently formed a minority 
government, securing the support of the Scottish Greens on a confidence and supply basis 
(Lynch, 2009: 623). The SNP’s election to office, however, did not result from or precipitate 
a surge in support for secession, but instead ‘coincided with an unusually low level of 
support for independence’ (Curtice et al, 2009: 58). The SNP’s electoral campaign 
committed the party to independence and the holding of a referendum, but was more focused 
on ‘emphasising its ability to provide Scotland with effective (devolved) government’ (ibid: 
6).  
100 
 
In August 2007, only months after taking office, the Scottish Executive (2007) 
published Choosing Scotland’s Future: A National Conversation, a White Paper on 
independence.51 The White Paper presented the SNP’s case for independence, yet this was 
framed within a wider discussion on how the existing devolution settlement could be 
advanced. Tellingly, the SNP-led government, cognisant of the minority support for 
independence, dedicated more space to discussing the devolution of further powers than it 
did independence. The SNP, however, remained committed to increasing support for 
independence and launched the National Conversation to do so. The National Conversation 
served as an open consultation with the Scottish public carried out via online discussion 
forums and a number of public consultation meetings, with the primary objective to build 
support for independence (Harvey and Lynch 2012).  
In reaction to the SNP’s electoral victory and increased focus on constitutional politics, 
pro-union forces in the Scottish Parliament, backed by the UK government, supported the 
establishment of a commission to review the devolution settlement and achieve, in the words 
of Scottish Labour’s then leader, Wendy Alexander (2007), ‘a more balanced home rule 
package.’ The Commission on Scottish Devolution (CSD - also referred to as the Calman 
Commission), with a total of 15 members from political parties, academia, business and 
community organisations, was established in 2008. It was tasked: 
To review the provisions of the Scotland Act 1998 in the light of experience and 
to recommend any changes to the present constitutional arrangements that would 
enable the Scottish Parliament to serve the people of Scotland better, improve 
the financial accountability of the Scottish Parliament, and continue to secure the 
position of Scotland within the United Kingdom (CSD, 2009: 3). 
 
Calman stood in direct contrast to the SNP’s National Conversation, given its ‘terms 
of reference…were explicitly unionist’ (Mullen, 2009: 38). There was no discussion of the 
independence issue, nor was there any explicit engagement with the general public. The 
Commission’s final report, – Serving Scotland Better: Scotland and the UK in the 21st 
Century  – published in 2009, recommended a number of revisions to the existing devolution 
framework, including the devolution of responsibility for airguns, speed and drink-driving 
limits; administrative responsibility for elections, and increased involvement for Scottish 
ministers related to BBC and Crown Estate appointments. The report emphasised the 
importance of a collaborative working relationship between the devolved administrations 
                                                 
51 The SNP renamed the Scottish Executive to the Scottish Government in September 2007. 
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and central government and called for improved interparliamentary (IPR) and 
intergovernmental relations (IGR), as well as changes to the structures of the Joint 
Ministerial Committee (JMC). The boldest recommendations of Calman related to finance. 
The Commission ruled out the devolution of Value Added Tax (VAT) and National 
Insurance but recommended the partial devolution of income tax which would see the 
creation of a new Scottish Rate of Income Tax.52 In addition, the Commission recommended 
the devolution of a number of smaller taxes: air passenger duty, aggregates levy, landfill tax 
and stamp duty land tax, as well as granting Holyrood significant borrowing powers. 
The Calman proposals signified an expansion of the powers of the Scottish Parliament 
and a move beyond the initial settlement of devolution envisioned in the late 1990s. It sought 
to strengthen the financial accountability of the Parliament as well as improve the operation 
of devolution. While Calman sought to achieve the aforementioned tasks, it equally sought 
to engender a new devolution settlement that would challenge support for the SNP and 
independence. The Scottish government, despite describing the remit of Calman as ‘too 
narrow’ and the devolution of further competences as ‘modest’, supported several of these 
recommendations (Scottish Government 2009). It welcomed the devolution of a number of 
taxes and borrowing powers but was critical of the commission’s limited recommendations 
on income tax. The Scottish government favoured full fiscal autonomy – whereby Scotland 
would be responsible for all tax raising and spending within its borders – but this was 
explicitly rejected by Calman (CSD 2009).  
The pro-union parties rallied round the recommendations of the Calman Commission 
and included a commitment to them in the electoral manifestoes for the 2010 general election 
(Mitchell and Van der Zwet, 2010: 715). No party achieved an outright majority in the 
election, resulting in a coalition government between the Conservatives and Liberal 
Democrats. The coalition government committed itself to implementing the Calman 
proposals and David Cameron, the first PM to lead a Conservative government since Major, 
promoted a new respect agenda with regards to the relationship between the UK government 
and the devolved administrations (Randall and Seawright, 2012: 109). In contrast to the 
intransigent unionism of previous Conservative PMs, Cameron pursued a ‘pragmatic 
unionism’ approach: a strategy that respected the divergence and distinctiveness of the 
devolved nations while committed to keeping them within the parameters of the union (ibid). 
                                                 
52 Under European law, Member States are unable to have different levels of VAT in a single state.  
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Calman’s recommendations were translated into the Scotland Act 2012, but by the time it 
reached the statute book it had been overtaken by a series of electoral and political events, 
not least the election of a majority SNP government in the 2011 Scottish Parliament election. 
                                                                                                           
4.3.2 2011-2016: From Rhetoric to Referendum 
In 2011, the SNP managed to achieve what the electoral system for the Scottish 
Parliament had been designed to eschew: a majority government. With a total of 69 seats, 
53 of which had come from the First Past The Post (FPTP) constituency vote, the SNP 
became Scotland’s first, and to date only, majority government. As in 2007, the electoral 
triumph of the SNP was not accompanied by a swing in favour of independence: ‘the SNP 
won its majority for that most mundane of electoral reasons: most voters thought that the 
party would do a better job in office than its rivals’ (Johns et al, 2013: 58). The Party had 
been successful in its aim of demonstrating competence in government, but its efforts to 
build support for independence had so far proved less successful.  
A referendum on independence had been a central plank of the SNP’s election 
manifesto, yet while there was much consensus that the prospect of a referendum was 
inevitable, the route to achieve this was significantly disputed. The Scottish government 
argued that the existing powers of the Scotland Act imbued the Scottish Parliament with the 
power to hold a non-binding referendum (Scottish Government 2012). The UK government, 
on the other hand, contested this view and argued that only the UK Parliament was able to 
legislate on a referendum (Scotland Office 2012).  
In line with the history of British political culture, which has tended to eschew taking 
contentious matters to court, the issue was amicably resolved through political channels and 
the Edinburgh Agreement, signed on 15 October 2012 by the British and Scottish 
governments.53 The Agreement confirmed that a referendum would take place under a 
Section 30 Order of the Scotland Act 1998 which would entail a temporary transfer of 
legislative competence to the Scottish Parliament to hold a referendum.54 The Agreement 
contained a sunset clause stating the vote must be held before 31 December 2014 and feature 
only one question on independence. A multi-option referendum was rejected by the UK 
                                                 
53 This will be examined in further detail in section four.   
54 Section 30 of the Scotland Act allows the powers of the Scottish Parliament to be extended by delegated 
legislation.  
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government; there was to be no offer of further territorial reform.  
Further to the stipulation that only one question was to feature on the ballot, the 
question was to be approved by the independent Electoral Commission, the referendum was 
to be conducted in line with the principles of the Political Parties, Elections and 
Referendums Act 2000 and the franchise to be extended to 16 and 17-year olds if the Scottish 
Parliament chose to do so. The following year, the Scottish Parliament passed the Scottish 
Independence Referendum (Franchise) Act 2013 and the Scottish Independence Referendum 
Act 2013, which together detailed the framework through which the referendum was to be 
conducted. The franchise was extended to 16 and 17-year olds, the date of the vote fixed for 
18 September 2014 and voters would be given a binary question: Should Scotland be an 
independent country? 
As discussed earlier, initial quarrels between the governments over the competence to 
hold a referendum were amicably settled through political agreement. Defending his 
decision to facilitate the holding of a referendum, Cameron admitted that it was indisputably 
a risk, but the costs of not doing so were deemed much worse.  He commented:  
I felt, as the prime minister of the UK, I had a choice. I could either say to them 
“well you can’t have your referendum, it is for us to decide whether you should 
have one.” I think that would have led to an almighty and disastrous battle 
between the Westminster Parliament and the UK government and the Scottish 
government and the Scottish first minister (Cameron, quoted in Watt 2014). 
 
In consonance with his ‘pragmatic unionism’ approach, the PM suggested he had a 
moral responsibility to enable the vote to go ahead. While it is evident that this rested on the 
presumption that voters would overwhelmingly reject independence, and thus an easy 
campaign for the ‘No’ side, Cameron’s approach was applauded by both sides.55 
Additionally, Cameron became ‘an unlikely hero’ for other secessionist movements, 
specifically Catalonia (Cetrà 2014). It became evident, however, that Cameron’s 
pragmatism had clear limits. The insistence that the referendum should feature only one 
question underlined the majority opinion among the pro-union parties that further devolution 
should not be conceded to Scotland in return for a ‘no’ vote.  
In November 2013, the Scottish government published a 600-page White Paper: 
Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland, the first detailed blueprint of 
                                                 
55 This was corroborated in interviews.  
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the SNP’s vision of an independent Scottish state (Scottish Government 2013). Interestingly, 
the SNP vision of an independent Scotland was, in the words of Keating (2015b: 78), ‘an 
attenuated form of independence’, given that the blueprint ‘retained much of the 
infrastructure of the union’. Indeed, in a series of speeches prior to the referendum, the then 
First Minister Alex Salmond, sought to soften the hard image of independence by pointing 
out that Scotland and the UK were joined in ‘six unions’ (political, social, monetary, 
monarchical, defence and European), yet the SNP only wanted to exit the political one 
(Salmond 2013). In the event of independence, Scotland would retain membership of the 
other five unions.  
Notwithstanding initial opposition to enhance devolution, increasing support for 
independence, as underlined by opinion polls, forced the hands of the pro-union forces to 
offer more devolution in the event of a no vote. The pro-union parties, therefore, campaigned 
on the basis that a ‘no’ vote would set in train a process whereby the powers and 
competences of Holyrood would be extended. ‘The Vow’, an agreement among the three 
leaders of the Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties, confirmed this shift in 
policy. Published on the front page of the Daily Record only two days before the referendum, 
the three unionist parties pledged to deliver ‘extensive new powers’ to Holyrood in the event 
of a ‘No’ vote.56 It was no longer a choice between independence or the status quo, but 
independence and further devolution.  
On 18 September 2014, following a dynamic and engaging campaign, on a turnout of 
nearly 85%, voters in Scotland by a margin of 55% rejected the SNP’s constitutional vision 
of independence. Speaking in front of Downing Street on the morning after the vote David 
Cameron announced the establishment of the Smith Commission – under the chairmanship 
of Lord Smith of Kelvin – ‘to oversee the process to take forward the devolution 
commitments with powers over tax, spending and welfare all agreed by November and draft 
legislation published by January’ (Cameron 2014).  
The Smith Commission involved the input of all five parties represented in the Scottish 
Parliament. Yet, while the pro-independence SNP and Greens put forward proposals in 
favour of devolving full powers over tax, borrowing powers and welfare to the Scottish 
Parliament, the pro-union parties were much more modest. There was, however, a general 
consensus among all parties that Holyrood should be given enhanced tax powers (Kenealy 
                                                 
56 ‘The Vow’ came as a result of a YouGov poll on 6 September 2017 predicting a two-point lead in favour of 
independence.  
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and Parry 2017). On 27 November 2014, in line with the tight schedule outlined by the PM, 
the Smith Commission delivered its report and recommended that: the Scottish Parliament 
collect all income tax levied on salaries in Scotland with discretion to alter the rates and 
thresholds; receive additional borrowing powers; be granted limited devolution over several 
social security benefits (including attendance allowance, disability living allowance and 
housing benefit); receive new powers to allow the Scottish Parliament to create new benefits 
in devolved areas as well as supplement the rates of UK benefits; an extension of the 
franchise to 16 and 17 year olds in Scotland; make the Scottish Parliament a permanent 
institution; put the Sewel Convention on statutory footing; encourage greater 
intergovernmental cooperation and increase the role of Scottish ministers in European policy 
making (The Smith Commission 2014). The Smith recommendations served as the basis of 
the Scotland Act 2016 and for the UK government amounted to making Scotland ‘one of the 
most powerful devolved parliaments in the world’ (BBC News 2016).  
The 2015 general election resulted in the replacement of the Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat coalition with a majority Conservative government. The election came less than 
a year after Scotland’s independence referendum and during the passage through parliament 
of the Scotland Act 2016. Paradoxically, the SNP, the party that lost the referendum, 
emerged as victors in the 2015 election. Under the leadership of Nicola Sturgeon, who 
replaced Alex Salmond in the aftermath of his resignation in 2014, SNP membership surged 
to make it the third biggest party in the UK and, in the aftermath of the 2015 election, the 
third biggest party in the House of Commons, winning 56 of Scotland’s 59 seats. In the 2016 
Scottish Parliament election the SNP hoped to repeat its electoral success, yet was two seats 
short of a majority.  
 
4.3.3 2016 and Beyond: A New Period of Constitutional Turbulence 
In the 2016 Scottish Parliament election, for the third time, the SNP was re-elected to 
government, albeit two seats short of a majority. For the first time in the Parliament’s history, 
the Scottish Conservatives secured more seats than Labour, while the Scottish Greens 
increased its number of MSPs to six, just one short of its 2003 record of seven (Anderson 
2016a). The loss of six seats meant the SNP had lost its parliamentary majority, but the 
success of the Greens ensured a pro-independence majority of MSPs (69 of 129) was still 
present in the Parliament. Unlike the 2007 and 2011 electoral campaigns, the SNP did not 
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include an explicit commitment to a referendum on independence in its manifesto, but 
argued in favour of another referendum in the event of ‘clear and sustained evidence’ of an 
increase in support for independence or ‘a significant and material change’ in circumstances, 
such as the UK’s withdrawal from the EU against the wishes of Scottish voters (SNP, 2016: 
24).  
In the run up to the EU referendum successive polls predicted an unambiguous vote 
for Remain in Scotland, while increasing support for Leave elsewhere in the UK. The EU 
referendum campaign unfolded differently in the four nations of the UK. In Scotland, the 
absence of any major political party in favour of Leave resulted in a pro-EU dominated 
campaign (McHarg and Mitchell, 2017: 512), while in England and Wales Euroscepticism 
was the order of the day (Henderson et al 2016). Part of the pro-EU sentiment in Scotland is 
rooted in the independence movement’s framing of the independence debate which favours 
an independent Scotland firmly anchored within the parameters of the EU (Anderson and 
Keil 2016). In England and Wales, however, predominant public opinion endorses a 
diametrically opposing view: the EU is seen to limit sovereignty. In the words of Curtice 
(2017: 49), ‘whereas in England and Wales membership of the EU has often been portrayed 
as a constraint on the sovereignty of the UK, in Scotland it has been presented as helping to 
facilitate the realisation of Scotland’s sovereignty.’  
In December 2015, the EU Referendum Act 2015 was given royal assent. The bill, as 
laid out in the Conservatives’ manifesto, legislated for an ‘in-out’ referendum on whether 
the UK should remain a member of the EU. Given the pro-EU position of the Scottish 
government, as well as poll results which predicted a significant majority in Scotland in 
favour of Remain, Nicola Sturgeon proposed a double majority rule which would require all 
four nations of the UK to vote Leave for the result to take effect. In Westminster, the SNP 
tabled an amendment to the referendum bill to include this proposal, but it was flatly 
rejected. The rejection of the double majority rule, as will be discussed, is a result of the 
unitary interpretation of the constitution still prevalent in Westminster despite the ongoing 
process of political decentralisation or the fact that the UK is not and never has been a typical 
unitary state. McCorkindale (2016: 357), for example, argues that while the UK 
government’s position on the double majority rule was ‘unsurprising and constitutionally 
justifiable’, it undermined the plurinational union-state character of the UK. Cameron, much 
like his Conservative predecessors, seemed to be thinking in unitary not plurinational terms.  
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Table Three: 2016 EU Referendum Results 
	 Leave	 Remain	 Turnout	
UK	 51.9%  48.1%  72.2% 
England	 53.4%  46.6%  73% 
Northern	Ireland	 44.2%  55.8%  62.7% 
Scotland	 38%  62%  67.2% 
Wales	 52.5%  47.5%  71.7% 
Source: Own elaboration, based on data from Uberoi (2016). 
 
On 23 June 2016, on a turnout of circa 72%, just under 52% of voters elected to end 
the UK’s 43-year-old relationship with the EU (see table three). Yet, while it was clear that 
a majority, however slim, had belied poll predictions and voted Leave, the varying results 
from the UK’s four nations resulted in an almost immediate debate regarding the validity of 
the result and the future constitutional landscape of the UK. Voters in Scotland and Northern 
Ireland voted unambiguously to remain, while in England and Wales, thin majorities voted 
to leave. The results of the EU referendum illuminated the image of a divided state. What is 
more, the fact that Scotland would leave the EU as a consequence of votes cast elsewhere in 
the UK, reignited debates on Scotland’s future constitutional status.  
Having campaigned for Remain, David Cameron resigned as PM and was replaced by 
former Home Secretary, Theresa May. In several speeches after becoming PM, May sought 
to placate the devolved governments by assuring that they would play a full and engaging 
role in the process of withdrawing from the EU (May 2016a). Consequently, the UK 
government established a new JMC on EU negotiations (JMC (EN) to bring together 
ministers from the UK and devolved governments. Meetings of the JMC (EN), as well as 
the actual JMC itself, however, have proved more controversial than constructive, including 
complaints that the views and concerns of the devolved administrations are still superseded 
by the priorities of the UK government (Interview with SNP MP).57 Academic analysis of 
JMC structures substantiate the frustrations of the devolved governments. McEwen and 
Petersohn (2015: 196) contend that the JMC’s role as a ‘forum for communication and 
shared learning, not decision-making’, limits opportunities for the devolved administrations 
to influence government policy. Moreover, the UK government predominantly chairs and 
sets the agenda for such meetings, thus, for Fletcher and Zahn (2017: 108), ‘it is hard to see 
how such a structure could deliver a genuinely inclusive debate that shapes and informs the 
                                                 
57 This will be further developed in section four.  
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Brexit roadmap for the UK, taking account of the differing interests and voting patterns of 
the devolved nations’.58 
In 2016, the Scottish government published two White Papers in response to the 
decision to leave the EU. The first, Scotland: A European Nation, published in November 
2016, was written for an international audience, detailing Scotland’s historical relationship 
and engagement with the EU as well as its position towards withdrawal negotiations. The 
following month, the government published Scotland’s Place in Europe, which set out a 
number of options for Scotland’s future: the UK retaining single market membership, 
bespoke arrangements for Scotland and further devolution of powers to the Scottish 
Parliament (Scottish Government 2016). The Scottish government posited the White Paper 
as a compromise solution and was followed by an announcement that it would take calls for 
a second independence referendum off the table in return for a soft exit from the EU, that is, 
retaining membership of the European Single Market (BBC News 2017a). Theresa May 
vowed to examine the proposals of the devolved governments in detail but her intention to 
withdraw from the Single Market impeded any potential progress in securing a compromised 
solution. As a result, and backed by the Scottish Parliament by a margin of 69 to 59 in March 
2017, the Scottish government called for the power to hold a second independence 
referendum. This was not flatly rejected by the UK government, but the PM stated that ‘now 
is not the time’ for such conversations (BBC News 2017c). 
Further to the dispute between the governments on the shape and form of the UK’s 
withdrawal from the EU, there was vehement disagreement over the UK government’s 
decision to trigger Article 50 – the formal process to initiate the UK’s withdrawal – without 
the consent of the devolved administrations. The UK government argued that the reserved 
nature of foreign affairs rendered moot any obligation to consult the devolved nations. The 
devolved administrations, on the other hand, challenged this unitary and centralist vision 
and argued that since EU legislation was embedded within the frameworks of the devolved 
settlements and withdrawal from the EU would substantially affect the competences of the 
devolved governments, the UK government was obliged under the Sewel Convention to 
request the consent of the devolved legislatures. The issue was discussed in the UK Supreme 
Court (UKSC) ruling on Miller V Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, 
whereby the judges concluded that while political conventions such as Sewel played an 
                                                 
58 This point was also corroborated in interviews.  
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important role in the British political system, this did not amount to a legal obligation on the 
part of the UK government to seek the consent of the devolved parliaments to trigger Article 
50 (UKSC 2017).  
Another area of contention between the devolved and UK governments relates to the 
reallocation of powers post-withdrawal. Article 11 of the UK government’s original 
European Union (Withdrawal) bill introduced the new status of ‘retained EU law’ which 
would ensure that all powers returning from the EU, whether devolved competences or not, 
would revert to Westminster control, with the possibility that at a later date some of these 
powers could be devolved. The devolved governments vehemently opposed what they saw 
as a ‘naked power grab’ and believed Clause 11 would amount to a significant rolling back 
of devolution (BBC News 2017d). Given that Scotland, for example, is a retaining model of 
devolution, whereby all matters are devolved unless explicitly reserved to the UK 
Parliament, there was evident merit in the Scottish government’s argument. Anderson and 
Gallagher (2018: 37) argue that while the UK government may well ‘be tempted to arrogate 
to itself the powers currently exercised by Brussels’, such a move ‘would breach the 
constitutional conventions regarding the devolution agreements’ and further jeopardise the 
already fragile union. In a similar vein to the UKSC’s ruling on the triggering of Article 50, 
the UK government, contrary to the decentralising logic of devolution and plurinational 
nature of the state, seemed to be endorsing a unitary and centralising approach to EU 
withdrawal. Amendments to the bill ensued in order to placate the devolved administrations’ 
concerns over the repatriation of powers, but while these, including a commitment that those 
powers repatriated to Westminster instead of Holyrood or Cardiff Bay could be devolved to 
Scotland and Wales after a seven-year period, placated the Welsh government which 
eventually consented to the bill, the Scottish government did not follow suit.  
In April 2017, in an attempt to increase her majority and strengthen her government’s 
hand in Brexit negotiations, the PM called a snap general election. The election outcome, 
whereby the Conservatives lost 13 seats and were thus stripped of their parliamentary 
majority, confounded pollsters, politicians and the public alike, and resulted in a 
controversial confidence and supply arrangement with Northern Ireland’s Democratic 
Unionist Party (DUP) (Tonge 2017). In Scotland, the SNP remained the country’s largest 
party in Westminster, but lost 21 seats. What is more, and exceeding expectations, it was the 
Conservatives that appeared to win the election in Scotland, winning 12 seats from the SNP. 
Territorial politics, as a result, remains high on the political agenda.  
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The next section provides empirical analysis on the merits and limitations of the 
Scottish autonomy model.  
 
4.4 Examining the Merits and Limitations of Scottish Devolution 
The development of constitutional politics and the evolution of devolution in Scotland 
over the last decade begs the question: is devolution limited in its ability to accommodate 
Scottish demands related to autonomy and secession? The previous section demonstrated 
that since the SNP has been in power there have been very few instances of constitutional 
calm. Instead, a prolonged period of constitutional turbulence has permeated the Scottish 
political system and despite a referendum with the potential to settle the matter, Scotland’s 
future constitutional status remains in flux. This section thus examines the abovementioned 
question and divides the analysis into two sections: the merits and limitations of devolution.  
 
4.4.1 The Merits of Devolution 
Devolution to Scotland, as well as to Northern Ireland and Wales, precipitated a 
cascade of changes to the political and electoral landscapes of three of the four component 
nations of the UK. While some of these changes were intended, a number were less so and 
have been thrown up as a result of the evolving process of devolution. As detailed in Chapter 
Two, different forms of territorial autonomy – devolution included – are employed by central 
governments in order to address a number of issues related to demands for recognition and 
empowerment of minority nations within plurinational states. Devolution, in this respect, 
met a pent-up desire for political decentralisation in Scotland, facilitating the institutional 
expression of Scottish distinctiveness and providing a legislature in which public policy 
could be tailored to national needs (Interview with SNP MSP 9).  
Overall, there is a general consensus, among academics, politicians and the public 
alike, that devolution has worked well for Scotland. The pro-union Calman Commission, 
established almost ten years after the inception of devolution, asserted that it had been a ‘real 
success’ (CSD, 2009: 5), while the SNP in its independence White Paper sought to build on 
the success of devolution to make the case for secession (Scottish Government 2013). Yet, 
while for pro-union representatives the establishment of the Scottish Parliament has proved 
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successful because it continues ‘to hold the union together’ (Interview with Conservative 
MSP), pro-independence supporters view it and any devolution of further powers as a mere 
‘stepping stone to independence’ (Interview with SNP MSP 7).  
 
4.4.1.1 The Easy to Adapt Constitution 
The UK is one of only few countries in the world that lacks a codified constitution. 
Much of its constitutional practice is written, but it is not collated in one single document 
and instead has developed through parliamentary legislation and political conventions. In 
recent years, there has been increased discussion on the merits and drawback of codifying 
the UK’s constitution, but so far, no consensus has been reached (Bogdanor 2009).  
The UK’s uncodified constitution means that it eschews ‘the prima facie rigidity of 
codified constitutions’ and this has been one of the principal strengths of the UK’s autonomy 
arrangements (Brouillet and Mullen, 2018: 50). The substantive symbolic recognition and 
institutional arrangements afforded to Scotland even before devolution in 1999, including 
administrative devolution and the establishment of the rather powerful Scottish Office, 
developed with relative ease as a result of the UK’s lack of a codified constitution and 
willingness to cater for Scottish distinctiveness. As McEwen and Lecours (2008: 239) note, 
‘states without a codified constitution may find it easier to adopt discourses and symbolic 
practices which can emphasise the multinational character of the state and give recognition 
to the national minorities within it.’ The UK is a case in point.  
The flexibility of the UK constitution vis-à-vis devolution is evident in the various 
Scotland Acts which have devolved further powers to the Scottish Parliament. These Acts 
have enhanced the legislative and fiscal architecture of the Scottish Parliament and were 
passed in Westminster without any requirement for special legal procedures for amendment. 
This rather smooth process contrasts with the experiences of other political systems – both 
mononational and plurinational, unitary and federal – whereby constitutional change is a 
much more cumbersome and complicated process (Benz and Knüpling 2012). The UK, on 
the other hand, avoids much of the intractable difficulties, angst and momentousness that 
normally surrounds constitutional reform. 
Constitutional change or amendments are enacted through ordinary legislation to the 
extent that ‘laws changing the constitution are undistinguishable from any other law passed 
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by Parliament in everyday politics’ (Behnke and Benz, 2009: 226). The paucity of 
institutional and/or legal hurdles to enact territorial reform has enabled successive UK 
governments to quickly react to the highly dynamic circumstances of devolution and attempt 
to secure a stable, albeit dynamic, equilibrium as relates to territorial politics. The success 
of the UK’s ability and willingness to adjust the devolution settlements to manage the 
mobilisation of countervailing powers in the devolved political systems is further 
illuminated when compared to the experiences of other countries. Some interviewees, for 
example, drew upon the Spanish case – whereby territorial reform has proved a highly 
controversial and complicated topic – to illuminate the strength of UK devolution in being 
able to manage and evolve with the dynamic circumstances of political reality (Interviews 
with Conservative and SNP MSPs). 
The tendency to take a more dynamic approach towards territorial reform has meant 
that UK governments have tended to avoid large scale constitutional reviews. It is a truism 
that a number of devolution commissions have taken place since the inception of devolution, 
but these have developed in silos, focusing on only one specific devolved territory (Kenealy 
and Parry, 2017: 2). In lieu of large-scale constitutional reviews, territorial reform has 
evolved in the shape of incremental adaptation resulting in a more fluid approach to 
territorial settlements (Anderson and Gallagher, 2018: 40). In the words of Tierney (2017: 
148), the UK’s constitutional model: 
Has worked very well over several centuries, allowing the UK body politic to 
adapt itself smoothly to new developments such as the creation and amendment 
of the devolution settlements for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland since 
1998, and the conclusion of the Edinburgh Agreement paving the way for the 
independence referendum.  
 
The Edinburgh Agreement, which provided that power be transferred to the Scottish 
Parliament to hold an independence referendum, is lucid evidence of the flexibility of the 
constitution in dealing with evolving dynamics in the political system. There was, as already 
noted, disagreement between the Scottish and UK governments over the legal power to hold 
a referendum, but the UK’s constitutional flexibility enabled it to avoid any difficult, 
prolonged and potentially destabilising debates as well as any legal challenge in the courts. 
Comparing the UK’s approach with Canada, one Conservative MSP argued that while the 
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Canadian Secession Reference59 is often held up as a benchmark in debates on secession in 
democratic countries, the Edinburgh Agreement went much further than the Canadian 
example: 
If you compare the Edinburgh Agreement with what the Supreme Court of 
Canada says in its famous Quebec Secession Reference ruling in the 1990s, the 
UK is much more generous than even Canada. What the Supreme Court of 
Canada said was if there was a Quebec secession referendum that resulted in 
what we would call a yes vote, that would trigger an obligation on Canada to 
negotiate, it would not trigger an obligation on Canada to let Quebec go. We said, 
the UK said, if Scotland votes yes, then Scotland becomes an independent state. 
Not if Scotland votes yes, we will talk about it (Interview with Conservative 
MSP).  
 
The cooperation of both the Scottish and UK governments was ensured in the 
Edinburgh Agreement and guaranteed a clear legal framework for the referendum. This, 
notes Casanas Adam (2017a: 83), ‘resulted in a fair and democratic process that was 
accepted by both sides’ and underlined the flexible nature of devolution, particularly in 
managing potentially destabilising issues within a multilevel system.  
The flexible and dynamic approach taken with regards to devolution can be both a 
merit and challenge. On the one hand, it is symptomatic of a paucity of strategic thinking 
which, rather than reinforcing the bonds that tie the union together, erodes such 
connections.60 On the other hand, the elasticity of the UK approach to autonomy has enabled 
the facilitation of a model that has created a powerful autonomous parliament while at the 
same time pursuing an agenda that is able to take evolving circumstances into account. 
Territorial reform, for good reason, is often difficult to secure. States, particularly those 
which play host to minority nations, must ensure a stable equilibrium between rigidity and 
flexibility, yet this is often difficult to achieve (Benz 2013). The UK, on the other hand, and 
in line with the thesis advanced by Carl Friedrich as discussed in Chapter Two, has tended 
to take a non-static view of territorial politics and as such has proved successful, much more 
so than other plurinational countries like Canada and Spain, in recognising, accommodating 
and celebrating its plurinational makeup (see Basta 2017; McEwen and Lecours 2008). In 
viewing the politics of devolution as a process, successive UK governments have been able 
                                                 
59 The Reference declared that no province has a unilateral right to secede from the Canadian federation, but 
the secession of a province is possible within Canadian constitutional law if a clear question on secession is 
supported by a clear majority of voters. In the event, there would be a constitutional obligation on the federal 
government to enter into good faith negotiations with the seceding province (Rocher and Verrelli 2003).  
60 I will return to this point later in the chapter. 
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to quickly react to political events as well as engender debate and discussion on further 
reform without the momentousness and controversy found in other cases. 
 
4.4.1.2 Low Level Litigation 
The flexibility of the UK’s constitution and processes of territorial reform tend to 
avoid the hyperactivity and sensitivity of mega constitutional moments as found in other 
cases. Linked to this, a subsequent strength of the UK’s devolution arrangements is the fact 
that the legal system has played a minimal role in resolving disputes between the different 
levels of government. In lieu of reliance on judicial adjudication, UK elites have tended to 
resolve disputes via political agreements.  
While the UK has been reluctant to use courts to settle constitutional disputes, legal 
proceedings vis-à-vis constitutional issues are an increasingly present characteristic of most 
plurinational and multilevel political systems (Aroney and Kincaid 2017). As argued by 
Tierney (2004: 247) ‘the courtroom has become in recent years an even stronger focal point 
for constitutional disputes in contemporary democracies and it is before the courts that some 
of the most highly charged constitutional disputes have been played out in plurinational 
states.’ In other plurinational states, including, Bosnia, Canada and Spain, courts have 
become key and at times controversial players in debates on territorial reform. In the UK, 
this has not been the case.  
Courts have played a role in policing disputes and challenges to devolved legislation, 
but these have mainly centred on arguments related to human rights as opposed to disputes 
between different orders of government on the allocation of powers and competences 
(Thomson and Gordon, 2017: 349). The lack of reliance on legal proceedings, for one 
Conservative interviewee, is rooted in the fact that the UK’s ‘constitutional business is based 
on building consensus’ rather than legal challenges (Interview with Conservative MSP). 
This is also a result of the uncharacteristically detailed allocation of powers in the Scotland 
Act 1998 which thus decreased the potential for disputes between the Scottish and UK 
governments. This ‘retaining model of devolution’, which saw all powers devolved to 
Scotland unless otherwise stated, was ‘a deliberate attempt to eliminate doubts [over which 
order of government controlled which power] and thus limited the possibilities for litigation’ 
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(Brouillet and Mullen, 2018: 63).61 The UKSC, as a result, has played a largely minimal role 
regarding devolution disputes. 
As well as a clear delineation of powers, the relatively straight-forward process to 
amend legislation pertaining to the devolved settlements has also avoided reliance upon the 
courts. As is observed in most federal political systems, courts often play an important 
function in interpreting the constitution as well as facilitating its amendment (Benz and 
Knüpling 2012). Experiences from plurinational states show, however, that such a role can 
generate problems of legitimacy for courts, whereby the balance of power as a result of court 
decisions often tips in favour of the central level of government (Tierney, 2004: 252). In the 
UK, however, a cooperative parliament is all that is required to amend existing legislation 
and thus the courts have not, as of yet, played a prominent role in adjusting the devolution 
settlements.  
A lucid example of the UK’s ability to avoid controversial litigation pertains to the 
2012 Edinburgh Agreement. As was noted earlier, there was disagreement amongst 
academics and politicians alike over the ability of the Scottish Parliament to hold a 
referendum on independence. While the Scottish government believed it already had the 
competence to hold a non-binding referendum, this was disputed by the UK government 
which argued that the constitution was a reserved matter and therefore not within the 
legislative competence of Holyrood. This could have resulted in a major legal showdown 
between the different orders of government, but instead was amicably settled through 
political channels. The Agreement avoided any possible legal challenge and represented a 
patent example of the UK’s constitutional flexibility and pragmatism in ‘keeping the 
constitution out of the courts and within the political system’ (Casanas Adam, 2017a: 93). 
In so doing, legal disputes over competence allocation are reduced and potentially 
controversial litigation eschewed.  
The lack of legal recourse in the UK has avoided much of the acrimony generated by 
litigation in other plurinational states. It is important to note, however, that while it is a 
truism that in terms of challenges to the devolved settlement, the experience of the UK has 
been rather smooth, challenges to Scottish criminal proceedings have proved controversial 
and have even led to the SNP questioning the composition and legitimacy of the English-
dominated UKSC (McCorkindale et al 2017). This has also been the case in other minority 
                                                 
61 The literature also refers to a ‘reserved powers model’. 
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nations, most recently in Spain, where decisions of the Constitutional Court have called into 
question its role as an ‘impartial arbiter’ (Casanas Adam, 2017b: 400).  In addition, although 
over the last 20 years there has been very little controversy as relates to the courts and the 
devolution settlements, the already fraught complications of withdrawal from the EU has 
shown that, in the absence of proper functioning and effective IGR, or indeed, a willingness 
among governments to find an amicable solution, it may well be that recourse to the courts 
becomes a familiar feature of the British political system.  
 
4.4.1.3 ‘A Powerhouse Parliament’ 
The Scotland Act 2016, enacted in the aftermath of the independence referendum, 
would, according to the UK government, result in the Scottish Parliament becoming a 
‘powerhouse parliament’, that is, ‘one of the most powerful devolved parliaments in the 
world’ (BBC News 2016). While there remains significant speculation on whether the 
increase in powers and responsibilities of the Scottish Parliament is deserving of 
‘powerhouse’ status (see McHarg 2016), there is no doubt that the Scotland Act 2016, as 
well as its precursor in 2012, significantly enhanced the autonomous responsibilities of the 
Parliament, particularly in the areas of taxation and welfare. This strong focus on autonomy 
has proved to be a significant asset to the Scottish devolution settlement: providing an 
electoral arena and platform in which the internal self-determination demands of Scotland 
can be expressed and in which legislation can be enacted and tailored to meeting Scottish 
specific demands and problems. This sense of support for devolution is not just shared by 
politicians of all political hues, but is equally shared among large swathes of the Scottish 
population. The Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, for instance, has consistently shown that 
those interviewed overwhelmingly support the Scottish Parliament and devolution 
settlement, albeit opinion differs as to what powers the parliament should or should not have. 
As the 2017 Scottish Social Attitudes Report makes clear, very few people believe that the 
Scottish Parliament and Government should have less influence and control over Scottish 
affairs to the extent that ‘the proportion of people saying the Scottish Government should 
have most influence over the way Scotland is run has not dropped below 63% since this 
question was first asked in 1999’ (Scottish Government, 2017: 20).  
As will be discussed later, the lack of shared rule arrangements to accompany and 
offset the self-rule provisions in the UK’s devolution settlements risks unravelling the union 
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as well as impinging on the ability and efficiency of the different orders of government to 
work together with regards to the shared competences between the parliaments. There seems 
to be, however, cross-party consensus that the focus on self-rule was a necessary provision 
in the initial devolution settlements in 1998. A number of interviewees commented, for 
example, that while there was now an apparent need to improve IGR as relates to concurrent 
policies such as taxation and welfare, devolution in the late 1990s met the demands of the 
Scottish electorate, civil society and political elite for a parliament with significant 
legislative autonomy. It was pointed out that Holyrood’s legislative powers had enabled the 
parliament to deliver ‘Scottish solutions to Scottish problems’ (Interview with SNP MSP 6), 
mitigate against policies it disagreed with such as the Bedroom Tax (Interview with SNP 
MSP 5) and increase the standing and reputation of the institution itself (Interview with SNP 
MSP 7). This has worked ‘to create a political centre for Scotland which turned out to be 
both competent and confident and growing in confidence’ (Interview with Green MSP 1), 
as well as ‘create an alternative centre of power that has electoral credibility’ (Interview with 
SNP MSP 1).  
The strong focus on autonomy has engendered a myriad of challenges for the Scottish 
and UK governments as well as for the future of the union itself, but equally has ensured the 
creation of a powerful political centre in Holyrood. In addition to these political guarantees, 
recent moves in the aftermath of the independence referendum to secure legal guarantees for 
the Parliament, including recognising the permanence of the legislature and government 
have further enhanced Scotland’s autonomy status (Himsworth 2016).62 Comparative 
analysis has also underlined this point. The Regional Authority Index (RAI), developed by 
Hooghe et al (2016), measures the levels of self-rule and shared rule in federal and 
decentralised systems.63 In 2010, Scotland scored 14 out of a maximum 18 in terms of self-
rule and had clearly come a long way in comparison with its pre-devolution score which was 
only one out of 18. The new powers devolved as part of the Scotland Acts in 2012 and 2016 
have further increased the autonomy of the Scottish Parliament and according to McEwen 
(2016: 236) increases Scotland’s score to 16. McEwen’s analysis demonstrates that while 
                                                 
62 It is important to point out that despite the rhetoric surrounding the legal guarantees of Clauses One and Two 
of the Scotland Act 2016, the legal interpretation of these clauses remains questionable (see Mullen 2016). In 
fact, as was made clear in the UKSC ruling on Miller V Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, the 
Sewel Convention, notwithstanding the intention to put it on statutory footing, remains a political not legal 
device.  
63 Self-rule is measured according to: institutional depth and policy scope, fiscal autonomy, borrowing capacity 
and the level of independence of legislature and executive (Hooghe et al, 2016: 25). Findings on the shared 
rule scale will be discussed in the next section. 
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Scotland’s autonomy remains behind the Canadian provinces, Swiss Cantons and the 
federacies of the Åland and Faroe Islands, it has more power, and in some cases significantly 
so, than sub-state entities in other decentralised polities like Spain and Italy as well as the 
Länder, provinces, regions and states of the Argentinian, Australian, Austrian, Belgian, 
Brazilian, German and Mexican federations. Scotland, despite the UK not being a fully-
fledged federation, is ‘one of the most autonomous devolved systems in the world’ (ibid: 
237).  
 
4.4.2 The Limitations of Devolution 
As detailed above, devolution is imbued with an inherent flexibility that has benefited 
the evolution of the decentralised system since its institutionalisation in the late 1990s. The 
original devolution settlements have been under continuous review and while very little 
changed in Scotland from 1999 to 2007, the election of the SNP to government reignited 
what has come to be an enduring debate on enhancing Scotland’s constitutional status. 
Notwithstanding the successes and benefits of Scottish devolution, a number of challenging 
limitations can also be identified. 
 
4.4.2.1 The Piecemeal Approach 
In 1998, William Hague (1998), the then leader of the Conservative Party, accused 
Tony Blair’s New Labour government of embarking ‘on a journey of constitutional upheaval 
without a route map.’ The tranche of constitutional reforms pursued under New Labour met 
stern opposition and the government was often portrayed as a group of constitutional 
vandals. As was noted above, the ease at which the architecture of the UK’s constitution can 
be amended is considered a strength of the UK’s constitutional framework, ensuring that 
settlements are in effect consistently under review and easily modified when deemed 
necessary. On the other hand, the lack of formality and difficulty in enacting such reform 
has led to a piecemeal and incoherent package of reforms. To quote Flinders (2009: 385), 
successive UK governments have suffered and continue to suffer from a bout of 
‘constitutional anomie’, that is, ‘the introduction of reforms in a manner bereft of any 
underlying logic or explicit principles, combined with the inability to adopt a strategic 
approach that is sensitive to the interrelated nature of any constitutional configuration.’ The 
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absence of a wider strategy in relation to devolution was one of the biggest criticisms 
levelled at the Blair government as relates to constitutional reform and is a patent limitation 
of the UK’s autonomy arrangements. The absence of an agreed and definitive destination in 
Scotland’s constitutional journey thus renders it conceivable that the establishment of an 
independent Scottish state is just as likely an outcome of the devolution project as the 
continuation of the union (Interview with SNP MSP 7).  
Given the discussion of Friedrich’s thesis in Chapter Two that constitutional politics 
should be fluid not static, it is hard to argue against a flexible approach to constitutional 
arrangements. But, the lack of finality as a result of the paucity of any long-term thinking 
on the accumulative impact of devolution seems to have aggravated rather than abated 
territorial tensions in Scotland. For one interviewee, devolution created ‘an insatiable 
monster’ that whet the appetite rather than quench the thirst for the devolution of more 
powers (Interview with Liberal Democrat MSP 1). Indeed, while devolution was hailed a 
unionist project, designed to embolden not weaken the union (Interview with Conservative 
MSP), the disjointed approach of reforms, coupled with a lack of vision, has ‘weakened the 
[UK’s] hard-core centre’ and thus has jeopardised not strengthened the union (Interview 
with Green MSP 1).  
The Labour Party, having introduced devolution, is responsible for the ad-hoc nature 
in which devolutionary politics has been developed by the centre. The Conservatives, 
however, despite vehemently criticising this piecemeal approach, have peddled a similar 
strategy since winning office in 2010. One Labour Party official observed that since the 
introduction of devolution nearly 20 years ago, neither Labour nor Conservative 
governments have made any really attempt ‘to try and consolidate how the cohesive picture 
would exist’ regarding territorial politics as a whole throughout the entire state (Interview 
with former Labour MP 2). Another official concurred with this point and argued that debate 
in Westminster on devolution is based on reactionary politics ‘as opposed to actually 
thinking this is the right thing for Scotland’ (Interview with former Labour MP 1). The 
existence of ‘the Vow’ and the tight schedule afforded to the Smith Commission evidence 
this point. Further powers were conceded to Scotland based on short term thinking, bereft 
of any wider constitutional consideration. In fact, while there is an argument that the pro-
union parties’ willingness to devolve more powers may have helped to – at least in the short-
term –  save the union, the lack of proper consultation paradoxically endangers it in the long-
term.  
120 
 
The successive strategy of devolving power to buy off secessionists and stop 
independence, made easy by the absence of intractable procedures that require governments 
to secure compliance with amendment processes beyond a mere vote in parliament, has not 
abated secessionist demands in Scotland. In actual fact, this, compounded with the lack of 
consensus on the final destination of Scotland’s devolution journey, has enabled pro-
independence supporters to frame devolution as a mere staging post to independent 
statehood: ‘the history of devolution and moving power from the central government down 
has not inhibited the drive for Scottish independence, it has very clearly strengthened it’ 
(Interview with Green MSP 1).  
The disjointed approach taken by successive UK governments has focused solely on 
self-rule and as a result has not abated demands for independence. Indeed, in line with the 
paradox of autonomy discussed in Chapter Three, this focus on self-rule may have merely 
exacerbated and thus heightened demands for further autonomy and secession. During the 
2014 referendum campaign, pro-union parties emphasised the importance of the ‘shared 
unions’ between Scotland and the rest of the UK, drawing attention to the economic, political 
and social unions as integral to the functioning of both entities. Successive UK governments, 
however, have struggled to convey a coherent message of what the union is for (Interview 
with former Labour MP 1). This lack of vision ensues from the piecemeal manner in which 
territorial change is managed in the UK, whereby no single ‘politics of devolution’ can be 
identified (Interview with former Labour MP 2). Instead, there exists a series of bespoke 
arrangements through which power has been devolved to different territories, void of a 
broader conversation on the accumulative impact of devolution on the territorial governance 
of the UK as a whole. This, for instance, was considered crucial in order to meet the varying 
needs and historical demands of the separate devolved nations, but as pointed out in a report 
by the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, the reactive nature of 
devolutionary politics has failed to view territorial politics through ‘the lens of the union’ 
and as such: 
There is no evidence of strategic thinking in the past about the development of 
devolution. There has been no guiding strategy or framework of principles to 
ensure that devolution develops in a coherent or consistent manner and in ways 
which do not harm the union (Select Committee on the Constitution, 2016: 30). 
 
This lack of thinking is also evident in the approach pursued by the UK government 
vis-à-vis Brexit and the devolved nations, whereby the views of the devolved 
121 
 
administrations, rather than being taken into consideration as the viewpoints of 
democratically elected governments, are instead perceived as an ‘irritation’ (Interview with 
Green MSP 1). There is an argument to say that Theresa May’s rhetoric after being chosen 
as PM to seek to find consensus among the nations and thus pursue a UK-approach to Brexit 
sought to correct some of the anomalies thrown up by devolution and the lack of holistic 
thinking about the union and how it is held together, but even this is a tenuous assertion. The 
approach advocated by May while it adopts the nomenclature of a UK-based approach, is in 
fact, a predominantly English approach which draws upon ‘a particular and controversial 
interpretation of the UK constitution’ (Blick, 2016: 1). This not merely disregards the 
understanding of the union from the devolved territories, but misunderstands, or indeed, 
chooses to ignore, the developments of territorial politics over the last 20 years. The weak 
development of an understanding of devolution, the purpose of the union and the 
plurinational reality of the UK state in Westminster and Whitehall thus necessitate deeper 
thinking as well as a change in mind-set which moves beyond unitary thinking reminiscent 
of the pre-devolution period. The UK state has changed dramatically in the last 20 years and 
as a consequence of EU withdrawal will be transformed further. The challenge, then, is to 
ensure a much more coherent and plurinational vision which does not seek to impose a 
particular constitutional order on its constituent components, as is apparent today.                       
 
4.4.2.2 The Absence of Shared Rule 
The initial devolution settlements rolled out in 1999, as well as the subsequent 
amendments to the devolved acts, which have seen the competences and powers of the 
devolved parliaments and assemblies increase, have moved the UK in a more federal 
direction. Yet, while the federal features of the UK have been enhanced by moving power 
away from the centre and towards the various peripheries, it is far from becoming a fully-
fledged federation. The lack of fundamental federal elements – the absence of a 
constitutional document dividing sovereignty between the different levels, the lack of formal 
mechanisms to ensure the sharing of power between the nations and central governments, 
the lopsided nature of devolution and the lack of enthusiasm among political elites – have 
thus far impeded any formal move towards federation (McEwen 2016).  
As was discussed in Chapter Two, federalism implies an equilibrium between two 
elements, ‘self-rule’ and ‘shared rule’. Devolution in the UK, however, has entirely ignored 
122 
 
the latter, resulting in a heavily decentralised periphery with very few formal mechanisms 
for cooperation or collaboration at the centre. Devolution has focused on building out, that 
is, decentralising power towards the periphery, but has failed to simultaneously build in: 
there is no formalised approach to ensure the inclusion and representation of the peripheral 
territories in central government decision-making processes.  
The congruence of political parties in government at the inception of devolution 
initially provided a benign environment for working relationships between the different 
levels of government. The SNP consistently advocated reform of the UK’s 
intergovernmental machinery, but upon taking office continued the previous informal 
approach to IGR (Cairney 2012). The Brexit debate, or more concretely, the need for 
strategic coordination and deliberation between the UK government and the devolved 
nations in the aftermath of withdrawal, has reignited focus on the inefficiency of the UK’s 
IGR. More pressing, however, is the challenges that already exist as a consequence of the 
devolution of taxation and social security powers to the Scottish Parliament. Scottish 
devolution has moved beyond the binary divide of devolved and reserved powers, but no 
formal shared rule procedures have been developed to accompany this significant 
development.  
Shared rule may refer to a number of arrangements, but ‘scholars largely agree on the 
general meaning of shared rule as participation of lower-level units in higher-level decision 
making’, typically a territorially representative second chamber or through IGR (Mueller, 
2013: 84). Such mechanisms, however, are largely absent in the UK, in part a result of the 
focus on self-rule for the constituent nations, as well as the nature of devolved arrangements; 
powers were either devolved or reserved, they were not shared. Using Hooghe et al’s (2016) 
RAI, it is possible to locate Scotland and its shared rule capacity in a comparative 
framework.64 From a maximum of 14, the RAI scored Scotland 6.5 (ibid: 417). Although, 
according to the RAI this is comparable with other minority nations such as Quebec, it is 
comparatively behind the federalised cantons of Switzerland, the Länder in Germany and 
the ACs in Spain. McEwen (2016: 237), however, questions the 6.5 score for Scotland and 
instead alters this to only 2.5, noting that the maximum of 4 points awarded to Scotland in 
                                                 
64 The measures used by Hooghe et al (2016: 26) to examine shared rule range across five dimensions: the 
extent to which sub-state governments can influence the policy process of national legislation (second 
chamber); the extent to which authority is shared between different levels of government in the 
intergovernmental arena; fiscal control; borrowing co-determination and the role of sub-state governments or 
electorates in determining constitutional reform.  
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the ambit of constitutional change, suggests ‘that regional governments could require 
referenda or exercise veto rights over constitutional change’ which, she notes, is not legally 
guaranteed since such rights have emerged ‘by convention rather than statute’. Indeed, the 
UKSC’s judgement on Sewel further substantiates McEwen’s assertion. Shared rule, thus, 
remains very weak. 
The UK’s constitutional architecture, however, in spite of the recommendations of the 
Smith (and Calman) Commission, which in line with advocating the new category of shared 
powers underlined the need for radical improvements to the largely informal network of 
IGR, has yet to formally institutionalise any efficient shared rule procedures. This, note 
McEwen and Petersohn (2015: 192-193), ‘is especially problematic’ because the most recent 
devolved powers as relates to taxation and social security not only increase the 
responsibilities of the Scottish Parliament, but concomitantly increases its ‘dependence on 
central government decisions in related policy fields which remain reserved.’ Effective 
channels and mechanisms to facilitate communication and cooperation between the Scottish 
and UK governments are now more important than they have been hitherto, yet no 
significant progress has been made to improve them.  
The absence of a constitutionally guaranteed voice at the centre for Scotland is thus a 
significant limitation of Scotland’s devolution arrangements. The establishment of a 
devolved legislature provided an arena to enhance the voice and power of the Scottish nation 
and illuminated the UK’s commitment to accommodating and recognising its plurinational 
diversity. Yet, while recognising distinctiveness and granting political autonomy have been 
successful planks of the UK’s accommodation strategy, the same commitment has not been 
mirrored in Westminster. The Scottish voice was increased at the periphery, but not at the 
centre. The issue of a Scottish voice at the centre was raised during debates on devolution 
in 1997 and in response to a question by former Liberal Democrat Leader, Charles Kennedy 
on the issue of securing a Scottish voice at the centre, the then Secretary of State for 
Scotland, Donald Dewar stated, ‘in the important areas of foreign affairs, defence, economic 
affairs and in particular fiscal affairs, there will still be a need for a Scottish voice in the 
administration of the day in UK terms’ (HC Deb, 31 July 1997, c462). No provisions beyond 
the Scottish Office and Secretary of State for Scotland, however, were envisaged.   
McEwen and Lecours (2008: 225) contend that ‘voice at the centre may be enhanced 
by the creation of a ministerial or bureaucratic position designed to speak on behalf of the 
national minority and articulate its collective policy and political preferences.’ Enhancement 
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of minority voice may also include reserved representation of parliamentary seats, a 
territorially representative second chamber or the institutionalisation of power-sharing 
mechanisms, such as consociationalism. The UK is notable for the absence of the latter two 
mechanisms,65 but did seek to enhance Scotland’s voice through the establishment of the 
Scottish Office in 1885, headed by the Secretary of Scotland (upgraded to Secretary of State 
in 1926) and a civil service for Scottish affairs (Mitchell, 2014: 31).  
The Secretary of State for Scotland is in effect Scotland’s voice in the cabinet, but 
again, as was pointed out by a number of interviewees, his lone voice is impotent against a 
majority of non-Scottish MPs (Interviews with SNP MSPs). One SNP member observed that 
the incumbent Secretary of State for Scotland, ‘represents a politics ethos that is really pretty 
marginal in Scotland’ and thus questioned whether one Conservative MP was able to be 
Scotland’s voice in cabinet, when the majority of other Scottish MPs hailed from different 
parties (Interview with SNP MSP 9). A Conservative parliamentarian did not entirely agree 
with this opinion but thought it necessary to reform central government infrastructure to 
ensure better representation of Scottish interests (Interview with Conservative MSP). 
Devolution, therefore, may have created significant space to increase Scotland’s voice at the 
periphery, but the same cannot be said at the centre. There is no doubt that Scotland’s 
parliamentary voice is heard in Westminster through the 59 MPs representing Scottish 
constituencies, but in terms of influencing the legislative and policy making processes, its 
influence remains rather marginal.  
Standing arrangements to ensure the involvement of the devolved nations in the 
consideration of reserved matters in Westminster were discussed before the inception of 
devolution. Interestingly, the White Papers on devolution to Scotland and Wales did not 
mention any forums to achieve the above, but these were included in the formal 
‘Memorandum of Understanding’ between the governments which established JMCs to be 
attended by Ministers from the UK government and the devolved administrations (Hazell, 
2000: 150). A plenary JMC – chaired by the PM – and sub-committees were established, 
including a committee for domestic issues and a committee for European affairs. The JMCs, 
however, quickly fell into disuse. Labour politicians in power in Cardiff, Edinburgh and 
London dealt with issues on an informal basis and as such no JMC, save the European sub-
                                                 
65 House of Lords reform has featured on successive UK governments’ reform agendas for several decades, 
yet reconstitution of the House of Lords as a territorially representative second chamber has been rarely 
discussed. It was, however, a manifesto pledge of the Labour Party in the 2015 general election.  
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committee, was held between 2003 and 2007. In 2008, the JMC was reconvened in part 
because of pressure from the newly elected SNP government to reinstate formal mechanisms 
of intergovernmental coordination but has tended to meet only once a year. The JMC may 
have ‘grown to become the central piece of political machinery in underpinning the 
devolution settlement’ (ibid), yet for parliamentarians familiar with these meetings, it has 
proven to be little more than ‘a talking shop’ (Interview with SNP MSP 5), a space for 
‘grandstanding’ (Interview with Liberal Democrat MSP 2) and ‘in urgent need of reform’ 
(Interview with Labour MSP 2). 
The effectiveness of the JMC, as well as the lack of guaranteed constitutional voice 
for Scotland, has been further called into question in the aftermath of the referendum on the 
UK’s membership of the EU. As was discussed earlier, a new JMC on EU negotiations –
JMC (EN) – was established and although it has met much more frequently in comparison 
to other JMC sub-committees, the intergovernmental forum remains the subject of much 
criticism. Interviewees repeated some of the well-rehearsed critiques of the JMC and pointed 
out that although the JMC (EN) was new, the structures remained the same: the UK 
government sets the agenda, chairs the meeting and dominates proceedings. One Green MSP 
argued that the JMC (EN) seemed to be as ineffective and futile as other JMCs and 
demonstrated the UK government’s disregard for listening to and accommodating the 
concerns of the devolved nations: ‘if the UK government was serious about listening to the 
devolved nations and about preserving the unity of its state – which all UK government are 
– if it was serious about that then the JMC would have been reformed a long time ago’ 
(Interview with Green MSP 1).  
Bilateral arrangements do exist between the governments and according to 
interviewees work much better than quadrilateral forums such as the JMC. Nevertheless, 
given that the JMC is the formal mechanism to facilitate dialogue and coordination between 
the UK government and the devolved administrations, the infrequency of its meetings, the 
dominance of the UK government, and the lack of willingness on all sides to foster a 
cooperative intergovernmental forum serve to undermine rather than bolster devolution 
arrangements. The extant JMC infrastructure is inadequate to foster a sense of partnership 
and cooperation among the devolved nations and central government and while it may be 
designed as a forum of consultation not co-decision, it even struggles to achieve this. 
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4.4.2.3 The Lack of a Plurinational Culture 
The above discussion illuminates how the absence of shared rule is a significant 
limitation of the Scottish devolution settlement. Devolution was designed to effect change 
at the periphery and not the centre, but in failing to consider how Whitehall and Westminster 
must also change as a consequence of devolution, successive UK governments have been 
unable to fully manage the strong and dynamic centrifugal political forces that have emerged 
or been reenergised by devolution. Resultantly, no overarching strategic vision of the UK’s 
constitutional journey has emerged, nor has the government’s intergovernmental machinery 
been reconfigured to manage centrifugal pressures as well as centre-periphery relations.  
Yet, while the absence of shared rule structures represents a significant challenge and 
limitation to the Scottish settlement, there was consensus amongst interviewees that reform 
could not be completely tangible, it would also require change around ‘amorphous’ aspects 
of politics (Interview with Conservative MSP), including how the UK government treats 
and deals with the devolved administrations in terms of ‘language, tone and approach’ 
(Interview with former Labour MP 2).66 
The existence of plurinational democracies necessitates the development of what may 
be termed a plurinational culture, which would reinforce the main tenets of the theory of 
multinational federalism. The UK is an indisputable plurinational state and shares some 
characteristics with those detailed in Chapter Three to describe plurinational federal political 
systems. But, while recognition and asymmetry are essential components, the development 
of a plurinational culture must go beyond this. This would involve a more inclusive and 
cooperative approach towards politics and decision-making, the pursuit of plurinational 
justice and the entrenchment of values such as equality, mutual respect, trust and partnership. 
In the UK, however, while there is some evidence of plurinational awareness and willingness 
to work politically to resolve problems, this has not necessarily translated into the 
development or entrenchment of a plurinational culture in which the rhetoric, actions, 
policies and decision-making processes of the central government are characterised by the 
abovementioned factors.  
For one SNP interviewee, a lot of tension between the Scottish and UK governments 
relates to ‘rhetoric…it is not always about substance. I think it is also about how the UK 
                                                 
66 This will be developed in further detail in Section six.  
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government treats Scotland’ (Interview with SNP MSP 8). For a Green MSP, the mantra 
‘might is right’ dictated Westminster’s relationships with the devolved nations (Interview 
with Green MSP 2). He continued that the disregard for the Scottish vote to remain in the 
immediate aftermath of the referendum, coupled with the unitary approach taken by the UK 
government to negotiations and the lack of clarity over the repatriation of powers 
demonstrated this to be true. The voice of the Scottish minority is drowned out and ignored 
by the majoritarian approach of the UK government and its commitment to an ‘English-
oriented Brexit’ (ibid). 
While it is unsurprising that pro-independence parliamentarians criticised existing 
structures and arrangements, pro-union representatives also discussed this issue. A 
Conservative MSP gave a clear example:  
The recent announcement by the DWP [Department for Works and Pensions] 
that half the job centres in Glasgow will close is a good example…that 
announcement should not have been made without consulting the Scottish 
government first. Job centres are reserved, they are not shared, but nonetheless 
when you know that the Scottish government is likely to create a new Scottish 
social security agency, when you know that bits of welfare are being devolved, 
when you know that the future of welfare provision in Scotland is fluid because 
of the things you signed up to in the Smith Commission Agreement and in the 
Scotland Act [2016], then do not act unilaterally (Interview with Conservative 
MSP; my emphasis).  
 
There is consensus, then, that another limitation of the devolution settlement is the 
absence, or slow pace of change in mentality in Westminster and Whitehall. As the example 
given above demonstrates, despite the decentralised structures that have dispersed power 
away from the central government, a rather centralised and unitary approach continues to 
inform central government thinking. This majoritarian thinking, which contrasts with the 
liberal nationalist approach detailed in the theoretical framework, is evident in the 
government’s approach to the results of the EU withdrawal referendum; Scotland’s vote to 
remain is considered inconsequential against the dominant English vote for Leave. This 
further draws attention to the hierarchical nature of devolution; it remains a UK-led project 
which still fails to fully accommodate the distinctiveness of Scotland, or provide 
mechanisms for Scottish influence over central government decision-making processes. 
 
128 
 
4.4.3 Summary 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from this analysis of Scotland’s devolved 
arrangements. First, devolution has proved flexible in accommodating the demands of those 
who support further autonomy. The issue of secession, for instance, was successfully 
managed through the establishment of a solid, transparent and legal framework. The 
flexibility of the UK’s constitutional arrangements, as well as the predominantly 
accommodative approach exercised by UK governments towards Scottish distinctiveness, 
was underscored in the 2012 Edinburgh Agreement which saw both the Scottish and UK 
governments work together to facilitate the holding of a referendum on Scottish 
independence. While it remains unclear whether such an agreement will again be reached 
should calls for another referendum be heeded, the agreement indisputably set an important 
precedent and, as will be discussed, contrasts with the non-accommodative approach to 
facilitating a vote on secession in Spain.  
Notwithstanding the flexibility of Scotland’s devolution arrangements, a number of 
limitations were identified which in turn demonstrate the precariousness of devolution in 
Scotland. The lack of finality of devolution in Scotland eschews the rigidity found in other 
states’ constitutional arrangements, but it simultaneously risks unbinding the ties that have 
seen the union persevere for over 300 years. Further devolution has been offered based on 
short-term tactical reactions and not on holistic, strategic long-term thinking. The UK has 
yet to find a stable equilibrium between too flexible and overly rigid constitutional 
arrangements. This is worsened by the fact that devolution has in effect become a project of 
the peripheries and not of the centre; almost no change has been experienced in Westminster 
or Whitehall. The absence of formal IGR, including, but not limited to forums for 
cooperation, risk the union becoming disintegrative rather than accommodative. In 
consonance with the lack of progress at the centre, very few efforts have been made beyond 
rhetoric to enshrine formal shared rule mechanisms in the UK’s constitutional architecture. 
While it is fair to point out that such mechanisms were never the concern of pro-
devolutionists, the increasing remit of the Scottish Parliament, which now includes 
responsibility for taxation and social security, as well as the most recent controversy vis-à-
vis EU withdrawal and the repatriation of powers and thus intertwined competences, 
necessitates deeper concern for the institutionalisation of shared rule structures to ensure 
some form of formal cooperation to manage this new category of shared competences.  
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4.5  The Constitutional Future of Scotland and the United Kingdom 
The constitutional journey embarked upon by the UK and its constituent nations in the 
late 1990s has completely transformed the landscape of British politics. Identifiable, 
separate political systems have evolved in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and while 
the union itself remains intact, its future is uncertain. In Scotland, the political transformation 
precipitated by the establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999 is epitomised in the 
shifting sands of the Scottish party system. The secessionist SNP has held the reins of power 
in Holyrood for over ten years, while the pro-union and initially devolution-sceptic Scottish 
Conservatives constitute the largest opposition party.  
The electoral dominance of the SNP has triggered a seemingly perpetual debate on 
what has come to be one of the defining features of the Scottish political system post-
devolution: territorial politics. The constitution, despite being a reserved issue and thus 
outside the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament, has dominated the political 
agenda since the SNP’s election in 2007. Furthermore, the rise of territorial political 
movements around the globe has led to a resurgence of interest in this field of study (Keating 
2008) and thus has refocused the spotlight on the development of territorial management in 
the UK’s home nations, namely Scotland. The campaign that preceded the 2014 vote on 
independence may have been hailed a democratic triumph, but the vote to reject 
independence failed to settle the matter. A number of questions in relation to the purpose of 
the union, Scotland’s place within it, as well as the accommodation of Scotland’s self-
determination demands remain.   
The penultimate section of this chapter, therefore, occupies itself with the future 
terrain of territorial politics in Scotland and the UK. Given that the constitutional future of 
Scotland and the UK remains in flux, this section examines the future of Scottish autonomy 
through the prism of the different positions endorsed by the main actors, ranging from 
recentralisation to federalisation, disintegration to confederation.  
 
4.5.1 The Conservatives: Forging a Strong and Stable Union?   
The Conservative Party’s commitment to the union is unyielding. Historically 
suspicious of territorial management, the Conservatives briefly flirted with the idea of 
devolution, before completely abandoning it under the leadership of Thatcher. More 
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recently, the party has moved beyond this limited view and instead has resorted to traditional 
Conservative thinking: support for the union balanced with recognition of the internal 
ethnonational plurality of the state. Despite claims, however, that the Conservatives are ‘the 
party of devolution’ (Davidson 2017), the party’s rhetoric is not always matched by its action 
and in government in Westminster has struggled to completely shake off its image as an 
English party inimical to Scottish demands and aspirations for further accommodation, 
empowerment and recognition. The Conservative government’s approach to Brexit, which 
despite being supported by the Scottish Conservatives, significantly jars with the Europhile 
rhetoric endorsed by the Scottish party and its leader prior to the 2016 referendum. In 
addition, while the party is aware of the challenges posed to the union in the wake of the 
experience of the 2014 independence referendum, its rhetoric and actions, particularly as 
relates to EU withdrawal and the repatriation of powers, threatens to wreak irreparable 
damage, rather than bolster, what the party’s 2017 manifesto termed ‘our precious union’ 
(Conservatives, 2017: 31). 
Support for the union, however, is not support for the status quo, but rather a reformed 
union in which there is a shift in emphasis away from separate, ad-hoc developments to a 
more holistic constitutional package for the whole of the UK. Both Ruth Davidson and 
Theresa May have endorsed this position. Davidson (2015), for instance, argued that as well 
as supporting devolution: 
We need more union, too. The maintenance of the union can no longer be bolted 
on as an added extra. All of us, including the UK Government machine, need to 
reflect consistently on how our decisions and actions impact on the union. 
Whitehall needs to start thinking like someone from Cardiff, or Carlisle, or 
Coatbridge and ask how it feels for them. 
 
Theresa May (2017) echoed something similar in her 2017 conference speech and 
stated, ‘for too long the attitude in Whitehall has been to “devolve and forget”’ and thus 
proposed reforming UK government policy towards the union, including ‘explicitly looking 
at the interests of the union’ in reserved policy. In line with this, a number of Conservative 
representatives have argued that while much has to change in Westminster and Whitehall to 
ensure devolved arrangements are respected and considered in UK government 
deliberations, it is equally important to increase the visibility of the union in the devolved 
parts of the UK. The 2014 independence referendum almost resulted in the near-death of the 
union, thus for these Conservatives increasing the prominence of the union is just as 
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important as supporting devolution. Adam Tomkins, Conservative MSP and Shadow 
Cabinet Secretary for Communities, Social Security, the Constitution and Equalities 
believed that ‘to positively present the union’ has proved a ‘chronic problem’ for successive 
governments, thus more has to be done to strengthen its case (Tomkins, 14 October 2015, 
HL 149). According to Baroness Goldie, former leader of the Scottish Conservatives, (11 
December 2015, HL 149): 
We are moving into an age where the Westminster government, of whatever 
political hue, should be cognisant of the need to make more visible to the 
recipients of its services throughout the United Kingdom that it has provided 
them. Whether it is an emblematic Union Jack, a logo on letterheads or whatever 
it may be, I don’t know but something needs to give a visible connection to the 
provision of service.  
 
Other Conservatives concurred with this assessment. One interviewee argued that 
‘nothing speaks as loud as money’ and suggested that the UK government, significantly 
increase its investment in Scotland which would in turn increase its visibility (Interview with 
Conservative MSP). He suggested that the UK learn from other plurinational states, such as 
Canada, whereby federal funding in the provinces is often signposted by the Canadian flag. 
Doing something similar in the UK, would, he believed, increase the visibility of the 
Westminster government and entrench a wider connection between the union and Scottish 
citizens.   
Much emphasis has been placed on enhancing a positive attitude towards the union as 
well as increasing the visibility of the Westminster government, but emphasis has also been 
placed on improving relationships between the devolved governments and the Westminster 
executive. Ruth Davidson (2015) promotes the creation of a ‘Committee of the Parliaments 
and Assemblies’ to be ‘a body designed to change the historic lurches of asymmetric 
devolution and examine in an ongoing fashion, the role and central importance of the union 
to provide a constant review and health check’. This, unsurprisingly, is rooted in the 
Conservative’s commitment to the union and hostility towards a second independence 
referendum, but also underlines the importance of viewing devolution in the round, and not 
as separate political projects. The UK Conservatives have also championed such tangible 
reforms. The 2017 manifesto committed the party to improving Westminster’s machinery to 
take account of devolved arrangements, including moving government beyond London and 
establishing civil service and cultural body offices in the other parts of the UK 
(Conservatives, 2017: 31). The party’s approach to Brexit, however, demonstrates that 
132 
 
Conservative rhetoric does not match the actions of government.  
Withdrawal from the EU has been seized upon by certain Conservatives to advocate 
reform of the UK’s own unions. Speaking in the House of Lords, Baroness Goldie argued 
that there was now an urgent need to ‘strain every sinew to protect and preserve our 
remaining United Kingdom union’ as a result of the decision to leave the EU (HL Deb, 5 
July 2016, C1879). Ruth Davidson (2016) agrees with Goldie’s assessment and writing in 
the Financial Times in October 2016 stated that ‘there is little doubt, as we face up to Brexit, 
that the union will be challenged once again to deliver’. In line with Davidson’s stance, other 
senior Conservatives, including the PM and Secretary of State for Scotland, champion EU 
withdrawal as an opportunity to recast and reinforce the union. In a similar vein to other pro-
union interviewees in this thesis, much has been made of the fact that while ‘Brexit has 
provided the SNP with plenty of ammunition’ it at the same time weakens the case for 
independence (Davidson 2017). Withdrawal will result in a new relationship between the 
UK and its European neighbours, but Davidson also forcefully posits that it should also 
initiate ‘a fresh start’ among the UK’s nations, and reset ‘the relationship Holyrood has with 
the United Kingdom government’ (ibid).  
The approach pursued by the Conservative government hitherto, does not, however, 
fit with the rhetoric endorsed by senior Conservatives. Instead, and reminiscent of relations 
between Scotland and the UK government under Thatcher, a narrow and contested 
interpretation of the UK constitution is being imposed on the devolved territories, ignorant 
of the plurinational reality of the UK or of the developments of devolution over the last two 
decades. In fact, the lack of concern afforded to devolution prior to the 2016 referendum, 
the hesitance of the UK government to engage with the devolved administrations, the 
judgement of the UKSC on Sewel, as well as the Conservative government’s intransigence 
in regards to discussions on the repatriation of powers, betrays a unitary, conservative and 
antedated interpretation of the UK constitution. This particular doctrine is widely contested 
in the devolved nations which instead adopt a more multilevel, federalist and plurinational 
vision of the UK state. In consequence, the Conservative government’s approach has the 
potential to be just as risky to the continued existence of the union as those advocating 
Scottish independence.  
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4.5.2 Labour and the Liberal Democrats: Reinventing the ‘F’ Word?  
Labour and the Liberal Democrats have been highly critical of the Conservative 
government’s approach towards the devolved nations in relation to EU withdrawal and 
vehemently scathing of the attempt at recentralisation of repatriated powers. In contrast with 
the Conservatives, both Scottish Labour and Scottish Liberal Democrats advocate a federal 
future for the UK, believing that this ‘third way’ offers an optimistic alternative to ‘the 
intransigent unionism’ of the Conservatives and ‘the radical independence of the SNP’ 
(Interview with Labour MSP 2). Despite the federalising tendency that has developed as a 
result of devolution over the last 20 years, federalism remains a marginalised constitutional 
preference in Scotland and the UK as a whole (Keating 2015a).  
In the aftermath of Brexit, as well as Scottish Labour’s support for federalism, the 
Liberal Democrats believe that ‘the momentum for a federal UK is building’ (Purvis 2017). 
In this vein, the party believes federalism can serve as a way out of the binary constitutional 
divisions that continue to be discussed in Scotland and as such ‘design a system that would 
bring us all together’ and ensure that Scotland, as well as England, Wales and Northern 
Ireland, would ‘have the best of both worlds’ (Interview with Liberal Democrat MSP 2). EU 
withdrawal is thus framed as an opportune moment to recast the UK in a more federal 
direction. At the same time, the Liberal Democrats also believe that the already complicated 
debates on Brexit have demonstrated the necessity of a more federal approach, to help 
manage disputes between the UK government and the devolved nations as well as ensure 
the creation of apparatus that would involve, in the words of the Scottish party leader, 
‘devolved administrations coming together to agree common frameworks’ (Rennie 2018).  
Yet, while the Liberal Democrats are indisputably united in calling for a more 
cooperative and consensual approach to British politics and believe federal structures would 
facilitate this, the party’s long-standing commitment to federalism, much like their Labour 
counterpart, remains ill-defined. There is no doubt that the experience of Brexit substantiates 
calls for experimentation with federal structures, but for example, neither the Liberal 
Democrats nor Labour have made much headway in explaining how federalism would work 
with regards to England, the largest nation of the UK with circa 85% of the state’s 
population. Thus, while federalism is a potential solution and indeed posited as a cure to 
manage ‘the politics of identity’ and ‘the politics of grievance’, the lack of detail on how 
federalism would work remains an intractable hurdle to increasing the appeal of the party’s 
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preferred constitutional provision (Interview with Liberal Democrat MSP 2).67  
Scottish Labour has tended to avoid detailed debate on Scotland’s constitutional status 
(Hassan and Shaw, 2012: 299-316). The party did not enter into prolonged constitutional 
discussions until the referendum on independence and even then, the party looked like it had 
been ‘dragged kicking and screaming into this debate rather than embracing it properly…we 
have always been behind the curve with the recent autonomy debate’ (Interview with former 
Labour MP 1). The party’s reluctance to enhance devolution in Scotland was evidenced in 
its 2014 constitutional report, outflanked and overshadowed by the Conservatives (Anderson 
2014).  
Squeezed at both ends of the political spectrum, with the SNP on one side championing 
independence and the Conservatives on the other advocating union, Scottish Labour has 
struggled to articulate a distinctive vision vis-à-vis Scotland’s constitutional status. The 
referendum decision to leave the EU has propelled the territorial dimension of Scottish 
politics back onto the political agenda and has afforded Scottish Labour an opportunity to 
find its constitutional voice. For one MSP, ‘Brexit’, in terms of constitutional politics, 
‘changes the game quite profoundly’ (Interview with Labour MSP 3) to the extent that ‘we 
need a new post-Brexit settlement for Britain that keeps the UK together’ (Interview with 
Labour MP). As a result, Scottish Labour, akin to the Conservatives, considers Brexit an 
opportunity to forge a (re)new(ed) vision for Scotland’s constitutional future while 
concomitantly precipitating wider debate on reshaping the territorial governance of the 
whole UK. In the words of former party leader, Kezia Dugdale (2016), ‘while Brexit has led 
us into a period of instability and chaos, it also provides us with an opportunity to confront 
problems in our society and make lasting changes that have long been overdue’. The 
incumbent Scottish Labour leader, Richard Leonard (2018), argues along similar lines. 
Federalism has thus become what Scottish Labour presents as an alternative to ‘two 
different brands of nationalism’ (Interview with Labour MSP 2). Former PM Gordon Brown 
(2017) has also advanced this position and presents federalism as ‘the third option’ which 
‘transcend[s] the bitter division and extremism of an inflexible, die-hard Conservatism at 
war with an intransigent and even more hard-line nationalism’. Hitherto, the party has taken 
what may be termed an organic approach to the subject, providing very few details as to 
                                                 
67 This was corroborated in interviews whereby a number of non-Liberal Democrat interviewees believed 
neither Labour nor the Liberal Democrats had done enough to explain how federalism would work vis-à-vis 
the size of England.  
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what a federal restructure of the UK will eventually look like. Core elements of any re-
structure, however, include a people’s constitutional convention, a new Act of Union and 
reform of government institutions, specifically the House of Lords (Interview with Labour 
MSPs 1, 2, 3).  
A constitutional convention, ‘should bring together groups to deliberate on the future 
of our country and propose a way forward that strengthen the UK and establishes a new 
political settlement for the whole country’ (Dugdale 2016). The idea of the convention is 
not only supported by Scottish Labour but has the backing of its Welsh counterpart and the 
UK Labour Party, too. In a similar vein to the Conservatives, such a convention would 
ensure a UK-wide debate about further change, avoiding what has come to be the norm of 
separate, disjointed discussions in each of the different parts of the UK. Scottish Labour has 
also expressed its support for a new Act of Union to ‘renew partnership between Scotland 
and the other nations of the UK’ (Interview with Labour MSP 1), further ‘strengthen the 
union’ (Interview with Labour MSP 3) and ‘provide constitutional balance’ among the UK’s 
constituent nations (Interview with Labour MSP 2). For Scottish Labour, it is therefore 
important to not only ensure a renewed constitutional settlement committed to protecting 
and enhancing the powers of the Scottish Parliament, but also to reform the UK and reset 
the relationships between the different nations and governments on a more equal standing.  
However, while Scottish Labour may now have a forward trajectory in terms of 
constitutional policy, ‘there is a long way to go to persuade people it is an attractive 
proposition’ (Interview with Labour MSP 2). A core problem that Labour face is the lack of 
support for a federal future from its Labour counterparts in other parts of the UK, including 
party leader Jeremy Corbyn. Corbyn, for example, endorsed the Scottish party’s call for a 
constitutional convention, but rejected calls for a new Act of Union (BBC News 2017b). 
One Labour interviewee agreed with Corbyn and believed that the Scottish party’s move 
towards federalism was nothing more than a mere ‘branding exercise…rather than a 
fundamental shift in the [party’s] constitutional position’ (Interview with former Labour MP 
2). The jury remains out, therefore, even amongst the party faithful, as to whether federalism 
really is a worthwhile constitutional endeavour. 
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4.5.3 The SNP and Scottish Greens: A Fluid Interpretation of 
Independence? 
The SNP and Scottish Greens’ commitment to independence for Scotland is as resolute 
as the Conservative Party’s support for the union. Both parties fully support the Scottish 
devolution project and since its inception have campaigned for the devolution of more 
powers and responsibilities, as well as for independence. Despite losing the independence 
referendum, the Greens and SNP substantially increased their party memberships and 
chalked up significant results in the 2016 Scottish Parliament election. In the aftermath of 
the 2016 EU referendum, both the Greens and SNP have called for a major rethink and 
redesign of the Scottish devolution settlement, but at the same time have remained consistent 
in their support for independence. In March 2017, both parties joined together to pass a 
resolution requesting permission from Westminster to hold a second independence 
referendum, and although this has been put on hold as a result of the SNP’s loss of 21 seats 
in the 2017 general election, independence remains the long-term constitutional preference 
of both parties.  
As has already been discussed in this chapter, the lack of concern afforded to the 
devolved governments on the part of the UK government with regards to Brexit policy 
formation has further soured relations between the different governments and in fact has led 
to an unprecedented situation in which the Scottish and Welsh governments present 
themselves as defenders of the national interest against the tyranny of the UK government. 
Both the SNP and Greens have consistently complained that the EU referendum exposes the 
existence of a ‘democratic deficit’ insofar as the wishes of Scottish voters are superseded by 
demands elsewhere in the UK (Interview with Green MSP 1 and SNP MSP 8). Drawing 
upon this, the rejection of the SNP’s double majority proposal, the failure of the UK 
government to facilitate an agreed approach to trigger Article 50, the ruling of the UKSC on 
the status of Sewel and the attempt by the Conservatives to recentralise repatriated powers 
from Brussels, both the SNP and Greens have sought to show that Scotland, in spite of 
rhetoric to the contrary, is not an equal member of the union. Consequently, Nicola Sturgeon 
(2017b) has argued that the UK’s status as a plurinational democracy is under threat. The 
SNP, as a result, has called for a complete rethink of devolution, not only in terms of the 
devolution of powers, but the role the devolved governments should play in influencing 
central government policy and the hierarchical structures which see the devolved 
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administrations treated as ‘mere subordinate provinces not equal nations’ (Interview with 
SNP MSP 3).  
For the SNP, an extension of powers to the Scottish Parliament is crucial to create a 
better autonomy settlement after withdrawal from the EU. As well as calling for the 
devolution of repatriated powers for devolved competences, the SNP also believes other 
powers related to current reserved matters should be devolved, including, inter alia, 
employment law, equalities, health and safety and consumer protection. The Scottish 
government’s White Paper (2016: 42-43) argued that: 
Leaving the EU requires a rethinking of the nature of the UK as a state to ensure 
an appropriate balance of powers and responsibilities to replace that previously 
shaped with reference to EU law and institutions, and to avoid a further 
concentration of power at Westminster. This needs to cover both the devolution 
of powers, and the arrangements for devolved institutions to have a say in 
decisions on reserved matters affecting the countries concerned. 
 
The paper lays out a number of powers to be considered for further devolution 
including, inter alia, import and export control, immigration company law and insolvency 
and social security which would, in effect, create a much looser union styled along 
confederal rather than federal lines. In interviews for this thesis, all SNP members advocated 
the further devolution of powers to Holyrood, most endorsing a model that would see 
everything but foreign affairs, defence and some macroeconomic policy reserved to 
Westminster.  
What may be termed the SNP’s ‘second-best’ model has the hallmarks of a confederal 
approach as opposed to independence per se. Indeed, while during the 2014 referendum 
campaign the SNP campaigned in favour of independence, the vision put forward by the 
party prior to the vote was a vision that saw independence as ‘internationalist’, not 
‘isolationist’ (Interview with SNP MSP 4). The SNP’s model of independence would not 
result in the severing of ties between Scotland and the rest of the UK, but would instead be 
based on enhanced cooperation, shared goals and common confidences. In short, the SNP 
advocated ‘independence-lite’ (Keating and McEwen, 2017: 9). There is an argument, 
however particularly in light of the interview data analysed here, that the vision of 
independence has hallmarks of a confederal approach, too. Indeed, commenting on the 
SNP’s independence plans, particularly Alex Salmond’s proposed retention of the social, 
monetary, monarchical, defence and European unions between Scotland and the rest of the 
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UK, former SNP MP, George Kerevan (2013) stated: ‘Salmond is offering us a new British 
confederation in everything but name.’  
Watts (2008: 10) writes that confederations ‘occur where several pre-existing polities 
join together to form a common government for certain limited purposes (for foreign affairs, 
defence or economic purposes), but the common government is dependent upon the will of 
the constituent governments’. The UK, in its current form, is far from meeting the criteria 
that denotes a confederation, but the SNP’s independence vision does. Furthermore, in the 
context of Brexit, the SNP has made much noise with regard to the UK as a union of equal 
members. Confederation, then, would ultimately ensure a much more equal relationship: 
Scotland would retain its own sovereignty and autonomy in certain areas, while pooling it 
in others. It is already clear that the SNP advocate ‘a rather attenuated form of 
independence’, evidenced in the party’s ‘independence in Europe’ policy which accepts the 
inevitable limitations on the independence of states, particularly in today’s globalised world 
(Keating and McEwen, 2017: 9). A confederal arrangement, therefore, may alter the final 
destination on what the SNP envision as Scotland’s constitutional journey, but would not 
entail a complete overhaul of the party’s constitutional vision.  
Independence may remain the SNP’s constitutional preference, but the recent decision 
to suspend plans for an immediate independence referendum demonstrate that it constitutes, 
as it has largely always done, a long-term rather than short-term goal. Instead, as has been 
noted above, the SNP has devoted its energies to championing further devolution to 
Holyrood as well as support for a complete overhaul of devolution to ensure a more coherent 
and accommodative model of autonomy is sustained. The Greens, on the other hand, support 
the extension of powers to the Scottish Parliament, particularly in relation to immigration, 
but are much more radical in their support for a second independence referendum. The Party 
believes that the decision to withdraw from the EU coupled with the ‘belligerent stance 
against Scotland’ taken by the PM and her government ‘make an independence referendum 
inevitable’ (Chapman 2017). Patrick Harvie and Maggie Chapman, the party’s co-leaders, 
urged Nicola Sturgeon not to heed advice about delaying her proposed referendum arguing 
that ‘the UK government’s choice to ignore the strong remain vote in Scotland and to take 
a narrow UK-wide leave vote as a pretext for a hard Brexit stance’ required a second 
independence referendum (quoted in Davidson 2017).  
For both the Greens and the SNP, independence remains the parties’ long-term 
constitutional preference. The independence movement failed to win the 2014 referendum 
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but has remained alive, buoyed by the 45% vote in the referendum. As such, many pro-
independence interviewees believed independence was within touching distance and thus 
offers of other constitutional arrangements would fall short ‘when the ultimate goal is in 
sight’ (Interview with Green MSP 1). The terms and implications of the UK’s withdrawal 
from the EU will have profound ramifications for Scotland’s devolution settlement, as well 
as the electoral fortunes of the SNP and its independence project. In light of this and the 
2017 general election, the SNP is treading a more cautious approach, while the Greens 
remain committed to their support for an immediate second independence referendum. In 
the current discourse, discussions on moves towards a confederal model are all but absent 
and indeed would be perceived by both Scottish and UK parties as a radical solution. 
However, as the analysis here demonstrates, while a new confederal model would move the 
Conservatives and Labour beyond their comfort zones, a looser constitutional framework 
may well be the required solution that not only ensures a more coherent and accommodative 
model of autonomy, but would render the pursuit of Scottish independence obsolete. This, 
it may well be argued, would be a tough selling point for the SNP, but as this section has 
shown, the party is already very much confederal in its thinking. 
 
4.6 Forging a Coherent Model of Autonomy in the UK 
20 years after the inception of devolution, Scotland and the UK stand at a 
constitutional crossroads. There is little doubt that devolution has proved a remarkable 
success, yet tensions remain and the constitutional issue, notwithstanding the 2014 
referendum, is far from settled. The differing referendum results among the nations in the 
2016 EU referendum, the process towards triggering Article 50 as well as the UK’s 
government’s approach towards withdrawal and the repatriation of powers illuminate just 
some of the most pressing issues facing the UK.  
A predominant feature of the UK’s constitutional order has been one of elasticity, 
manifest in the further devolution of powers that has occurred to the devolved territories in 
recent years. The implementation of new powers in Scotland, however, has not arrested or 
severely dampened support for independence (Henderson and Mitchell 2015), and it is 
becoming patently clear that observing the development of devolution solely through the 
prism of self-rule is a significant limitation of the UK’s territorial thinking. In addition, the 
constitutional upheaval provoked by the UK’s departure from the EU necessitates urgent 
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thinking vis-à-vis the layout of the UK’s territorial architecture and majority-minority 
relations. In light of this, the penultimate section of this chapter brings together both 
theoretical and empirical considerations, as discussed in Chapter Three, to examine some of 
the most important elements in the ongoing debate about the accommodation, empowerment 
and recognition of Scotland within the UK. In doing so, this section seeks to move debate 
beyond the current limited discussions of self-rule mechanisms and examine whether other 
reforms, both in silos and in combination, can work to improve and bolster the UK’s extant 
constitutional arrangements.  
 
4.6.1 The Normative Dimension 
In In Search of the Federal Spirit, Burgess (2012a: 22) writes that the different 
governments operating in multilevel contexts ‘must assist and support each other, inform 
and consult each other, cooperate and coordinate activities with each other, respect 
established procedures and generally maintain friendly relations with each other.’ In order 
to bolster the abovementioned arrangements, Burgess identifies a number of federal values 
and principles that are essential to guide relations in multilevel states, particularly in 
plurinational contexts in which there is even more imperative on different orders of 
government to create a hospitable environment in which both majority and minority 
communities cannot just exist, but flourish (see also Gagnon 2014).  
From a normative consideration, some of the biggest issues with regards to relations 
between the Scottish and UK governments relate to important principles such as trust, 
equality, respect and partnership. Political congruence, which for the first two terms of the 
Scottish Parliament saw Labour in power in Edinburgh and London, better facilitated 
relations between Holyrood and Westminster, but this has not been the case in more recent 
years between the SNP and Conservatives. To compound to this already tenuous 
relationship, the absence of consensus on the UK’s departure from the EU has further 
complicated relations and illuminated a widening gulf between the Scottish and UK 
governments.  
Trust is an essential component that undergirds multilevel plurinational systems, 
requiring different governments within the state to work together as well as ‘clear 
mechanisms to allow the minority nations to participate in the shared government of the 
federation’ (Requejo, 2015: 164; see also Karmis and Rocher 2018). In the proceeding 
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section I will discuss some of these mechanisms, but it is clear that in the context of the UK 
the differing interpretations of the state, as well as the ‘competitive nation-building and 
nationalist claims, especially when secessionist parties are in power’, have resulted in ‘a 
detrimental impact on relations of trust’ between the Scottish and UK governments 
(McEwen, 2017: 669). On the one hand, pro-union representatives distrust the SNP given 
the party’s support for independence and thus question the party’s commitment to 
devolution. One interviewee believed the SNP was ‘timid’ to use extant powers ‘because it 
doesn’t want Scotland to believe that devolution is enough’ (Interview with Liberal 
Democrat MSP 1).  
On the other hand, the process of preparing for EU withdrawal has further deepened 
distrust between the Scottish and UK governments. While, for example, the Conservatives 
argue that ‘the UK government has made it plain that there will be no re-reservation of 
powers as a result of Brexit’ (Interview with Conservative MSP), the general view among 
pro-independence representatives, as well as some Labour interviewees, was sceptical and 
suspicious of the UK government’s approach: ‘we have no reason to trust them that these 
powers would go directly from Brussels to Edinburgh’ (Interview with Green MSP 1).  
Clause 11 of the UK government’s original EU (Withdrawal) bill underlines and 
supports this claim as the UK government proposed repatriating all EU competences to 
Westminster, including those that were already devolved. The new status of ‘retained EU 
law’ was vehemently opposed by the Scottish and Welsh governments which hailed such 
moves a ‘power grab’ that not only went against the spirit of devolution, but represented the 
first significant rolling back of devolution in its two decades of existence (BBC News 
2017d). The threat by the devolved administrations to withhold consent for the bill resulted 
in a revision to the UK government’s position, but while the Welsh government 
subsequently gave its consent to the bill, the Scottish government did not follow suit. As a 
result, there has been a significant erosion of trust between the UK government and the 
devolved administrations.  
The attempt at recentralisation, which is to occur irrespective of the consent of the 
devolved administrations, also reveals a more pressing concern as relates overall to 
devolution arrangements: the ability of the UK government to unilaterally alter the 
devolution settlement. Reinforced by the UKSC’s decision that the Sewel Convention was 
a political rather than legal convention, the UK government has made clear that whether 
approved by the devolved administrations or not, its proposed measures will proceed as 
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planned. This centralising and unitary impulse would result in the unilateral alteration of the 
respective devolved acts, fruit of only a simple parliamentary majority, which, for instance, 
is not the case in other plurinational states, including Spain, where the central government 
cannot unilaterally alter the distribution of powers by a simple majority in parliament. As 
well as further eroding trust between the different levels of government, the UK 
government’s approach is at odds with the values and principles that undergird a 
plurinational culture, necessary in such states to manage majority-minority relations.  
The UKSC’s judgement on Sewel also undermined the federal spirit and federalising 
tendency of the UK. In lieu of ruling that EU relations was a reserved matter and thus out 
with the competence of the devolved government and thus not subject to the Sewel 
Convention, the UKSC’s judgement went beyond this, declaring the Sewel Convention not 
binding at all. As Keating (2018: 46) points out, unlike in Canada whereby through the 1998 
Secession Reference the Supreme Court of Canada adopted a role in ‘constitutional 
reasoning’, the UKSC sought to confine ‘itself to the letter of the law and the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty’ to the extent that, ‘after twenty years of a federalising 
tendency…it was insisting on the fundamentally unitary nature of the UK constitution’. The 
UK government’s unilateral approach, buoyed by the UKSC’s ruling, further betrays this 
unitary vision of territorial politics and equally underlines claims that successive UK 
governments have yet to fully grasp the reality and logic of devolution and the constitutional 
developments this has entailed (Interview with former Labour MP 1).  
It is well known that devolution, unlike federalism (at least in theory), establishes a 
more hierarchical territorial setup, given that power is merely delegated to the devolved 
administrations and can be rescinded or encroached upon by the central government. Given 
the importance attached to parliamentary sovereignty, the UK has a ‘constitutional 
hierarchy’, but at the same time, UK governments have sought to eschew exercising this 
‘constitutional muscle… in part for fear of losing electoral support and legitimacy among 
their electorates’ (Swenden and McEwen, 2014: 489). The battle over Brexit between the 
UK government and the devolved administrations, however, has already shown a 
willingness on the part of the UK government to flex its ‘constitutional muscle’ in line with 
the imposition of its particular interpretation of the UK constitution. Scottish Secretary, 
David Mundell, has explicitly acknowledged this point, noting that one of the fundamental 
issues between the UK and Scottish governments relates to the ‘interpretation of our 
constitution’ (BBC News 2018). However, while this, in the words of Burgess (2009: 188), 
143 
 
requires the central government as the representative of the majority community to exercise 
‘self-restraint’ and ‘self-discipline’, the reality in the UK is that the Conservative 
government’s approach imposes a constitutional interpretation on the devolved nations 
which fundamentally contest it.  
Evolving arrangements predicated upon principles and values such as engagement, 
mutual respect and partnership are crucial elements to help facilitate relations between the 
different orders of government in a multilevel polity. In recent years, this has become all the 
more important as a consequence of concurrent functions, namely those on social welfare 
extended in the Scotland Act 2016. In addition to this, withdrawal from the EU also 
spotlights the need for better working relationships among governments, particularly if the 
UK state is to remain intact. The UK government has made much noise about seeking to 
reach consensus and achieving a ‘UK approach’ over Brexit, but hitherto a statist and 
centralist approach has prevailed. This, for instance, is evidenced in a number of issues and 
developments in the aftermath of the referendum result, but was also evident prior to June 
23; despite the fact that EU withdrawal would have a significant impact on devolved issues, 
‘there were no arrangements in place to provide the devolved territories with a formal, 
legally defined role in deciding whether or not to hold the EU referendum; what should be 
the nature of the vote itself; and how to respond to it’ (Blick, 2016: 4). Laforest and Keating 
(2018: 179) reach a similar conclusion noting, ‘to a greater extent than was appreciated in 
London, common EU membership served to hold the British union together.’  
For one Labour interviewee the crux of the problem is that, while, as a result of 
devolution, ‘Scotland and Wales have changed fundamentally’, the same cannot be said for 
Westminster, which ‘has not caught up’ with the developments of devolution (Interview 
with former Labour MP 1). As a consequence, Theresa May’s approach towards the result 
of the referendum, which was to see the UK as a state-wide demos, is widely questioned and 
rejected, particularly in Scotland, where the nationalist government claims its own mandate 
from the referendum, which is for Remain. Theresa May (2016b), however, rejects this 
notion: 
Because we voted in the referendum as one United Kingdom, we will negotiate 
as one United Kingdom, and we will leave the European Union as one United 
Kingdom. There is no opt-out from Brexit. And I will never allow divisive 
nationalists to undermine the precious union between the four nations of our 
United Kingdom’. 
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The majoritarian approach taken by the PM, whereby the will of the majority 
transcends the will of the minority, poses challenges to the plurinational context of the UK. 
While it is true to point out that the UK as a whole voted to leave, this is to simplify the 
plurinational reality of the UK, which, after all, is composed of four individual constituent 
units, each with its own recognised demos. As discussed, the Scottish government sought to 
correct this anomaly through proposing a double majority rule. In the words of Alex 
Salmond, ‘nations within a multinational state should be recognised as more than regions, 
counties or areas and should not be counted by population; they are national entities in their 
own right, and that confers a relationship of respect’(HC Deb, 16 June 2015: c192). Rather, 
the UK government rejected the territorial supermajority and the future of devolution, as a 
result, remains in the balance.  
Given the radical change expected from EU withdrawal, particularly in relation to 
devolution arrangements, the importance of securing a consensus-based approach to 
managing the implications and effects of withdrawal cannot be overstated. The rhetoric of 
the PM and other UK government ministers has very much chimed with this ideal, but grave 
concerns remain ‘about the extent to which the UK position takes account of the preferences 
of the devolved governments’ (Greer, 2018: 135). Rooted in the UK government’s unitary 
conception of sovereignty, its approach conflicts with the multilevel and plurinational vision 
of the UK endorsed by the devolved governments and in particular, the Scottish 
interpretation that the union is a negotiated pact and thus its terms can be revised. For one 
SNP representative, ‘we are no longer the coming together of nations, we are all one-nation’ 
(Interview with SNP MSP 2), while for the Greens ‘it is clear that the UK government sees 
the UK as a single unitary entity and they are just going to forge ahead because they believe 
they have a mandate and there is no differentiation underneath that’ (Interview with Green 
MSP 1).There is very little evidence of compromise. 
Compromise is an essential component of plurinational states, particularly, as Gagnon 
(2014: 87) notes, if the state ‘is aspiring to have a promising future’. Gagnon (ibid), positing 
cooperation and compromise as essential aspects of federalism, continues that in a 
plurinational state, ‘it is important for the national group involved to show proof of 
compromise, tolerance, and respect for diversity, and to maintain and strengthen bonds 
based on trust between partners, while adhering to an ensemble of shared values.’ In short, 
the existence of a democratic and plurinational state warrants negotiation and compromise 
between majority and minority groups.  
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Both the Scottish and Welsh governments championed the pursuit of consensus and 
compromise in light of the EU referendum results. In Scotland’s Place in Europe, the 
Scottish government did not merely focus on its constitutional preference of independence 
but presented a number of potential avenues to be explored, not excluding but not limited to 
independence. Consonant with the fundamental values and principles inherent in the 
multinational federal model, as discussed in Chapter Three, the Scottish government 
committed to doing this ‘in good faith and a spirit of compromise’ (Scottish Government, 
2016: viii). The paper accepted the need for ‘UK-wide frameworks’ but stipulated that these 
must be the result of an inclusive decision-making process, ‘that should be a matter for 
negotiation and agreement between the governments concerned, not for imposition from 
Westminster’ (ibid: 41).  
The Welsh government (2017: 17) advocated a similar approach, positing that where 
necessary, common approaches and frameworks should be developed ‘through discussion, 
not diktat’ and proposed the creation of a ‘UK Council of Ministers’ to operate like the EU 
Council of Ministers, involving regular meetings. The ‘retained EU law’ approach 
advocated by the UK government, however, is far removed from the consensus-building 
proposals of the devolved administrations, that neither envisions equal working relationships 
nor joint decision-making processes. This has reinforced the ‘imbalance of power in the 
relationship’ (Interview with SNP MSP 4) between the Scottish and UK governments and 
the issue of a democratic deficit: ‘it has become abundantly clear that the UK government 
is not interested in compromise or in accommodating differentiation within the UK’ 
(Interview with Green MSP 1).  
Brexit illuminates a number of puzzles, dynamics and contradictions thrown up as a 
result of devolution, but moreover, reveals a lack of serious thought not only about the 
ramifications of Brexit vis-à-vis the UK constitution, but, as was discussed as a limit of 
devolution, the absence of vision for any constitutionally acceptable future direction for the 
UK as a whole. Short-term exigencies are prized over any long-term outlook. Referendum 
provisions were not designed to take the plurinational nature of the UK into consideration, 
nor have the devolved governments been guaranteed any role in consolidating the UK 
government’s position on withdrawal. Devolution, despite fundamentally altering the 
territorial landscape of the UK, remains feeble. In light of this, and particularly the UK 
government’s majoritarian approach, in which a centralising tendency has been pursued as 
the default position, it is clear that a more plurinational and constitutionally sensitive 
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perspective is necessary to rebuild trust and confidence between the different levels of 
government and rekindle what is a limp plurinational spirit. In short, a more inclusive, 
collaborative and consociational approach to politics is required. This, it could be argued, is 
not just necessary to ensure a commitment to and thus understanding of how the UK 
constitution has changed and developed since the inception of devolution, but more 
crucially, is essential if devolution is to remain the organising principle to continue to bind 
the UK together.  
The approaches advocated by the Scottish and Welsh governments as relates to EU 
withdrawal and UK-wide frameworks vis-à-vis devolved powers have a markedly 
consociational flavour, but, notwithstanding the urgency to ensure a much more cooperative 
and constructive style of relations, the UK government has appeared intransigent in allowing 
such a politics influenced by more federal and plurinational thinking to develop. Rather, an 
aggressive reassertion of a unitary, old-fangled sovereigntist interpretation of parliamentary 
sovereignty has resurfaced, counter to any commitment to plurinational respect and justice 
and thus a serious threat to the continuation of the UK state in its current form. There is, as 
was discussed earlier, acknowledgement from the Conservatives that more has to be done to 
change thinking on devolution and make a better case for the union, but while there is 
agreement that Westminster and Whitehall need to change, the actions of the UK 
government do not match its rhetoric. In the words of one SNP representative, ‘the real test 
of democracy is about how you treat your minorities not whether the majority gets its way 
and inevitably that’s the compromise which, at the moment, there isn’t much sign of’ 
(Interview with SNP MSP 1).  
 
4.6.2 The Empirical and Institutional Dimension 
On a normative level, we have seen that there is a distinct lack of influence of federal 
or plurinational thinking in the psyche of the UK government as relates to devolution, as 
well as the impact of Brexit on the UK’s territorial set-up. Power has been hollowed out to 
three of the four nations in the UK in the form of democratically elected governments and 
legislatures, but a hierarchical and majoritarian vision has yet to subside in the upper 
echelons of the UK Parliament and government. This hierarchical and majoritarian vision 
lends credence to complaints in Scotland that the UK government has yet to fully catch up 
with the ramifications of devolution and the changed and changing nature of the UK 
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constitution.  
The process of managing the UK’s exit from the EU has merely emboldened such 
grievances, whereby the aggressively unitary attitude of the UK government, as well as the 
UKSC, reinforce the view that Scotland, rather than commanding respect as a nation with 
an elected government and parliament, as befits the practice of politics in a democratic 
plurinational state, is instead treated as a subordinated province without any meaningful 
voice or influence in central government decisions. As discussed in section five, while there 
is acknowledgement that Brexit poses a risk to the territorial setup of the UK, representatives 
from all political parties have equally sought to frame it as an opportunity to recast the union. 
This is necessary, as discussed above, at a normative level in terms of the philosophy and 
thinking behind devolution, as well as institutionally. As one interviewee put it, the debate 
on Brexit had already shown that ‘we need to reconfigure the constitutional arrangements 
that empower nations and regions more effectively’ (Interview with former Labour MP 1). 
It is to these institutional tools I now turn.  
The sole formal representation of Scotland as a territorial entity in the UK government 
is the Secretary of State for Scotland and the Scotland Office. Political incongruence, 
however, has limited the ability of the Secretary of State for Scotland to fulfil his or her dual 
role of advancing Scottish interests in the cabinet while advancing the interests of the UK 
government in Scotland. The conflicting and at times diametrically opposing visions of the 
Scottish Nationalist government and the UK Conservative government render this task 
difficult if not impossible. One SNP MSP pointed out that as long as the SNP was in 
government in Scotland, any Secretary of State for Scotland from any of the pro-union 
parties would be the ‘servant of conflicting masters’ and as such limited in his or her capacity 
to be Scotland’s voice in national decision making (Interview with SNP MSP 1).  
For one interviewee, the fact that ‘the territorial offices of Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland are now so hollowed out and so small’ necessitated reform of these 
structures and suggested the establishment of ‘a very powerful department of state at the 
heart of government’ to better manage and keep adrift with developments in the devolved 
territories (Interview with Conservative MSP). This would result in improved relations 
between government departments, the devolved administrations and the central government 
as well as ensure that devolution was a central rather than peripheral concern for the UK 
government. In recent years, this has become much more important given the introduction 
of concurrent functions in the Scotland Act 2016 which necessitates, at the very least, a 
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functioning relationship between the UK and Scottish governments.  
Concurrent competences are not unique to the UK but constitute an intractable issue 
for the distinct levels of government as a result of the UK’s lack of formal and effective 
intergovernmental machinery. ‘A formal system of intergovernmentalism is widely seen as 
a crucial component in any credible decentralised model’, but 20 years after the inception 
of devolution and in spite of a myriad of reports vehemently critical of the UK’s extant 
intergovernmental structures, very little has changed (Tierney, 2008: 452). The JMC may 
have been introduced to provide a forum for cooperation between Whitehall, Westminster 
and the devolved administrations, but its lack of formality as well as hierarchical 
organisation, which consequently elongates the unitary mentality that characterises UK 
government thinking about devolution, has rendered it a weak and ineffective format. 
 The creation of the JMC (EN), created to provide an arena to facilitate discussion on 
EU withdrawal, although notably not designed as a forum to facilitate joint decision-making, 
signalled a new phase in IGR between the UK government and the devolved nations. The 
intergovernmental forum has, however, been a consistent source of complaint for the 
devolved administrations, which in spite of the JMC (EN), have not been party to UK 
government thinking. In this vein, while the JMC (EN) may have created a ‘much more 
focused and task-oriented’ committee, ‘it would be a considerable stretch…to regard the 
JMC (EN) as a channel through which the devolved governments have been able to date, to 
exert meaningful influence’ (McEwen, 2017: 682). It did, after all, fail in its principal 
objective: securing agreement on a joint approach to triggering Article 50.  
Withdrawal from the EU has already proved to be ‘a test of intergovernmental 
relations at a quadrilateral basis’ and requires serious reboot in order to ensure a more 
efficient and constructive forum for engagement and partnership among the devolved 
nations and UK government (Interview with Conservative MSP). In order to bolster existing 
IGR architecture and facilitate the development of a more plurinational political culture such 
changes could include, but are not limited to, a fixed schedule of meetings, for example, at 
least two a year, rotating the location of meetings between the four nations, and the creation 
of a JMC secretariat to relieve the UK government of the organisational responsibility of the 
meetings while simultaneously improving transparency and checking the seemingly 
unfettered dominance of the central government on existing arrangements.   
Yet, while there seems to be general consensus that IGR need to be ‘enhanced and 
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have much more statutory authority’ (Interview with former Labour MP 1), there was 
general consensus among interviewees from all parties, that ‘people’ and ‘personalities’ 
were as much an impediment to intergovernmental cooperation as the design of the 
structures themselves: ‘to be blunt, they are as effective as participants allow them to be’ 
(Interview with SNP MSP 1). Hence, while there is undoubtable mileage in providing a more 
robust intergovernmental machinery ‘to provide a mechanism whereby the devolved 
administrations can ensure not just that they are heard but they are listened to’, it is equally 
important that, in line with the normative discussion above, the different partners within the 
multilevel and plurinational state canalise a more plurinational and federal spirit through a 
commitment to working with each other, irrespective of party affiliation and constitutional 
vision (Burrows and Fletcher, 2017: 55).  
While more formal intergovernmental mechanisms are considered important to 
facilitate joint working between the devolved governments and the UK government, 
particularly between the Scottish and UK governments as a result of concurrent 
competences, interparliamentary relations (IPR) are also important, although oft-considered 
of second-class importance in the UK (Evans 2018). The lack of concern afforded to IPR is 
evidenced in the fact that ‘there is no institution that brings together the four UK legislatures 
in the way that the JMC does for the four governments’ (ibid: 3). Forging a more constructive 
working relationship among and between the different parliaments was mooted by several 
interviewees as a more innovative tool to ensure a better working relationship and that, 
notwithstanding the hollowing out of power, the centre remained connected with its 
peripheries. One interviewee described how the Scottish Parliament’s Social Security 
Committee sought to utilise inter-parliamentary machinery by holding joint meetings with 
the Scottish Affairs Committee in Westminster (Interview with Conservative MSP). Evans 
(ibid: 9) discusses in more detail the objective and success of these meetings and points out 
that while it remains unclear whether such joint sessions will be a regular feature of 
Westminster-Holyrood relations, the model itself: 
Represents the germ of a potentially significant extension of IPR cooperation 
that could see IPR become a vehicle for scrutiny of IGR at a time when the scale 
of the latter, already made more significant by the earlier-mentioned expansion 
of concurrent policy responsibilities in recent devolution legislation, will become 
even more significant as a result of Brexit.  
 
As well as using committee to committee structures to help facilitate partnership 
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between the Scottish and UK governments, the British-Irish Council was also mooted by a 
couple of interviewees as a potential model to bring parliaments together (Interviews with 
SNP MSPs 1, 2). Membership of the Council is already extended to the devolved 
parliaments, as well as the UK’s crown dependencies, but could serve as a model to create 
a formal and robust interparliamentary forum that would enable, for example, discussions 
related to common frameworks which will result after Brexit. As Evans (2018: 14) notes, 
‘this trend towards ever more interconnected union, at least policy responsibility wise, looks 
set to only increase in the future’, thus establishing or extending new and more innovative 
working practices, such as those discussed above, would be a welcome step in guaranteeing 
the UK’s constituent nations a role in the machinery of central government. This would 
likewise facilitate opportunities to develop and deepen the confidence, trust and sense of 
partnership required to ensure a promising future, not merely for the state as a whole, but 
the constituent units themselves.  
Reform of the House of Lords into a territorially representative chamber, as advocated 
in the 2015 Labour Party manifesto, was also high on the agenda of interviewees in 
discussing how to increase the influence and clout of the UK’s nations in central government 
decisions. In line with their support for federalism, Labour and Liberal Democrat 
interviewees were more strongly supportive of the creation of a geographically 
representative second chamber, or in Labour parlance, a ‘Senate of the Nations and 
Regions’. Some interviewees believed such reform would relieve ‘a lot of the angst’ of 
territorial politics and the relationship between the Scottish and UK governments, while 
equally ensuring that England was once and for all given a proper territorial voice (Interview 
with Liberal Democrat MSP 2). The SNP’s long-standing opposition to the House of Lords 
is well known, but all interviewees expressed support for reform, provided that members 
were directly elected or nominated by the devolved administrations.  
In contrast to power-sharing models such as consociationalism, the devolved 
territories – neither the governments nor the parliaments – do not have a guaranteed 
constitutional role in central government decision-making. As was pointed out by an SNP 
interviewee, irrespective of which party held a majority of the 59 Scottish seats in the House 
of Commons, the ability of all 59 Scottish MPs to influence UK government policy was 
severely limited. She posited that:  
We [the SNP] have the vast majority of Scottish representation, but unless you 
end up with a minority government down the road [Westminster] that voice is 
not heard…we might be making a difference about how people perceive us in 
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Scotland…but we are not making a difference in terms of policy (Interview with 
SNP MSP 2).  
 
Labour in power in Westminster and Holyrood between 1999 and 2007 masked the 
absence of any guaranteed constitutional role for the devolved nations in central government 
decision-making. Informal networking functioned in lieu of formal arrangements and thus 
impeded the development of any formal or constitutionally sanctioned intergovernmental 
procedures that would enable Scottish ministers to exert influence over reserved policies, 
irrespective of whether they impacted upon devolved areas of jurisdiction (McEwen, 2017: 
670). The election of 56 SNP MPs in 2015 increasingly spotlighted this issue and the 
Scottish government and SNP party members have consistently highlighted that despite 
wielding the majority of Scottish seats in the House of Commons, the influence of Scottish 
MPs is impotent in the context of a majority (English) government. Interviewees drew upon 
policies such as the renewal of trident, the bedroom tax or the most recent EU (Withdrawal) 
bill to demonstrate that despite the majority of Scottish MPs voting against these policies or 
offering amendments, the lack of guaranteed role for Scottish influence rendered their 
opposition obsolete (Interviews with SNP MSPs).  
Drawing upon the consociational model detailed in Chapter Three, it is clear that the 
UK system is not consociational, although it shares similarities with some of its principal 
components, namely segmental autonomy. Veto powers accorded to minority elites is 
another important element of the consociational model, but do not explicitly exist in the UK 
system. There is an argument that the Sewel Convention, in effect, serves as an informal 
veto over encroachment of the central government in devolved affairs. Two important 
points, however, must be considered. Firstly, none of the four nations of the UK wield an 
explicit, legally entrenched veto power over decisions made by the central government. 
Second, the judgement of the UKSC in the Miller case effectively ruled that Sewel was not 
a veto power; neither the Scottish government nor Parliament have legal power to stop EU 
withdrawal. 
Generally, interviewees responded negatively to the constitutional guarantee of veto 
powers, with one interviewee describing the idea as ‘crackers’: ‘you cannot have the tail 
wagging the dog’ (Interview with Liberal Democrat MSP 1). One Labour official, however, 
argued that the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, particularly the lack of consensus around 
which type of Brexit to pursue, the challenges for the constitutional authority of the devolved 
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territories, and thus the threat of the UK’s government ‘railroading us into all of these 
decisions with enormous implications’ necessitated a broader examination of devices such 
as minority vetoes and double majorities (Interview with former Labour MP 1). While there 
is predominant hesitance at the institutionalisation of veto powers, or indeed, qualified 
majorities regarding specific policy areas, the plurinational reality of the UK, combined with 
its commitment to democratic principles, as well as the uncertain future terrain of British 
politics, demonstrates that irrespective of opinion that considers such mechanisms as alien 
to British political tradition, they may become crucial tools to check the majoritarian 
tendency of central government while putting minority nations on a more equal and 
equitable footing.  
In plurinational contexts, while a commitment to liberal democracy is important, it is 
clear that it is not sufficient to ensure the accommodation, empowerment and recognition of 
national minorities essential to sustain the order and stability of the state. In this section I 
have discussed a number of factors from both a normative and empirical viewpoint that are 
not only considered important to ensure the survival of Scotland as a constituent unit within 
the UK, but moreover to ensure the survival of the UK as a plurinational state. It is possible 
to identify some traits of a plurinational culture in the UK, but it is clear, from both a 
normative and empirical perspective, that this is weak and thus requires development and 
deepening in order to ensure a more genuine plurinational culture permeates not just the 
devolved institutions, but the apparatus of the central state, too. In this vein, it is important 
to look beyond the current model and develop arrangements with regards to shared rule as 
well as a more consociational approach to politics which will not only muscle-up the 
democratic and plurinational credentials of the state, but moreover will help rebuild trust 
and confidence among the different governments.  
 
4.7 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has analysed the development of territorial politics in Scotland and the 
UK, paying particular attention to the SNP’s time in office. From the analysis presented in 
this chapter, it is clear that discussions related to Scotland’s place in the UK not only 
continue but remain at the forefront of political debates. Taking into consideration the 
analysis presented in this chapter, a number of observations with regards to the UK’s 
experience with autonomy, plurinationalism and secessionism can be made.  
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First, devolution, despite its limitations, has proved to be a remarkable success, lauded 
by both pro-union and pro-independence supporters. Entrenching the principle of 
differentiation, an important feature stipulated by liberal nationalist scholars, Scotland’s 
autonomy arrangements have succeeded in allowing Scotland to go its own way, albeit – at 
least for the time being – within the framework of the UK. In addition, in a nod to the flexible 
approach championed by Carl Friedrich, devolution has become an evolving process, which 
despite posing challenges to the overall development of the UK’s territorial landscape, has 
enabled successive UK governments to take a much more dynamic approach to 
constitutional reform. At the same time, however, there are clear limitations to Scotland’s 
autonomy model. The different limitations identified in this chapter: the piecemeal approach 
to devolution, the lack of shared rule and the absence of a plurinational culture, are factors 
which, left unchecked could potentially further increase secessionism in Scotland, thus 
jeopardising the future existence of the union. The lack of formal IGR and other shared rule 
mechanisms have impeded the development of trustworthy and cooperative partnerships 
between the Scottish and UK governments as well as allowing for the perpetuation of 
majoritarian thinking at the centre. Notwithstanding devolution, Westminster and Whitehall 
continue to operate as before.  
Second, the analysis in section five revealed that the future of Scotland within the UK 
lies between three potential scenarios: recentralisation, reformulation and disintegration. All 
political parties champion some form of reform, but while for some this is limited to the 
devolution of only some repatriated powers in the aftermath of EU withdrawal, for others 
this requires a complete overhaul and rethink of the UK’s constitutional architecture. The 
incumbent UK government has advocated rhetoric in favour of the union and increasing its 
importance in everyday life, but the analysis presented here demonstrates that this is mainly 
lip service. The government’s approach towards Brexit betrays a unitary and centralising 
strategy that not merely risks rolling back devolution, but poses a grave threat to the 
continued existence of the union itself. In this vein, the Scottish government’s call for a 
second independence referendum looks likely to increase. Yet, the analysis presented here 
has demonstrated that short of independence, a confederal approach may work for the benefit 
of both the majority and minority communities, saving the union while moving Scotland 
closer to attaining the status of independent statehood without the predicted drama in 
between.  
Finally, and drawing upon the theoretical framework proposed in Chapter Three, it is 
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clear that reform of the UK’s approach to autonomy, as well as the institutional furniture 
itself, is required in order to ensure a more coherent and accommodative model of autonomy. 
A number of institutional reforms as relates to IGR, Whitehall architecture and the House 
of Lords would result in stronger shared rule mechanisms that would increase the standing 
of the minority nations in the functions of central government. Drawing upon the last 20 
years’ experience of devolution as well as the complicated debate with regards to 
withdrawing from the EU, there is merit in proposing that a much more consensus-based 
and inclusive approach to politics would help strengthen the union as well as the 
plurinational credentials of the UK. The UK’s current approach to autonomy, while 
beneficial in some respects, continues to be guided by a hierarchical tendency and unitary 
thinking that impedes and undermines the development of a plurinational culture and some 
of its most important values and principles, including cooperation, trust and mutual 
understanding. The different compromises proposed by the Scottish and Welsh governments 
in the aftermath of the Brexit vote had a markedly consociational favour, but the approach 
of the UK government, in contradistinction with its rhetoric, has been to proceed without 
not by consensus. This chapter has argued that the unilateral approach taken towards EU 
withdrawal by the UK government, as well as the lack of concern afforded to examining the 
ramifications of withdrawal on the devolved territories, misunderstands the importance of 
both the EU and devolved frameworks in holding the UK together. In light of the unravelling 
of these bonds, it may well be that a trajectory towards a more consociational approach will 
not only further deepen democracy and entrench a truly plurinational culture but may be the 
required remedy to prevent the disintegration of the union.  
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5. Chapter Five: Catalonia 
‘Spain today is a state for all 
Spaniards, a nation-state for a 
large part of the population, 
and only a state but not a 
nation for important 
minorities’ (Linz, 1973: 99). 
 
‘The State of Autonomies has 
worked for almost 40 years, 
but it does not mean that it can 
work for the next 40’ 
(Interview with PSC MP 1). 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Centre-periphery relations have a long and controversial history in the Spanish state, 
oscillating between periods of centralisation and decentralisation. Incessant attempts to 
forge a homogenous population, and thus eradicate minority nationalism, have failed to have 
much success in Spain, even under periods of dictatorial rule. In fact, as a result of repressive 
mechanisms that sought to eliminate Spain’s internal diversity, minority nationalisms, 
namely in the Basque Country and Catalonia, came to embody a democratic spirit committed 
to ensuring the empowerment of such minority communities within a liberal democratic 
framework. Despite the longevity of Spain’s national question, the puzzle has yet to be 
adequately resolved and continues to inform constitutional debates in the twenty first 
century.  
This chapter analyses the development of territorial politics in Catalonia, paying 
particular attention to the rise of the independence movement, accompanied by pro-
sovereignty and ultimately pro-independence governments since 2010. It begins with a 
detailed overview of Catalan-Spanish relations dating back to the conquest of Catalonia in 
1714, with particular focus on the evolution of the Catalan nationalist movement as well as 
its distinct demands for accommodation and recognition within the contours of the Spanish 
state. Equally important is an examination of how the Spanish state has sought to deal with 
such demands, which, notwithstanding the transition to democracy in the late 1970s, has 
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pursued a strategy to contain rather than empower the state’s national minorities. Next, the 
chapter examines the most recent developments vis-à-vis Catalan demands for better 
accommodation, empowerment and recognition, beginning with the 2010 TC ruling on 
Catalonia’s Statute reform. From here, the chapter analyses the merits and limitations of the 
Spanish experience of decentralisation including the state’s levels of self-rule and shared 
rule, the pernicious issue of recognition and the role of the TC in the development of 
territorial politics. The chapter then turns to analysing the future terrain of Catalan politics 
and Catalonia’s territorial and constitutional journey, drawing upon the numerous visions of 
the various political actors in Catalonia. In line with the analysis of the previous section as 
well as the theoretical framework discussed in Chapter Three, the penultimate section of this 
chapter examines from both a normative and institutional viewpoint, potential avenues for 
reform of the current Spanish territorial regime. 
 
5.2 The Context of Political Partnership 1714-2010 
Since the Middle Ages, Catalonia has existed as a territorially defined entity with an 
identifiably distinct language and culture. Its political covenants and constitutions antedated 
the Magna Carta and its parliament was one of the first to be established in Europe 
(McRoberts, 2001a: 1). Unlike Scotland, Catalonia never existed as a fully independent 
territory. Keating (1996: 142) argues that while the existence of autochthonous institutions, 
such as the Corts (Parliament) and the Generalitat (government), are often drawn upon by 
Catalan nationalists as evidence of its past independent status, the entity was best described 
as a ‘self-governing principality’.  
From 1137, Catalonia formed an integral and equal partner of the Catalan-Aragonese 
confederation, maintaining its distinctiveness vis-à-vis language, culture, institutions and 
laws (Balcells, 1996: 5). Notwithstanding the dynastic union between the Crowns of Aragon 
and Castile in the late fifteenth century, this sense of distinctiveness was preserved. Akin to 
Scotland in the aftermath of 1707, Catalonia retained its own institutions, culture and 
language. 
Between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, a creeping process of 
centralisation from Castile resulted in a number of Catalan-instigated rebellions and 
ultimately the siege and surrender of Barcelona to Castilian forces on 11 September 1714. 
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From here on, a centralised model of governance was imposed upon Catalonia. Seeking to 
replicate the French Jacobin model, Spanish elites pursued a process of Castilianisation 
throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. But, rather than create a culturally 
homogenous population, such centralist processes merely alienated territories like Catalonia 
and further emboldened minority nationalist movements (Muro and Quiroga, 2005: 34).  
Catalan nationalism emerged as a political force towards the end of the nineteenth 
century, preceded by the Renaixença (Renaissance), a largely apolitical cultural movement 
committed to the revival of Catalan as a literary language. The Renaissance increased the 
visibility of Catalan throughout Catalonia and reinforced the territory’s cultural 
distinctiveness, providing ‘the atmosphere in which Catalan nationalism was to be born’ 
(Balcells, 1996: 25). The evolution of Catalanism from a cultural movement to an overtly 
politicised nationalist movement entailed the inclusion of a number of overlapping and 
competing ideologies and ideas (McRoberts, 2001a: 25).68 What emerged towards the end 
of the nineteenth century, however, was a Catalanist movement that remained wedded to the 
idea of building a self-governing Catalonia within a federal Spain. Notions of separatism 
were all but absent from this pro-Catalan discourse.  
Unlike the Scottish nationalist movement, nationalism in Catalonia crosses the left-
right ideological spectrum. The Lliga Regionalista (Regionalist League), for example, 
emerged in 1901 under the leadership of Enric Prat de la Riba as the first Catalanist, 
conservative and bourgeois political party. It dominated Catalan politics for much of the first 
two decades of the twentieth century and was instrumental in securing the establishment of 
the Mancomunitat in 1914 (Medrano, 1994: 549). Although a largely administrative 
arrangement, the Mancomunitat represented the first official institutional recognition of 
Catalonia’s distinctiveness since the territory’s defeat in 1714. It was, however, a short lived 
endeavour and abolished in 1925, by which time the Spanish government had been 
overthrown by Miguel Primo de Rivera in a dictatorship which, contrary to the recognition 
bestowed on Catalonia by the Mancomunitat, sought to eradicate Catalan distinctiveness and 
foist upon Catalans, a homogenous, pro-Castilian identity. 
 By the 1930s and the fall of the Primo dictatorship, the ascendancy of conservative 
                                                 
68 Interestingly, from its inception until the present day, Catalan nationalism has appeared in various guises in 
the ideological thinking of Anarchists, Carlists, Communists, Conservatives, Federalists, Separatists, Socialists 
and Republicans. This remains relevant today given that the different political parties involved in the 
independence movement straddle the left-right ideological continuum.  
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Catalanism that precipitated the creation of the Mancomunitat gradually eroded and 
transmuted into a left-wing republican movement, manifest in the establishment of Esquerra 
Republicana de Catalunya (Republican Left of Catalonia – ERC) in 1931 (Argelaguet, 2011: 
155). 1931 also saw the proclamation of the Second Spanish Republic which not only 
heralded the return of democracy, but equally reaffirmed acknowledgement and recognition 
of Catalonia’s ethnonational distinctiveness (Moreno, 2001: 54). Nonetheless, this 
recognition of Catalonia’s distinct status, was, much like Spain’s previous flirtation with 
institutional recognition, short-lived.  
The victory of Francoist forces in 1939 precipitated a 40-year period of dictatorial rule 
during which Catalan nationalism, or more concretely minority nationalism, was identified 
as a bête noir of the regime. As well as rejecting regional autonomy, which under the Second 
Republic had been granted to Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque Country, the Franco regime 
equally repudiated democracy, anti-clericalism and socialism (Guibernau, 2004: 34). The 
regime, however, harboured a ‘special hatred’ towards Catalonia and sought to completely 
eradicate Catalan culture, identity and language from society (McRoberts, 2001a: 46). 
The death of Franco on 20 November 1975 initiated Spain’s transition from an 
authoritarian regime towards democracy. The transition, unsurprisingly, was fraught with 
complications, including the challenge of satisfying pro-democratic forces, namely 
Catalonia and the Basque Country which demanded a right to autonomy, without offending 
the autonomy-cautious Spanish nationalists that supported the Franco regime. For most, 
however, the damage inflicted by the Franco regime vis-à-vis these territories ensured that 
both democracy and decentralisation would become comfortable bedfellows. As Roller 
(2002: 71-72) notes, ‘it was widely accepted that a refusal or reluctance to address the issue 
of regional autonomy and cultural, linguistic and historical differentiations would endanger 
the consolidation and establishment of the post-Franco democratic regime.’ 
The challenge of drafting a constitution that reflected and balanced the concerns of 
both pro-autonomy and autonomy-cautious sides in Spain was a protracted process.69 The 
Constitution which emerged has been infamously analysed in the academic literature, 
considered ‘a model of ambiguity’ (Keating, 1996: 149), ‘a great document of compromise’ 
                                                 
69 Two committees were established. An initial Committee on Constitutional Affairs with 36 members and a 
subsequent drafting subcommittee with seven members. The drafting committee included three Unión de 
Centro Democrático (UCD) representatives, one socialist, one Communist, one member of the Alianza 
Popular (AP) and one Catalan representative. Notably absent from the committee was a Basque representative 
after the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV) decided to boycott the process.  
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(Dowling, 2013: 114) and ‘a feat of semantic engineering’ (Balfour and Quiroga, 2007: 46). 
According to one interviewee, the Constitution represented ‘a solution conditioned by the 
politics of that time’ inasmuch as it lacked precision and allowed for two distinct 
interpretations (Interview with Catalunya en Comú-Podem MP 1). The lack of precision 
relates to a number of articles, including the recognition of Spain’s internal diversity, the 
fuzzy boundaries to delineate competences and the lack of self-definition as to what sort of 
state Spain is. Consequently, there remains ongoing debate as to whether the state is a strictly 
unitary or federal model (Requejo 2017; Sala 2014). This was also reflected in a number of 
interviews where definitions ranged from ‘pre-federal’ (Interview with ERC MP 1), ‘flawed 
federalism’ (Interview with PSC MP 1) to ‘quasi-federal’ (Interview with C’s MP). Arzoz 
(2012: 179) succinctly encapsulates this lack of consensus, defining Spain as a 
‘multinational quasi federal unitary state’.  
The Constitution provided for an open-ended rather than a definitive territorial model 
and detailed two processes – a fast track (Article 151) and a slow track (Article 143) – to 
achieve autonomy.70 The former process was designed specifically for those regions which 
had approved Statutes during the Second Republic and enabled them to gain more extensive 
autonomy than the slow track regions. The fast-track procedure was well received in the 
historic regions given that it afforded them extensive autonomy as well as reinforced their 
perceived status as historically distinct communities. The Constitution, however, despite 
acknowledging the existence of these ‘historic nationalities’ did not enumerate them. 
Moreover, while asymmetry appeared to be the order of the day, reinforced by the fact that 
the Basque Country and Navarre were accorded fiscal autonomy, the necessity of individual 
negotiations between each community and the central government meant the Constitution 
provided for the development of ‘both asymmetric and symmetric devolution’ (Colino and 
Hombrado, 2015: 175). In the event, 17 ACs were established to form part of the Estado de 
las Autonomías (State of the Autonomies).  
The drafting of the Constitution was an indisputable critical juncture in Spain’s 
democratic transition, but the fact that there was no ‘democratic rupture’ with the past 
immediately tainted the transition as well as enshrined in the Constitution competing 
conceptions of the Spanish state. Cooperation amongst the political elites, including 
                                                 
70 Article 151 also contained an exceptional route to autonomy for any region wishing to achieve the same 
level of autonomy as the historic nationalities. This entailed a number of complex conditions such as a 
referendum in which the proposed statute had to be approved by a majority in each of the region’s provinces.  
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representatives from Catalonia, was pivotal in the development of Spain’s pacted transition, 
but this did not lead to a wholly inclusive process in which the political longings from the 
Basque Country and Catalonia for recognition of nationhood and a right to territorial self-
government were explicitly and enthusiastically embraced. Consequently, the Constitution 
codified two competing conceptions of the Spanish state: an explicit mononational vision 
that provided for decentralisation and a tacit recognition of Spain’s internal ethnoterritorial 
diversity as well as a more open interpretation, confirming the existence of the historic 
nationalities and a guaranteed right to self-government. Article Two of the Spanish 
Constitution has been termed ‘the most controversial [Article] in the whole text’ (Guibernau, 
2003: 124), and 40 years after its inception, remains just as contentious (see Cetrà and 
Harvey, 2018: 10). Article Two states:  
The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the 
common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards; it recognises and guarantees 
the right to self-government of the nationalities and regions of which it is 
composed and the solidarity among them all (my emphasis). 
 
On the one hand, Article Two affirms the concept of Spain as a nation-state, a state 
composed of only one nation which cannot be divided. On the other hand, it recognises the 
existence of other nationalities and regions (though these are not identified) and their right 
to self-government. While recognising other nationalities and regions, Article Two makes 
clear that there is only one nation, that of Spain. As Balfour and Quiroga (2007: 52) note, 
the recognition of the historic communities such as the Basque Country, Catalonia and 
Galicia as nations was considered ‘anathema for the right and the Armed Forces’, while the 
relegation of the aforementioned historic communities to the status of mere regions, ‘would 
have been unacceptable to the regional nationalists and the left’. The result was thus ‘a rather 
ambiguous formula’ whereby two competing conceptions of the nation were enshrined 
(Martínez-Herrera and Miley, 2010: 8).71  
Title VIII of the Constitution, entitled ‘The Territorial Organisation of the State’ 
detailed the processes of gaining autonomy as well as the powers conferred upon the 
different levels of government. However, given that from its inception, decentralisation was 
conceived as a process involving each prospective AC negotiating individually with the 
                                                 
71 It is important to note, that while Spain is often held up as a prototypical case whereby ambiguity has been 
enshrined to meet the needs of both minority and majority communities, competing national visions are not 
unique to Spain and in fact are a general characteristic of plurinational states. Canada, for instance, is a case in 
point (see Anderson 2018). 
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central legislature, the Constitution’s enumeration of competences is somewhat vague (Aja 
and Colino, 2014: 448). Article 149 enumerates no fewer than 32 ‘exclusive’ areas of 
legislative competence for the state, including ambits such as customs, defence and 
international relations. The preceding Article 148 lists 22 powers that may be assumed by 
the ACs, but as a result of the open-ended decentralisation process, no exclusive powers 
were delineated to the ACs in the Constitution (Colomer 1998). To add to this lack of clarity, 
Article 150 (sections one and two) states that other legislative and administrative powers 
may be transferred to one, some or all the ACs, while section three imbues the central 
government with authority to intervene in AC jurisdiction in order to protect and promote 
‘the general interest’ of the state. This vague delineation of competences and powers led to 
a rather messy system of overlapping jurisdictions.  
The PSOE, under Felipe González, was swept to victory in the 1982 general election, 
instituting a period of socialist dominance that would last until 1996. During much of this 
period, the socialists formed a majority government (see Figure four). Yet, while they 
remained committed to Spain’s territorial re-organisation, the party’s penchant for 
‘Jacobism’ and ‘statism’ gradually tempered its zeal for decentralisation (Nagel, 2010: 121). 
There was a clearly identifiable strategy of slowing down decentralisation under the PSOE, 
but the concern with harmonisation preceded the PSOE’s assumption of power, precipitated 
by an attempted coup d’état in 1981.  
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The failed coup was widely interpreted as a backlash against decentralisation and 
entailed a radical shift in the Spanish government’s decentralisation policy. The government 
sought to impede the process of decentralisation through the Ley Orgánica de Armonización 
del Proceso Autonómico (Organic Law for the Harmonisation of the Process of Self-
government – LOAPA). The result of a bipartisan agreement between Unión de Centro 
Democrático (Union of the Democratic Centre - UCD) and PSOE, LOAPA was designed to 
end the perceived existence of first and second order ACs by diminishing the powers of the 
fast-track ACs while bolstering the competences of the others. The bill was fiercely opposed 
by the historic nationalities, particularly provisions that would see already devolved powers 
revoked and a requirement that legislative acts passed by autonomous parliaments be 
approved by the central government (Agranoff and Ramos Gallarín, 1997: 12). Catalonia 
and the Basque Country challenged this in the TC, the result of which was a landmark ruling 
that struck down 14 of LOAPA’s clauses and prohibited unilateral action by central 
government to reform the distribution of powers. Yet, and much to the chagrin of the Catalan 
and Basque governments, the TC upheld the use of Basic Laws in AC jurisdiction to promote 
and protect ‘the general interest’ as stipulated in Article 150(3) of the Constitution (Muñoz 
Machado 1983). 
Between 1982 and 1993, the González administrations, repeatedly invoked ‘the 
general interest’ to pass Basic Laws in a number of ambits, including, economic 
development, education, health care and tourism (McRoberts, 2001a: 73). Despite 
challenges from ACs, the TC tended to uphold central government intervention (Máiz et al 
2010). In effect, the González governments’ aim was not merely to ensure a more equal 
development of territorial autonomy in the state, but to weaken claims of distinctiveness 
from the historic communities. In 1992, the governing socialists signed an agreement (pacto 
autonómico) with the PP to rationalise the autonomy process by gradually extending the 
powers of the slow track ACs and provide a maximum level of competences (techo 
autonómico) (Agranoff and Ramos Gallarín, 1997).72 The doctrine, dubbed ‘café para todos’ 
(coffee for everyone), was designed to dilute the powers of the fast track ACs and top up the 
competences of the other regions, while reaffirming the primacy of the central government. 
In short, café para todos was designed to dilute diversity and undermine claims for distinct 
                                                 
72 The PP was founded in 1989 to replace the AP. Despite a change in nomenclature, the party continued to 
advocate a mononational vision of the state.  
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treatment from the historical communities.73 The most controversial articles of LOAPA may 
have been invalidated by the TC, but the underlying objectives of the law – to standardise 
the autonomy regime and thus curtail the increasing distinctiveness of the historic 
nationalities – remained in motion.   
In reaction to the extension of decentralisation to the other ACs, the historic 
nationalities advocated the transfer of further powers to their communities. It was not until 
1993, however, when the PSOE lost its majority, that nationalist parties, such as CiU74 
gained leverage and were able to extract concessions from the central government in return 
for parliamentary support (see table four).75 This was also to be the case in the 1996 election 
when the PP failed to win a majority.  
  Table Four: Governments in Spain (1979-2011) 
Year	 Party	 Type	
1979‐1981	 UCD	 Minority	
1982‐1986	 PSOE	 Majority	
1986‐1989	 PSOE	 Majority	
1989‐1993	 PSOE	 Majority	
1993‐1996	 PSOE	 Minority	
1996‐2000	 PP	 Minority	
2000‐2004	 PP	 Majority	
2004‐2008	 PSOE	 Minority	
2008‐2011	 PSOE	 Minority	
 Source: Ministerio de Interior. 
 
During the same period, CiU took a more decidedly nationalist stance and called for 
                                                 
73 Despite controversy surrounding the café para todos doctrine, it was warmly received in the slow track ACs 
which, since the creation of the state of autonomies, consistently pressed for the devolution of more powers to 
reach the status originally reserved for the historic nationalities (Hombrado 2011).  
74 CiU was an ‘alliance of convenience’ formed in 1978 between two separate parties, Convergència 
Democràtica de Catalunya (CDC) and Unió Democràtica de Catalunya (UDC) (Elias, 2015: 80).  
75 This policy is known in Catalan as ‘Peix al cove’, translated into English as ‘a bird in the hand’. In essence, 
it meant ‘CiU would take advantage of periods of national minority government to negotiate benefits for 
Catalonia’ (Field, 2016: 160).  Under the González regime, Catalonia gained further powers over healthcare 
and its regional police force, as well as retained 15% of the income tax paid by residents (although this was 
not limited to Catalonia and was extended to all ACs, save the Basque Country and Navarre). This was 
extended to 30% under the minority Aznar (1996-2000) administration.  
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the redistribution of power in Spain along confederal lines. This idea of ‘shared sovereignty’ 
was reinforced in the Declaration of Barcelona, signed on 16 July 1998 by the main Catalan 
(CiU), Basque (PNV) and Galician (Bloque Nacionalista Galego – BNG) nationalist parties. 
The joint declaration complained that after 20 years of democracy Spain had yet to establish 
any official juridical or political recognition vis-à-vis the historical nationalities and called 
for a radical reform of the Spanish Constitution to recognise Spain as a multilingual, 
multicultural and multinational state. Both the PP and PSOE rejected the declaration and 
instead mounted a defence of the constitutional status quo (Balfour and Quiroga, 2007: 156-
157). 
In the general election campaign in 2000, the PP campaigned on a pro-decentralisation 
platform, albeit in favour of further equalisation, but once in office, this time with a majority, 
the party’s pro-decentralisation position was replaced by an increasingly centralist stance 
(Verge, 2013: 325).76 Having secured an overall majority, the government was no longer 
obliged to seek the support of smaller nationalist parties and as such adopted a much more 
conservative, centralist and Spanish nationalist discourse. Health care competences were 
further extended to the slow-track ACs, but the government claimed this signalled ‘a halt’ 
in the devolution process (Colino, 2009: 266). This resulted in accusations of centralisation 
and resymmetrisation (Máiz et al 2010), reflected in the increased number of legal 
challenges brought to the TC by ACs against central government legislation (Grau Creus 
2005).  
The PP government became much more critical of demands for further autonomy, 
including increased hostility towards language policy and developed a markedly nationalist 
discourse aimed at accentuating Spanish culture and ‘strengthening the Spanish national 
identity and the Spanish language’ (Colomer, 2017: 959). In line with this, the government 
sought to re-energise Spanish nationalism through a new discourse of ‘constitutional 
patriotism’ and as such was transformed ‘from being the foremost critics of the 
Constitution… [to]…its staunchest defenders (Nagel, 2010: 129).77 The 2004 Spanish 
election took place in the wake of a terrorist attack in Madrid and returned a narrow and 
surprising victory for the Spanish socialists. With a total of 164 seats, the PSOE led by José 
Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, formed a minority government, which although reliant on the 
                                                 
76 For more on the specific territorial strategies employed by the PP and PSOE see Fabre (2008) Hopkin (2009) 
and Verge (2013).  
77 For more on the PP’s constitutional patriotism see Balfour and Quiroga (2007) and Muro and Quiroga 
(2005).  
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votes of smaller parties to invest Zapatero as Prime Minister, did not seek any formal 
coalition partner or agreement with other parties (Field, 2009: 418). In contrast to the PP, 
the PSOE under Zapatero campaigned on a pro-decentralisation platform, committed to 
further decentralisation and reform of the Constitution and the ACs’ Statutes of Autonomy.  
Zapatero, in contradistinction with Aznar, endorsed a ‘nationalist friendly’ stance, 
cognisant of Spain’s internal diversity and comfortable with the description of Spain as a 
‘nation of nations’ (Interview with PSC MP 2). This nationalist friendly approach became 
much more emphatic after the 2003 Catalan regional election in which the PSC, with the 
support of ERC and Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds - Esquerra Unida I Alternativa 
(Initiative for Catalonia Greens-United and Alternative Left –ICV-EUiA), formed a centre-
left coalition, known as the tripartit and ended CiU’s two decade hegemony over Catalan 
politics.78 Pasquall Maragall, the new President of the Generalitat, with the support of 
Zapatero, campaigned in favour of Statute reform and placed this constitutional issue at the 
top of the political agenda.  
The development of Catalan self-government and conferral of further competences 
that was achieved in 1979 resulted from situation-specific negotiations and deals during 
episodes of minority government (Field 2015). The decision, therefore, to pursue Statute 
reform marked a further stage in the development of the Spanish State of Autonomies.79 
Indeed, several interviewees pointed out that Maragall’s framing of the debate on Statute 
reform was intended to amend and update the Catalan Statute of Autonomy, but was 
essentially designed to engender change in the Spanish Constitution and State of 
Autonomies (Interviews with Catalunya en Comú-Podem and PSC MPs). The objectives of 
the reform were threefold: to clarify and protect the division of competences, to increase the 
powers of the Generalitat, including a new fiscal arrangement, and to redefine the extant 
relationship between Catalonia and Spain, with emphasis on recognition of the 
plurinationality of the Spanish state.  
Arguably, one of the biggest issues with the 1978 Constitution was the lack of clarity 
vis-à-vis the division of competences among the ACs and central government.80 The Catalan 
Statute, therefore sought to correct this and assiduously detailed with extreme precision 
                                                 
78 Interestingly, the PSC polled fewer votes in 2003 than in 1999. Its elevation to government was only made 
possible thanks to the electoral breakthrough of ERC and ICV-EUiA.  
79 Other ACs also pursued Statute reform: Andalucía (2006), Valencia (2006), Aragon (2007), The Balearic 
Islands (2007), Castile and Leon (2007) and Extremadura (2011).  
80 This was corroborated in a number of interviews.  
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which level of government held jurisdiction over competences. This process, known as 
blindaje (shielding), included identifying the different levels in each section and sub-section 
in an attempt to protect the Generalitat’s jurisdiction from encroachment by the central 
government (Keating and Wilson, 2009: 552). The new Statute also advocated the 
recognition of Catalonia as a nation as well as the conferral of new powers, including over 
finance and immigration.  
 
Source: Departament de Governació, Administracions Públiques i Habitatge 
 
As per the multilevel process of Statute reform detailed in the Constitution, the draft 
Statute was approved by the Catalan Parliament and was then sent to the Spanish Parliament 
for review (Colino 2009). Here, however, in spite of Zapatero’s pre-election promise to 
accept the Statute and ensure a smooth process of ratification, the reform encountered its 
first hurdle. As a result of opposition from PSOE members, including vociferous regional 
barons such as the Presidents of Andalucía and Extremadura, the draft Statute was subject 
to a number of modifications. Amendments were applied to 144 of the 227 articles. The 
Statute no longer conceived of Catalonia as a nation, except in the Preamble, which stripped 
the statement of ‘juridical value’ (Requejo, 2010: 161). On finance, Catalonia’s share of 
taxation increased to 50% of all taxes raised in the region, but the creation of an autonomous 
tax agency was rejected. In addition, amendments were applied to other important articles 
on language and Catalonia-Spain relations. The amended text passed votes in both houses 
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of the Spanish Parliament, although ERC, as a result of the new changes, abstained. In the 
subsequent referendum campaign in Catalonia, both the PP and ERC campaigned in favour 
of a no vote, albeit for diametrically opposed reasons, but a resounding majority endorsed 
the new Statute.81 The PP rejected all versions of the Catalan Statute, disputed the 
constitutionality of 128 articles and subsequently referred it in the TC (Colino 2009).82 
The tripartit was reassembled in the aftermath of the 2006 Catalan election, which 
also saw the election of a new party, Ciutadans, (C’s) which won three seats in the 
Parliament. Founded during the reform process of the Statute, C’s eschewed endorsing a 
position on the left-right continuum and presented itself as an anti-nationalist party 
(Rodríguez Teruel and Barrio 2016). Internal problems, in part hangovers from the previous 
government, persisted but the tripartit survived the full term. During this time, the PSOE 
was re-elected as a minority government in the 2008 general election. By 2009, however, 
Spain’s previously hospitable economic climate had taken a dramatic nose-dive and the 
Spanish economy entered recession. The economic crisis, compounded by the final 
judgement of the TC, had the ingredients of ‘a perfect storm’, precipitated a significant spike 
in support for independence and significantly altered the course of Catalan politics for the 
foreseeable future (Interview with Catalunya en Comú-Podem MP 1).The next section 
further details the evolution of territorial politics beginning in 2010 with the TC’s final 
judgement on the reform of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy and the re-election of CiU to 
government. 
 
5.3 2010 – 2018 Chartering New Territory  
5.3.1 2010-2012 Fiscal Autonomy and the ‘Right to Decide’ 
On 28 June 2010, after four years of deliberations, the TC released its judgement on 
the Catalan Statute of Autonomy. It found 14 of the referred articles ‘unconstitutional’ and 
narrowed the interpretation of a further 27 (STC 31/2010). Much of the Statute remained 
intact, but some of its most symbolic and important proposals, were ‘filleted…to the point 
of evisceration’ (Burgess, 2015b: 25). The TC’s judgement nullified the proposal of Catalan 
                                                 
81 74% on a turnout of just below 50%.  
82 The PP was not the only actor to mount a legal challenge against the Statute. The Spanish Ombudsman and 
5 other ACs (Aragon, Balearic Islands, Murcia, La Rioja and Valencia) referred aspects of the Statute to the 
TC.  
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as the preferred language, denied any legal effect to the definition of Catalonia as a nation 
and rejected the Statue’s attempts to create a typology of competence jurisdiction. The 
court’s decision sparked a flurry of civil society movement (Crameri 2015), manifest in the 
huge demonstration held in Barcelona on 10 July 2010 under the banner, ‘Som una nació. 
Nosaltres decidim’ (We are a nation. We decide).83 Furthermore, accusations of 
‘politicisation’ and a ‘centralist bias’ dogged the TC in the aftermath of the decision, with 
many pro-independence supporters claiming it heralded a rupture of the 1978 constitutional 
pact (Interview with PDeCAT MP 1 and ERC Senator). As Casanas Adams (2017b: 357) 
notes, ‘the Court’s 2010 decision in the Catalonia case strongly divided scholars, 
institutions, and public opinion, leaving the future of the system at a crossroads and 
undermining the Court’s legitimacy in the eyes of some people in Spain.’  
Prior to the TC’s judgement, a series of unofficial and non-binding referendums on 
independence took place in municipalities across Catalonia. The Constitution does not allow 
for the holding of a sub-state referendum on independence, but in line with the law, local 
municipalities in Catalonia organised a series of unofficial and non-binding local 
referendums on independence, the first taking place in the small town of Arenys de Munt in 
September 2009.84 On a turnout of circa 41%, 96% of voters voted yes to the question, ‘Do 
you agree with Catalonia becoming an independent, democratic and social state under the 
rule of law, integrated in the European Union?’ (Muñoz and Guinjoan, 2013: 45).  
As a result of the municipal referendums, coupled with growing dissatisfaction in the 
aftermath of the TC’s final judgement on the Statute, the ‘right to decide’ movement gained 
increasing traction (López 2017). The movement, however, while it included elements that 
alluded to a right of external self-determination, was not exclusively secessionist and 
presented itself as an inclusive grouping committed to facilitating the necessary tools and 
structures to enable Catalans to freely decide their political future (Requejo and Sanjaume, 
                                                 
83 Interestingly, there is ongoing debate as to whether the Catalan independence movement represents a top-
down or bottom up movement. Most interviewees believed the movement was bottom-up, arguing that 
demonstrations in favour of independence and the right to decide ‘forced political institutions to sit up and take 
notice of this demand’ (Interview with CUP MP). On the other hand, a PP interviewee described the movement 
as top-down, believing that ‘the government propelled the movement by using its influence and power to 
convince Catalans to support the right to decide and/or independence’ (Interview with PP MP). Others, 
however, saw merit in both arguments and posited the movement as multidimensional: ‘it is true that the bottom 
current influenced the top, but from 2012 it’s also true that the role of the government was fundamental to 
maintaining the level of mobilisation in favour of independence because they put all public services, 
communications, civil servants and all the structures of the government at the service of this movement’ 
(Interview with Catalunya en Comú MP 1).  
84 This was reiterated by the TC in 2008 when considering a proposal from the Basque Parliament to hold a 
two-pronged consultation on the future relationship of the Basque country and Spain (STC 103/2008). 
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2015: 124). This was most evident in the 2010 Catalan election campaign when CiU, which 
historically had pursued an anti-secessionist strategy, adopted the language of the right to 
decide movement to bolster its key priority in the election campaign: to negotiate a new 
fiscal pact for Catalonia (CiU 2010). 
The elections in November 2010 saw the return of a CiU (minority) government and 
the electoral decline of the tripartit coalition partners. Both the PSC and ERC recorded 
dismal electoral performances, the former polling its worst ever electoral result, while the 
latter’s provision of seats was reduced to ten and forced into fifth place behind the Partido 
Popular-Catalunya (PP-C) and ICV-EUiA. C’s maintained its three seats, but was overtaken 
by a new pro-independence party, Si (Catalan Solidarity for Independence), which won four 
(Rico 2012). Prior to the election, CiU ruled out any formal coalition and thus entered into 
policy-specific deals with different parties as and when required, including reliance on the 
PP-C (Martí, 2013: 508).  
The socialists not only left office in Catalonia, but in the 2011 general election, badly 
affected by Zapatero’s mismanagement of the economic crisis, were replaced by the PP, 
which secured a comfortable majority. The PSOE won only 29% of the electoral vote, while 
the PP won 45%, securing it 186 seats (Kennedy 2012). Giving past experiences of a 
majority PP government, there was little optimism in Catalonia that the Generalitat would 
be able to secure a new fiscal pact (Interview with PDeCAT MP 1). Indeed, while the 
economic crisis was one of the primary drivers to reform Catalonia’s fiscal arrangements, 
the disadvantageous economic climate which led to a tightening of the central government’s 
budgets and an identifiable strategy of economic recentralisation, rendered the opportunity 
of reform unlikely (Dowling 2017). In September 2012, at a meeting between President Mas 
and PM Rajoy, the former requested that Catalonia leave the common financing system and 
be granted fiscal autonomy. But, on the basis that the new fiscal proposal would contravene 
the Constitution and a suspicion that Mas was merely ‘taking advantage of the difficult 
economic situation to shore up his own electoral support’, it was flatly rejected by the 
Spanish PM (Interview with PP MP).  
The inability to secure a new fiscal pact led President Mas to call early elections for 
November 2012. This decision was compounded by the fact that civil society organisations 
such as Omnium Cultural and the newly established Assemblea Nacional Catalana (Catalan 
National Assembly – ANC), had mobilised huge numbers of Catalans to demonstrate in 
favour of the right to decide. Just over a week before Mas met Rajoy, for example, the ANC 
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organised a massive demonstration in Barcelona under the banner ‘Catalunya, nou estat 
d’Europa’ (Catalonia – new state in Europe) (Crameri 2015). Prior to its dissolution, the 
Catalan Parliament passed a resolution in favour of holding a referendum on independence 
and kick-started the 2012 electoral campaign (Parlament de Catalunya 2012).85  
 
5.3.2 2012-2015: The Participation Process and Plebiscitary Elections   
The refusal of the Spanish government to enter into negotiations vis-à-vis a new fiscal 
pact for Catalonia, alongside the mass mobilisation of civil society in support of the right to 
decide, culminated in President Mas’ decision to call a snap election in November 2012. 
The campaign was dominated by the independence issue, primarily the right to hold a 
referendum on independence (Rico and Liñeira 2014). CiU radically shifted its territorial 
position away from its traditional accommodationist stance towards not only pro-right to 
decide (which had begun to evolve in line with the party’s support for fiscal autonomy), but 
in support of the creation of an independent Catalan state. The party’s electoral manifesto 
justified this shift on the basis that the central government was not willing to negotiate and 
thus the only alternative was for Catalonia to seek the establishment of its own state via a 
referendum (CiU, 2012: 9). ERC, Si and Candidatura d’Unitat Popular (Popular Unity 
Candidacy – CUP) also included support for independence and a referendum in their 
manifestoes.86 What is more, the increasing salience of the territorial issue precipitated the 
polarisation of party positions (see Barrio and Rodríguez-Teruel 2017) as well as led to an 
identifiable ‘outbidding’ strategy in order to win votes in which both the PP and CiU 
‘entertained themselves by outbidding each other on the nationalist dimension’ (Colomer, 
2017: 960).87  
The election took place on 25 November with turnout of nearly 68%. CiU failed to 
gain the majority it had campaigned for and to the surprise of many lost 12 of the 62 seats it 
gained in 2010. ERC, for the first time in the party’s history, became the second largest party 
(21 seats), overtaking the PSC, which was relegated to third place, and just one seat ahead 
of the PP-C. The anti-independence C’s more than doubled its share of the vote increasing 
                                                 
85 For more on the Catalan Parliament’s role in the constitutional debate see (Viver Pi-Sunyer and Grau Creus 
2016).  
86 CUP is a radical-left, anti-capitalist ‘assembly-based party initiative’ and prior to the 2012 national election, 
had only ever fielded candidates in municipal elections (Feenstra et al, 2017: 28-29). 
87 For more on ethnic outbidding see Rabushka and Shepsle (1972), Zuber (2012) and Zuber and Szöcsik 
(2015).  
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its tally of seats to nine, while the pro-independence CUP won three seats. The split of the 
pro-independence vote among CiU, ERC and CUP denied CiU an absolute majority, but the 
Parliament was, for the first time in its modern history, composed of a pro-right to decide, 
as well as a pro-independence majority. As had been the case in 2010, CiU, albeit with fewer 
seats, formed a minority government. No party entered into coalition with CiU, but a deal 
was struck between ERC and CiU which saw the former support the latter in crucial votes 
in return for a referendum on independence to be held in 2014. 
Paving the way for a referendum, on the 23 January 2013, the Catalan Parliament 
passed The Declaration of Sovereignty and Right to Decide of the Catalan People Act 
(Parliament de Catalunya 2013), which was subsequently challenged by the central 
government and declared unconstitutional by the TC (STC 42/2014).88 The Generalitat 
produced a White Paper entitled The National Transition of Catalonia, and organised the 
referendum to be held on 9 November 2014 (Generalitat de Catalunya 2014). Voters were 
asked two questions, whether Catalonia should be a state, and if yes, whether that state 
should be independent (Liñeira and Cetrà, 2015: 263).  
In January 2014, the Catalan Parliament voted in favour of requesting permission from 
the Spanish government to hold the proposed referendum in November.89 Buoyed by the 
Scottish experience (Interviews with ERC and Catalunya en Comú-Podem MPs), a 
delegation from the Catalan Parliament presented an official request for the transfer of the 
relevant powers to the Catalan Parliament to facilitate the holding of a referendum (Cetrà 
and Harvey 2018). By a margin of 299 to 47, the Spanish Parliament rejected the request 
(Garea 2014). Hence, in September 2014, the Catalan Parliament passed its own law on non-
binding popular consultations. This was challenged by the Spanish government, temporarily 
suspended by the TC and ultimately declared unconstitutional (STC 31/2015; 32/2015). The 
Catalan government, however, in defiance of the TC, pressed ahead with the vote, 
rebranding it a ‘participation process’ which would have no legal effect. With an estimated 
turnout of circa 36%, an overwhelming majority of Catalans voted in favour of both 
questions (see table five). 
                                                 
88 La Declaració de sobirania i del dret a decidir del poble de Catalunya was passed with the votes of CIU, 
ERC, ICV-EUiA and one representative from CUP. C’s, the PP and the PSC voted against, although several 
members from the PSC defied the party whip and abstained.  
89 84 parliamentarians, which included members of CiU, ERC, ICV-EUiA as well as 3 deputies from the PSC 
(which defied the party whip to vote against), voted in favour of the request. PP-C, C’s and the remaining 
members of the PSC voted against. The 3 members of CUP abstained, believing that it was not necessary to 
request the permission of the central state to hold a referendum.  
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Table Five: November Consultation Results 
Yes-Yes 80.7% 
Yes-No 10.1% 
No-No 4.5%      
Source: Generalitat de Catalunya.  
Given the low turnout, a factor caused by the anti-independence boycott, the results of 
the consultation did not translate into any official mandate for Catalonia to secede from 
Spain (Martí and Cetrà, 2016: 108). A clear majority of participants had voted in favour of 
Catalonia becoming an independent state, but this was treated as a symbolic victory rather 
than a conclusive vote on independence. In January 2015, President Mas announced he 
would call an early election for September of the same year, framed as a de facto vote on 
independence.  
 
5.3.3 2015 and Beyond: From Secessionism to Secession? 
As discussed supra, the Spanish government’s response to the independence challenge 
in Catalonia has been a series of legal bulwarks, yet controversy and contestation of this 
strategy boldly increased in 2015 when the PP proposed emergency legislation to transfer 
new powers to the TC to specifically deal with the Catalan situation (Casanas Adams 
2017b). These new powers were designed to ensure the TC had power to enforce its own 
rulings and included the ability to impose recurring fines on or suspension of public 
authorities, public employees or private individuals that did not comply with TC rulings. 
The proposed legislation was vehemently criticised by opposition parties and challenged in 
the TC by the Basque and Catalan governments.90 The TC however, by a majority of eight 
to three upheld the measures (STC 185/2016), although, as Casanas Adams (2017b: 402) 
notes, the changes ‘not only placed further responsibility on the Court, but … effectively 
converted it into the Spanish government’s enforcer’.91  
On 27 September 2015, Catalans voted in yet another early election in which the 
independence issue remained at the centre of the campaign. Heralded as ‘plebiscitary 
                                                 
90 Criticism was not limited to Spain. The Venice Commission (2017), an advisory body of the Council of 
Europe, expressed concern that the measures to empower the Court to distribute fines or suspend elected 
officials from office could potentially harm its role as a ‘neutral arbiter’.  
91 This will be further elaborated in Section four.  
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elections’, voters in favour of independence were asked to vote for pro-independence parties 
in order to secure a majority of parliamentarians to begin ‘the process of disconnection’ from 
the Spanish state. Prior to the election, and largely as a result of the gradual radicalisation of 
CiU’s territorial stance, the CiU federation was dissolved. CDC, which tended to be the 
dominant partner in the alliance, had become much more pro-sovereignty that its UDC 
counterpart, which remained wedded to the idea of self-government, and as such the parties 
decided to end the three decades’ old alliance and compete separately in the impending 
election (Barberà and Barrio 2017). Free from its alliance with UDC, CDC sought to pursue 
a new pre-electoral partnership, yet this time with other pro-independence groupings in an 
attempt to ‘maximise pro-independence votes’ (Martí and Cetrà, 2016: 109). A deal was 
struck between CDC, ERC and other smaller parties and organisations to form the pro-
independence coalition, Junts pel Sí (Together for Yes – JxSí). Another coalition, Catalunya 
Sí que es Pot (Catalonia Yes we Can – CSQEP) was also formed. This left-leaning coalition 
included ICV-EUiA and the newly emerged Podemos party, which while opposed to Catalan 
independence, supported the right to hold a referendum and the recognition of Spain as a 
plurinational state (Rodríguez Teruel et al 2016).  
Turnout at the 2015 Catalan election was 77%, the highest recorded in an election in 
Catalonia since the transition to democracy. The pro-independence parties emerged 
victorious, winning a majority of seats (72), but were unable to secure a majority of votes 
(47.8%). On the other hand, those advocating an anti-independence stance won 39.1% of 
the vote, while those parties endorsing an anti-independence but pro-right to decide stance, 
won 11.5% of the vote. C’s emerged as a clear victor on the pro-Spain side, winning 16 
more seats than it had done in 2012.  
On 9 November 2015, JxSí and CUP joined forces to pass a resolution in the 
Parliament acknowledging that the majority of pro-independence parliamentarians 
represented a ‘democratic mandate… [to]…start the process to create an independent 
Catalan state in the form of a republic’ (Parlament de Catalunya 2015). The resolution 
committed the government to passing legislation to create Catalonia’s own state structures 
(such as a Catalan social security system and tax agency), dismissed the authority of Spanish 
institutions over Catalonia (particularly the TC) and to engage in a participatory process to 
create a new constitution for the independent Catalan republic. As a result of internal 
divisions among the three governing parties, implementation of the route map was delayed, 
but was kick-started with the election of Carles Puigdemont, the pro-independence mayor 
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of Girona, to replace Mas as President.92  
In September 2017, the Catalan Parliament, passed the Referendum Act 2017 
legislating for a binding referendum on independence and the Act of legal transition and of 
the formation of the republic 2017 which would come into force in the case of an affirmative 
outcome of the referendum. Both laws were immediately suspended by the TC, but caused 
considerable controversy in Catalonia, too (Interview with PSC MP 2). The Referendum Act, 
for instance, entailed ‘significant irregularities’ and was pushed through Parliament with 
only limited time for proper debate and scrutiny (which prompted the walkout of 52 
opposition parliamentarians) as well as passed with only a simple majority (Cetrà et al, 2018: 
133). In spite of this opposition and suspensions by the TC, the government organised the 
referendum to take place on October 1. Prior to this, the Spanish government caused much 
controversy in its attempts to impede the vote from taking place, including raids of buildings 
and offices in search of ballot boxes and voting papers, the closure of websites and the arrest 
of ministers and officials suspected of helping to organise the vote (Anderson 2017b).  
On 1 October 2017, amid a massive and harsh police operation to prevent the 
referendum from going ahead, circa 43% of voters participated in the referendum. From this 
number, over 90% voted in favour of the question ‘Do you want Catalonia to become an 
independent country in the form of a republic?’. Given the concerted state resistance to the 
vote, the boycott of anti-independence voters, and the paucity of ‘procedural guarantees’ 
(Field and Barrio 2017), the results of the referendum resulted in only a 
‘contentious…mandate for independence’ (Cetrà et al, 2018: 129). On 10 October, President 
Puigdemont declared Catalonia’s independence but immediately suspended it in return for 
negotiations with Madrid (BBC News 2017e). This attempt to use the affirmative vote for 
independence as leverage in negotiations, however, had very little effect as the Spanish 
government refused to enter into negotiations vis-à-vis independence and threatened to 
apply Article 155 of the Constitution which would suspend Catalonia’s autonomy and 
impose direct rule from Madrid.93 On 27 October, the Senate voted in favour of activating 
                                                 
92 CUP, which as a result of electoral arithmetic had been cast the role of kingmaker, refused to support the re-
election of Mas as a result of his pro-austerity programme pursued in the preceding parliament.  
93 Article 155 reads, ‘If a self-governing Community does not fulfil the obligations imposed upon it by the 
Constitution or other laws, or acts in a way that is seriously prejudicial to the general interest of Spain, the 
Government, after having lodged a complaint with the President of the Self-governing Community and failed 
to receive satisfaction therefore, may, following approval granted by the overall majority of the Senate, take 
all measures necessary to compel the Community to meet said obligations, or to protect the abovementioned 
general interest.’ 
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Article 155, while the Catalan President unilaterally declared Catalan independence. In the 
aftermath of the application of Article 155, Catalonia’s regional autonomy was suspended 
and the Catalan government deposed. In addition, a number of members of the Catalan 
government and the leaders of ANC and Omnium Cultural were remanded in custody on 
suspicion of rebellion, sedition and misuse of public funds, while others, including the 
deposed President, fled to other European countries.  
In line with the imposition of Article 155, the Spanish government called new 
elections in Catalonia for December 2017. Heralded by Rajoy as an opportunity ‘to restore 
democracy’, the election took place on 21 December, but there were only minor variations 
on the electoral results (Martín Plaza 2017). As had been the case in 2015, a majority of pro-
independence parliamentarians was elected (albeit two fewer than 2015), but the clearest 
victor was the anti-independence C’s, which emerged as the party that won most votes and 
seats. C’s’ election victory cemented the party’s reputation as the staunchest defender of 
Spain, but it was a ‘pyrrhic victory’ in that electoral arithmetic prevented the party from 
forming a government (Moreno 2017). As in 2015, non-secessionist parties (including both 
anti-independence and pro-referendum parties) won a majority of the vote (52.5%), but pro-
independence parties, on 47.5% of the vote had, once again, secured a majority of pro-
independence parliamentarians. The replacement of the PP government in Madrid with the 
PSOE in June 2018, led to the lifting of Article 155 and the confirmation of Quim Torra, a 
close ally of Puigdemont, as President of Catalonia. In terms of electoral arithmetic, the 2017 
election changed very little, and while the replacement of the PP with the PSOE indicated 
an immediate change in rhetoric, the constitutional issue remains far from settled. For many 
pro-independence supporters, it remains ‘game on rather than game over’ (Cetrà et al, 2018: 
140).   
The next section analyses the merits and limitations of the Spanish autonomy model 
in Catalonia.  
 
5.4 Examining the Merits and Limitations of Decentralisation in Spain 
The Spanish State of Autonomies has evolved over the last four decades, albeit 
questions of self-government and self-determination remain at the heart of ongoing political 
debates. As elucidated in the citation by Linz at the beginning of this chapter, there are 
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different conceptions and formulations regarding the configuration of contemporary Spain, 
most clearly in the relationship between nation and state. After over three decades of 
relatively harmonious coexistence, disenchantment with Spain’s territorial architecture and 
contestation as relates to centre-periphery relations have been voiced with increasing 
vehemence, most strongly manifest in the ongoing quest for Catalan independence. In 
attempting to cater to the demands of various actors, the Spanish system has often come 
under intense scrutiny and criticism, charged with ‘being both too centralised and too 
decentralised and simultaneously excessively rigid and overly flexible and fluid’ (Colino 
and Hombrado, 2015: 171). On the one hand, proponents of the territorial model continue 
to hold it in relatively high esteem, while, on the other, detractors consider it ‘a failure and 
disappointment’ (Crameri, 2014: 60). This section, therefore, examines Spain’s 
constitutional architecture in relation to its ability to accommodate minority nationalist 
demands vis-à-vis self-government, self-determination and recognition.  
 
5.4.1 The Merits of Decentralisation 
As has already been discussed, political decentralisation in Spain was viewed as an 
essential element in the country’s transition to democracy. At the 1977 general election, 
almost all political parties included support for territorial autonomy in their election 
manifestoes and thus the country’s path towards democratisation was twinned with a process 
of political decentralisation. The Constitution enshrined a model of decentralisation which 
involved bilateral negotiations between each region and the central state and the passing of 
a Statute of Autonomy specifically tailored to the political reality of each region. Given the 
authoritarianism of the Franco regime, emphasis was placed on reconciliation with and 
accommodation of the Basque, Catalan and Galician territories, all of which were guaranteed 
a right to self-government in the Constitution.  
 
5.4.1.1 A Democratic and Dynamic Model  
Spain’s democratic trajectory has been a turbulent one, punctuated by significant 
periods of civil war, dictatorship and repression. The transition to democracy in the wake of 
Franco’s death was considered a process that would develop in tandem with a process of 
decentralisation in an attempt to right some of the wrongs of the Franco regime. This 
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commitment to, or at least in the beginning, acknowledgement of, the necessity of 
reconciliation in line with democratic principles resulted in the modernisation of the state’s 
centralised structures and established and entrenched a liberal democratic system with 
support from above and below.  
The Constitution that resulted from the prolonged period of debate and negotiation 
symbolised ‘a new beginning’ and stood in stark contrast to the hyper-centralist and 
repressive politics of the Franco regime (Magone, 2008: 82). Between the first Constitution 
written in Cadiz in 1812 and the promulgation of the 1978 Constitution, Spain has had no 
fewer than seven constitutions, which, unlike the 1978 document, were not the result of 
compromise and negotiation but imposition (Viver Pi-Sunyer 2012: 220). The 1978 
Constitution was thus a ‘consensus Constitution’ and for this reason is defended so much by 
Spain’s main state-wide parties (Interview with PP MP). For the PP, for example, the 1978 
document represents ‘a Constitution for everyone; it had the advantage of bringing people 
together around the table to achieve consensus among almost all political parties’ (ibid). The 
arrival at consensus was no mean feat considering that a compromise had to be found among 
the competing proposals of the Francoist forces, which advocated unitarism, the left-wing 
parties, which endorsed federalism, and the peripheral nationalists that sought self-
government and recognition of their differential facts (hechos diferenciales). As already 
discussed, the result was ambiguous wording, but as Núñez (2000: 135) attests, ‘in spite of 
its terminological vagueness and lack of congruity, it [the Constitution] has also proved itself 
to be a surprisingly, functional, flexible and robust provisory solution.’  
Writing in the late 1990s, Colomer (1998: 41) described the process of decentralisation 
as ‘the most innovative institutional feature in democratic Spain.’ While in recent years the 
Constitution has amassed growing numbers of detractors, there is no doubt that it engendered 
a dynamic decentralisation process that enabled the creation of the State of Autonomies with 
ACs able to achieve rather generous levels of administrative and legislative autonomy. The 
Constitution prescribed an open-ended territorial model which ‘permitted regions, following 
different procedures justified on historical and political grounds, a broad leeway to choose… 
the degree of devolution desired among the possibilities offered by the Constitution’ 
(Colino, 2009: 263). This principle – el principio dispositivo – described as the most 
prominent and fundamental principle of the Constitution, enabled each AC to assume the 
powers it wanted within the limits established by the Constitution (Viver Pi-Sunyer 2008). 
In essence, the framers of the Constitution, in lieu of establishing definitive territorial 
178 
 
arrangements, settled on an open-ended and flexible model to be subsequently defined by 
negotiations between the regions and central government and the evolving jurisprudence of 
the TC. However, as will be later developed, while the Constitution provided only a loose 
framework for the territorial model, it was anchored within a rather rigid framework that, 
for instance, allowed for the development of autonomy insofar as it did not question or pose 
a threat to the territorial integrity of the state or the supremacy and existence of the Spanish 
nation-state.  
This flexibility, however qualified, still ensured the devolution of significant powers 
to the ACs and in this regard proved much more flexible than other plurinational states such 
as Canada.94 In Spain, the Constitution’s open-ended model allowed for the development of 
asymmetry, the two track approach to autonomy, recognition of co-official languages as well 
as other de jure asymmetry such as respect for Catalan civil law and fiscal autonomy for the 
Basque Country and Navarre. Some aspects of the Constitution hinted at a liberalism I and 
statist agenda, but some of the aforementioned aspects, at least on paper, are consonant with 
a liberalism II vision. There was no explicit recognition of Spain’s plurinational reality in 
the 1978 Constitution, but it constituted ‘reconciliation’ with the historic territories 
(Interview with C’s MP) and an ‘implicit recognition’ of their cultural and linguistic 
distinctiveness (Interview with PP MP). In this sense, the 1978 Constitution represented ‘a 
watershed moment’ in the relationship between Catalonia and the Spanish state, a state in 
which there was some recognition, however timid, of its differential fact and a guaranteed 
right to self-government (Interview with Catalunya en Comú-Podem MP 1). Spain, in a very 
short time, transformed from being a highly centralised state to one of the most decentralised 
in Europe.   
 
5.4.1.2 The Consolidation and Enhancement of Self-Rule 
The institutionalisation of autonomy in Spain permitted the peaceful accommodation 
of minority nationalist projects while concomitantly advancing and deepening democracy. 
The Constitution provided only the framework for decentralisation and as such it was the 
ACs themselves, through the creation of their Statutes of Autonomy, that ‘complet[ed] the 
                                                 
94 Pierre Trudeau, the PM responsible for the repatriation of the Canadian Constitution in 1982, considered 
provincial equality a cornerstone of Canadian federalism, but this had the effect of stymieing Quebec demands 
for recognition of special status (Laforest, 2014: 64). 
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content of the constitutional text and concretis[ed] general aspects of the Spanish 
Constitution related to the territorial power structure’ (Viver- Pi Sunyer, 2012: 222). 
According to Article 147 of the Constitution, Statutes of Autonomy ‘constitute the basic 
institutional rules of each Autonomous Community and the State shall recognise and protect 
them as an integral part of its legal order’. Statutes, while Organic Laws that complete the 
Constitution, remain subordinate to it, but are in effect mini constitutions for the ACs (Flores 
Juberías, 1998: 203).  
The Catalan Statute passed in 1979 represented a complete reversal of the treatment 
of Catalonia under Franco. As well as enshrining a number of exclusive powers for the 
Generalitat, the Statute referred to the Catalan territory, culture, history, language and 
symbols such as the flag, to the extent that, in line with Flores Juberías above, it came to 
represent a Catalan Constitution. Related to this, the autonomy afforded to Catalonia was 
used by the Catalan government and its President, Jordi Pujol to further entrench his 
nationalist project of fer pais (Catalan nation-building).  
Pujol’s nationalist project, which began before the transition to democracy, sought 
nothing less than the cultural, economic and social reconstruction of Catalonia (Pujol 1980). 
Hence, the powers devolved to the Generalitat were used to deliver public services, but were 
crucial elements in Pujol’s process of ‘proto-state building’ (Dowling, 2013: 123). 
Generalitat control over policy in education, language, culture, communications and media 
provided successive Pujol governments with important tools and opportunities to entrench 
its political objectives.95 As Crameri (2015: 100) notes, ‘the 23 year period of government 
by Jordi Pujol from 1980 to 2003 saw the consistent top-down dissemination of discourses 
designed to convince Catalans (and others) that Catalonia was a nation’.  
As well as contributing to the Generalitat’s nation-building project, territorial 
autonomy in Catalonia has also ensured the devolution of a substantial number of 
competences that have made Catalonia a very powerful sub-state entity. This point was 
raised by PP and PSC representatives who believed that Catalonia was a powerful 
autonomous region and that other autonomous sub-state entities, such as Scotland and the 
                                                 
95 It is important to reiterate that while Pujol was an unapologetic Catalan nationalist, his vision was for a 
strong Catalonia within a strong Spain. Support for self-government and self-determination was not framed as 
secessionist.  
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German Länder, had fewer competences than Catalonia (Interviews with PSC MPs).96  
Using the RAI developed by Hooghe et al (2016), it is possible to locate Catalonia 
within a comparative framework of 81 countries.97 Prior to the passing of the Catalan Statute 
of Autonomy and the first elections to the parliament held in 1980, Catalonia scored only 
six out of the maximum 18, but by 2010 this had risen to 14. Interestingly, Catalonia scores 
below both Scotland (after the implementation of the Scotland Act 2016) and the German 
Länder (as well as a number of others such as Quebec, the Swiss cantons; the US and 
Australian States and the Basque Country and Navarre), but does score the same as units in 
the fully-fledged federations of Argentina, Belgium and Brazil. Catalonia, therefore, may 
not enjoy the same level of self-government as some in other established federations or 
regionalised states, but has significant levels of autonomy and thus does indeed belong to 
one of Europe’s most decentralised states.   
Much like in Scotland, survey evidence demonstrates the sustained support amongst 
the Catalan population for autonomy, albeit increasing numbers of respondents in recent 
years have expressed support for secession rather than increased levels of autonomy (CEO 
2019). From this evidence, however, it is clear that while support for independent 
nationhood has steadily increased in the last decade, support for inhibiting Catalonia’s 
existing autonomy provisions or indeed its status as an AC within the Spanish state are 
marginalised and minority positions. In a recent round of polling, for example, fewer than 
six per cent of respondents believed that Catalonia’s position within the Spanish state should 
be nothing more than ‘a region of Spain’ (ibid).   
Since the passing of the 1979 Statue of Autonomy and prior to the reform process that 
took place after 2003, Catalonia secured incremental enhancements of its self-governing 
powers as a result of concessions given by minority Spanish governments in return for 
Catalan support in the Spanish Congress. This quid pro quo scenario saw deals reached on, 
inter alia, socio-economy policy, increased investment and the devolution of further 
autonomous powers (Heller 2002). Much like the Scottish Parliament, the powers of the 
Catalan Parliament have gradually increased. Yet, while in Scotland these changes have 
                                                 
96 This opinion was not shared by interviewees from other parties. León et al (2017) draw similar conclusions 
in their survey of politicians, whereby PP and PSOE politicians generally consider the level of devolution for 
Catalonia ‘fine’, whereas representatives from CiU and ERC consider it ‘not satisfactory’.  
97 To recap, the RAI measures both self-rule and shared rule. Self-rule is measured according to: institutional 
depth and policy scope, fiscal autonomy, borrowing capacity and the level of independence of legislature and 
executive. Findings on the shared rule scale will be discussed in the next section.  
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occurred in response to the electoral successes of the SNP, in Spain they have taken place 
as a result of the failure of the state-wide parties to gain absolute majorities. Among 
interviewees, there was general agreement that the ‘pragmatic’ approach of peix al cove 
worked well, for both Catalonia and Spain, ‘beefing up Catalan competences while ensuring 
a stable government [in Madrid]’ (Interview with JxCat MP 1). The approach, in line with 
the flexible approach to federalisation endorsed by Friedrich discussed in Chapter Three, 
ensured a period of almost permanent dialogue, negotiations and bargaining and was in line 
with the ‘Catalan tradition of pactism’ (Interview with Catalunya en Comú-Podem MP 1). 
All this, was made possible through the pliable nature of the territorial model and 
distribution of power.  
 
5.4.1.3 Intergovernmental Forums: Attempting to Forge a Federal Spirit?  
As is well known and has been discussed elsewhere in this thesis, processes of self-
rule are often accompanied by, and indeed complemented by, mechanisms of shared rule. 
Shared rule is an important element in multilevel systems as a vehicle to foster cooperation, 
mutual trust and inter-territorial solidarity. As is the case in the UK, shared rule mechanisms 
in the Spanish context, specifically the Senate and IGR, are relatively weak and have been 
the subject of much academic and political criticism. Conversely, in recent years new 
research has demonstrated that while there is still much to be done in order to improve upon 
and consolidate shared rule in Spain, developments since the early 2000s have demonstrated 
a maturation of IGR (Colino 2009; Colino and Parrado 2009; Expósito 2017; García Morales 
2009; León 2017).  
As well as measuring self-rule, Hooghe et al’s (2016) RAI allows us to examine and 
situate Spain’s shared rule mechanisms within a comparative context.98 From a maximum 
of 14, Spain’s ACs (which exclude the Basque Country and Navarre) score 9.5, placing them 
ahead of many of the regions it was behind or on par with in terms of self-rule.99 The 
American states score 7.5 and the Swiss Cantons 8.5. Interestingly, the Spanish ACs also 
                                                 
98 To recap, the measures used by Hooghe et al to examine shared rule range across five dimensions: the extent 
to which sub-state governments can influence the policy process of national legislation (second chamber); the 
extent to which authority is shared between different levels of government in the intergovernmental arena; 
fiscal control; borrowing co-determination and the role of sub-state governments or electorates in determining 
constitutional reform.  
99 The Basque Country and Navarre, given their fiscal autonomy, are measured separately. On shared rule they 
were one point in front of the remaining 15 ACs. 
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poll much further than other plurinational states, including Belgium, where the regions score 
only 5.5, Canada whose provinces score 6, while Quebec scores 6.5, and the UK, where 
Scotland scores only 6.5. Akin to the UK, decentralisation in Spain has focused on building 
out as opposed to building in, but as Hooghe et al and the analysis below shows, there have 
been some attempts to create and maintain forums for intergovernmental cooperation.  
Since the Spanish transition to democracy, a number of intergovernmental forums 
have been developed in Spain, vertically and horizontally, bilaterally and multilaterally, 
sectoral and cross-sectoral. As mentioned above, analyses of IGR have been predominantly 
negative and there remains much room for reform.100 Nevertheless, in taking stock of the 
merits of Spain’s experience with decentralisation, it is undeniable that intergovernmental 
forums have played an important role in consolidating the decentralised system and 
institutionalising and demonstrating, at least to a certain extent, cognisance of the federal 
spirit and some of the values that undergird it (see Burgess 2012a). 
Bilateral commissions were established early on in the transition to democracy in order 
to negotiate the devolution of competences from the central government to ACs, and have 
continued to evolve as forums of debate, discussion and cooperation between ACs and the 
central government. These commissions include representatives from both the central 
government and respective ACs and have become the preferred channel for maintaining 
relations with the central government (Interview with PDeCAT MP 1). Multilateral 
arrangements are considered to reduce Catalonia to ‘just another AC’ and as such preference 
is for bilateralism as this enables Catalonia to be on equal footing with the central 
government (Interview with Catalunya en Comú-Podem MP 1). The focus on bilateral 
relations in the reform of the Catalan Statute, which not only increased the visibility of these 
arrangements but sought to make them permanent bodies, underlines this point.101  
Bilateral commissions are the earliest mechanism of IGR developed in the wake of the 
democratic transition but were closely followed by a multilateral forum of participation: 
sectoral conferences. Sectoral conferences were designed to serve as multilateral bodies that 
would foster cooperation among the ACs and the central government and provide a space 
for inter-ministerial discussion on specific policy briefs. These conferences bring together 
                                                 
100 This will be developed in the next section.  
101 Taking the initiative from the Catalan Statute, a number of other ACs sought to ensure the permanence of 
a bilateral relationship with the central government through including this in the reform of their respective 
Statues.  
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ministers and senior officials from the central government and ACs and to date, 47 sectoral 
conferences have been convened. García Morales (2009: 55) considers the establishment of 
sectoral conferences as one of the most significant developments in the consolidation of 
political decentralisation and described them as ‘the motor of collaboration’ that have 
facilitated the exchange of points of view and ideas, as well as being effective forums of 
participation. 
Another important initiative vis-à-vis collaboration and cooperation between the two 
levels of government was created by Zapatero in 2004. The Conference of Presidents, which 
brings together the PM of the central government, the presidents of the 17 ACs and the 
president-mayors of the autonomous cities Ceuta and Melilla, was created as a vertical forum 
to facilitate closer cooperation among the different orders of government. Although not an 
entirely new concept in multilevel systems, this was a new mechanism for regulating 
relations in Spain and was believed to have ‘filled a hole’ in the constitutional architecture 
(Expósito, 2017: 6). Designed to promote coordination, ensure the participation of ACs in 
central government decisions and to serve as a forum for the resolution of intergovernmental 
disputes, the Conference of Presidents represents an important advance in IGR in Spain, 
although only six meeting have taken place in a period of nearly 15 years (Aja 2006).102  
This short analysis of IGR in Spain has shown that the Spanish government and ACs 
have made much headway in the advancement of shared rule mechanisms. However, it is 
important to point out that while there is much to criticise about these arrangements, the bad 
press has often clouded analysis of the maturation of these intergovernmental forums 
(Colino 2013). It is true, as will be developed in the subsequent section, that much more 
needs to be done in terms of bolstering shared rule in the Spanish state, but an assessment 
of the last four decades shows that much progress has been made in achieving qualitative 
changes in the system.  
 
5.4.2 The Limitations of Devolution 
One of the biggest achievements of the autonomy process, as we have seen, was the 
facilitation and consolidation of the transition to democracy. The Constitution guaranteed a 
right to self-government for Spain’s respective regions and the subsequent development of 
                                                 
102 Conferences took place in 2004, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2012 and more recently in 2017.  
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the system has led to incremental increases in the powers of the ACs and the establishment 
of a number of intergovernmental forums. These forums have in some ways attempted to 
provide mechanisms of influence, participation and dispute resolution and while there is still 
significant room for improvement, their mere existence underlines a maturation in the 
development of Spanish autonomy. Notwithstanding these merits, praise of the Spanish 
system is few and far between. Crameri (2014: 60) succinctly encapsulates this lack of 
support, noting that detractors of the system often couch it ‘as a failure and disappointment 
that belongs firmly in the past’ while reform of the system, particularly moves towards 
asymmetric federalism, are conceived as ‘an impossible dream that could only come to pass 
in a utopian future.’ Interviews carried out for this thesis were peppered with complaints 
about autonomy arrangements, and as will be seen, these were not limited to pro-
independence supporters.  
 
5.4.2.1 The Centralist Tendency  
The history of state and nation-building in Spain has oscillated between periods of 
centralisation and decentralisation. Commitments to decentralisation, which included the 
First and Second Republics, were undermined and ultimately failed as a result of the unitary 
ideology of the Spanish right. Tellingly, this statist vision, even at the hands of brutal 
dictators, failed to materialise and the end result is nothing short of ‘a bad copy of France’ 
(Interview with JxCat MP 2). The association of centralisation with the draconian policies 
of Franco tainted any centralist programmes in the transition to democracy and thus resulted 
in a Constitution that represented ‘the outright rejection of the centralist model imposed by 
Francoism’ (Guibernau, 2004: 72). Yet, in spite of the constitutionalisation of a 
decentralised model with a clear commitment to asymmetry, Spain’s main political forces, 
representing both the left and the right, have impeded the organic evolution of the system 
and instead have sought to engineer its trajectory towards a more centralised and 
symmetrical territorial model. In the words of Gillespie (2015: 12), ‘although the notion of 
“Spanish nationalism” has experienced ideological reformulation and differentiation under 
democracy, it has tended to remain more or less centralist.’  
Criticism abounds in relation to the central government’s ability to intervene and 
encroach upon regional competences, regardless of being the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
ACs. This option has been consistently exploited by central governments in order to 
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circumscribe the competences of the ACs and push towards policy uniformity, including in 
economic development, education, health care, tourism and welfare (see Máiz et al 2010). 
As Requejo (2017) notes, the fact that the central government can freely encroach upon the 
competences of the ACs undermines any claim that Spain is a federal country.  
Notwithstanding the protest of ACs as relates to processes of recentralisation (notably, 
not only the historic communities have protested against this), more recent Spanish 
governments have enacted questionable centralising policies. These processes of 
recentralisation are worsened still by the fact that, namely in the case of PP governments, 
they have been accompanied by a reinvigorated Spanish nationalism, which accepts the 
existence of the territorial model, but continues to seek to foist a mononational and statist 
ideology upon it. Aznar’s aversion to further developments in autonomy, for instance, not 
only led to a recentralist approach, but coincided with an increasingly ‘neo-nationalist 
Spanish discourse designed to promote uniformity’ (Requejo, 2010: 158). 
More recently, this centralist and neo-nationalist approach was embodied by the Rajoy 
governments under which the Organic Law for the Improvement of Educational Quality 
(LOMCE) was passed. This law sought to standardise the curricula (through increasing the 
powers of the Ministry of Education at the expense of the powers of the ACs) and contested 
the policy of linguist immersion in those ACs with co-official languages, requiring fewer 
subjects to be taught in vernacular language (Muro 2015). Predictably, the Generalitat took 
umbrage at the propositions of the law, particularly the comments of the Minister 
spearheading the policy, who believed that it was necessary in the case of Catalonia to 
‘Hispanicise Catalan students’ (Aunión 2012). Recentralisation was framed as guaranteeing 
parity of equal rights and citizenship. Yet, in line with the theoretical framework discussed 
in Chapter Three, clearly demonstrates the pernicious ramifications of the tyranny of the 
majority and a lack of respect and recognition of minority rights. Equal rights, in this 
example, are fashioned solely in the image of the majority community.  
The examples discussed above demonstrate a classic liberalism I understanding of the 
state. For some, centralisation is a necessary phenomenon with regards to ensuring 
‘efficiency’ within the autonomies model (Interview with PP MP) and parity of rights among 
the ACs (Interview with C’s MP). For others, however, these centralising dynamics have 
sought to dilute the national and cultural distinctiveness of the historic nationalities 
(Interview with PDeCAT senator) and reinforce the ‘superiority’ of the Spanish state 
(Interview with ERC MP 2). A predominantly unitary and uniformist ideal continues to 
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permeate the ideologies of Spain’s main state-wide parties, betraying a territorial rather than 
plurinational vision of the state in which recognising and accommodating ethnonational 
differences are side-lined in favour of supposed equal treatment of all ACs. In short, 
processes aimed at territorial symmetry and standardisation, whether overt or implicit, while 
they may erroneously propagate a myth of nation-state status, incidentally serve to 
undermine rather than bolster the cohesion of the state and respect for ethnonational 
diversity. Spain, as we have seen, is no exception to this and in the words of one interviewee, 
will continue to battle this issue until central governments realise ‘they are trying to solve 
problems in the twenty-first century with answers from the nineteenth century’ (Interview 
with PSC MP 1).  
 
5.4.2.2 The Problem of Convoluted Recognition    
As discussed in Chapter Three, there has been a groundswell of research examining 
the importance of recognition for minority communities, particularly in plurinational states. 
Despite the constraints of the time, the 1978 Constitution represented a critical juncture in 
the development of democracy in the Spanish state, which included recognition, at least to 
some extent, of the state’s internal diversity. The so-called ‘national question’ was a salient 
yet sensitive issue in which the framers of the Constitution tried to find equilibrium between 
Francoist forces and the historic nationalities. The Constitution, in turn, differentiated 
between historic nationalities and regions and guaranteed them a right to self-government, 
but concomitantly qualified this by declaring the indivisibility of the Spanish nation. Other 
articles elaborated further, such as Article Three, which declared Castilian, ‘the official 
Spanish language of the State’, but in a nod to those ACs with distinct languages, declared 
these languages co-official in the respective ACs and vowed to respect and protect this 
linguistic diversity. The Constitution also recognised the existence of historical legal 
privileges (fueros) which in turn entrenched an asymmetric fiscal agreement for the Basque 
Country.  
The recognition of Spain’s internal diversity, while it indisputably signified a clear 
break with the previous authoritarian regime, endorsed only a timid acceptance of Spain’s 
plurinationality. Achieved through ambiguous wording, the Constitution succeeded in 
cementing two competing conceptions of the state which hitherto remain unresolved and as 
such ‘contaminates all of the debates’ related to Catalonia’s political status and relationship 
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with Spain (Interview with PSC MP 1). While differentiating between historic nationalities 
and regions, the framers of the Constitution eschewed any explicit recognition of nationhood 
for Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia and consequently impeded any official 
acknowledgment of Spain as a plurinational state. Thus, constitutional debate between Spain 
and Catalonia are dominated by two conflicting visions: a mononational conception of the 
state versus a plurinational vision. In the words of Arzoz (2018: 247), ‘the Spanish 
Constitution of 1978 attempted to combine the traditional ideology of the nation-state with 
a limited recognition of territorial and cultural autonomy.’  
There was general consensus among interviewees that more had to be done to ensure 
that the internal diversity of the Spanish state was reflected in the Constitution. This idea, 
however, was refuted by PP and C’s interviewees. For the PP, further recognition was a 
futile endeavour since the 1978 constitution already recognised the distinct status of some 
ACs (Interview with PP MP). For C’s, ‘nationalism is an ideology not a right’, thus aversion 
to constitutional reform to further recognise Spain’s internal diversity was much stronger:  
We do not agree with academics that say Spain has to recognise the specificity 
of Catalonia in the Constitution. We do not agree with this because our 
Constitution is a pillar of our country that belongs to the citizens not the 
nationalities…and we do not want to change this (Interview with C’s MP).  
 
In contrast, PSC interviewees considered constitutional reform essential in order to 
explicitly recognise the plurinational nature of the Spanish state. One interviewee pointed 
out that while there was already recognition of the ‘national character of Catalonia…in the 
Constitution and in several laws’, more was required to make this explicit and ensure that 
institutions are reformed ‘to fit with the reality of Spanish and Catalan Society’ (Interview 
with PSC MP 1).  
For other interviewees, the lack of recognition of Catalonia’s nationhood, reinforced 
Catalonia’s status as a subordinate minority that is not treated ‘as a political subject’ nor an 
equal stakeholder in the state (Interview with ERC MP 1). This is compounded by the state’s 
mononational vision and the dismissal of requests for recognition or differentiation ‘from 
stateless nations seen…as selfish, backward and medieval’ (ibid). The relegation of the term 
nation in the reformed Catalan Statue as well as the prolonged process of approving the 
Statue and the subsequent referral to the TC were frequently drawn upon as examples of the 
clash between the mononational and plurinational conceptions of the Spanish state. The 
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paucity of consensus and willingness among Spanish elites to initiate constitutional dialogue 
on negotiating Spain’s plurinationality was framed as a state threatened rather than enriched 
by its diversity (Interview with JxCat MP 1). Indeed, while a C’s MP believed statements 
that Spain did not respect its internal diversity were unfounded, she believed that more 
needed to be done to ensure this was considered an inherent value: ‘we respect diversity, but 
maybe we need to love it as a value, as a special thing that Spain has and other countries do 
not have, so maybe we need a new government that understands that this diversity is a good 
thing’ (Interview with C’s MP).  
A plurinational vision of the Spanish state is not limited to nationalists in the peripheral 
territories but is also a feature of the Spanish political landscape. The PSOE’s zeal for 
recognition of plurinationality was markedly tempered once Zapatero left office, but other 
left-wing parties, namely Podemos, have consistently endorsed a plurinational agenda which 
includes supporting Catalonia’s right to self-determination. The unwillingness of other 
Spanish elites to entertain this notion, including the PSOE, is rooted in the lack of 
recognition afforded to Catalonia to be recognised as a political subject, equal and not 
subordinate to, the central state (Interview with ERC MP 1). A liberalism I vision prevails.  
Encroachment on AC policy jurisdiction has become a general characteristic of 
Spanish politics. Yet, while this is strongly opposed by the ACs, particularly the historic 
nationalities, some interviewees, evoking the guise of equal citizenship and treatment, 
argued that a certain level of central government encroachment was necessary to ensure that 
all ACs are treated the same: 
What the [historic] nationalities want is that they want to have more competences 
than the others…they gain these competence but what they do not like is that the 
others [other ACs] get them too and this is the idea that we are better than the 
others…it is difficult to say the other Autonomous Communities should have 
fewer rights than Catalonia’ (Interview with PP MP).  
 
To this end, successive PP and PSOE governments have sought to roll out the same 
level of autonomy to all ACs, to the extent that, reference to historic nationalities, 
irrespective of what the Constitution says, ‘nowadays means all 17 autonomous 
communities’ (Interview with C’s MP). In the absence of a plurinational model to acquiesce 
the demands for recognition of Catalonia, the issue of recognition remain a perennial 
problem.  
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5.4.2.3 High Level Litigation: The Politicisation of the Judiciary 
The TC, established by Article 159 of the Constitution, came into being in 1980 and 
has played a pivotal role in the development of autonomy and construction and consolidation 
of the State of Autonomies. As a result of the lack of detail in the Constitution regarding the 
development of autonomy, it fell to the TC, as the only state institution with ‘a monopoly 
on the interpretation of the Constitution’ to put flesh on the bones of the autonomy model 
(Rodríguez and Harguindéguy, 2017: 3). The TC, thus, was not merely the actor involved in 
the mediation of disputes between the central government and ACs, but has been and 
continues to be ‘an active power’ in shaping the territorial system (Guillén López, 2008: 
559). However, the relatively high esteem in which the TC was held during the first years 
following the transition has gradually dissipated, rooted in charges of politicisation and 
centralist bias.103  
The Court is composed of 12 judges who are chosen by four different institutions: the 
Congress, the Senate, the central government and the General Council of the Judiciary 
(GCPJ).104 The nomination process, however, has come under a barrage of criticism for 
‘politicising’ judges and facilitating the selection of judges ‘ideologically influenced’ by the 
main state-wide parties (Interview with JxCat MP 1). There is no guaranteed role for the 
smaller parties or ACs themselves in nominating judges. As a result, the nomination process 
is dominated by partisan and ideological influences whereby political parties seek to secure 
the nomination of judges more predisposed to their ideological leaning. Judges, as a 
consequence, ‘are identified by the parties that support them’ (Guillén López, 2008: 536). 
In recent years, this has become much more pronounced where political parties, namely PP 
and PSOE, have attempted to have judges recused, particularly those at odds with their 
ideological leaning (Miley 2008).  
In the Second Spanish Republic, regions were guaranteed a role in deciding the 
composition of the republic’s constitutional court, the Tribunal de Garantías 
Constitucionales (Sánchez Barrilao 2009). This, however, was not the case after the 
transition. The Basque Country and Catalonia have consistently called for reform of the 
                                                 
103 The gradual decrease in trust and confidence in the TC has been recorded in studies carried out by the CEO. 
In Catalonia, the October 2017 survey recorded only 4.1% of respondents with ‘full confidence’ in the work 
and deliberations of the TC, while 39.1% had ‘no confidence’.  
104 The Congress and Senate each choose four judges (passed with a three-fifths majority) while the central 
government and GCPJ choose two, the latter also requires a three-fifths majority. 
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nomination process to secure a guaranteed role for the ACs.105 This was most clearly 
reflected in the reformed Catalan Statute which advocated for the participation of the 
Generalitat in appointing judges to the TC and GCPJ. In 2007, the 1979 Organic Law of the 
Constitutional Court (LOTC) was reformed to include, among other things, an amendment 
that would enable the ACs to compile a list of proposed nominees to be selected by the 
Senate, subject to the three-fifths majority rule. But, in the event that enough support is not 
secured for an AC proposed nominee, the Senate has ‘the final say’ and is ‘free to select 
judges other than those proposed by the legislatures of the autonomous communities’ 
(Palermo and Kossler, 2017: 197-198). Advancements have been made in order to make the 
nomination process much more inclusive, yet as was pointed out in one interview, the ACs 
are still inhibited in proposing judges and furthermore there is no constitutional guarantee 
that a Catalan judge will sit on either the TC or Supreme Court (Interview with PDeCAT 
MP 1).  
While the TC has consistently played a fundamental role in the development of the 
State of Autonomies and the many disputes that have arisen as a result of its consolidation, 
more recently it has played a leading role in the debates vis-à-vis Catalonia’s place within 
Spain. This, as has already been discussed, began with the Statute reform in which the TC 
was heavily criticised for adopting a restrictive interpretation of the Constitution. For some, 
the TC’s actions represented nothing less than a juridical coup d’etat, in which the creation 
of an independent Catalonia seemed an easier feat than continued negotiations on reforming 
state machinery (Gagnon, 2014: 8).106 The problem with the TC’s 2010 judgement, however, 
was not so much the content, although this was vehemently contested, but the tone in which 
this was handled (Interview with Catalunya en Comú-Podem MP 2). Rather than adopting 
a more conciliatory and flexible position, as had been demonstrated in the early years of the 
transition, the TC’s judgment was considered unnecessarily harsh, particularly its reference 
to recognition of only one nation. In the words of Ferreres Comella (2015: 575), ‘the 
court…did not choose the most felicitous phrase when it asserted that “the constitution only 
knows of the existence of the Spanish nation”’. The TC continues to play a key role in the 
territorial crisis between the Catalan and Spanish governments, albeit its role as a neutral 
arbiter has been increasingly questioned. ‘The Constitutional Court’, remarked one 
                                                 
105 The Declaration of Barcelona lambasted the TC as a centralist instrument of the state which facilitated the 
curtailment of AC power in favour of the central government. This inimicality towards the TC was much 
stronger in the Basque Country which from the 1990s refused to interact with the TC and boycotted it.  
106 This was also corroborated in a number of interviews.  
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interviewee, ‘should be a tool to arbitrate, but rather than be the referee it has become a 
player for one of the two teams’ (Interview with JxCat MP 2).  
 
5.4.2.4 The Territorially Unrepresentative Chamber 
Shared rule, as already discussed, is an essential component in decentralised systems. 
In Spain, both bilateral and multilateral forums have emerged and the Constitution 
envisioned a bicameral system which included the establishment of an upper chamber – the 
Senate (Senado) – to serve as a ‘chamber of territorial representation’. On paper, both IGR 
and the Senate demonstrate cognisance of the significance of shared rule mechanisms in 
decentralised Spain. In reality, however, while the existence of these forums is irrefutably 
fundamental to the functioning of shared rule, the practical experience has been relatively 
limited. IGR remain weak while the Senate, in terms of composition and functions, fails to 
live up to its constitutional mandate as a genuine territorially representative chamber.  
In the Spanish system there is a perception that ‘connections between the Autonomous 
Communities and the central government are weak’ as a result of the paucity of ‘strong 
principles like loyalty, collaboration [and] coordination’ (Interview with C’s MP). 
Intergovernmental forums have been designed in order to combat such problems and provide 
new arenas for centre-periphery relations, but the perception remains that the historic 
nationalities, particularly Catalonia, explicit in their pursuit to see their differential facts 
recognised, are ‘selfish and lacking in solidarity’ (Interview with PP MP). As is the case in 
the UK, intergovernmental forums in Spain are hierarchical; the central government 
dominates and thus ACs are suspicious of multilateral forums which they perceive as tools 
to centralise AC competences as opposed to fostering a joint partnership (Interview with 
PDeCAT MP 2). A crucial drawback, however, which was also discussed in relation to the 
UK and Scotland, is the lack of willingness on either level of government to constructively 
engage in intergovernmental schemes. Central government, despite participating in such 
mechanisms, continue to be influenced by ‘romantic notions’ of centralism and uniformity 
(Interview with PSC MP 2), while the ACs, namely the historic nationalities, prefer bilateral 
relations in order to bolster their claims of distinctiveness: ‘they are mechanisms which do 
not serve for what the state is looking for which is the harmonisation of politics…nor for 
what the Autonomous Communities are looking for which is to intervene and influence state 
affairs’ (Interview with PDeCAT MP 2). Hence, while there are clear issues with the 
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structure and effectiveness of IGR in relation to the participation of sub-state governments 
on influencing central government policy and decisions, this is coupled with a lack of 
willingness on both sides to put aside differences and work together. As posited by Expósito 
(2017: 11), the inherent problem with IGR ‘reveals that an important problem of political 
culture still exists’ whereby neither the central government nor the ACs ‘understand that 
collaboration is a legal duty as well as a practical requirement for decentralisation to function 
well.’  
As has been discussed, the Constitution provided for an open-ended decentralisation 
model that did not specify any number of sub-state units. As such, the Senate, in spite of the 
Constitution’s claim that it was a ‘chamber of territorial representation’ was designed to be 
a provincial rather than regional chamber (Roller, 2002: 77). The provinces, a hangover from 
the pre-transition centralist state, were assigned equal representation and four senators were 
to be directly elected from each province, totalling 208.107 This was to be complemented by 
the appointment of one senator to represent each of the ACs, as well as one senator per 
million citizens which in the latest election totalled 58.108  
In terms of composition, it is clear that the Senate fails to fulfil its role as a territorially 
representative chamber. This is further evidenced through an examination of the limited 
powers assigned to the upper chamber, which includes very few powers in relation to the 
ACs. The Senate is very much a subordinate body to the untrammelled power of the 
Congress, lacking legislative powers as well as playing no role in investiture votes, motions 
of censure or votes of no confidence. Furthermore, while the Senate yields a veto power 
over legislation from the Congress, it has only a limited period of two months to enact 
changes or veto legislation; on the return to Congress, however, these changes or veto can 
be overridden by a simple majority in the case of the former and an absolute majority in the 
latter. In short, the Senate is perceived as a mere ‘expensive spellcheck service’ tasked with 
simply rubber-stamping bills (Interview with PDeCAT MP 1).  
Acknowledgement of reform of the Senate has been a recurring feature of political 
                                                 
107 The number of Senators elected for the Spanish islands differs. Gran Canaria, Mallorca and Tenerife each 
elect 3 senators while the smaller islands, Fuerteventura, Lanzarote, Menorca, Ibiza and Formentera, La 
Gomera, El Hierro and La Palma, elect one senator each. The autonomous cities, Ceuta and Meillia, are 
assigned two Senators each.  
108 In the latest Senate election, held on 26 June 2016, the PP maintained its overall majority with 126 seats, 
the PSOE won 42, Unidos Podemos 16, ERC 10, PDeCAT 2, and C’s 0. Once combined with the appointment 
of senators to represent the ACs, the PP has 147 senators, the PSOE 62, Unidos Podemos 20, ERC 12, PDeCAT 
4 and C’s 4. 
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parties in Spain, although plans for reform differ in terms of composition and function. In 
the 2016 general election, for example, the PP, PSOE and Podemos argued in favour of 
Senate reform, while C’s advocated its abolition in return for a ‘Council of the Presidents of 
the Autonomous Communities’. In government, however, despite rhetoric, neither the PP 
nor PSOE have seriously pursued reform. Nationalist parties in the Basque Country and 
Catalonia have at various times supported Senate reform, including veto rights for the 
historic nationalities. Support for reform, however, is conditioned by the view that reform 
of the Senate into a proper multilateral intergovernmental forum should not be at the expense 
of bilateral relations (Interview with PDeCAT MP 1).  
 
5.4.3 Summary 
A number of pertinent conclusions can be drawn from this analysis of Spain’s 
experience with decentralisation. The rather flexible and fluid territorial model provided for 
in the Constitution enabled the institutionalisation and ultimately consolidation of an 
autonomy model that has stayed in place for over four decades. A number of significant 
policy briefs have been devolved to Catalonia which, in turn, has been able to ensure the 
continued existence and protection of its cultural and linguistic distinctiveness. In addition 
to self-rule powers, IGR meetings and collaborative initiatives have increased in recent 
years, providing ACs with opportunities to participate in the decision-making process of the 
central government. In truth, while the existence of these forums signifies a clear maturation 
of Spanish IGR, they are often undermined by the actors involved, both at the central 
government and AC level.  
Notwithstanding these merits, a number of limitations were identified which underline 
some of the principal problems with the Spanish state’s experience with accommodation. 
Centralising tendencies have been a feature of all Spanish governments since the transition 
and in spite of rhetoric that champions the decentralised model, central governments have 
consistently sought to recentralise power, bolster the role of the centre and diminish claims 
of historical distinctiveness. This is rooted in another important and challenging limitation 
which relates to the lack of official recognition accorded to the historic nationalities. 
Recognition is undoubtedly an essential component of politics in a plurinational state, yet 
rather than accepting the expressions and claims of distinctiveness by the minority nations 
within Spain, successive governments have consistently sought to impede them, 
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jeopardising the stability of the system and undermining previous attempts at 
accommodation. This is compounded by the high levels of litigation on autonomy matters 
which have damaged the role of the TC as an impartial arbitrator. IGR, as noted above, have 
helped provide forums for intergovernmental cooperation and dispute resolution, but the 
absence of a genuinely territorial representative chamber further exacerbates centre-
periphery tensions. In taking stock of the merits and limitations of the Spanish territorial 
model, it is clear that there is evidence to bolster arguments on both sides of the debate, but 
recent events show that in the absence of reform, the Spanish model may have reached its 
limits.  
 
5.5 The Future of Catalonia in Spain 
The transition to democracy embarked upon in the late 1970s precipitated, as was the 
case in the UK after 1997, a constitutional journey which has completely transformed the 
landscape of Spanish politics. Evidently, there are components of the Spanish system which 
underline continuity, including the bicameral parliamentary system, the monarchy and the 
continued relevance of the main state-wide parties, the PP and PSOE. In more recent years, 
change rather than continuity has been the order of the day. The party system has witnessed 
the most change. The PP and PSOE remain dominant actors, but their hegemony has been 
challenged by C’s and Podemos and the once stable two-party system has transmuted into a 
multiple party electoral arena.  
In Catalonia, the party system has also bore witness to a number of changes, including 
the entrenchment of the independence-constitutional cleavage alongside the more traditional 
left-right axis. New political parties specifically committed to the territorial question have 
been created, old alliances between others have collapsed, while all parties, irrespective of 
left-right positioning, have been forced to adopt a position on independence. As is the case 
in Scotland, territorial politics remains a central component of political life in Catalonia and 
looks set to dominate for the foreseeable future. As in the previous chapter, the penultimate 
section of this chapter examines the future terrain of territorial politics in Catalonia and 
Spain.  
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5.5.1 The PP, Ciudadanos and Spanish Constitutionalist Nationalism 
The PP and C’s are the staunchest and most unabashed defenders of the Constitution, 
the one-nation conception of Spain and the unity of the state. AP, the progenitor to the PP, 
was overtly hostile to the Constitution, namely the autonomy regime, but over time, and 
particularly with the replacement of the AP with the PP in 1989, the latter party not only 
came to accept the decentralised territorial model and was crucial to its subsequent 
development, but became staunch supporters of the Constitution. This was most clearly 
developed under the leadership of Aznar who sought to reinvent the Spanish nationalism 
tainted by the Francoist regime and restore prestige and pride in all things Spanish. In a 
similar vein, the governments of Mariano Rajoy (2011-2018) continued with the promotion 
of this constitutionally patriotic discourse, enlivened by the territorial crisis in Catalonia. 
Yet, while the language of constitutional patriotism is forcefully peddled by both the PP and 
C’s, it has been widely misinterpreted and instead has become a guise for the reinvention of 
an exclusive Spanish nationalism.109 C’s, in comparison to the PP, is a relatively new party 
but endorses a similar discourse on constitutional patriotism, or what may be termed 
constitutional nationalism, which includes a firm rejection of minority nationalist 
movements.  
Adopting the title of constitutional patriots has not altered the PP’s traditional support 
for the development of a Spanish nationalist project in which Spanish national identity, the 
Spanish language and aspects of Spanish culture are accentuated and prized over the 
minority nationalisms also found in the state (Colomer, 2017: 959). For the PP, respect for 
the Constitution entails complete loyalty to it and its principles, including the indivisibility 
of the state, and strict adherence to what is written as opposed to a more fluid conception of 
the spirit of its content. This, as discussed in Chapter Three, clashes with the liberal 
nationalist vision in which questioning the organisation of the state is not considered 
problematic (Kymlicka, 2001a: 39). The PP’s stance is most evident in the denial of a path 
to facilitate a referendum on secession in Catalonia. In his speech on the Catalan referendum 
and the proposed application of Article 155 in October 2017, Rajoy (2017) lambasted the 
Generalitat’s declaration of independence as a clear example of institutional disloyalty, 
described the October 1 referendum as ‘an exercise against democracy’ and accused the 
Generalitat of having ‘attacked our constitution…the rules and institutions of self-
                                                 
109 For more on the theory of constitutional patriotism, see Habermas (1996) and Mueller (2007).  
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government in Catalonia and their own Statute’. This continued a line of argumentation and 
strategy pursued by the Rajoy government which sought to deny any extant constitutional 
path for an independence referendum. For the PP, national sovereignty and the unity of Spain 
were, are and will remain, non-negotiable principles.  
For a long time, another non-negotiable principle for the PP was constitutional reform. 
The 2015 election manifesto described the State of Autonomies as ‘the best formula to 
articulate unity and diversity’ (PP, 2015: 141), and the party, according to one 
representative, ‘feels comfortable with the State of Autonomies in relation both to the 
decentralisation of competences and the decentralisation of spending’ (Interview with PP 
MP). In fact, a recurring feature of the Rajoy administration vis-à-vis the State of 
Autonomies and Catalan demands for more powers and recognition was to argue that in 
Spain ‘there was little more left to decentralise’ (Casado, quoted in Público 2017). Rajoy 
(2016), for example, posited ‘there is no country in the world with a level of political 
decentralisation like Spain’ and that Spain has ‘a higher [level] of political decentralisation 
of all federal states in the world’ (Rajoy 2014). As was discussed earlier in this chapter, the 
RAI index demonstrates this not to be the case, and while it is true that Catalonia enjoys the 
same level of autonomy as the constituent units of other federations, such as Argentina, 
Belgium and Brazil, it scored lower on the self-rule scale than other autonomous regions 
including the Australian and US states, the German Länder, Quebec, Scotland and the Swiss 
Cantons.  
In addition to pursuing the argument that enough has already been devolved to the 
ACs, the PP, has in the past, consistently rejected offers of constitutional change, including 
recognition of the plurinationalism of the state, enumeration of the ACs in the constitutional 
text and clarification of competences. On the fiscal model, the PP is ‘open to discussions’, 
but the party remains unconvinced by any reform proposal, specifically a special economic 
scheme for Catalonia (Interview with PP MP). Discussing constitutional reform in 2013, 
Rajoy rejected any rash reforms in reaction to growing support for independence in 
Catalonia: ‘I have the impression that to plan a reform of the Constitution in order to satisfy 
those that are not going to be satisfied with this reform would be a huge error’ (Manetto 
2013). PP representatives are thus sceptical of further decentralisation or constitutional 
reform, including the party’s newly elected leader who recently rejected territorial reform, 
bluntly stating that the PP would ‘reinforce our Constitution instead of splitting it open’ 
(Casado 2018). The PP’s intransigence towards constitutional and territorial reform, 
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however, will serve, as happened to the Conservatives in the UK and Scotland under 
Thatcher and Major, to further alienate the party from Catalan politics.  
Since the inception of C’s in 2006, the party has incessantly rejected the title ‘Spanish 
nationalist’ and in a similar vein to the PP, considers itself ‘constitutionally patriotic’ 
(Interview with C’s MP). C’s have religiously criticised the PP and PSOE for pandering to 
the demands of minority nationalists and intentionally ‘not doing things so that separatist 
politicians do not get angry’ (Rivera 2017b). Recently, for example, the party has attacked 
the plurinational vision of Spain promoted by the PSOE and to demonstrate their opposition, 
withdrew from the committee in Congress on territorial reform. C’s accused the PSOE of 
having an erroneously skewed and biased vision of Spain and the party leader, Albert Rivera, 
commented that his party believed in reforming the Constitution, but could not support ‘the 
invention of the nation of nations’ (La Vanguardia 2018). The election of a C’s government 
would put an end to this ‘politics of appeasement’ and as such put minority nationalists 
firmly in their place (Rivera 2017b).  
Despite rhetoric which has a markedly (Spanish) nationalist flavour, C’s seeks to 
encourage the vision that it is a ‘postnational party’ in which emphasis is placed on being 
patriotic and a commitment to the Constitution rather than any specific Spanish identity 
(Roldán 2017). Rivera, equally seeks to promote this idea of an inclusive, constitutionalist 
and postnationalist approach, albeit the party’s rhetoric oscillates between mononationalism 
and postnationalism. Emphasis is placed on the equal treatment of all citizens: ‘the solution 
to the problems of Spain are not about giving more privileges, but more equality’ (Rivera 
2017a). In this vein, C’s has religiously criticised the Basque and Navarre economic model, 
describing it as ‘a democratic anomaly’ and the unfair privileging of two ACs over others 
(Alberola 2017).  
C’s, unlike the PP, are much more emphatic in their support for constitutional reform, 
although this remains limited in the ambit of territorial politics. In 2015, the party published 
a document entitled Proposals for Democratic and Institutional Regeneration and while it 
advocated a number of reforms, including enumerating the ACs in the Constitution, 
clarifying competences, reform of the common fiscal regime and the replacement of the 
Senate with a Council of the Presidents of the Autonomous Communities, the document 
explained that any reform ‘must be done with upmost caution [and] political prudence’ 
(Ciudadanos, 2015: 3). The party advocates a number of changes that would affect Title 
VIII of the Constitution, but rejects the devolution of further powers or constitutional 
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recognition of the historic nationalities. Instead, and echoing claims by former PP PM Aznar, 
C’s believe ‘it is time to finalise the State of Autonomies’ (ibid: 8).  
The PP and C’s endorse a similar mononational vision of Spain in which symmetry is 
prized over asymmetry, and distinctiveness, while tolerated, is not something to be 
emphasised, particularly at the expense of the dominant nationalism of the state. Yet, as 
advocates of this dominant nationalism, the parties gain an advantage over other nationalist 
movements in the state, which in turn undermines any greater recognition of Spain’s internal 
diversity and further entrenches the antiquated, more restrictive and statist liberalism I 
approach. Both the PP and C’s continue to support the existence of the State of Autonomies 
and are, in principle, committed to celebrating Spain’s diversity, but this is limited to the 
cultural sphere: recognition of the existence of a nation other than the Spanish one is 
anathema to the PP and C’s’ conception of the state.  
 
5.5.2 PSOE and Podemos: Territorial Reform in the ‘Nation of Nations’ 
Unlike those parties endorsing a more right-wing/centre-right agenda, PSOE and 
Podemos are much more vociferous and enthusiastic about constitutional change, including 
an overhaul of the territorial model. Federalism has been a long-standing policy of PSOE, 
but the party has consistently struggled to make a case for such territorial remodelling, even 
when in power with majority governments. For Podemos, a federal, and at times, confederal 
vision has been at the heart of the party’s electoral agenda since it burst onto the political 
scene in early 2014. The party’s initial zeal for profound constitutional and territorial change 
has progressively shifted from radical support to break the 1978 constitutional pact to more 
muted support for constitutional change. Significant constitutional and territorial reform 
remains central to the Podemos plurinational vision of Spain, coupled with the party’s 
support for a ‘constituent process’ to ensure support for a new constitutional and territorial 
settlement is more bottom-up than top-down.  
While for the PSOE, and its Catalan counterpart, the PSC, federalist rhetoric has been 
a feature of both parties for several decades, the recent territorial crisis has increased interest 
and analysis in what the socialists’ proposals would entail. This has become even more 
important since the elevation of the PSOE to government in June 2018. Prior to this, and as 
was noted above, party leader Pedro Sánchez had already underlined the importance he 
attached to territorial reform in agreeing to support the application of Article 155 in return 
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for the establishment of a congressional committee to examine territorial change. After 
coming to power, the party’s positive rhetoric vis-à-vis territorial change has continued, 
peppered with critique of both the PP and Catalan governments for having escalated the 
territorial conflict. The PSOE, for instance, has criticised the former for failing to provide 
an alternative and more accommodating vision of Spain that would placate pro-
independence Catalans. In addition to this, much noise has been made as relates to the PP’s 
strategy of invoking the Constitution as a legal straitjacket that not only precludes secession, 
but discussions of the matter. The incumbent minister for territorial affairs, Meritxell Batet 
(2018), has made this abundantly clear, arguing: 
We will not hide behind the Constitution…on too many occasions in recent 
years, the Constitution has been presented only as a regulation that imposes 
prohibitions to act and it is much more than this. It is the regulation that permits 
different options and that even permits us to arrive at agreements that integrate 
the possible diverse political options instead of excluding all the options except 
one, that of the government of the day. 
 
This has also been the case for the PSC, which, in the December 2017 election, 
presented their leader, Miquel Iceta, as the reconciliatory candidate; an alternative between 
the ultra-conservatism of the PP and C’s and the radicalisation of the pro-independence 
parties. On the latter, the PSOE have also been very critical, not only because they 
‘contravened the Statute… [and] the Constitution’, but ‘promised things which they were 
aware they could not deliver’. In short, ‘they promised us independence, but lost us our self-
government’ (Interview with PSC MP 2). In contradistinction to the PP and C’s, however, 
the socialists are much more cognisant of the internal plurality of the Spanish state, including 
recognition of Catalonia as a nation. Socialist interviewees explicitly acknowledged 
Catalonia’s status as a nation and believed that both the PSC and PSOE had explicitly 
embraced the term to underline the parties’ recognition of the plurinational reality of the 
Spanish state. Such recognition, however, was qualified by the opinion that constituting a 
nation did not imply a right to decide, that is, hold an independence referendum (ibid). In 
the words of another representative, the PSC occupied a third way approach to the issue: 
‘we do not share the idea that every single nation has to form its own state or reach statehood 
but we neither share the idea that the state can only afford one nation within it’ (Interview 
with PSC MP 1).  
This premise was further underlined in a document examining the debate on the right 
to decide in Catalonia written by one of PSC’s MPs. Drawing upon other empirical cases 
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and the expertise and analysis of various constitutional experts, the document concludes that 
Catalonia has no right to secession, neither through remedial justifications nor a unilateral 
route (Pedret I Santos 2016). Threaded throughout the document, however, is a critique of 
the monist interpretation of the right to decide term, as well as the restrictive interpretation 
of sovereignty endorsed by parties such as the PP and C’s. In fact, drawing upon the case of 
Canada, specifically the 1998 Supreme Court Secession Reference, much is made of the 
importance of negotiations and acknowledgement of the opposing side, even if ‘this opinion 
implies breaking with [Spain’s] territorial integrity protected by Article 2 of the 
Constitution’ (ibid: 78). In consonance with a liberal nationalist position, the document 
concludes that while a referendum is neither ‘inconceivable’ nor ‘desirable’, it would be 
unfair, and indeed, undemocratic, to simply ignore any growing support for independence 
(ibid: 82).  
The PSOE have painted a clear picture of the type of reforms required in order to 
ensure the full federalisation of the Spanish state, including recognition of its 
plurinationalism, reform of the Senate to a ‘federal organ’, clarity of the distribution of 
competences and the decentralisation of judicial power (Fundació Rafael Campalans 2013). 
In the meantime, the incumbent minister for territorial policy has argued for other changes 
which need not affect the Constitution, including improved IGR in order to better sow the 
seeds of federal principles, including confidence, loyalty, reciprocity and solidarity (Batet 
2018). In addressing the congressional constitutional committee, Batet stressed the 
importance of redesigning IGR, particularly as a solution to foster dialogue between the 
Spanish and Catalan governments. Arguing for improved mechanisms for the participation 
of the ACs in state projects and decisions, the minister cited the reinforcement of already 
existing instruments such as sectoral conferences and the Conference of the Presidents: ‘We 
have to get over the traditional formal rigidity of the organs of cooperation…and work…so 
that sectoral conferences are not considered as isolated or even sporadic meetings, but as 
permanent structures’ (ibid). She continued, that the ‘Conference of the Presidents must be 
the cornerstone of the system of cooperation’, arguing that revalidating these IGR, ‘would 
build a general framework of intergovernmental confidence and loyalty which are 
fundamental in order to advance in the construction of a federal culture’ (ibid). The 
importance of these proposals was corroborated in interviews inasmuch as one PSC MP 
considered the ‘construction of mechanisms for the participation of the federated units in the 
decision-making of the state’ as ‘crucial’ (Interview with PSC MP 1). 
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Podemos share a number of similarities with PSOE in terms of territorial reform, 
although PSOE’s federal vision is much more detailed. One significant difference between 
the parties, however, is Podemos’ support for a referendum on Catalan independence. The 
party supports Catalonia’s continued membership of the Spanish state, albeit a reformed and 
overtly plurinational state, but has consistently supported the right of the Catalan people to 
decide their future via a referendum. The Catalan crisis has thus been framed by Podemos 
as an opportunity to initiate debate on significant territorial change. For the party’s leader, 
Pablo Iglesias (2017), ‘the crisis in Catalonia is the proof that it is necessary to think about 
new formulas in order to deal with the plurinationality of Spain’. Developing on this idea in 
a recently published book, entitled, Rethinking Plurinational Spain, Iglesias (2018: 28) 
writes, ‘what has happened in Catalonia for the last few years evidences the lack of political 
willingness from the state government to offer a democratic way out of the situation’. As 
such, the party, akin to the PSOE, have used the Catalan situation to refocus attention on its 
territorial plan, with emphasis on two components: recognition of plurinationality and a new 
federal or confederal model.  
Recognition that Spain is, in the words of the Podemos leader, ‘a country of countries’ 
has been a central component of the party’s territorial policy (ibid: 29). Iglesias (ibid) has 
explicitly acknowledged the existence of four nations in Spain - ‘the Spanish nation, the 
Catalan, the Basque and the Galician’ and has challenged those parties that espouse a 
mononational vision: ‘those who say that Spain is mononational have understood nothing 
from the history of the last two hundred years’. Instead, Podemos promotes a plurinational 
understanding of the state in which the nationhood of the historic nationalities is recognised 
in the Constitution and the internal diversity of the country is constitutionally protected. The 
aim of Podemos is, therefore: ‘to build a common project that constitutionally reflects the 
plurinationality of our country and which remains attractive so that the majority of the 
nations that make it up decide to stay’ (ibid: 28). While, however, a plurinational state is oft-
described as an ‘undebatable reality’ (Interview with Catalunya en Comú-Podem MP 1), 
since its inception, Podemos has argued that territorial reform must not be an elite-led 
process. Indeed, for this reason, the party refused to join the congressional commission 
established to examine the territorial model and instead opted to create its own ‘constituent 
process’, entitled ‘Connect Spain’ (Conectar España). This saw a number of high-profile 
party officials hold events in different cities throughout Spain to explain their envisioned 
territorial model and commitment to recognition of plurinationality.  
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Podemos are equally committed to moves towards a confederal or truly federal model 
(Iglesias, 2018: 35). In a similar vein to the PSOE, Podemos advocates constitutional reform 
in relation to the clarification of competences, the fiscal regime, the Senate and recognition 
of plurinationality. However, in advocating a confederal approach, Podemos go beyond the 
institutional parameters envisioned by the PSOE and seek to convince pro-independence 
Catalans that they can have the best of both worlds: a relatively independent status while 
sharing sovereignty with a hollowed out Spanish state. As was argued by one interviewee, 
‘it’s all about shared sovereignty. The independence movement want to share sovereignty 
with Europe but not with Spain’, thus, moves towards confederation, whereby the existence 
of the latter would be dependent upon its constituent governments, would represent a 
‘potential solution’ to the Catalan crisis (Interview with Catalunya en Comú-Podem MP 1). 
The territorial reform programmes presented by both the PSOE and Podemos seek to 
overcome what several interviewees described as the ‘emotional break’ or ‘psychological 
disconnection’ between pro-independence Catalans and the rest of Spain (Interviews with 
ERC and Catalunya en Comú-Podem MPs). Both parties have criticised the obdurate and 
unaccommodating positions of the PP and C’s, and in the spirit of Friedrich, endorse a 
flexible approach towards the Constitution. Some form of reform is on the agenda of the PP 
and C’s, but little concern is devoted to reconciling the diametrically opposed projects of the 
pro-independence Catalans and those who advocate timid change to the territorial status quo. 
For Podemos and PSOE, however, significant emphasis is placed on using the territorial 
crisis as an opportunity to recast the relationship between Catalonia and Spain and effect 
profound change that would substantially alter the territorial landscape of the Spanish state. 
Therein, however, lies the rub. Notwithstanding the positive endorsements of reform by 
those on the left, federalism remains a heavily contested project by the Spanish right as well 
as a marginalised option in Catalonia. The challenge for Podemos and the PSOE, then, is 
not merely to design change that will pass the cumbersome process to amend the 
Constitution, but moreover, and equally as important, demonstrate that their nice words and 
ideas can be translated into real change and political action.110  
                                                 
110 Sections 167 and 168 of the Spanish Constitution describe two mechanisms for constitutional reform. 
Article 167 requires the approval by a three fifths majority of both the Congress and Senate and if requested 
by one tenth of members of either house, a referendum. In the event that a total revision of the Constitution or 
a partial revision relating to specific articles is proposed, Article 168 stipulates that a two thirds majority in 
each chamber must pass any modification, followed by the immediate dissolution of the chambers and new 
elections. The newly elected chambers are then required to ratify the proposed amendment(s) as well as 
approve it, again with a two thirds majority which is ultimately subject to a referendum.  
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5.5.3  The Pro-Independence Parties: Between Pragmatism and 
Unilateralism  
As was discussed earlier in this chapter, the Catalan independence movement is a 
heterogeneous movement. It not only includes the support of a number of civil society 
organisations, many of which were spawned as a direct consequence of increasing support 
for the right to decide and independence, but also straddles the traditional left-right 
ideological axis. The issue with such a heterogeneous grouping, however, is that while the 
parties may share the same end goal – an independent Catalan republic – the means of 
achieving this unsurprisingly differ. As one interviewee noted, ‘the debate inside the 
independence parties’ is no longer about the merits of independence over the status quo or 
other territorial settlements, nor about the right to decide, but ‘about the way of creating an 
independent state’ (Interview with ERC MP 3).  
This section examines the strategies of four political parties JxCat and PDeCAT, ERC 
and CUP. From the analysis it is clear that the creation of an independent Catalan republic, 
as posit all parties, was voted for by citizens in the 2015 and 2017 elections and the 2017 
referendum, yet hitherto two opposing strategies have emerged. On the one hand are situated 
those politicians who believe that a strong and viable Catalan government able to lead 
negotiations with the state, and thus the abandonment of any unilateral avenues, is required 
to ensure the transition of Catalonia from an AC to an independent republic. On the opposing 
side, however, are a number of pro-independence supporters and politicians who advocate 
the maintenance of the independence push, including intensifying the conflict with the state 
through civil and institutional disobedience, the internationalisation of the conflict and 
support for a unilateral, rather than negotiated route to independence. While it is easy to 
place parties such as JxCat, PDeCAT and ERC in the former category, and the more radical 
CUP in the latter, the strategies pursued by each party are not necessarily contained to one 
side. Negotiations are often framed as the most desirable outcome, but no pro-independence 
party has completely discounted the unilateral option. 
Among the pro-independence parties, JxCat won most seats at the 2017 election and 
thus remain the main party that forms the incumbent Catalan government. Despite being one 
of the parties that approved the unilateral declaration of independence by President 
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Puigdemont in October 2017, the strategy remains ‘to find an agreed solution’ which would 
entail a state-approved referendum (Interview with JxCat MP 1). One representative 
described the party as having ‘no clear position’ but qualified this by noting it endorses ‘a 
position in favour of rupture, to break with the constitutional order of the time’ (Interview 
with JxCat MP 2). In this vein, the pro-independence results of the 2015 and 2017 elections 
and 2017 referendum, are considered by the party as a clear mandate to pursue independence 
and ‘build an independent Catalan state in the form of a republic’ (Interview with JxCat MP 
2). 
PDeCAT, JxCat’s sister party in Madrid, endorses an identical position. One 
interviewee, posited, that while the party continued to support the holding of an official 
referendum, which ‘would be a referendum with a choice between independence for 
Catalonia and an offer from Madrid’, the party had little faith that the central government 
would be able to muster an alternative as attractive as independence (Interview with 
PDeCAT MP 1). At the same time, however, there was general consensus amongst 
interviewees that, as was the case with JxCat, the most optimal solution was to deescalate 
tensions and seek agreement on an official referendum. One MP considers the unilateral 
pursuit of independence, ‘an obvious mistake’ and continues that while ‘the electoral results 
of the 27 September 2015 legitimised the [pro-independence] parliamentary majority to do 
many things…the majority in favour of independence was not sufficient to opt for a 
unilateral route’ (Interview with PDeCAT MP 2).  
A negotiated solution remains central to the strategy pursued by JxCat and PDeCAT, 
but scepticism abounds as to whether such an agreement, notwithstanding the change in 
Spanish government, could be reached. PDeCAT, for instance, rejected the PSOE’s call to 
form a congressional commission on territorial reform, and while the party has framed such 
reforms as desirable, it has simultaneously argued that the party’s concern is with the 
creation of new state structures in Catalonia not the reform of extant ones in Spain. 
Interviewees framed territorial reform as too little, too late and argued that previous attempts 
by the Generalitat to secure reform, including the 2006 Statute reform and the 2012 request 
for a new fiscal pact, had bolstered the conclusion that ‘it is easier to proclaim independence 
than get a new Statute or new financial arrangement’ (Interview with PDeCAT MP 1). For 
both JxCat and PDeCAT, the détente offered by the PSOE government, including the 
commitment to finding a political solution was welcomed, but the parties’ main aim is the 
construction of an independent Catalan republic.  
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ERC endorse a similar strategy in relation to JxCat and PDeCAT, with emphasis on 
finding ‘a democratic solution’ to the party’s support for an independent Catalan republic 
(ERC, 2018: 14). The party’s strategy is detailed in their publication, Ara, La República 
Catalana, in which it considers the 2017 referendum as ‘the founding moment of the Catalan 
Republic’ and commits the party to working towards a negotiated solution that would see 
Catalonia separate from Spain (ibid). Importantly, however, the party document makes clear 
that, while: 
Dialogue with the state is the preferred and desired option by Esquerra 
Republicana…if in the face of the persistent refusal of the Spanish government 
a self-determination referendum is not possible, we cannot reject a declaration of 
independence, in line with the conditions set out in the positive opinion of the 
International Court of Justice in the Hague of the 22 of July 2010, about the 
unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo (ibid: 34-35).  
 
Thus, while ERC is committed to building a Catalan republic in conjunction with 
support of the Spanish state, it is equally committed to pursuing other routes, including the 
less desired unilateral declaration of independence. Emboldened by the attitude and actions 
of the Spanish state, which includes the incarceration of the party’s leader and several MPs, 
some ERC members believe the time has come ‘to take a risk’ by continuing the pursuit of 
the unilateral route (Interview with ERC MP 3).  
On the prospect of potential constitutional reform, ERC has remained as dismissive as 
other pro-independence parties. It also refused to join the congressional committee on 
territorial reform and all interviewees agreed that constitutional reform was beyond the 
interest of the party. Interviewees posited several changes such as reform of Article Two, 
the inclusion of the right to decide as well as the creation of a ‘collective project’ in which 
all languages were official and all citizens felt a sense of belonging yet, this proposal, 
described by one interviewee as ‘being more like Switzerland’ was dismissed as being 
antithetical to the traditional Castile-dominated interpretation of Spain espoused by the main 
state-wide parties (Interview with ERC MP 1). Akin to one PDeCAT interviewee, an ERC 
member believed the pursuit of tangible and accommodative territorial reform in Spain was 
‘utopian’ and as such concluded:  
I think it is impossible for Spain to change…I always ask, what is more difficult, 
to build your own country with a process of secession or to transform the whole 
of Spain? You cannot transform the whole of Spain and what it means to be a 
Spaniard from Barcelona (Interview with ERC MP 3).  
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CUP, in line with ERC, also endorse a unilateral stance, but while for the latter this is 
considered a tool of last resort, CUP’s leader, Carles Riera has proclaimed it ‘the only way 
to make the republic a reality’ (Esteve 2017). The Party’s strategy paper passed at the May 
2018 national assembly, however, endorses a more muted approach, stipulating:  
In the absence of a state and an international community committed to the 
recognition of the right to self-determination, the construction of an independent 
republic can only be the product of the ability to justly bring the states and the 
international community to a negotiation and agreement on the exercise of self-
determination (CUP, 2018: 19).  
 
Yet, while for other pro-independence parties, emphasis is placed on a negotiated 
solution with the mutual respect of both sides, the CUP paper attests that the creation of an 
independent republic, ‘will only be the product of the combined and sustained exercise of a 
period of massive institutional disobedience supported by all possible institutions’ (ibid).  
Institutional and civil disobedience has been central to CUP’s independence strategy. 
The party has incessantly criticised JxCat and ERC, and their joint alliance JxSí, for pursuing 
what CUP has termed a ‘completely ineffective’ strategy of attempting to negotiate 
independence within ‘a legal framework designed to impede the exercise of self-
determination’ (Sallellas 2018). Moreover, CUP has vehemently criticised the two 
aforementioned parties for failing to adequately prepare Catalonia for a unilateral 
declaration of independence, which included, as promised by the JxSí government, the 
creation of state structures. In the words of one party official: 
It was a fantasy that we would have a democratically elected government capable 
of showing their flexibility in front of this massive popular movement… 
[and]…this took us to the farcical idea that we would be able to negotiate this 
rupture with Spain and then we find ourselves in the most recent situation where 
neither the government nor the structures of Catalonia were prepared for a 
unilateral declaration of independence (Interview with CUP MP).  
 
For CUP then, the strategy is to continue with the construction of an independent 
republic, including state structures to ensure not just political independence, but economic 
and fiscal sovereignty, too (ibid). CUP, similar to JxCat and ERC, have consistently 
denounced the inflexibility of the central state with regards to Catalan sovereignty and a 
referendum. In contrast with the other parties, however, it believes the only way to secure 
independence is through putting concerted and persistent pressure on the central government 
through mass civil and institutional disobedience.  
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A commitment to constructing an independent Catalan republic remains at the heart 
of the strategies pursued by Catalonia’s pro-independence parties. A negotiated pact is 
heralded as the ideal solution, but no pro-independence party has ruled out pursuing the 
unilateral route. CUP endorses a more radical approach towards independence, but while 
JxCat, PDeCAT and ERC are willing to negotiate with the central government, there has 
been very little backtracking in the long-term goal of Catalan independence. This is further 
compounded by the fact that a number of high-profile politicians remain in prison for their 
role in the organisation of the 2017 referendum.111 This legal predicament contrasts strongly 
with the evolving independence movement in Scotland and, depending on its outcome, will 
no doubt have significant ramifications for the future trajectory of the Catalan independence 
movement. As is the case in Scotland, support for independence has yet to remain steady 
above the required 50% mark. Hence, in Catalonia, the challenge for independence parties 
is not just to win the support of the Spanish authorities to hold a state-approved and legal 
referendum, but to convince a majority of Catalans to support the independence route. This, 
as recent events demonstrate, will be no mean feat.  
 
5.6 Forging a Coherent Model of Autonomy in Spain  
So far, this chapter has examined and analysed the evolution of historical demands for 
Catalan autonomy and the varying strategies employed by successive Spanish governments 
to respond to (or not) these demands. We have seen that, unlike in Scotland, only limited 
symbolic recognition has been afforded to Catalonia and while autonomy was granted as 
part of the country’s democratisation process and further powers have been conceded over 
time, an identifiable centralisation or symmetrisation strategy has been pursued by both 
conservative and socialist governments. It is a truism, as was discussed by various interview 
partners, that Catalonia has a significant level of autonomy, but attempts to further bolster 
Catalonia’s self-rule powers and the pursuit of special recognition has jarred with the 
mononational, symmetrised and territorial vision endorsed by Spain’s main political parties.  
Far from the pacted transition to democracy in the late 1970s, which despite being 
fraught with difficulties, was achieved through a period of consociational bargaining that 
sought to ensure the inclusion of a number of stakeholders in the design of a democratic and 
                                                 
111 In November 2018, the Spanish attorney general charged those incarcerated former ministers and senior 
officials with rebellion and misuse of public funds with carries a minimum sentence of up to 17 years in prison.  
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decentralised model, 40 years later a gulf has appeared between Spanish and Catalan elites. 
It is the objective of this section, therefore, to examine from both a normative and 
institutional viewpoint, some of the biggest issues and potential routes for reform vis-à-vis 
the Spanish territorial regime that would seek to not only ensure the stability and continued 
existence of the Spanish state, but, in line with the prerequisites of plurinational justice, 
would equally bolster the accommodation, empowerment and recognition of Catalonia as a 
minority nation within the Spanish state.  
 
5.6.1 The Normative Dimension 
The Spanish state has facilitated autonomy for Catalonia, as well as the other 16 ACs, 
but one of the biggest anomalies in the Spanish experience with decentralisation relates to 
the dominant mind-set of Spanish political elites, which lacks some of the principal 
attributes, such as self-discipline, self-restraint and sensitivity to minority nation demands, 
required of majority communities in plurinational systems (Burgess 2009). In contemporary 
Spain, there is a relatively precarious federal spirit, evident in the absence of a commitment 
from both Catalan and Spanish elites to federal values and principles, as well as an almost 
non-existent plurinational culture, in which the existence of other nations is not merely 
tolerated – which in itself is insufficient – but wholly denied. Acknowledging the lack of 
federal culture in Spain, one interviewee posited, ‘it is not a lie to say that we have a good 
level of decentralisation, but, I think we lack a good level of federalisation’ (Interview with 
PSC MP 1). A similar point was reiterated by another PSC MP who believed that while ‘at 
the level of the Spanish government much more could be done to recognise that Spain is 
plurinational’, reform was not merely to be institutional nor constitutional, but required a 
change in culture and mind-set (Interview with PSC MP 2).  
As already discussed when examining the limitations of decentralisation, one of the 
most frequent complaints as relates to the relationship between Catalonia and Spain is the 
lack of recognition, and thus the perceived lack of respect from Spanish quarters, regarding 
Catalan culture, language and claims to nationhood. Despite the Constitution’s implicit 
recognition of Catalonia’s right to autonomy, ‘Spain has never treated Catalonia as a 
political subject to the extent that Catalan citizens, just because they are citizens of 
Catalonia, feel like second-class citizens inside what is the Spanish state’ (Interview with 
ERC MP 1). This lack of respect for Catalonia as a political entity is not necessarily rooted 
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in any denial of the existence of Catalonia as a self-governing AC, but the refusal of Spanish 
elites to treat Catalonia as an equal partner in the decentralised system.  
In Catalonia, it is clear that there is still significant appetite for better recognition of 
Catalonia as a distinct nation within Spain, but significant emphasis is placed on recognising 
Catalonia as an equal partner in the state. Several interviewees described the extant 
relationship between the Spanish state and Catalonia as ‘imperialistic’ (Interview with CUP 
MP) and ‘colonial’ - ‘the Spanish state has always wanted to be superior to the Catalan 
nation and the Catalan government’ (Interview with ERC MP 2). This hierarchical tendency 
clashes with the equal partnership theory endorsed by liberal nationalists and proponents of 
multinational federalism, oft-considered a prerequisite to ensure the loyalty of minority 
nations towards state institutions and thus the stability and integrity of the state (Gagnon 
2014). The Spanish state, in contrast, considers itself to be the dominant authority, but it is 
clear that this narrow-minded interpretation of power and control must be substantially 
changed if Spain wishes Catalonia to remain an integral component of the Spanish state: 
‘there has to be a profound mental change. They have to realise that diversity is not a 
problem’ (Interview with ERC MP 1).   
As well as a lack of recognition as an equal partner, the lack of respect accorded to 
Catalonia vis-à-vis its own national language and culture is a further impediment in the 
development of a plurinational culture in Spain. Spain is indisputably a pluricultural and 
plurilingual country, and while there seems to be a tacit acceptance of this, even amongst 
the most Spanish nationalist parties, much more needs to be done to demonstrate that the 
central state ‘understands that diversity is a good thing’ (Interview with C’s MP). As we 
have already seen, successive Spanish governments have consistently encroached upon 
Catalan competences, particularly in the area of education and language. For one ERC 
interviewee, Spain embodies ‘an inflexible model of coexistence’ in which, irrespective of 
rhetoric or constitutional provisions, there is a lack of respect accorded to Catalan 
distinctiveness and thus ‘we feel like we cannot be ourselves’ (Interview with ERC Senator). 
‘Catalanism’, attested another interviewee: 
Has always had a model of Spain… [and] it is not just saying we want to be an 
independent country. We wanted to share the same state … but what we 
understand, that is, what a Catalan understands to be Spain, there is no Spaniard 
that understands this Spain. So, when we are talking about Spain [and Catalonia], 
we are talking about two different countries…the model that political Catalanism 
has always defended is, I want to be a citizen of Spain, but at the same time I am 
Catalan. It is my way of being Spaniard (Interview with ERC MP 3).  
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As is the case in other minority nations, there is an inherent clash between the 
plurinational vision of Spain endorsed by Catalonia and the mononational vision of the state 
promoted by Spanish elites. The mononational vision of Spain, however, while it seeks to 
promote an inclusive identity, inherently excludes those Catalans that endorse a different 
and competing vision. Indeed, as argued by Kymlicka (2001a: 105), opposition from the 
majority group to treating national minorities differently with regards to an asymmetric 
distribution of powers or, as is the case here, recognition of a distinct national identity, ‘is 
rooted in a latent ethnocentrism – i.e. a refusal to recognise that the minority has a distinct 
national identity that is worthy of respect.’ It is fair to conclude that this is the case in Spain.  
Drawing upon the example of Switzerland as a model of federal stability with a 
collective project that recognises its plurilingual and pluricultural diversity, one interviewee 
posited, ‘if it was like this in Spain, lots of independentists would not be independentists’ 
(Interview with ERC MP 1). In contrast to Switzerland, the tradition of Spanish political 
culture has not sought to promote an inclusive project, but instead has outright rejected or 
as was the case in the late 1970s, only tacitly acknowledged difference. This clearly 
demonstrates the need for change in the model of accommodation not only to ensure that 
minorities are not misrecognised simply because they belong to a minority, but more 
importantly to ensure and particularly in the case of Catalonia, to repair the bonds of trust 
that have been continuously eroded over a number of years. In Spain, however, a monist and 
crudely majoritarian approach has been prized over the accommodation and recognition of 
minority nations.  
Secessionism is a politically charged and at times controversial issue in plurinational 
states, but, as has been argued elsewhere, plurinational states seem destined ‘to live in the 
shadow of secession’ (Keil and Anderson, 2018: 96). In Spain, there is no constitutional path 
to facilitate the secession of an AC, but in contradistinction with other states such as Canada 
and the UK that have sought to work with sub-state governments to hold a referendum on 
independence, such calls for dialogue and negotiation in Spain have been met with a wall of 
silence, denial and ultimately confrontation. The PP and C’s are of similar persuasion on 
this issue believing that discussions on independence cannot take place ‘because it is not 
foreseen in the constitutional order to have a self-determination referendum’ (Interview with 
PP MP). Yet, in democratic plurinational states, seeking the de-legitimisation of a 
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secessionist project through means other than dialogue and negotiation are challenging and 
problematic, particularly given the presumable aim of the majority community is to achieve 
the loyalty and allegiance of the minority community to ensure the maintenance of the 
territorial integrity of the state. Kymlicka (2001a: 118) acknowledges the perverseness of 
this issue: ‘too often we have adopted the wrong standard for measuring unity and 
allegiance. We have defined unity and loyalty as the elimination of the very idea of 
secession. This is not a reasonable or realistic standard for any multinational state.’  
In Spain, the use of the Constitution by the Rajoy administration as a legal straitjacket 
to outright reject discussion on secession ultimately posed a serious threat to the stability 
and unity of the Spanish state, as much as, for instance, those advocating Catalan 
independence. Dismissal of the claims of minority nations, whether they question the unity 
of the state or not, undermines the importance of federal principles such as mutual respect 
and tolerance and particularly in the case of Spain has served to further erode the already 
tenuous bonds of trust between the Catalan and Spanish governments. Dealing with 
intractable issues such as secession, necessitates respect, tolerance and good-faith 
negotiations, as well as frank and honest dialogue. In this vein, majority communities must 
move beyond their narrow perceptions and engage with minority communities, in what Tully 
(1995: 24) terms ‘an unending constitutional dialogue, or multilogue, of mutual 
recognition’.  
Yet, while it is clear that ‘majority nations in multinational federations have a moral 
responsibility to keep alive the federal spirit’, minority nations must equally share the burden 
(Burgess, 2009: 179). In Catalonia in recent years, there has been a significant breakdown 
of relations between the Spanish and Catalan governments, but while it is incumbent upon 
the Spanish government to ensure the evolution and development of a plurinational and 
federal spirit, Catalonia must also play its part. There is no doubt that elements of the federal 
spirit exist in Spain and have played a prominent role in the historical relationship between 
Catalonia and the Spanish state, embodied, for example, in the Catalan tradition of pactism. 
Furthermore, analysis of the 2006 reform of the Catalan Statute clearly reveals an explicit 
commitment to federal principles, evident for instance in the strengthening of IGR between 
the different orders of government. Nonetheless, while for many the debacle over Statute 
reform constituted a moment of reflection vis-à-vis Catalonia’s place within Spain, for 
others, namely anti-independence supporters, it was further evidence of Catalonia being 
‘selfish and lacking in solidarity’ (Interview with PP MP).  
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A consistent grievance with regards to Catalonia’s place within Spain relates to fiscal 
matters and in recent years has increased support amongst Catalans for a new fiscal model, 
as promoted by CiU from 2010. The Rajoy administration consistently rejected fiscal 
autonomy for Catalonia. Amongst governmental and other Spanish nationalist elites, as well 
as the mainstream Spanish media, the lack of perceived economic solidarity from Catalonia, 
is often framed as a wealthy but selfish Catalonia, averse to inter-territorial fiscal solidarity 
(Dowling 2017). This, combined with a perceived disloyalty towards Spanish institutions 
and a lack of trust that Catalonia would continue to contribute to state coffers, rendered 
impossible the possibility of granting fiscal reform to Catalonia. In the words of a PP 
representative: 
The risk is having an independence movement in government. The fact that they 
could collect all taxes could mean that at one point in time they could decide to 
stop contributing to the expenses of the state, which is what they have tried to do 
now. The proposition of the independence movement and the unilateral plan was 
to have all the powers to collect and then to say to Spain we will not pay anything 
to the state. Therefore, for this reason, there have always been reservations about 
ceding or even debating the collection of state taxes by Catalonia. These were 
fears, but over time these have been demonstrated to have been justified and 
justify why we have not done this to the present day (Interview with PP MP).  
 
Perceived disloyalty from the Catalan government and parliament towards Spanish 
institutions was also discussed in detail with regards to IGR. It has already been noted that 
Catalonia, much like other minority nations, prefers bilateral dealings with the central 
government as opposed to multilateral forums in which Catalonia is  treated as ‘just another 
AC’ (Interview with Catalunya en Comú-Podem MP 1). However, while noting that it was 
important for the Spanish government ‘to recognise the singularity of Catalonia both at a 
symbolic and institutional level’ one interviewee argued that the Generalitat’s 
dismissiveness of multilateral IGR clashed with the ‘instruments for this in our own Statute’ 
(Interview with Catalunya en Comú-Podem MP 2). This lack of institutional loyalty, for 
some a necessary measure to force change so that Spain ‘accepts us as a political subject’ 
(Interview with ERC MP 1), stems from, but at the same time, reinforces the lack of trust 
between Catalonia and the Spanish state. In this vein, it is incumbent on both sides to 
facilitate, at the very least, a functioning political relationship. 
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5.6.2 The Empirical and Institutional Dimension 
On a normative level, I have discussed the importance of the development of a 
plurinational culture and treating minority nations as equal partners in the federal political 
system. This is also as true in the institutional design of the system, including in the 
devolution of powers, but relates as much to equity as it does to equality.  
As has already been noted, the Spanish experience of political decentralisation is 
characterised by an almost incessant strategy of symmetrisation that has undermined the 
autonomy granted to ACs, particularly the historic nationalities. Strong unionist parties 
influenced by their territorial approach to autonomy, that is the American model of 
federalism, advocate a symmetrical approach, perceiving asymmetry as an unjust privilege 
for certain minorities (C’s here is a case in point). This notion, however, has been challenged 
by Kymlicka (2001a: 105), who asserts that hesitance or failure to grant asymmetry to 
‘nationality-based units’ over ‘regional units’ rooted in justifications of equality are wrong: 
‘equality for individual citizens does not require equal powers for federal units.’ Kymlicka 
(ibid), further develops this point arguing that, according special status to a region, either in 
the constitution or through the asymmetrical devolution of powers, is an important step in 
the fulfilment of plurinational justice ‘since it ensures that the national identity of minorities 
receives the same concern and respect as the majority nation.’ The reform of the Catalan 
Statute sought to limit the ability of the central government to encroach upon the 
autonomous policy spheres of Catalonia through Basic Laws, but its attempt to disentangle 
competences and thus create a typology of competence jurisdiction was ultimately rejected 
by the TC. While asymmetry was an important principle in the development of Spain as a 
decentralised and democratic polity, Spain’s most nationalist parties frame it as a potential 
threat to the continuation of Spain in its current form.  
The discussion of multinational federalism in Chapter Three made clear that 
asymmetry is an integral component to ensure the inclusion of minority nations as 
stakeholders in the political system as well as acknowledging their status as more than 
regions in the system. Gagnon (2001: 321-222), for instance, considers asymmetry an 
important tool for a number of reasons, including, to ensure ‘better protection of a 
community defined by language and culture’, to fulfil the requirements of a ‘politics of 
recognition’ and finally, as a tool of equality and equitable treatment, which relates to 
‘equality of outcome rather than for identical treatment.’ In Spain, however, as has been the 
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case in Canada and Quebec, the majority community has afforded a lack of concern towards 
the particular needs of minority nations. This, however, as noted above, rather than 
cementing the equality of treatment of all individuals, in effect harms those who identify 
with a minority community. In Spain, thus, there is a necessity to move beyond the 
perception of asymmetry as a privilege and ensure a territorial model and asymmetrical 
distribution of powers that empowers minority nations inasmuch as secession from the host 
state is rendered futile. The Spanish experience vis-à-vis asymmetry and minority nations 
has shown that attempts to tamper with the distribution of competences, including the 
encroachment of central government on AC policy spheres, as well as recentralising 
measures, have not solely undermined recognition of Catalonia or impeded its development 
vis-à-vis equality and equity, but moreover, and more worryingly, has itself contributed to 
the instability of the state. In discussing the importance of asymmetry for Quebec, Gagnon 
(ibid: 337) concludes, ‘if Quebec is to remain in a political partnership with the Rest of 
Canada in the twenty-first century, it is clear that the option of ignoring the concept of 
asymmetrical federalism simply does not exist.’ The same stands true for Spain.  
As was pointed out by one interviewee, granting powers to ‘a political community that 
feels a common identity and a [sense of] nationhood’ is an important move in a plurinational 
system, but this is ‘merely the starting set’ that requires an almost permanent conversation 
over which powers should efficiently remain at which level (Interview with PSC MP 1). 
Powers, however, do not mean much when the minority nation does not feel adequately 
recognised by the majority community: ‘you cannot address issues of recognition only by 
giving more powers, particularly if the starting set is already granted’ (ibid). Indeed, this 
seems to be the case in Catalonia inasmuch as grievances vis-à-vis the Catalan relationship 
with Spain is not necessarily focused on powers, as for instance is the case in Scotland, but 
the lack of genuine recognition afforded to Catalonia within the Spanish state: ‘the problem 
is not so much about political decentralisation but the recognition of plurinationalism and 
the recognition of the existence of different nations with the right to self-government and to 
be political entities’ (Interview with PDeCAT MP 2).  
To ensure the stability and integrity of a plurinational state, it is often taken for granted 
that minority nations must become stakeholders in the state and participate, through a 
number of devices, in the decision-making powers of the central state. In Spain, as I have 
discussed, there are few opportunities for effective shared rule and while IGR are hailed as 
important mechanisms for such cooperation, there is no guarantee nor legal requirement for 
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the central government to take into consideration the viewpoints of the ACs. As a member 
of the Spanish state, Catalonia remains a structural minority, thus it is only logical that a 
conscious effort on the part of the central government must be made to ensure Catalan 
influence and participation in state decisions. This has already been underlined as a crucial 
component by the PSOE’s incumbent minister for territorial policy and was enthusiastically 
supported by PSC interviewees who believed the inclusion of Catalonia ‘in building the will 
of the state’, was a necessary component in advancing the existing territorial model 
(Interview with PSC MP 1). Drawing upon other plurinational federations, several 
interviewees suggested that Spain could learn lessons from Canada and Quebec, namely ‘the 
acceptance of asymmetry’ (Interview with PDeCAT MP 1) as well as guaranteed respect for 
minority languages:  
A French speaking citizen of Canada can address their institutions in French even 
if it is not in Quebec, but it is necessary? Maybe it is not a primary need, but it is 
necessary if you want French-speaking citizens of Canada to believe that Canada 
is the state of [English and] French speaking people. I’m talking about these 
kinds of policies…it is possible in Spain and we can imagine these policies that 
would make Catalan people feel recognised in a state like ours [Spain] (Interview 
with PSC MP 1). 
 
The Canadian experience with opt-out clauses was also mooted as a potential device 
that would, as in the case of Quebec, emphasise the asymmetrical principle considered 
necessary in plurinational federal systems, but equally ensuring some sort of differentiated 
status for Catalonia (Interview with PDeCAT MP 1). This, for instance, would be a welcome 
mechanism in the ambit of education given the increasing intensity of complaints that have 
been amassed over the years as a result of central government encroachment in this policy 
jurisdiction. 
Another important tool in ensuring that minority nations become stakeholders in the 
state is through the institutionalisation of a territorially representative second chamber. The 
Spanish Senate, predominantly organised along provincial rather than AC lines, has in recent 
years sought to entrench its role as a territorial chamber, namely in advancements to grant a 
role for the ACs in the nomination of judges for the TC. Nevertheless, as was discussed 
earlier, this process can be overruled by party political senators in the event that an AC-
proposed judge does not secure the required support.  
The Senate, despite its nominal title as a ‘territorial chamber’ plays a limited role in 
representing the ACs and thus also requires reform to ensure the accommodation, 
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recognition and empowerment of Catalonia within the Spanish state. Much like reform of 
the House of Lords in the UK, Senate reform has been mooted by several political actors 
over the years, but as a consequence of the divergent positions of different political actors, 
as well as lack of consensus and lukewarm support from both state-wide and AC-specific 
minority parties, little progress has been made, leading one scholar to term Senate reform 
‘mission impossible’ (Roller 2002). Among interviewees, there was general consensus that 
the chamber should be reformed, but enthusiasm for reform was rather muted, save for 
Catalunya en Comú-Podem representatives: ‘A plurinational state has to have a plurinational 
territorially representative chamber’ (Interview with Catalunya en Comú-Podem MP 1). In 
the words of another representative: 
The senate should be a real territorially representative chamber. Right now, it is 
not. It does not make sense as it is at the moment to have Senators elected by 
provinces, there should be autonomic Senators. Here, another vision would be 
that they would be chosen by the [autonomous] parliaments or the governments 
and that the Senate has the specific function to be a true second chamber and act 
like a territorially representative chamber (Interview with Catalunya en Comú-
Podem MP 2).     
 
For pro-independence representatives, Senate reform was, unsurprisingly, not high on 
their agenda. On the one hand, this relates to the priority of independence rather than 
reforming the Spanish state, but on the other, is rooted in the fear that Senate reform would 
not necessarily benefit Catalonia and its preference for bilateralism: ‘we are scared of reform 
because we think it would be a step backwards’ (Interview with PDeCAT MP 1). 
Representatives support Senate reform on the condition that Catalonia’s preference for 
bilateral relations is not replaced by a multilateral forum in which its voice is the same as, 
or drowned out, by other ACs.   
In this vein, other institutional mechanisms such as minority vetoes or double majority 
rules may serve as useful tools that would empower minority nations while concomitantly 
ensuring them a stake in the interests of the state. Veto powers for the historic nationalities 
were mooted in the 1998 Declaration of Barcelona and already exist in the Spanish system 
with regards to the Basque economic model and its five-yearly quota laws concerning the 
Basque contribution to the Spanish state.112 C’s, as discussed earlier, contest the Basque 
                                                 
112 The negotiations involved in the renewal of the agreement necessitate mutual agreement between both the 
Basque and Spanish governments and in essence ‘gives both Spanish and Basque delegations equal veto 
power’ and reinforces the ‘bilateral relationship between equals’ sought by the Basque government (Gray, 
2016: 126). 
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economic model believing it to privilege the Basque Country over other ACs and consider 
deepening asymmetry as inhibiting the equal status of all ACs. Contrary to this opinion, 
there is reason to argue that rather than putting the Catalans in a position to dominate the 
Spanish majority, veto powers or double majority rules, could conversely be seen as putting 
the Catalans on a more equal footing.113                                                                                                           
Judicial litigation has become a central feature of the development of the Spanish 
experience with autonomy and while it is not uncommon for the contours of a decentralised 
system to be shaped by the jurisprudence of constitutional judges, in Spain a number of 
problems abound concerning the nomination of judges and thus the separation of powers 
within the democratic system. As was previously discussed, the nomination process for 
judges to the Spanish TC is dominated by the Spanish Parliament and thus results in the 
politicisation of the judiciary insofar as judges are proposed by political parties not so much 
for their professional competency but rather their ideological leaning. Indeed, for several 
interviewees, the lack of independence and impartiality of the Spanish judiciary stems from 
the Franco dictatorship and thus represented Spain’s ‘inconclusive’ (Interview with 
Catalunya en Comú-Podem MP 2) or ‘imperfect’ (Interview with CUP MP) transition 
whereby there was no proper rupture, ‘elites passed from the dictatorship and adopted the 
label “democrat”, but they were the same people, judicial, police and political elites’ 
(Interview with ERC MP 1). Although, it is easy to dismiss such complaints as a skewed 
party-political position, as for example, was done by a PP representative, the Council of 
Europe (2018) has repeatedly emphasised that the politicised nomination process of Spanish 
judges undermines their independence and impartiality.  
There was general consensus amongst interviewees, save the PP, that reform was 
required of the nomination process of judges, not just for the TC, but the entire Spanish 
judiciary. In discussions about the perception and role of the TC, one interviewee noted, 
‘there is no guarantee a Catalan judge will sit on it’ and thus urged reform in relation to 
including Catalonia, as one of the historic communities of Spain, in the nomination process 
(Interview with PDeCAT MP 1). A similar point was made by a PSC representative who 
considered the judiciary, ‘the less federalised aspect of Spain’ and thus believed that ACs 
should be given a concrete role ‘in the election of several high-ranking public servants’, such 
as constitutional judges (Interview with PSC MP 1). Such proposals, which would see 
                                                 
113 This, for example, is the argument used to defend Quebec’s demand for a special veto power (see Kymlicka, 
2014: 34).  
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Catalonia empowered to nominate or even appoint constitutional judges, would result in a 
more accommodative and empowering autonomy model.  
Some of the institutional arrangements detailed above have a markedly consociational 
flavour. As discussed in Chapter Three, consociationalism, prescribed and mooted as a tool 
to achieve conflict management and empower minorities, broadly entails four specific 
arrangements: coalition government, territorial autonomy, proportionality and minority 
vetoes. Save autonomy, Spain has not institutionalised these consociational arrangements, 
but, in light of recent events, moves towards a consociational model may help resolve some 
of the current and most pressing tensions.  
Spain’s transition to democracy, as well as the initial development of the territorial 
system, which necessitated bilateral negotiations between ACs and the central government, 
chimed with the consociational idea. In order to garner consensus and generate support for 
the democratisation process, political elites were involved in bilateral and multilateral 
negotiations, to the extent that, ‘the consensual agreement made explicit in the 1978 
Constitution can be interpreted as an unwritten pledge to extend the procedures of political 
dialogue and consociationalism as guiding principles for future developments of internal 
accommodation’ (Moreno, 2007: 88). As a majoritarian democracy, Spain has travelled far 
from some aspects of the consociational approach. As Swenden (2006: 262) notes, ‘the 
Spanish centre lacks any consociational features. Although the regions have gained 
substantial self-rule, the composition of the national executive, the Senate, Constitutional 
Court and civil service does not systematically protect the interests of the historic 
communities, let alone of all the 17 regions’ [emphasis in original]. In periods of minority 
government, however, which as shown in table four has been a familiar characteristic of 
Spanish politics, arrangements have been made between Spanish and minority nationalist 
parties, necessitating periods of continuous political dialogue, negotiation, bargaining and 
compromise. Consociational thinking and practices work to temper majoritarian democracy 
and as such make it more federal and thus accommodative of minority demands. Supporting 
minority governments in Spain has worked well for Catalonia in terms of the devolution 
legislative competences and increased fiscal powers, and for one interviewee ‘ensured a 
good relationship…[between Catalonia and Spain]…because it worked well for Catalonia, 
but hasn’t been bad for Spain either’ (Interview with PSC MP 2).  
The practice of decentralisation in Spain, which has an inherently majoritarian flavour, 
has undermined the consensus-driven approach taken during the transition, and, more 
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importantly, poses a threat to the future stability of the Spanish state. Minority nations and 
their secessionist projects are often blamed for the instability of states, but, as this chapter 
has shown, it is often the majoritarian thinking and anti-federalist practices that endanger 
the continuation of the state. The consociational model purports to be a ‘kinder, gentler’ 
form of democracy, and while the theory is not without its detractors, recent events in the 
relationship between Catalonia and Spain demonstrate a need for self-discipline on both 
sides, but also increased concern for consensus-based decision making at the Spanish level 
(Lijphart, 2012: 306). In plurinational states, consociational techniques are necessary to 
facilitate consensus and ‘to counter and temper the unitary thrust of democracy and make it 
more “federal”’ (Forsyth, 2007: 156). Spain’s central institutions, as well as the normative 
thinking behind them, are more majoritarian than consociational, yet consociational 
practices are not entirely alien to Spanish politics. More, however, must be done to increase 
the voice of Catalonia in state institutions that would not only ensure better recognition and 
empowerment of Catalonia, but would relieve tensions from some of the existing inbuilt 
pressures and provide mechanisms to manage some of the potential tensions between the 
devolved institutions and the central administration.  
 
5.7  Concluding Reflections 
This chapter has examined the development of territorial politics in Spain and 
Catalonia, paying particular attention to the further autonomy and secessionist demands of 
successive Catalan governments and how these have been managed by the Spanish 
government. Taking this analysis into consideration, a number of observations as relates to 
the Catalan and Spanish experience of autonomy, plurinationalism and secessionism can be 
made.   
First, the Spanish model of autonomy, despite some of the identified limitations, has 
served Spain, Catalonia as well as the other 16 ACs well in a number of areas: facilitating 
the entrenchment of a liberal democratic system and enabling the devolution of a significant 
chunk of public policy. In spite of the exaggerations of PP representatives who describe 
Catalonia as one of the most decentralised sub-state territories in the world, it is clear that 
Catalonia has control over a rather significant portion of public policy. To this end, Catalonia 
was not only central to the development of the Spanish autonomy system, but has, 
incrementally, become a very powerful and autonomous sub-state entity.  
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Second, despite the benefits of the State of Autonomies there are a number of 
limitations which undermine the model of autonomy institutionalised in Spain. The most 
pressing drawback relates to the centralising tendency of successive Spanish governments 
betrayed in both rhetoric and action which have included identifiable symmetrisation 
processes designed to dilute the claims of the historic nationalities. Not only does this go 
against the constitutional order of 1978 but lends credence to complaints that the 
accommodation of minority nations’ self-determination aspirations is not possible within 
the extant autonomy framework. This is made worse by the lack of sensitivity towards the 
plurinational nature of the Spanish state which is denied by those political parties associated 
with the centre-right, such as the PP and C’s. In addition to these limitations, the reliance on 
litigation as opposed to seeking negotiated and political solutions and compromises to 
demands for further autonomy or secession are a cause for concern in a plurinational 
democratic setting. In fact, while the Spanish government’s recourse to the courts under 
Rajoy was perceived as the best strategy to inhibit the potential secession of Catalonia and 
thus keep the state together, it has further soured centre-periphery relations and 
paradoxically poses a greater challenge to maintaining the extant borders of the Spanish 
state.  
Third, in a similar fashion to Scotland, the future territorial layout of Catalonia and 
Spain can be broadly defined in three potential scenarios: recentralisation, reformulation and 
disintegration. From the analysis discussed above, no political party overtly advocates a 
recentralisation agenda, but the re-election of the PP or the election of a C’s government 
would seriously challenge the existing autonomy model, not discounting the threat of 
recentralisation. The PSOE and Podemos are the two parties which most strongly advocate 
territorial reform, albeit this differs in relation to managing Catalan demands for a 
referendum on secession. Both parties propose the federalisation of the Spanish state, but, 
as a result of numerous hurdles, including the lack of consensus among politicians and the 
public alike on federalism, as well as the cumbersome process of constitutional change, it is 
unlikely that such radical change will be implemented any time soon.  
Independence remains the constitutional preference of the incumbent Catalan 
government as well as a number of political parties, civil society organisations and a 
significant proportion of the Catalan population itself. Pro-independence parties welcomed 
the change of government in June 2018, but while under the PSOE meetings have resumed 
between the Catalan and Spanish governments and the PSOE are much more open to 
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territorial reform than the PP, pro-independence parties, at least in the short term, have no 
intention of changing their constitutional course.  
Finally, the Spanish experience with autonomy underlines the need for more 
innovative thinking with regards to accommodating, empowering and recognising minority 
nations. As in the case of Scotland and the UK, this must involve changes both in rhetoric 
and mind-set as well as institutional developments that are designed to not merely contain 
further demands but create an environment in which minority nations can flourish. In 
Catalonia, this is fundamental to ensure opportunities to rebuild trust and create a much more 
hospitable environment for both minority and majority communities. Hence, an important 
reform in Spain is not related to any tangible institution or mechanism, but the way the state 
is viewed and understood by political elites. At an institutional level, it is clear that Catalans 
support a deepening of the autonomy model, but while this may result in the devolution of 
further powers, equally important is a commitment to asymmetry, considered a necessary 
condition for the successful survival of minority nations and their plurinational hosts. 
Furthermore, change must also be effected with regards to shared rule mechanisms, 
particularly the development of more efficient mechanisms that would ensure the inclusion 
of ACs in central government decision-making processes. In this regard consociationalism 
offers important lessons for Spain. Such a move, given recent events in Catalonia, may seem 
way beyond current thinking, but political elites should be aware that steps towards a more 
accommodative, imaginative and innovative model are necessary if the Spanish state is to 
continue to hold together, even in the short term.  
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6. Chapter Six: Comparative Discussion 
6.1 Introduction  
The previous chapters analysed the ways in which accommodation strategies have 
been pursued by successive Spanish and UK governments, the merits and limits of these 
approaches, the potential scenarios for the future terrain of each case and, in line with the 
theoretical framework set out in Chapter Three, what could be done to offset the limitations 
of extant autonomy regimes.  
This penultimate chapter pulls together the findings from the preceding data chapters, 
drawing attention to some of the similarities and differences between both cases and the 
approaches employed by state governments to manage the evolving demands of the 
nationalist and independence movements in Scotland and Catalonia. Taking into account the 
limitations of the UK and Spanish autonomy models, I sketch a thematic analysis of the 
main themes that emerged from the analysis and illuminate some of the most important 
elements required in the crafting of a more coherent and accommodative model of 
autonomy. The chapter concludes with a comparison of the three potential scenarios that 
look set to characterise the territorial future of both the UK and Spain.  
 
6.2 Comparing Strategies for Accommodation  
As discussed in Chapter Two, there are a number of institutional responses a state may 
take in order to accommodate plurinationalism within their borders. The UK and Spain have 
taken similar and distinct approaches to these various institutional repertoires. Below, I 
analyse the experience of the three most important elements of the territorial strategies 
employed by the UK and Spanish governments: symbolic recognition, self-rule and shared 
rule (see table six).  
 
6.2.1 Symbolic Recognition 
Symbolic recognition is an important component of accommodation strategies for sub-
state groups in a plurinational state (Kymlicka 2001a; Norman 2006; Swenden 2013). Such 
224 
 
recognition may take the shape of the recognition of nationhood for minority nations, the 
acknowledgement of the plurinational character of the state in its constitution as well as in 
other state symbols such as flags and anthems. Recognition of nationhood for minority 
nations, for instance, is an important symbolic gesture that may in turn further strengthen 
the bonds that bind a state together. But, so too is recognition of the state’s plurinationality. 
This, for example, underlines the willingness of the state to accommodate its internal 
diversity, protect its national minorities and ensure the continued existence of the state 
(Keating, 2001: 107).  
The relative ease with which the UK has recognised its plurinational character is 
rooted in the formation of the state as a union-state as opposed to a prototypical unitary state. 
The union of 1707 incorporated Scotland into the political, albeit unitary framework of 
England, but Scotland retained significant freedom in terms of autarchic institutions. The 
UK itself recognised this pluralism through the name and symbols of the state whereby, the 
UK’s name reflects ‘its plurinational composition, while the union flag is no more than the 
superimposition of the flags of the component nations’ (ibid: 104). The acceptance of the 
UK’s plurinational makeup and thus of differentiation between the concepts ‘nation’ and 
‘state’ has also facilitated the identification of the existence of a Scottish demos, as opposed 
to a monist interpretation, as is the case in Spain, of a single demos.  
Contrary to the UK, Spain has been historically uncomfortable with recognition of its 
plurinationality. The Constitution effected in the aftermath of the transition to democracy, 
recognised the existence of ‘Spaniards and peoples of Spain’ as well as ‘the right to self-
government of the nationalities and regions of which it [Spain] is composed’. Yet, while 
there is a commitment to internal self-determination and the protection of multiculturalism, 
including other languages spoken in the state, the Constitution falls short of recognising its 
plurinationality. Instead, the Constitution propagates a mononational view of the state in 
which Spain is conceived as a traditional nation-state with the existence of only one demos, 
the Spanish demos, to whom ‘national sovereignty belongs’. As a result, claims for the 
existence of a Catalan nation and Catalan demos are highly contested, evident in the refusal 
to confer nationhood on Catalonia or to transfer the power to hold an independence 
referendum. Unlike the UK, where there is general agreement on the plurinationality of the 
state, Spanish political elites are divided between those who support acknowledgement of 
Spain’s plurinational status, including constitutional recognition, as well as those who 
consider such recognition as anathema to Spain’s traditional constitutional order. 
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Table Six: Comparing Strategies for Accommodation 
	 UK Spain 
Symbolic 
Recognition 
Recognition of Scotland as a 
nation. 
Acknowledgement of UK as a 
plurinational state. 
Constitution enshrines some 
recognition of distinctiveness e.g. 
historic nationalities and co-official 
languages in certain ACs. 
Constitution acknowledges the 
existence of only one nation, the 
Spanish one. 
Some reference among political 
elites (PSOE/Podemos) to 
plurinationality of Spain, but 
vehemently rejected by others 
(PP/Cs).  
Spanish language as the only 
official language of the state. 
Self-Rule Significant powers devolved in 
1999, as well as in updated 
Scotland Acts 2012 and 2016. 
Institutionalisation of a retaining 
model of devolution. 
Increase in fiscal autonomy.  
Asymmetric approach to 
devolution. 
Potential to devolve a number of 
significant policy briefs.  
Initial asymmetrical devolution but 
has gradually evolved to a more 
symmetrical system.  
Central government encroachment 
on AC policy briefs through 
Organic Laws.  
Limited fiscal autonomy for the 
ACs, except Basque Country and 
Navarre. 
Shared 
Rule 
No territorially representative 
second chamber.  
No mechanisms to ensure 
influence of sub-state nations at 
central government level.  
IGR forums such as JMC.  
Secretary of State for Scotland 
with full cabinet ranking. 
Sewel Convention. 
Senate is limited in its role as a 
territorially representative chamber. 
Secretary of State for Territorial 
Politics. 
Other languages can, at certain 
times, be used in the Senate but not 
in Congress.  
IGR forums such as sectoral 
conferences and Conference of the 
Presidents. 
 
6.2.2 Self-rule 
Self-rule is broadly defined as the decision-making powers within the jurisdiction of 
sub-state national or regional parliaments (Mueller 2017). In Spain, self-rule was very much 
framed as a necessary concession to secure the support of minority nationalists during the 
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transition. This has also been the case as the autonomy system has evolved whereby further 
powers have been granted to the historic nationalities in return for their support during 
periods of minority government in Parliament. The open-ended model on the division of 
powers in the Constitution allowed for the development of an asymmetrical path, considered 
a requirement to differentiate Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia from the newly 
created ACs and thus guarantee their participation and support in the development of the 
system. Yet, while the Constitution provided for a rather flexible and quite substantial 
division of powers along asymmetric lines, successive Spanish governments have sought to 
curtail the development of asymmetry and instead symmetrise the division of powers. As 
well as this, a recurring feature in the Spanish experience of autonomy has been one of 
central government encroachment in AC jurisdiction which has gradually intensified 
tensions between the central government and ACs, namely the Basque Country and 
Catalonia. This centralising approach is rooted in the predominant understanding – albeit 
venerated ideal – of Spain as a homogenous nation-state with a symmetrical model of 
autonomy.  
Scotland, much like Catalonia, has also become a very powerful sub-state territory. In 
a similar vein to the Spanish experience, the decision to devolve autonomy was not 
necessarily related to any overarching concern with the accommodation or empowerment of 
Scotland as a minority nation within the UK but was rooted in attempts by the Labour Party 
to further entrench its electoral dominance in Scotland and thus side-line the pro-
independence SNP. In contrast with the Spanish model, the Scotland Act 1998 sets out a 
rather clear distinction between the competences of both orders of government and 
institutionalised a retaining model of devolution; the Scottish Parliament controls all powers 
except those reserved to Westminster. In addition to this, the Sewel Convention provides 
that the UK Parliament will not normally legislate on devolved matters without the prior 
consent of the Scottish Parliament, thus inhibiting the ability of London-based departments 
to encroach upon devolved competences. The powers of the Parliament have increased over 
the years but in contrast to Catalonia, this has not been to secure party support in the state 
legislature, but rather a reaction to the electoral success of the SNP and thus attempt to stifle 
support for independence. All in all, the devolution of further powers has enhanced 
autonomy in Scotland and further entrenched the asymmetrical design of devolution. Hence, 
while asymmetry has never found much favour in Spain amongst the main state-wide parties, 
it remains a fundamental component of UK devolution, further cementing Scottish 
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distinctiveness within the UK state.  
 
6.2.3 Shared Rule 
Shared rule, which refers to the participation of sub-state entities in the decision-
making processes of the central government, has been a neglected dimension of power in 
both the UK and Spain (Mueller 2013). Devolution to Scotland was finally granted after a 
sustained period of campaigning, but was concerned solely with self-rule. There were 
discussions prior to the re-establishment of the Scottish Parliament vis-à-vis relations 
between the different orders of government post-devolution, but emphasis was on self-rule 
rather than increasing the voice of Scotland – or the other nations – at the centre. Prior to 
devolution, and in the absence of self-rule for Scotland, a number of instruments were put 
in place to increase the voice of Scotland at the centre, including the overrepresentation of 
Scotland in the House of Commons and the establishment the Scottish/Scotland Office and 
Secretary of State for Scotland.114 Apart from this, however, opportunities for Scottish 
influence at the centre have been significantly limited. In terms of IGR, informal and 
bilateral relations exist as too does the JMC. As discussed in Chapter Four, while the former 
seems to work well, the latter is characterised by a hierarchical structure that does not serve 
as an effective lever of input or influence for the constituent nations on central government 
policy making. In addition, none of the UK’s component units yield a veto power over 
central government policy spheres and while for some the Sewel Convention may represent 
an indirect veto, it is ‘more a means of protecting self-government in areas of devolved 
competence than a way to exert influence over Westminster policy that affects devolved 
territories’ (McEwen, 2016: 231).  
Shared rule in Spain is also a limited affair. The Senate is described in the Constitution 
as a ‘the House of Territorial Representation’, but its capacity to act as such is circumscribed 
by its functions (or lack thereof) and composition which is largely based on provinces rather 
than ACs. In addition, as is the case in Scotland, there is a lack of appropriate mechanisms 
and institutions to ensure that both nationwide and regional interests are represented and 
protected in central government policy spheres. A number of IGR forums have been 
established, but these are significantly limited in their capacity to serve as mechanisms to 
                                                 
114 In 2005, as a result of devolution, the number of seats for Scotland in the House of Commons was reduced 
from 72 to 59.  
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either provide input or influence over central government decisions.  
 
6.3 Examining the Limits of Territorial Autonomy  
As discussed in the preceding chapters of this thesis, territorial autonomy has been 
framed as an important tool particularly in plurinational states for a number of reasons. 
These include, inter alia, as a tool for conflict resolution, a device to protect minorities and 
their interests, a mechanism to ensure equilibrium between unity and diversity and a way to 
extend and deepen democratic principles and practice. More recently, however, as a result 
of the complex interplay of centrifugal and centripetal forces, territorial autonomy has come 
under increased pressure and intense scrutiny. This section, therefore, through both a 
normative and empirical lens, sketches a thematic and comparative analysis of some of the 
most significant and pressing limitations of the autonomy models in the UK and Spain. 
 
6.3.1 A Plurinational Culture 
As discussed in earlier chapters and has been examined in the scholarly literature, 
plurinational states, by implication of their cultural, ethnic, linguistic or religious diversity, 
are distinct from their mononational counterparts (Basta et al 2015; Burgess and Pinder 
2007; Gagnon and Tully 2001; Gagnon et al 2003; Lluch 2014; Seymour and Gagnon 2012). 
As a result, plurinational states encounter a number of specific challenges shaped by the 
diversity of the state, including what measures should be adopted to accommodate national 
diversity and render the pursuit of independence by sub-state territories obsolete. To this 
end, the development of a ‘plurinational culture’ is an essential component to help bolster 
and guarantee the stability and territorial integrity of the plurinational state while at the same 
time, providing space and institutional structures that protect and promote the distinctiveness 
of minority groups.  
The discussion on a plurinational culture put forward in this chapter draws upon 
existing debates on liberal nationalism, federalism and multinational federalism. In this vein, 
a plurinational culture refers to relations between the central state and sub-state entities, as 
much at a normative level, that is the values and principles that guide and underpin these 
centre-periphery relations, as in institutions themselves. Building on the works of James 
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Tully (2000) who advocated ‘the ethics of hospitality’ and Charles Taylor (1994) who 
advanced the thesis of ‘the politics of recognition’, Gagnon (2014: 80) posits that centre-
periphery relations, should not, as is often the case, be taken for granted and instead should 
be predicated on the institutionalisation of ‘equal, respectful power relationships among 
national communities, and enable stakeholders to focus on relations of non-domination 
among different orders of government’. A hospitable political environment, reciprocal 
recognition, territorial autonomy and effective shared rule mechanisms are essential 
components of a plurinational culture to help facilitate a permanent dialogue between 
different levels of government within a multilevel plurinational state as well as ensure a 
flexible centre-periphery relationship. Key to this success is the maintenance of dialogue 
between the different groups and levels of government in a plurinational state. As Pfeffer 
(2015: 153) puts it, ‘despite the fact that different groups will not always agree with each 
other, it is important that they agree to remain in dialogue with one another.’  
Spain and the UK have used territorial autonomy as the principal mechanism to 
accommodate the Catalan and Scottish territories, but this had not led to the entrenchment 
of a plurinational culture. There are, as was discussed in the previous chapters, identifiable 
elements of plurinational awareness in both cases, but as discussed below, many of the 
values and principles that undergird a plurinational culture – sensitivity to national claims, 
compromise and trust, to name just a few – are lacking in relations between the different 
levels of government. In this vein, it is unsurprising, as pointed out by Requejo (2015: 163), 
that when compared to other plurinational states, including, Belgium, Bosnia, Canada and 
India, both the UK and Spain fall behind these states in the accommodation of national 
minorities in terms of decentralisation and official recognition.  
Symbolic recognition is a key aspect of ‘crafting successful territorial strategies for a 
plurinational state’ that demonstrates ‘that national political elites are willing to identify the 
state as plurinational and recognise that it encompasses multiple, but possibly 
complementary identities’ (Swenden, 2013: 71). As posited below, the entrenchment of a 
plurinational culture requires states to move beyond symbolic recognition, but this remains 
an important component to underline the commitment of the state to protect its sub-state 
entities and engender a plurinational interpretation of the state, as much among political 
elites as ordinary citizens.  
On the recognition of the plurinational nature of the state, Spain and the UK have 
pursued dissimilar strategies. While the former has yet to reinterpret the state along 
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plurinational lines, the acceptance, recognition and celebration of the UK’s plurinational 
nature has been an uncontroversial feature of the British political landscape for much of 
modern political history. Interestingly, however, while in comparison to Spain, the UK has 
been much more overt in embracing its plurinational status, this has not entailed a more 
sensitive approach to central government thinking. As discussed in Chapter Four, this 
paucity of plurinational sensitivity is often betrayed by the unitary and majoritarian approach 
taken by central state representatives, described by one interviewee as a ‘political and 
cultural bubble or philosophy’ in which ‘there is an inbuilt narrative or perception that we 
[Scotland] are a region, just a small part or annex of something bigger’ (Interview with SNP 
MSP 3). Thus, while the UK has sought to embrace symbolic recognition, made easier by 
the absence of a codified constitution, centre-periphery relations remain characterised by 
insensitivity on the part of the central government towards the national distinctiveness of 
Scotland. The unwillingness of the UK government to compromise on Brexit, despite the 
overwhelming Remain vote in Scotland, further lends credence to this argument.  
Recognition in Spain has proved to be a much more complicated affair. The framers 
of the Constitution sought to entrench some sort of recognition of the distinctiveness of the 
Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia, but this remained rather implicit, disguised by a 
strongly pro-decentralisation but mononational interpretation of the state. 40 years after the 
transition to democracy, the lack of recognition afforded to the plurinational nature of Spain 
remains a controversial topic. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter Five, while a number of 
political parties in Catalonia and the Basque Country as well as those state-wide parties on 
the ideological left advocate official recognition of Spain’s plurinationality, other political 
parties, such as C’s and the PP, remain vehemently opposed to any reform that would confer 
legitimacy on the nation-building processes of the historic nationalities, namely Catalonia. 
This absence of official recognition, combined with outright hostility on the part of C’s and 
the PP, impedes the entrenchment of a plurinational culture and accommodation of Catalonia 
within the extant political system. Decentralisation has been the primary tool to 
accommodate Spain, but as shown by recent events, in the absence of official recognition of 
Catalonia’s national status, support for secession is likely to continue to grow (Interview 
with PSC MP 1).  
The use of autonomy at the expense of official recognition in Spain has fuelled rather 
than diluted further demands for constitutional recognition in Catalonia. This is compounded 
by the fact that asymmetry, both in terms of the distribution of powers and according special 
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status to certain ACs, has been oft-viewed with suspicion among Spanish elites. This is not 
entirely unique to the Spanish case, but has been further antagonised by the seemingly 
incessant attempts by successive Spanish governments to symmetrise powers and curtail the 
asymmetrical development of the State of Autonomies. In so doing, processes of 
symmetrisation and recentralisation have undermined and thwarted the development of a 
truly plurinational culture. As discussed in Chapter Five, some interviewees justify 
symmetry because of ‘efficiency’ (Interview with PP MP) or to ensure ‘equal parity of 
rights’ (Interview with C’s MP), but as discussed by Kymlicka (2001a: 105), this opposition 
to asymmetry amongst the majority national group ‘is rooted in a latent ethnocentrism- i.e. 
a refusal to recognise that the minority has a distinct national identity that is worthy of 
respect.’ The development of territorial politics in Spain upholds Kymlicka’s thesis.  
In the UK, asymmetry remains the central characteristic of the UK’s territorial 
landscape, but the discussions vis-à-vis the repatriation of powers post-EU withdrawal 
underline the precarious nature of devolution as relates to the centralising tendencies of the 
UK government. It is a truism that EU relations are a reserved matter, that is, outside the 
legislative and executive competences of the Scottish government and Parliament, but EU 
withdrawal will have a profound impact on the devolved territories, which after all, have 
developed wholly within the framework of the EU. The UK government’s approach, 
however, has, contrary to any plurinational spirit, not sought compromise or consensus from 
the devolved nations, despite the latter’s willingness to do so (Anderson 2017a). Tellingly, 
the UK government rejected this approach and while it may seem possible to justify this on 
grounds that foreign affairs remain a reserved matter, this is to misunderstand the importance 
of bargaining, consultation and deliberations in plurinational states, whereby the concerns, 
demands and wishes of minority nations are marginalised, or as has been the case in the UK 
as relates to EU withdrawal, ignored, because of the fact that national minorities are 
condemned to structural inferiority.  
In Spain, the absence of dialogue over the Catalan government’s proposal to hold an 
independence referendum also underlines the absence of a plurinational culture. As posited 
in Chapter Three, liberal nationalists advocate territorial autonomy as a way to protect and 
promote minority groups and keep existing states together. However, while liberal 
nationalists do not champion secession over territorial autonomy, there is acknowledgement 
that when plurinational states are not successful in preventing increasing support for 
secession, the central government should not seek to obstruct debate on secession (Kymlicka 
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2001a). Rather, as was the case in the UK, the central state should be willing to enter into 
good faith negotiations with the sub-state entity in question, ultimately allowing ‘for the 
possibility of secession in accordance with norms of democracy, justice and rule of law’ 
(Norman, 2006: 175). Attempts to shut down debate on secession are not only incompatible 
with democratic norms and plurinational justice, but from an empirical viewpoint, may 
hasten rather than impede ‘processes towards secession in less happy ways’ (Tierney, 2009: 
251). Spain and Catalonia are cases in point.  
Demands for dialogue on secession jar with the constitutional vision of Spain endorsed 
by the main Spanish political elites, but such differences, as was the case in the UK, should 
not preclude discussion on the topic. Rather than seek to secure a political and compromised 
solution, the default reaction in Spain has been to forego dialogue in favour of recourse to 
the courts. The persistent use of the TC, however, has not led to any long-term judicial 
containment, but instead ‘has diminished the legitimacy of the Court and its role as a neutral 
arbiter’ (Interview with CUP MP). This, paradoxically, has engendered rather than 
prevented political instability in the Spanish polity. The adjudication of courts, while 
important, should not inhibit nor replace dialogue between different governments, 
particularly in plurinational states in which courts and their decisions are oft-perceived as 
instruments of the majority community (Tierney 2004). The Spanish TC’s litigation on the 
Catalan Statute and independence related legislation, as well as the UKSC’s decision on the 
Sewel Convention lend credence to this argument. 
Building on the work of liberal nationalists and those who advocate multinational 
federalism as a tool to institutionalise structures to protect and promote national minorities 
within a liberal democratic framework (Burgess 2012b; Gagnon 2010), this section has 
illuminated a number of requisites essential to the development of a plurinational culture. A 
plurinational culture is undergirded by a number of normative values and principles that are 
fundamental to informing centre-periphery relations, but also with regard to the design of 
central institutions. In Spain and the UK, the development and entrenchment of a 
plurinationally sensitive mind-set in which a commitment to respecting national minorities 
and their ethnonational distinctiveness is key, has been impeded by the predominant unitary 
and mononational interpretation of the state. Drawing upon some of the points detailed here, 
central to a plurinational culture is willingness on all parts of the state to engage in dialogue 
and continuous conversation to ensure the development of flexible intra-state relations 
which are essential to engender and substantiate trust and loyalty between the different levels 
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of government. To accompany this almost permanent renegotiation of the state, central 
institutions, such as intergovernmental forums and upper chambers must also serve as viable 
institutions in which there is reciprocal recognition and structures to ensure effective self-
rule and shared rule.  
 
6.3.2 Empowerment 
Simone Chambers (2002: 99) posits that ‘voice, rather than votes, is the vehicle of 
empowerment’. Although Chambers was writing about the context of widening the public 
sphere to ensure the inclusion of marginalised voices in political life, the same thesis is also 
relevant with regards to minority nations. In this vein, minority nations do not simply require 
an autonomous parliament in which a regional or national demos can vote for sub-state 
parties – although this is an important point of departure – the same legislatures, and by 
implication minorities, must also be given a stronger voice and at the centre, that is, in the 
deliberations of central government.  
Self-rule is the predominant strategy prescribed to ensure voice at the periphery. This 
involves the establishment of constitutional, electoral, legal and political arenas in which 
minority nations are free to determine themselves. Coupled with this is the development of 
asymmetric arrangements which not only provide for the abovementioned spaces, but endow 
the minority nation with a special status, setting it apart from other sub-state entities within 
the framework of the state. While there are, however, a number of merits in decentralising 
power to minority nations, and thus empowering them with regard to specific policy areas, 
self-government entails only limited empowerment inasmuch as minority nations are 
hindered by the actions and policies of central governments. In this sense, self-rule 
arrangements have been designed to contain rather than empower minority nations. This is 
evident in the cases of Scotland and Catalonia which, despite wielding significant autonomy, 
are limited in their advancement within extant structures by state governments which seek 
to fashion the state in the eyes of the majority community and remain hostile to the territorial 
aspirations of national minorities. 
At first glance, there is merit in stating that Scottish devolution, while limited, allowed 
for enhanced empowerment. The exclusion principle used to define the powers in the 
original Scotland Act 1998 alongside asymmetry can be drawn upon to illustrate this point. 
On the former, the Scotland Act posited that all powers were devolved to Scotland unless 
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explicitly reserved to Westminster, not only empowering Scotland insofar as the powers that 
had already been agreed to be devolved but also that any new powers to emerge would be 
within the purview of the Scottish Parliament (Brouillet and Mullen, 2018: 63). In addition 
to this, devolution further entrenched the UK’s experiment with asymmetry. Territorial 
arrangements for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland were designed to meet the 
exigencies of each case at hand, resulting in distinct autonomy arrangements for each of the 
three territories and rejecting the notion, as has been the case in Spain, that a ‘one size fits 
all’ strategy can work to accommodate the constitutive components of a plurinational state.  
Yet, while there is some evidence to demonstrate support for the empowerment theme, 
there are a number of counterclaims which underline the argument that the rationale behind 
devolution was to contain rather than empower. Indeed, this was briefly discussed in Chapter 
Four in which a number of interviewees, particularly from the Labour Party, made it 
explicitly clear that while they believed devolution was good for democracy through 
providing Scotland with an autonomous parliament, the policy was not shaped by concern 
for the accommodation of Scottish distinctiveness or the empowerment of Scotland in 
majority-minority relations. Instead, devolution was an attempt to further entrench the 
electoral dominance of Labour and by implication stymie the SNP and its pro-independence 
agenda. The oft-cited remark by Labour’s then Shadow Secretary of State for Scotland, 
George Robertson, that devolution would ‘kill nationalism stone dead’ underlines this point 
(Watt 2011). The choice of a proportional electoral system for the Parliament, described by 
Donald Dewar as ‘the best example of charitable giving this century in politics’ equally 
betrays the containment rationale (HC Deb, 6 May 1998: c803). While presented in a 
positive light as model that would engender a more inclusive party system in which smaller 
parties would be better represented, the surreptitious aim behind the electoral system was to 
prevent the SNP from every securing the majority required to propel its independence 
agenda. 
The establishment of the Sewel Convention could also be hailed an example of 
Scottish empowerment, although more recently its status has been called into question. The 
Convention was deliberately created to police Westminster intervention in devolved affairs, 
compelling the former, in spite of its status as retaining formal legal power notwithstanding 
devolution, to seek the consent of the devolved parliament and assemblies to legislate on 
devolved affairs. The Convention, therefore, is of considerable importance, particularly 
when compared with Spain, whereby in the absence of any agreement akin to Sewel, central 
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governments have religiously encroached upon devolved competence jurisdiction. Recent 
developments in the UK, however, caution against the empowerment thesis. In the aftermath 
of the 2014 independence referendum and perceived as a positive sign that Westminster was 
finally catching up with the ramifications of devolution, the Scotland Act 2016, following 
the recommendation of the Smith Commission, included provisions that recognised the 
Scottish Parliament as ‘permanent’ and placed the Sewel Convention on statutory footing. 
The move, however, as confirmed by the judgement of the UKSC in the Miller case, did not 
entail the entrenchment of Sewel as a legally binding principle. There is an argument, as 
posited by Keating (2018: 48), that the UKSC’s decision merely ‘confirmed what we already 
knew’, but it simultaneously spotlighted the vulnerability of devolution as a political project, 
affirming that devolution, ‘at root [is] little more than the delegation of powers which can 
be revoked unilaterally at any time’.  
The risk of unilateral action by the central government and thus precariousness of 
autonomy was further revealed in the UK government’s EU (Withdrawal) bill, which 
initially sought to take control of all powers retuning to the UK from Brussels, irrespective 
of the retaining model of devolution enshrined in the Scotland Act. The UK government 
framed its position as necessary to ensure common frameworks across the country, but in 
invoking ‘the national interest’ revealed a propensity for centralisation, rather than 
differentiation, undermining and potentially undoing the fundamental principles and 
decentralising tendency precipitated by devolution. In this vein, rather than using EU 
withdrawal as an opportunity to reaffirm the state’s commitment to respecting 
plurinationalism and thus Scottish distinctiveness, particularly important in light of the firm 
majority vote in Scotland to remain in the EU, the UK government’s preferences instead 
rendered autonomy in Scotland even more vulnerable in the emerging post-Brexit landscape.  
In a similar fashion to Scotland, autonomy for Catalonia and the other historic 
nationalities and newly created ACs was less about empowerment and more about finding a 
solution palatable to those who wanted profound reform and those who were hesitant to 
change. This was confirmed in a number of interviews in which there was acknowledgement 
that autonomy was a compromise that would accommodate Catalan demands for internal 
self-determination, albeit it was more ‘a solution to keep Catalonia happy and silence 
demands for more self-government’ (Interview with ERC MP 2). While other interviewees 
disagreed with this sentiment, one posited that autonomy was not necessarily about 
accommodation, empowerment or recognition but rather ‘efficiency…the reality has to be 
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that it has to be implemented from the point of view of efficiency’ (Interview with PP MP). 
Hence, while the system of Catalan autonomy has evolved over the years and Catalan 
nationalists remained aspirational in enhancing autonomy arrangements, the predominant 
strategy for managing autonomy has not been influenced by an overarching concern with 
the accommodation and empowerment of minority nations, but the development of a system 
of decentralisation designed to dilute rather than enhance any distinct sense of ethnonational 
distinctiveness.  
As discussed in Chapter Five, one of the biggest tensions between the Catalan and 
Spanish governments is the lack of clarity on the division of powers provided for by the 
Constitution. The powers assigned to Catalonia, as well as the advances secured during 
periods of PP and PSOE minority government clearly amount to extensive self-government, 
but the messy system of competence jurisdiction has increased disputes between the 
different orders of government, necessitating the involvement of the TC to mediate and 
resolve such disputes. This markedly contrasts with Scotland and the UK whereby hitherto 
there has been remarkably little recourse to the courts. 
Moreover, while there was an initial acceptance of an asymmetrical division of 
powers, over time central governments have not merely sought to symmetrise the territorial 
system, but have also become outright hostile to an asymmetrical division of powers. This 
hostility towards asymmetry, predominantly embodied by the PP and C’s, is shaped by the 
territorial rather than plurinational understanding of the state, whereby an equal distribution 
of powers among all ACs is envisioned. As discussed in Chapter Three, this territorial vision 
is inherently problematic in a plurinational state in which asymmetrical autonomy 
arrangements are necessary to cater for the cultural and linguistic distinctiveness of minority 
nations which by implication of being a minority in the state are alienated from the dominant 
majority culture (see Gagnon 2010). Symmetrisation or recentralising programmes 
evidently affect all ACs, but for minority nations the effect is much more profound and 
implicates lasting ramifications for the existence and future survival of these distinct 
communities. In short, the recentralising and symmetrising approaches of central 
government have had the effect of delegitimising and enfeebling rather than empowering 
Catalonia and its claims to ethnonational distinctiveness.  
In Spain, recentralisation and symmetrisation have been widely pursued through 
central governments’ use of Base Laws, Organic Laws or spending power. Under the guise 
of the general or national interest, successive Spanish governments, both the PP and PSOE, 
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have interfered in the competences of ACs, demonstrating a disregard for the importance of 
self-rule powers to empower minority nations as well as a ‘denial of the federalist philosophy 
inherent in the Constitution and the Statutes of the Autonomous Communities’ (Máiz et al, 
2010: 79). As posited in Chapter Five, one of the most recent and controversial examples 
was the Rajoy government’s educational reform (LOMCE) which was opposed by Catalonia 
on grounds that it reduced AC autonomy in setting the curriculum and required those ACs 
with more than one language to teach fewer hours in the vernacular language. The enactment 
of LOMCE underscores the lack of empowerment of Spain’s minority nations and further 
reveals the lack of plurinational culture in Spain; LOMCE betrays a liberalism I 
understanding of the state in which individual rights transcend collective rights and the 
culture of the minority, in this case the Catalan language, is dismissed and rendered 
subordinate to the majority culture and language. 
The activation of Article 155, which suspended autonomy in Catalonia in the aftermath 
of the unilateral declaration of independence by President Puigdemont also reveals the lack 
of empowerment of Catalonia, alongside the vulnerability of self-rule in Spain. Article 155 
cannot lead to the abolition of Catalan autonomy, but this measure allows for the suspension, 
substitution or sequestration of already decentralised powers. Article 155, however, is rather 
ill-defined (Bossacoma and López Bofill, 2016: 127). The Article states that the Spanish 
government may take ‘all measures necessary to compel the community to meet said 
obligations’, yet there is no detail on what taking ‘all measures necessary’ entails. This is 
problematic because these measures are thus stipulated by the central government and state 
institutions, which as a result of their mononational and territorial interpretation of the state, 
are inhibited in assessing the long-term political, legal and constitutional ramifications of 
their actions on the ACs themselves. Here, a direct comparison can be drawn with the Sewel 
Convention which although used in a completely different context, is also lacking in detail 
when defining the term ‘not normally’. Hitherto in the UK context this has been solely 
interpreted by the UK government and its particular interpretation of the convention and 
unitary functioning of the state. In this vein, the concerns and wishes of the minority are 
superseded by the majority.  
Empowerment is an important aspect of accommodation strategies. The evidence 
presented here shows, however, that while the UK and Spain have moved power downwards 
and created powerful autonomous sub-state entities, this empowerment has been hindered 
by the centralising tendencies of central governments which continue to act unilaterally or 
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in a majoritarian fashion irrespective of the wishes of the minority. The UK and Spain may 
have shown a willingness to decentralise power, but they have been slow in providing and 
developing attempts to seriously empower their sub-state entities. What is more, 
opportunities to heighten existing empowering mechanisms have been inhibited by the 
actions of central governments or state institutions, thus autonomy strategies become 
territorial schemes for containment as opposed to genuine empowerment. This lack of 
empowerment not only jars with the pursuit of plurinational justice but emphasises the 
precariousness and vulnerability of self-rule arrangements in plurinational states. 
 
6.3.3 Voice at the Centre 
Self-rule is an important tool to ensure the empowerment of minority nations within 
plurinational states, but so too is including minority nations in the apparatus of central 
government and state institutions (Elazar 1987; Kymlicka 2001a; Swenden 2013). Such 
mechanisms, including a territorially representative second chamber and effective forums 
for IGR, are essential to facilitate dialogue, foster trust and build bridges of solidarity 
between the different orders of government. IGR thus play a very important role in 
plurinational states, but, as a result of the competing nationalisms of different groups, are 
much more ‘conflict laden’ than their mononational counterparts (Swenden, 2006: 3). 
Guaranteeing a voice at the centre for minority nations is a crucial aspect to heighten the 
aforementioned values and principles and supplement self-rule strategies; demonstrating to 
minority nations that their aspirations, interests and wishes are best served by continued 
membership within the plurinational state rather than independence. Spain and the UK, 
however, lag behind in terms of heightening the voice at the centre of Scotland and 
Catalonia, which not only impedes the development and entrenchment of a more 
plurinationally sensitive political culture, but risks further unravelling the already tenuous 
bonds that are currently struggling to hold the states together.  
In the aftermath of the independence referendum and along the lines of the proposals 
advanced by the Smith Commission, new powers devolved to Scotland in the Scotland Act 
2016 created new policy interdependencies between the Scottish and UK government in 
policy areas such as social security. While not unusual in federal or regionalised systems, 
policy and institutional interdependence is a new dynamic in the UK and presents a 
challenge to the development of the system, particularly in light of the inexistence of shared 
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rule mechanisms to facilitate dialogue and cooperation between the different governments 
(McEwen and Petersohn 2015). The House of Lords in its current format is not a chamber 
that represents the devolved territories and while this change has been mooted in the past 
(see Royal Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords 2000), reform has been 
overshadowed by debate about the chamber’s composition. Mechanisms which do exist, 
however, such as the JMC, are inefficient as effective means of ensuring cooperation and 
collaboration between governments and as tools to exert influence over central government 
policy. This was confirmed by interview data, but there was agreement across the different 
parties that while the hierarchical structures of the JMC inhibit any real exertion of influence, 
the lack of willingness on all sides to work together was an additional impediment.  
Existing IGR mechanisms in the UK are heavily influenced by their unitary heritage, 
not helped by the ongoing monist and hierarchical thinking on devolution peddled by the 
UK government. In this view, IGR underline the thesis that ‘devolution is but a peripheral 
concern for the UK government’ (Interview with SNP MSP 3). In lieu of providing space to 
engender a genuine and democratic dialogue as well as a sense of belonging and trust among 
the different levels, existing mechanisms merely represent the centralisation of authority and 
reinforce the idea that majority communities and central governments in plurinational states 
are unreceptive and disinterested in the genuine accommodation, empowerment and 
recognition of the aspirations and wishes of minority nations.  
 IGR in Spain suffer from similar problems, but while scholarship on IGR in the UK 
is almost completely lacking in positivity, recent scholarship in Spain has been somewhat 
positive (Colino 2009; Expósito 2017; León 2017). Sectoral conferences are the most 
prevalent multilateral intergovernmental forum, but while these forums cut across a number 
of concurrent policy areas, ACs, not limited to Catalonia, continue to see such conferences 
as instruments of the central government to intervene and coordinate AC legislation rather 
than an opportunity for ACs to exert influence over central government decisions (Interview 
with PDeCAT MP 2). This has had the effect of further generating mistrust between the 
different orders of government, but also partly explains the rapid growth amongst Catalans 
for independence, a growing number of whom regard the pursuit of independence an easier 
feat than reform of extant Spanish constitutional apparatus (Interview with PDeCAT MP 1). 
This, compounded with the fact that the Senate is largely designed along provincial not AC 
lines, underlines that while IGR are considered an essential feature of plurinational states in 
order to supplement self-rule arrangements and secure a sense of inclusion among minority 
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nations, in Spain, as in the UK, they have perversely become mechanisms of exclusion. IGR 
structures have become tools of disempowerment not empowerment.  
In the UK, the lack of concern afforded towards shared rule was shaped partly by the 
campaign for a Scottish Parliament, which focused solely on self-rule, and by party political 
congruence in the aftermath of the first election in 1999. In addition, the asymmetric design 
of devolution, as was also the case in Spain, necessitated bilateral negotiations, hence little 
attention was paid to increasing the voice of Scotland at the centre beyond the presence of 
Scottish MPs in the House of Commons. As discussed in the data chapters, bilateral IGR are 
considered by both Catalonia and Scotland as better than multilateral forums, representing 
a more effective channel through which they can heighten their influence with central 
government as well as elevate their status as an equal political subject. In both Spain and the 
UK, however, while bilateral relations may serve a purpose to embolden claims of equality 
from minority nations, they remain weak channels through which either Scotland or 
Catalonia can exert real pressure to influence or determine central government decisions or 
policy. IGR in both cases remain inadequately robust to act as effective channels for 
minority nations to ensure that their voices are heard and listened to.  
Besides ineffective intergovernmental instruments and the absence of a truly territorial 
second chamber, neither Scotland nor Catalonia have a veto power over central government 
legislation and have no guaranteed appointment role to state institutions, such as the 
Constitutional or Supreme Courts. The lack of shared rule is often disguised by the number 
of parliamentarians representing minority nations in central parliaments, but in the cases of 
Scotland and Catalonia, party incongruence has increasingly illuminated the paucity of 
opportunities and mechanisms available to minority nations to ensure their voice is listened 
to in central government deliberations.  
Despite general acknowledgement that shared rule is an important strategy to increase 
the voice and inclusion of minority nations in a state as well as increasing their stake in it 
too, the UK and Spain have been slow to institutionalise any genuine shared rule 
mechanisms to achieve the aforementioned. This has not only had the effect of decreasing 
opportunity for the participation of minority nations in the affairs of the state, but may also 
help explain increasing support for secessionism, particularly in Catalonia. IGR have 
developed and evolved in both cases, but rather than create forums to enable bargaining and 
compromise, and thus foster a sense of co-ownership and partnership within the state, 
intergovernmental structures are rigid and impose what is perceived as an immutable 
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framework that simply extends the control and monist thinking of the central government. 
The experiences of preparing for EU withdrawal and the debate over the Catalan 
independence referendum show that the absence of shared rule further complicates relations 
between the different governments, but where they do exist, these are not designed to offer 
flexibility in meeting the complex challenges of plurinational states. Increasing the voice of 
minority nations in both the periphery and centre is a salient prerequisite for plurinational 
states to survive, yet hitherto, shared rule seems to have been nothing short of a mere 
afterthought.  
 
6.3.4 Partnership  
Equal partnership is a common theme in the analysis of minority nations in 
plurinational states and is a central point of comparison between the Scottish and Catalan 
cases, as well as the responses this has engendered by the UK and Spanish states (Gagnon 
2014; Kymlicka 2001a; Requejo 2005). Unsurprisingly, the term equality means different 
things to different political actors, but although the contexts of the Catalan and Scottish cases 
differ, there is an overarching concern with the place and status of these nations within the 
wider state.  
Both Scotland and Catalonia, shaped by their history as independent or semi-
independent territories, construe their position in the plurinational states of Spain and the 
UK as one in which they have a right to be considered equal partners. This is rooted in their 
interpretation of sovereignty, which they posit should not be considered indivisible but 
should be shared (Keating 2001). This more fluid interpretation of sovereignty, in which 
authority is shared across multiple levels, is an integral component of the EU, and for some 
interviewees was a justification for advocating secession from the UK and Spain while 
supporting continued membership of the EU (Interview with SNP MP 6 and ERC MP 1; see 
also Cetrà and Liñeira 2018). In addition, the actions of the central governments also impact 
upon the position of Scotland and Catalonia. In both cases, central governments promote a 
hierarchical territorial model in which, contrary to the aspirations and wishes of minority 
nations, Scotland and Catalonia are considered subordinate members not co-equals. As a 
result, minoritarian preferences are superseded by the preferences of the majority, 
undermining the role of minority nations as legitimate political actors and inhibiting their 
full participation in the state. The debate over Brexit in the UK and the organisation of an 
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independence referendum in Catalonia illustrate this point.  
It is well-established that devolution involved the creation of hierarchical structures in 
which the Scottish Parliament was subordinate to the Westminster Parliament, enshrined in 
the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. This hierarchical and imperialistic understanding 
of devolution was further illuminated in the Miller case in which the UKSC took an 
explicitly Diceyan interpretation of the notion of sovereignty, reasserting that it was 
Westminster not Holyrood that was sovereign. This, for many, was unsurprising given that 
mention of the Sewel Convention is often prefaced by caveats forcefully asserting the 
supremacy of Westminster, but it did refocus attention on Scotland’s place in the union. In 
the words of Nicola Sturgeon (2017a):  
The claims about Scotland being an equal partner are being exposed as nothing 
more than empty rhetoric and the very foundations of the devolution settlement 
that are supposed to protect our interests – such as the statutory embedding of 
the Sewel Convention – are being shown to be worthless. This raises fundamental 
issues above and beyond that of EU membership.   
 
As was discussed in Chapter Four, the union between England and Scotland was 
interpreted in Scotland as a political partnership between equals. The predominantly 
‘English’ interpretation, which jars with the Scottish vision, not only remains to this day, 
but has resurfaced and been reinforced by the UK’s unilateral approach to EU withdrawal. 
The debate on the status of Sewel makes this clear as too does the rhetoric from the UK 
government. The Secretary of State for Scotland, for instance, not only argued that Sewel 
was not relevant with regards to EU withdrawal because Brexit was an extraordinary event, 
but further posited ‘Scotland is not a partner in the UK; it is part of the United Kingdom’ 
(HC Deb 14 June: c1129).  
Equal partnership was a key theme during the 2014 referendum campaign, with the 
SNP advocating independence on the basis that Scotland could recast its political 
relationship with the rest of the UK. In the aftermath of the referendum, despite rosy rhetoric 
from pro-union politicians that Scotland is an equal member of the union, complaints of a 
‘democratic deficit’ have remerged in response to what some Scottish politicians perceive 
as the imposition of an English-oriented Brexit on Scotland (Interviews with SNP MSP 8 
and Green MSP 2). The one-nation policy in relation to EU withdrawal endorsed by May 
has clear parallels with the approach taken by Thatcher in the 1980s in which unionism is 
conflated with unitarianism and is interpreted in Scotland as a violation of any equal sense 
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of partnership among the nations of the union. As a result, Scotland is not conceived of as 
an equal partner and the future of the union itself remains in jeopardy. 
In Catalonia, terms such as ‘democratic deficit’ are also bandied around by Catalan 
nationalists (Interview with ERC MP 1). While in the UK there is at least some rhetoric that 
refers to equal-to-equal relations between Scotland and the rest of the UK, this is not the 
case in Catalonia whereby complaints about the lack of an equal partnership are perceived 
not only as institutional subordination, but oppression (Interview with ERC MP 2). The 
inability of Spanish elites to accept, or for those who do accept, advance, a plurinational 
understanding of the Spanish state perpetuates the unitary interpretation of the Spanish polity 
in which neither the historic nationalities nor the other ACs are considered equal partners. 
Indeed, the pro-plurinational rhetoric of the incumbent PSOE, while a step forward in 
fostering a plurinational culture in Spain, has been met with strong resistance from parties 
on the right of the ideological axis which have, as a result, hardened their stance vis-à-vis 
recognition of plurinationality and the accommodation of Catalonia within the territorial 
system. The institutional inferiority of Catalonia was reinforced by the TC’s 2010 judgement 
and for many represented the imposition a new constitutional order that undermined the 
1978 constitutional pact (Interviews with Catalunya en Comú, ERC and JxCat MPs). The 
lack of political dialogue to solve some of the legitimate grievances of the Catalan 
government, the refusal of the Spanish government to engage in debate on a referendum and 
the forceful reaction of authorities in the October referendum bolster the image of Catalonia 
as nothing more than a subordinated province.  
In both Scotland and Catalonia, the central governments’ conception of political 
decentralisation is not one of building a working relationship between and among co-equal 
partners, but rather of institutionalised domination in which the central government retains 
supremacy over devolved and decentralised institutions. While, in theory, this is the reality 
of a devolved system which does not divide sovereignty among the state’s constituent 
components, in plurinational states such as Spain and the UK, such domination has 
pernicious effects which not merely undermines democracy and plurinational justice – as 
championed by liberal nationalist scholars – but poses a direct threat to the continued 
existence of the state. As the cases discussed here show, minorities which do not feel 
adequately recognised or accommodated as equal partners within the state will look for other 
ways to ensure recognition and treatment as full partners, including independence.  
In the UK, debate over EU withdrawal has reinforced the institutional domination 
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argument and bolsters the Scottish government’s complaints that the UK as a partnership of 
equals is merely fiction. The history of relations between Scotland and the rest of the UK 
has seen the former recognised as a legitimate political actor, unlike Catalonia in Spain, but 
this recognition does not entail the ability to participate in the decision-making processes of 
the central government or be treated as a co-equal in the political partnership. The fact that 
the substantive Scottish majority vote to remain in the EU is superseded by the slight 
majority vote to leave in the larger and thus more dominant England, underlines this point. 
 Seeking unanimous consent over certain decisions is an important feature in a 
plurinational society, evidenced by power-sharing arrangements, including veto powers, 
which exist in a number of plurinational states including, Belgium and Bosnia. Yet, while 
withdrawal from the EU is indisputably a critical decision that given its potential 
ramifications for the territorial structure and hence constitutional future of the UK should 
have been administered along the lines of power-sharing principles, this was not the case. 
Instead, Scotland, alongside the rest of the UK, will leave the EU, reinforcing the opinion 
that Scotland and its decision to vote Remain is nothing short of an ‘afterthought’ and 
‘irritation’ for the UK government (Interview with Green MSP 1).  
In Spain there is little consideration of Catalonia as an equal partner in the state. This 
is further inhibited by the perception among a growing number of pro-independence and 
right to decide Catalans that their territory is not treated as a legitimate political entity, let 
alone a co-equal partner in the Spanish state. This, for instance, is legitimised further when 
analysing the rhetoric of the central government in dismissing calls for a referendum on 
independence. In complete contrast to the UK, even under the most unitary Conservative 
PMs, Catalonia is explicitly denied a right to determine its own political future. This, as was 
discussed earlier, further demonstrates the absence of a plurinational culture in Spain, but 
equally jars with the principles of plurinational justice and self-determination as advanced 
by liberal nationalist scholars. Far from participating on a level playing field, Catalonia, akin 
to Scotland, is subject to a system of domination in which the practice of a more sensitive 
plurinational approach has been traded for institutionalised dominance by the central 
government.   
 
6.3.5 The Crisis of Accommodation in Liberal Democracies 
Describing the prevailing situation in Catalonia and Spain, one interviewee spoke of 
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‘the perfect storm’ in which a number of crises – democratic, financial, political and 
ultimately territorial – has precipitated growing support for independence in Catalonia 
(Interview with Catalunya en Comú MP 1). Yet, while there is an argument to state that 
plurinational liberal democratic states are under threat, not just from below by minority 
nations, the future existence of the later is also in peril, astutely described by Gagnon (2014), 
as an ‘age of uncertainty’. This era of unpredictability is shaped by majority communities 
and the rhetoric and policies of central governments, which, in an attempt to institutionalise 
their dominance in the political arena, have failed to adequately cater for the 
accommodation, empowerment and recognition of the self-determining aspirations of 
minority nations. As a result, ‘national minorities feel that national majorities are 
unreceptive to the most important of their national and identitary claims’ and in the face of 
such circumstances, have looked towards independence as a possible solution (ibid: 7).  
As this thesis has shown, accommodation is the most coherent and democratic strategy 
to cater to the demands and wishes of minority nations, while concomitantly ensuring the 
continued existence of the host state. The increasing vociferousness of minority groups in 
recent years has reinvigorated attention with accommodationist strategies insofar as 
countries in all corners of the world have sought to refashion the structures of the state in 
order to create a model of enriching coexistence. However, as the cases of the UK and Spain 
illustrate, even the most economically developed and democratically entrenched states 
continue to face struggles vis-à-vis the accommodation of minority nations. In this vein, it 
is fair to conclude that much more is required to ensure that central governments, and by 
implication majority communities, adequately respond to the aspirations and demands of 
minority nations.  
The analysis presented in this thesis clearly demonstrates the prevailing crises 
unfolding in the UK and Spain with regards to the accommodation of Scotland and 
Catalonia. Despite decades of relatively harmonious relations, recent events in both states 
have reignited debates on the place of minority nations within plurinational states and 
refocused attention on majority-minority relations which in both cases continue to be 
characterised by the dominance of the former over the latter. As a consequence of their slow 
response in institutionalising a more coherent form of accommodation that does not seek to 
contain minority nations but rather justly accommodate, empower and recognise them, the 
UK and Spain are at a constitutional crossroads.  
Devolution has remarkably altered the territorial landscape of the UK state, but while 
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this has worked well for a number of years, the experience of the Scottish independence 
referendum, and pressure for a second referendum, as well as the ramifications of the UK’s 
withdrawal from the EU, in spite of the emphatic vote in Scotland for Remain and the refused 
consent of the Scottish government for the UK government’s EU (Withdrawal) bill, will 
radically alter the system, albeit there is no consensus in which direction. Constitutional 
issues have occupied political agendas for almost a decade, precipitated by the rise of the 
SNP and its vision for independence. As a result of this and to convince Scots to reject 
independence, autonomy arrangements in Scotland have evolved and in light of Brexit will 
experience a fourth iteration of devolution. This ad-hoc development of constitutional 
change has limited a holistic approach to territorial reform and while this has meant the self-
governing powers of Scotland have gradually increased over the years, the status of Scotland 
within the union has yet to be settled. Further, central government and state institutions have 
yet to seriously catch-up with the changes introduced by territorial politics. This is an 
indisputable concern but is made worse by the fact that the incumbent UK government is 
committed to pursuing a unitary approach to withdrawal, reminiscent of pre-devolution 
times. This exclusive approach has inhibited cooperation with the devolved administrations 
and bolstered by the London-based hierarchy of IGR poses a grave threat to the already 
fragile union.  
Recent events in Catalonia also present an intractable challenge to the continued 
development of the State of Autonomies and the existence of the Spanish state itself. Akin 
to Scotland, the Spanish experience with decentralisation has been relatively harmonious, 
although central governments have increasingly sought to symmetrise the decentralisation 
process in an unjust and ultimately unsuccessful attempt to dilute claims of distinctiveness 
from the historic nationalities. Such attempts, however, have religiously backfired and have 
merely emboldened the nationalist movements in different ACs to pursue further demands 
for territorial reform. This was most evident in the reform of the Catalan Statute, which 
sought change for Catalonia as well as Spain, in the hope that the latter would become a 
much more recognisable plurinational state inasmuch as Catalonia would be accorded the 
status of nationhood. The 2010 judgement of the TC thus put Catalonia and Spain on course 
for a constitutional collision and in the absence of any willingness to reform from the central 
state, or indeed an alternative to the mononational vision peddled by the Rajoy government, 
the Catalan independence movement was propelled centre stage and precipitated the origins 
of the territorial crisis which continues to prevail today. Unlike the UK, the response in 
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Madrid has been to simply dismiss, ignore or denounce the claims for reform or referendum 
from Catalonia, compounded by the refusal of the central government to even enter into 
dialogue on the issues. Events in 2017 – which involved the unofficial referendum, the 
heavy-handed response of state forces to the referendum, the unilateral declaration of 
independence, the suspension of autonomy and the incarceration of a number of pro-
independence politicians and civil society leaders, while others fled to neighbouring 
countries to escape imprisonment – underline the complexity of the situation.  
The stability of the UK and Spain remains in the balance. Neither state has effectively 
developed a plurinationally sensitive political culture in spite of attempts to manage and 
accommodate the states’ national, cultural, social and linguistic diversity, while the other 
themes identified above remain largely contentious. Autonomy arrangements have not stood 
still in either case, but the predominant strategy of muddling through has come under 
increasing strain in recent years, the result of centrifugal and centripetal pressures. In light 
of this, the penultimate section of this chapter, drawing upon the themes identified above 
and the theoretical discussions laid out in Chapter Three, seeks to move beyond the rather 
limiting territorial arrangements already in place to ensure the institutionalisation of a much 
more coherent and accommodative territorial model.   
 
6.4 Forging a Coherent Model of Accommodation 
Writing in 2014 with regards to the development of the Catalan independence 
movement in the face of explicit opposition by the Spanish government, Gagnon (2014: 76) 
posited: ‘the current situation prevailing, for instance, in Spain requires that political and 
social players be uncommonly imaginative; political models that respect national diversity 
must be devised; institutions must be reimagined on a more democratic and equitable basis.’ 
Several years later, the political situation in Spain has become much more complex and in 
desperate need of rejuvenation. This is also the case in the UK, whereby an equally complex 
albeit less confrontational political situation is unfolding and much like in Spain, the 
territorial integrity of the UK state remains in the balance. In light of this, the penultimate 
section of this chapter compares and examines what could be done to help relieve some of 
the inbuilt tensions that permeate relations between the different orders of government in 
both cases. As discussed in the preceding chapters, the UK and Spanish approaches to 
accommodation, while hitherto successful in keeping both states intact, have been 
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increasingly challenged in recent years necessitating a rethink and examination of the 
purpose of the state and the design of its structures.  
 
6.4.1 A Plurinational Culture 
The development and entrenchment of a plurinational culture is an important 
component in ensuring the accommodation of minority nations within plurinational states. 
In addition to this, and underlined by the analysis presented in this thesis, the development 
of a better and more plurinationally sensitive political culture is key to the advancement of 
a more coherent, accommodative and empowering autonomy model. As has been discussed, 
both Spain and the UK have taken dissimilar approaches to the recognition of 
plurinationality, but while the UK remains much further ahead than Spain, a plurinationally 
sensitive political culture is lacking. In both countries, central governments are influenced 
by a unitary rather than plurinational vision which not only impedes and even denies the 
existence of a federalising tendency but has also muddied relations between the different 
orders of government. This, as a result, has undermined positive rhetoric concerning equality 
and partnership (at least in the UK) and has further sewn seeds of mistrust between the 
minority and majority communities.  
A much more plurinationally sensitive approach to politics, which would necessitate 
a much more consensus-based approach to decision-making, as advocated by 
consociationalist scholars, is thus required in both the UK and Spain. In the UK, there are 
some signs of a plurinational culture, but the recent controversy over Brexit has increasingly 
spotlighted the unitary approach of the UK government, which has hitherto taken a monist, 
dated and exclusive rather than inclusive approach to the design of withdrawal policy, 
treating the devolved administrations as consultees rather than partners in the state. In Spain, 
the development of a plurinational culture would have to involve some sort of official 
recognition and consensus among political elites on the plurinational nature of the state. This 
would equally involve change in the mind-set of the central government and state institutions 
engendering a more inclusive approach to politics in which minoritarian preferences are not 
transcended by the will of the majority. The development of a plurinational culture is as 
much about institutions as it is about the thinking and philosophy behind central state 
governmental policy.  
The development of a plurinational culture was described by one interviewee as ‘being 
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more like Switzerland’ (Interview with ERC MP 1). Although not strictly a plurinational 
state, Switzerland’s pluricultural and plurilingual traits have much in common with the two 
cases studied in this thesis. For Burgess (2006: 82), the evolution of Switzerland represents 
‘a unique admixture of political institutions and an indigenous political culture rooted in the 
spirit of Bundestreue – of reciprocity, mutual trust and understanding, tolerance, dignity, 
partnership and respect for and recognition of minorities – that values consensus, 
conciliation, compromise and consent above crude majoritarian calculation’. The assortment 
of values and principles identified by Burgess are integral components for a plurinational 
culture and there is much to be learned for both the UK and Spain by studying Switzerland 
as a case study. The focus on bargaining, negotiation and compromise as well as 
Switzerland’s approach to consensus democracy, whereby there is a requirement for 
‘unanimity among the Cantons with respect to certain particularly sensitive questions’, 
would avoid the presumption of central government dominance that has come to characterise 
politics and relations between Scotland the UK, Catalonia and Spain (Pinder, 2007: 9).  
Moves away from a unitary, majoritarian and in the case of Spain mononational 
understanding of the state towards a more plurinational, decentralised and consensual 
approach is a necessary move for the Spanish and UK states. In this vein, the states would 
not only come to be bastions of plurinational respect and justice, but moreover would 
demonstrate a willingness to reform, thus dampening, although not eradicating, the 
secessionist tendencies of the Scottish and Catalan movements. As pointed out by Kymlicka 
(2001a: 118), the removal of secessionist parties and secessionism is an intractable goal and 
in fact is a perverse standard by which to measure the success of a plurinational federal 
political system. Instead, central governments and majority communities should focus on 
building and modelling a political system that rebuilds and fosters trust between and among 
the different communities and orders of government. Plurinational states need to be much 
more flexible in the development of politics in the state, embracing rather than rejecting the 
need to continually evolve and rethink the state, including its telos and political structures.  
Support for secession in Scotland and Catalonia has gradually increased in recent 
years, but while it is easy to consider the rise in secessionism a consequence of 
decentralisation, that is, a slippery slope to secession, the actions of the central government 
must also be taken into account. Grievances from Scotland and Catalonia do not merely 
focus on demands for further autonomy but relate to what they see as unjust and hierarchical 
treatment of the minority nations by the central government. It is thus imperative that if the 
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UK and Spanish states seek to gain the trust and loyalty of minority nations as well as their 
continued membership of the state, majority-minority relations must move beyond the 
existing hierarchical models and institutionalise a new relationship in which consensus 
rather than dominance characterises relations.  
 
6.4.2 Empowerment 
A plurinational culture is key to the development of multinational federalism in the 
UK and Spain. Linked with this is the topic of recognition, including acknowledgement that 
a plurinational federal political system is composed of different demoi, rather than one 
demos and that some of the most important liberal values, such as equality and justice, 
require rethinking and remoulding from the predominant monist interpretation to a much 
more pluralist understanding. In line with better recognition of the plurinational nature of 
the state, plurinational states must also ensure a clear, fair and asymmetric division of 
competences and powers. In plurinational states, the allocation of competences necessitates 
an asymmetrical division of powers in order to protect the identities and heritage of minority 
nations (Keating 1999). This also reinforces the idea of political union between minority 
nations and majority communities as a partnership of co-equals in which diversity and 
national distinctiveness are not merely tolerated but celebrated as integral characteristics of 
the state itself (Gagnon 2014).  
While in the UK recognition of nationhood and support for asymmetry are relatively 
uncontroversial topics, in Spain this is most clearly not the case. Successive Spanish 
governments have sought to recentralise competences from ACs to the central government, 
and while this is often under the guise of economic efficiency, such symmetrisation 
processes seek to dilute claims to distinctiveness from the historic nationalities, thus 
weakening demands for plurinational recognition from the minority nations. The lack of 
recognition of Catalonia, processes of recentralisation and inimicality towards asymmetry 
are plausible factors which have hastened the increase in support for secession in recent 
years. Hence, as well as a better plurinational understanding of the state, a commitment to 
an asymmetrical decentralisation of powers is required. In Spain, such a commitment would 
have to ensure that the interference of the overweening central government upon the 
competences of the ACs is limited. This would also be achieved by a clearer division of 
competences in the Constitution which would provide clear jurisdictions for the different 
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orders of government and would thus reduce the number of disputes between ACs and 
central government. 
Plurinational states face a difficult challenge in finding an equilibrium between 
majority and minority communities and thus centre and sub-state aspirations and wishes. 
Hence, while in Spain there has been hesitance by PSOE and outright rejection by PP 
governments to entrench recognition and deepen asymmetry, when this has occurred it has 
been subject to ‘a majority political backlash’ by the wider Spanish majority community 
(Basta, 2017: 56). Yet, while there is evident hostility towards entrenching a special status 
for Catalonia, the process through which asymmetry has evolved – through quid pro quo 
scenarios – has been vehemently criticised by some within Spanish society, which perceive 
Catalonia and the Basque Country as having an unfair advantage over other ACs. This is 
rooted in the nation-state interpretation of Spain propagated by the Constitution which 
denies the recognition of a Catalan demos and thus distorts any understanding of Catalan 
claims for asymmetry as a necessary requisite to protect its cultural heritage and national 
identity. Therefore, what is required in Spain is not just recognition of plurinationality and 
a commitment to asymmetry, but also a less opaque and more consensual model of 
coexistence which would better accommodate Catalonia and assuage complaints from the 
majority community.  
In Scotland, there is relatively little controversy surrounding explicit recognition or 
asymmetry. Devolution, however, was designed to contain rather than empower Scottish 
aspirations for autonomy (and indeed, independent nationhood) and while the powers of the 
Scottish Parliament have gradually increased in recent years, the Brexit debate has once 
again refocused debate on the capabilities of Holyrood as well as the ability and robustness 
of devolution settlements to weather radical change such as leaving the EU. The default 
position of the UK government, which was to take control of all powers returning from 
Brussels irrespective of the allocation of competences in the devolution acts, demonstrates 
the vulnerability of the devolution settlement to be unilaterally altered without the consent 
of Scotland. Thus, as much in Spain as in the UK, central governments must see political 
decentralisation not as the central government relinquishing control over policy areas, but 
as a necessary feature of modern, democratic and just plurinational states. A model of 
coexistence in plurinational states should be informed by some of the values and principles 
identified in the preceding section but should also use decentralisation as a tool to empower 
minority communities. Through proper recognition, a fair and clear distribution of 
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competences and powers and a commitment from central governments to work with rather 
than at the expense of governments in minority nations would go a long way to resolving 
some of the tensions that currently characterise relations between Scotland and the UK and 
Catalonia and Spain.  
 
6.4.3 Voice at the Centre 
Guaranteeing the empowerment of minority nations is achieved by the entrenchment 
of asymmetrical self-rule as well as ensuring the participation of minority nations in the 
decision-making processes of the central government. It is a truism that enhanced autonomy 
should result in decreased influence at the centre, as for example is the case in the UK House 
of Commons and the implementation of English Votes for English Laws, but in neither Spain 
nor the UK are Catalonia or Scotland guaranteed a role at the centre. Scotland and Catalonia 
are not represented as territorial entities in the second chambers, have no entrenched veto 
power and are guaranteed no role in the appointment of personnel to state institutions, such 
as the TC or UKSC. The latter point contrasts with other plurinational states such as Belgium 
and Canada. The Belgian Constitution, for example, provides for six French and six Dutch 
speaking judges to sit on the Constitutional Court (Swenden, 2006: 81), while in Canada, 
three of the nine judges that sit on the Supreme Court must come from Quebec (Tierney, 
2004: 211).  
The UK and Spain have second chambers, but these are not organised along territorial 
lines. Consequently, central government decision-making processes and institutions are not 
obliged to take into consideration minority nation preferences. Reform of the House of Lords 
and Spanish Senate into territorially representative chambers would be a welcome change 
in the UK and Spain that would not only ensure a guaranteed role for Scotland and Catalonia 
at the centre but would further deepen democracy and in turn bolster the democratic 
legitimacy of the extant upper houses. In state institutions, Scotland and Catalonia remain 
marginalised minorities which as a result of territorial arithmetic can be simply ignored by 
majority communities and governing parties. This, for instance, was the case in the Spanish 
Senate when Catalan autonomy was suspended despite the majority of Senators representing 
Catalonia voting against the measure (Interview with ERC and PDeCAT Senators). In the 
UK, clear examples include the SNP’s proposed double majority rule for the EU referendum 
and amendments to the EU (Withdrawal) bill as relates to the repatriation of powers which 
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despite being supported by a clear majority of Scottish MPs were voted down by other non-
Scottish parliamentarians (Interview with SNP MSP 2). The demands, viewpoints and 
wishes of minorities are rendered obsolete by the combined votes of the majority 
community. 
Recasting the House of Lords as a territorially representative chamber to provide a 
space in which the aspirations, interests and wishes of the UK’s four nations can be debated 
and deliberated would be a considerable advance in deepening the UK’s commitment to 
plurinational justice and improving the democratic legitimacy of the House of Lords. In 
Spain, reforming the Senate into a chamber that represents the ACs rather than provinces 
would further improve the standing of the institution and warrant increased influence and 
voice for the state’s ACs at the centre. In the UK and Spain, the existence of a territorially 
representative chamber would underscore the commitment of the plurinational states to 
minority accommodation, assuring more than a representative role for minorities.  
In addition to the establishment of a second chamber as a multilateral cooperative 
forum, IGR in both cases also need radical reformulation in order to replace the hierarchical 
structures that currently exist and ensure that a more inclusive, consensus-based approach 
prevails. Relations between minorities and majorities are often a key measurement in 
determining the success of plurinational states thus the organisation of IGR is a crucial 
component. Governments in both the UK and Spain have created forums to facilitate IGR 
but the dominant presence of the central government which organises meetings, sets the 
agenda and chairs proceedings, inhibits the development of these forums as instruments of 
influence for minority nations. Instead, IGR should be reformulated as mechanisms that 
bring together the different governments to discuss, debate, bargain and negotiate central 
government policy and decisions that have implications for the sub-state entities. This way, 
IGR would fortify the interconnectedness of the existing states, providing an arena in which 
agreements could be reached through a process of bargaining and negotiation rather than 
central government imposition. 
In the UK, IGR were slightly reformed in the aftermath of the EU referendum, but 
apart from a change in nomenclature, the JMC remains a forum in which the devolved 
administrations are mere consultees. As a consequence of EU withdrawal, IGR will be 
crucial to manage the ramifications of territorial politics of Brexit, particularly the messy 
task of disentangling competence jurisdictions on repatriated powers and ensuring coherent 
frameworks that do not endanger the UK’s own single market. To this end, the only viable 
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way forward is to radically redesign IGR to ensure the development of a more coherent 
system that continues to be a forum for the dissemination of information, but also moves 
beyond this to become an arena in which the different orders of government can work 
together, negotiate and where necessary compromise. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 
Four, the creation of a UK Council of Ministers, modelled along the British-Irish Council to 
bring together the devolved parliaments with the Westminster Parliament would also be a 
beneficial addition to the UK’s extant IPR architecture, fortifying relations between 
parliaments as much as governments.   
IGR in Spain oscillate between a number of forums, but as in the UK, the central 
government is the omnipotent player. Increased tensions between the Catalan and Spanish 
governments in recent years have rendered IGR a difficult if not impossible task between 
these two entities, but it is precisely because of this conflict that improvements are urgent. 
As is the case in Scotland, bilateral relations should remain an integral component of Spanish 
intergovernmental architecture, but emphasis should also be placed on multilateral forums 
to enable the smooth delivery of concurrent polices as well as effective procedures for 
conflict resolution. This point is of equal importance in both cases studies in this thesis, 
whereby a more inclusive approach should be taken towards policy-making, and those 
policies and approaches which could potentially inflame existing tensions or infringe upon 
devolved competence jurisdictions should be avoided.  
In addition to reforms of second chambers and IGR, the role of minority nations at the 
centre can equally increase as a result of other mechanisms such as veto powers (for 
example, over constitutional change), the inclusion of minority nations in central 
government delegations and securing an appointment role for sub-state entities in appointing 
personnel for state institutions. Neither Scotland nor Catalonia wield any veto power over 
constitutional change and do not have any guaranteed role in appointing personnel to state 
institutions. Representatives from devolved governments in both cases have in the past 
formed part of delegations representing the state at the supranational level, but this role is 
relatively limited and does not include powers to negotiate separately from the line taken by 
the central government (Interview with SNP MSP 1). As the UK leaves the EU and rounds 
of negotiations begin on securing international trade deals with other countries, there is 
potential for the UK government to increase the role of the devolved administrations by 
involving them in the negotiation processes of signing trade agreements. With the devolution 
of further powers to the devolved territories and a need for more efficient IGR to secure the 
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common frameworks necessary to safeguard and manage the UK’s internal market, bringing 
devolved governments on board in trade negotiations would be a welcome development. 
This, for instance, would not only ensure closer coordination and cooperation among the 
plurality of political orders, but would avoid the top down decision-making approach that 
has hitherto characterised IGR and would provide the devolved governments with a real 
opportunity to contribute to and influence central government policy. 
Part of the problem of the UK and Spain relates to the influence of majoritarian 
principles and outlook that characterise the political system. In plurinational states, however, 
the idea of a single demos endorsed by the majoritarian approach is highly controversial and 
thus an unfeasible way for the state to be organised or function. An alternative approach as 
we have seen is consociationalism and while this thesis is not suggesting that the UK or 
Spain should become fully-fledged consociations, there are a number of important lessons 
that can be learned in order to move beyond the constitutional stalemate prevailing in both 
countries and rebuild confidence and trust in central government and central state 
institutions. The mechanisms mentioned above do just this and would ensure a much more 
inclusive approach to governing in which there is political inclusion at an institutional level 
and the interests of minority nations are not just heard but listened to. 
 
6.4.4 Partnership 
The notion of partnership is a central tenet of liberal nationalist scholarship. Minority 
nations, it is posited, do no solely seek accommodation and empowerment within the 
plurinational state, but equally desire recognition as an equal partner (Gagnon 2014). In both 
Scotland and Catalonia, there is an indisputable wish for this recognition, yet central 
governments have been less forthcoming. In the words of Tierney (2004: 327): 
Even when the plurinational state constitutionally entrenches territorial 
decentralisation; even when the state endeavours to be democratic and inclusive; 
and even when the dominant national identity is presented as multicultural and 
multilingual; at a fundamental level such a vision still possesses homogenising 
tendencies which serve to undermine the alternative nation-building processes 
and national visions which are central to the existence of sub-state national 
societies.   
Decentralisation processes in the UK and Spain created the necessary working 
relationships between the different orders of government (although this has been much more 
strained in Catalonia than in Scotland), but what is missing from extant relations is a sense 
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of partnership predicated on mutual respect and equality in which the sub-state units are not 
treated as mere subordinates or offshoots of the central government and state institutions, 
but as equal partners. For one SNP interviewee, ‘involving us [Scottish government] and 
making us part of the process’ would demonstrate ‘a genuine commitment to partnership’ 
and dissipate the ‘us versus them’ mentality that hitherto characterises centre-periphery 
relations (Interview with SNP MSP 9). A similar point was made in Catalonia in which 
mechanisms to ensure the participation of ACs ‘in making the will of the state’ were 
considered the most optimal route to ensure effective shared rule and forge a more equal 
sense of partnership between Catalonia and the central state (Interview with PSC MP 1).  
As discussed in Chapter Four, the terms of union with England allowed Scotland to 
enter into political partnership with the former as an equal partner in 1707, albeit this was a 
Scottish not English interpretation. Over the centuries, however, the relationship has 
transmuted from this perceived equality to one in which Scotland is the mere junior partner. 
The SNP’s case for independence remains predicated on the idea of renewing the 
relationship between Scotland and the rest of the UK, described in the White Paper on 
independence as an opportunity to have ‘a new, updated partnership of equals between the 
people of Scotland and the rest of the UK’ (Scottish Government, 2013: 29). During the 
campaign, pro-union politicians made much noise about the UK as a ‘family of nations’, but 
rhetoric of equal partnership was equally employed by the same politicians, including party 
leaders in Scotland and parliamentarians in Westminster (Cameron 2014). In spite of these 
warm words, however, developments since the vote to leave the EU have reignited debates 
about the hierarchical structures of territorial politics.  
Under Sewel, the Westminster Parliament would ‘not normally’ interfere in devolved 
matters unless permitted to do so by the Scottish Parliament. For the UK government, 
bolstered by the UKSC’s judgement on Sewel, Brexit represents an extraordinary 
circumstance, but the plurinational nature of the UK renders unilateral action by the UK 
government a risky and problematic affair, particularly in terms of strengthening claims that 
the union represents an equal partnership. If ‘not normally’ is simply dictated by the UK 
government’s own interpretation, then the convention itself, is moot. Instead, Westminster 
needs to move beyond this unitary conception and see the devolved nations not merely as 
constituent components of the state, but as integral and equal partners in the UK.  
Having gone through an existential crisis in 2014, the union is once again under strain. 
The actions of the UK government, however, demonstrate that lessons have yet to be learned 
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in relation to the territorial organisation of the state and addressing the widening gulf 
between the role and status Scotland envisages at the centre of the state and the role it 
currently plays. What is required in the UK and ties in with the preceding sections on 
fostering a more plurinational culture and empowering minority nations, is a fundamental 
re-conceptualisation of the UK state and the relationship of its constituent nations with the 
centre to secure the right form of partnership between the plurality of political orders. For 
Scotland, this should be nothing short of recognition of equal partnership which would entail 
an increased role for the Scottish government at the centre and would end the hierarchical 
and domineering relationship that remains in play today. There is no agreed approach on 
how this could be achieved but moves in a federal or confederal direction would certainly 
help to offset some of the principal complaints of minority nations vis-à-vis equality and 
partnership (Anderson 2016b).  
Unlike in the UK, relations between the Spanish state and the Catalan government 
have reached an impasse in recent years. In a similar fashion to Scotland, grievances in 
Catalonia are shaped by the absence of a sense of partnership whereby Catalonia would be 
treated on the same level pegging as the Spanish government. In Spain, the existence of 16 
other ACs, including two other historic nationalities, provides a competitive dynamic that 
exists in the UK but is less pronounced. Equal partnership, however, as much as in Scotland 
as in Catalonia, is about reciprocal recognition and effective shared rule to increase the voice 
of Catalonia at the centre. This would require a recasting of intergovernmental forums, both 
bilateral and multilateral, as well as reform of the Senate along territorial lines to ensure a 
vehicle for the voice of Catalonia to be heard and listened to. 
Given the almost complete breakdown of relations in recent years, there is a sense of 
urgency for the Spanish government to be much more genuine and indeed imaginative in 
the ways it interacts with Catalonia. This, for instance, would necessitate mutual respect for 
self-government institutions, and thus refrainment from policy encroachment, as well as 
pursuing a much more inclusive approach to governing including reforming IGR to ensure 
that existing forums become mechanisms that foster inclusive debate to enable ACs to 
influence central government policy. Moreover, recourse to the courts should be considered, 
by both orders of government, as a measure of last rather than first resort. In this light, 
governments would have to work together, in the spirit of good faith and compromise, to 
resolve political problems, but do so in a fair, transparent and equal manner. This would not 
just meet the necessary prerequisites of a plurinational federal political system, as well as be 
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in line with liberal nationalism, but would further strengthen the bonds of cooperation and 
trust between the different governments.  
Nurturing a sense of equal partnership is an integral component to the development 
and entrenchment of the UK and Spain as plurinational states. It is no secret, as discussed 
by liberal nationalist scholars, that seeking equal-to-equal relations with state governments 
is an overriding objective of minority nations (Kymlicka 2001a; Gagnon 2014; Nootens 
2013; Norman 2006; Requejo 2003; Seymour 2004). States, however, in spite of 
decentralising power or institutionalising some form of official recognition for national 
minorities, have been slow in taking up the mantle to develop a sense of equal partnership. 
In the UK and Spain this is rooted in and shaped by the monist and unitary interpretation of 
the state by political elites which unfairly dismiss and disregard the wishes of minority 
nations in favour of their own majoritarian positions. Given the tradition of institutionalised 
domination and by implication exclusion of minority preferences in the UK and Spain, 
moving beyond this towards a more equal and shared sense of partnership is no mean feat. 
Recent events in Scotland and Catalonia demonstrate, however, that the continued loyalty 
of these minority nations cannot and should not be taken for granted.  
 
6.5 Scotland and Catalonia beyond 2018 
The UK and Spain are states in constitutional flux. In the latter, events in the latter half 
of 2017 reignited latent tensions and further deepened the widening gulf between the Catalan 
and Spanish governments, while in the UK, EU withdrawal will not only alter political 
dynamics across all four territories but could potentially precipitate the secession of 
Scotland. In both states, territorial politics remains a moving target.  
The UK’s withdrawal from the EU has already tarnished relations between the Scottish 
and UK governments, namely as a result of the UK government’s approach to triggering 
Article 50, withdrawal negotiations (in which the devolved governments have played no 
formal role) and the ongoing preparation for the repatriation of powers. In addition to this, 
the aftermath of EU withdrawal looks set to be equally challenging, compounded by the fact 
that different political parties hold the reins of power in Westminster and Holyrood (and 
Cardiff and Belfast), with diametrically opposing constitutional visions. In Spain, the 
elevation of the PSOE to government in June 2018 increased the potential for a thawing of 
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tensions between the Spanish and Catalan governments but demands for an independence 
referendum have not dissipated. Unlike the previous administration, territorial reform is high 
on the agenda of the Sánchez government, but while the latter has restored bilateral relations 
in an attempt to reinstate dialogue between the two entities, the PSOE government remains 
resolute in its opposition to an independence referendum. This is further compounded by the 
legal charges brought against former ministers and senior officials involved in the 
organisation of the referendum. The constitutional future of both cases remains as uncertain 
as it is unknown.   
Drawing upon the analysis discussed in the preceding chapters, there are broadly three 
potential scenarios for the constitutional landscape of both countries in the near future: 
recentralisation, reformulation and disintegration. 
 
6.5.1 Recentralisation 
Autonomy arrangements in Spain and the UK are precarious in nature and thus at risk 
of recentralisation. The aggressive reassertion of parliamentary sovereignty by Theresa 
May’s Conservative government, and indeed the Leave campaign more generally during and 
after the EU referendum, has reignited fears of a recentralising agenda shaped by the unitary 
understanding and vision endorsed by leading political elites in the upper echelons of the 
UK state. Despite rhetoric championing a UK approach to EU withdrawal, which would as 
a consequence of the differing results necessitate discussion and compromise between the 
different orders of government, the PM has hitherto failed to secure consensus among the 
devolved administrations. Instead, the UK government has sought to assert its authority on 
the devolved governments, reinforcing the vulnerability of devolution and the hierarchical 
nature of autonomy in the UK. 
As discussed in Chapter Four, the UK government has somewhat softened its approach 
with regards to the repatriation of powers but to date the Scottish government has yet to 
approve of the UK government’s approach or legislation. There is agreement among the 
different orders of government that there will be a requirement for common frameworks as 
relates to certain repatriated powers in order to ensure policy consistency and/or 
coordination. What is unclear, however, is the manner in which these common frameworks 
will be reached. Both the Scottish and Welsh governments have called for clarity on this 
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approach as well as advanced a number of ideas which posit that common frameworks must 
be the result of negotiation, compromise and consensus from all parties involved and not, as 
has been the UK government’s approach hitherto, diktat. In the absence of reform, as 
discussed in the preceding section, the UK government risks not only undermining the 
fundamental and foundational principles of devolution but could seriously jeopardise the 
continued existence of the union itself. Sandford and Gormley-Heenan (2018: 10) sum up 
the importance of this point: ‘at present, the danger lies in the contrast between the previous 
pattern of generous concessions to the devolved administrations, and non-interference by 
the UK government, and a future unilateral (even if temporary) reassertion of central 
sovereignty to accommodate the consequences of Brexit.’ 
In Spain, there is an equal if not increased risk of recentralisation. While the incumbent 
PSOE government advocates further territorial reform, both the PP and C’s favour bringing 
the Spanish experience of decentralisation to a firm halt, with support for the recentralisation 
of certain powers. As has been discussed, recentralisation has been a firm feature of Spanish 
politics as both PP and PSOE governments have sought to rein in the powers and 
distinctiveness of the historic nationalities to engender a more equal distribution of 
competences among all ACs. Recentralisation also became a common feature under the 
Rajoy governments, sold as a necessary strategy in order to balance the books of ACs during 
the years of recession (Muro 2015). While there is no denying that there was a need to tighten 
the strings of the public purse, in Catalonia such financial recentralisation was perceived as 
an ideologically and politically motivated strategy rather than any deep concern with 
balancing the books.  
In addition to this, the application of Article 155 was considered firm proof of the 
vulnerability of autonomy arrangements in Spain, which could be overturned by a vote in 
the Senate, and of the recentralising impulse that is inherent in Spanish territorial politics. 
As a number of interviewees pointed out, the recentralisation agenda of the Rajoy 
government was an unequivocal factor in precipitating the growth of support for 
independence throughout Catalonia. Yet, despite the restoration of Catalonia’s self-
government institutions and attempts by the PSOE government to uphold dialogue in 
seeking a political solution to what is after all a political problem, Sánchez has made clear 
that he is not averse to reapplying Article 155 if progress is not made (Ortega 2018). To 
exacerbate this further, both the PP and C’s not only support the reapplication of Article 155 
and are overt in advocating this approach, but also support the recentralisation of important 
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policy areas such as education which they accuse the Catalan government of using as a tool 
of ‘indoctrination’ in favour of independence (Sanmartín 2018). The parties unsurprisingly 
reject the language of centralisation, but there is a clear concern that the election of a PP or 
C’s government would negatively impact current autonomy arrangements.  
 
6.5.2 Reformulation 
Autonomy arrangements in both the UK and Spain have evolved over the last few 
decades and as a result of recent events will continue to do so in the near future. 
Arrangements in Spain have been ripe for reform for a number of years, but the lack of 
consensus among political elites has inhibited any progress on this front. Alongside 
Podemos, the newly appointed socialist government are the most vociferous advocates of 
territorial and constitutional reform, with support for a number of changes including, reform 
of the Senate, naming the ACs in the Constitution, an overhaul of IGR and reform of 
financial arrangements. In addition, the incumbent government also supports the creation of 
a new Catalan Statute (Díez 2018), but as was made clear in interviews for this thesis, 
support for this is limited to the PSC, PSOE and Podemos.  
The PSOE’s preference is for the transition towards a fully-fledged federal system, 
which advocates believe, akin to those proponents of federalism in the UK, would relieve 
some of the tensions that have grown over the years as a result of political decentralisation 
and the growing salience of identity politics. The path towards federalism, however, as much 
in Spain as in the UK, is fraught with impediments, not least the lack of support among 
political elites and the public alike. In the meantime, however, the Sánchez government has 
shown a willingness to listen to the grievances of the Catalan government and has already 
sought to recast and reform intergovernmental machinery so as to ensure better relations 
between the two governments. In addition, the PSOE oversaw the restoration of the 
Generalitat and has sought to temper the acrimonious relations that characterised the Rajoy 
government’s relationship with Catalonia, through engaging in dialogue, albeit this remains 
limited on the issue of an independence referendum.  
The problem is, however, that while much noise has been made about the 
reinstatement of dialogue between the Catalan and Spanish governments, if the parameters 
of dialogue are unilaterally decided by the central government, which would preclude any 
discussion on the issue of an independence referendum, then there is little prospect for a 
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palatable solution for both sides. It is important, therefore, not to overstate the effect of the 
Sánchez administration; a state of cautious optimism should prevail. The PSOE, after all, 
have only 85 seats in Parliament. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter Five, while there is 
support for territorial reform in Catalonia, primarily constitutional recognition and reform 
of Catalonia’s fiscal arrangements, the debate continues to revolve around the celebration of 
an independence referendum, staunchly opposed by the PSOE. As in the UK over Brexit, 
there is a fundamental clash between the conception of sovereignty in Spain and Catalonia. 
In this regard, territorial reform may appease some grievances in Catalonia, but seeking an 
agreed solution to settle Catalonia’s future territorial status, remains high on the agenda and 
will involve some difficult, but necessary conversations.  
Territorial reform will also be a feature of the UK’s post-Brexit landscape with 
Scotland poised to experience its fourth iteration of devolution. The Scottish government’s 
proposals for a differentiated Brexit, which would not necessarily look out of place in the 
UK’s already highly asymmetric territorial layout, was firmly rejected by the UK 
government, with the added caveat that as a result of EU withdrawal the devolved 
administrations’ powers would increase. In addition to this, the Scottish government (2016: 
1) has called for ‘a fundamental review of the UK’s constitutional arrangements’ to eschew 
any attempts at recentralisation by Westminster as well as to better facilitate policy delivery 
in Scotland and tailor such policies to Scottish-specific needs. Thus, in addition to calling 
for the direct repatriation of those powers currently under the purview of the EU, the Scottish 
government has also called for the devolution of further powers on matters such as 
employment law, equalities legislation, health and safety regulations and consumer 
protection laws.  
As discussed in Chapter Four, EU withdrawal is hailed by pro-union parties as an 
opportune moment to think seriously about devolved settlements as well as the purpose of 
the union itself. It is clear that as a result of withdrawal the powers of the Scottish Parliament 
will grow, but the hesitance on the part of the UK government to cede immediately those 
powers which are legally already devolved underlines that the repatriation of powers will be 
anything but a smooth process. The need for common frameworks will require reform of 
intergovernmental machinery, but as noted in the previous section, the UK government’s 
penchant for control may significantly affect relations between the different governments 
and the future of the union, too.  
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6.5.3 Disintegration 
The third and final scenario discussed in this chapter is the prospect of state 
disintegration. In the UK, the independence issue was not settled by the 2014 referendum 
and in light of Brexit, the issue was placed back on the table, supported by a vote in the 
Scottish Parliament in March 2017 to call for the transfer of power from Westminster to 
Holyrood to hold a second referendum. In light of the SNP’s electoral performance in the 
2017 general election, in which anti-independence parties won 21 of the SNP’s previously 
gained 56 seats, the Scottish government shelved any immediate plans for a referendum but 
has consistently argued that as a consequence of EU withdrawal, a second referendum must 
be held.  
The UK government, in line with tradition, did not wholly reject the Scottish 
Parliament’s call for another referendum, although Theresa May, clearly having learned the 
lesson of the previous vote, is indisputably less forthcoming than her predecessor. Yet, while 
it is true that Brexit may be the trigger for a second vote on Scotland’s constitutional status, 
EU withdrawal equally complicates the issue. On the one hand, during the 2014 referendum 
campaign, the future status of Scotland within the EU was a central issue, with opinion 
divided as to whether or not Scotland would remain inside or outside the EU in the event of 
an affirmative vote for independence. Prominent politicians, including the leader of the 
Scottish Conservatives, Ruth Davidson, for instance, argued forcefully against 
independence as a way to ensure continued Scottish membership in the EU, claiming ‘[i]t’s 
disingenuous … to say No means out and Yes means in, when actually the opposite is true. 
No means we stay in’ (Davidson 2014). EU withdrawal thus changes the context of a second 
independence vote, hence the UK government’s hesitance in agreeing to it.  
On the other hand, as was underlined by the results of the 2017 election, while support 
for independence has remained steady around the 40-45% mark, the prospect of another 
referendum campaign as well as further constitutional upheaval, is an unattractive prospect 
to many voters in Scotland, including those who voted for independence in 2014 and for the 
SNP at the 2015 and 2016 elections (Curtice 2017). Added to this is the fact that the SNP’s 
policy of independence in Europe is strongly opposed by a portion of the SNP’s 
membership; Euroscepticism is not a uniquely English phenomenon. The fall in support for 
the SNP at the 2017 election has temporarily removed the referendum issue from political 
debate, but the ramifications of Brexit, with specific focus on how the UK government treats 
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the devolved administrations in the aftermath of withdrawal, may very well precipitate an 
opportunity for Scots to once again go to the polls. The result of that vote, as would be the 
case in Catalonia, is far from being a foregone conclusion.  
In the absence of an agreed solution to the Catalan independence quagmire, the 
prospect of state disintegration remains increased. Exacerbating this prospect is the fact that 
pro-independence politicians and civil society activists remain in prison facing charges of 
up to 25 years for the role they played in organising the 2017 vote. As mentioned above, 
while the change in government in Madrid may herald an advance in relations between the 
Catalan and Spanish governments, the PSOE remains wedded to the idea of indivisible 
sovereignty and thus opposed to any referendum on independence. Paradoxically, however, 
the intransigence of Spanish political elites to recognise Catalonia as a political entity and 
facilitate a negotiated referendum, preceded by a campaign in which both sides put forward 
their cases, as took place in Scotland, may hasten rather than impede territorial breakup. The 
reinstatement of dialogue is clearly a very important step in re-establishing and improving 
relations between the Spanish and Catalan governments, but failure to engage seriously on 
the independence issue not only imperils future relations with Catalonia but endangers the 
continued existence of the Spanish state itself.  
The Catalan independence movement, as previously discussed, is anything but 
homogenous. Political parties and civil society organisations are united by the same goal, 
but the means of achieving this differ. A negotiated solution, which would involve a state-
approved referendum, remains the most favoured solution, but no pro-independence party 
has completely rejected the unilateral route. Opinion remains divided across and within pro-
independence parties on this issue, but for some, the intransigence of the Spanish state in 
organising a referendum renders the pursuit of a negotiated solution obsolete; unilateralism 
is framed as the only solution (Interview with CUP MP). In the absence of an agreed solution 
with Spanish authorities, the unilateral option remains on the table, but while it is clear that 
this is not the most desired route to ensure the creation and international recognition of an 
independent Catalan republic, it would incontrovertibly shake the already wobbly pillars of 
the Spanish state.  
The scenarios sketched here show that the future constitutional layout of the Spanish 
and UK states lie among three options: recentralisation, reformulation and disintegration. 
Recent events in Scotland and Catalonia have already had significantly destabilising effects 
on the territorial settlements entrenched in each case, but demonstrate that any resolution of 
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current constitutional quagmires will have clear ramifications for the evolution of territorial 
politics. In both cases, circumstances are conducive to further territorial reform, but the 
direction of travel remains unknown. Moves towards any of the three scenarios discussed 
here will depend on the future context and circumstances in both countries, namely the 
consequences of EU withdrawal in the UK and the negotiation of an independence 
referendum in Catalonia, as well as the outcome of the trials of those pro-independence 
politicians held in prison. Only time will tell.  
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7. Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
This thesis has examined the evolution of territorial politics in the UK and Spain with 
particular focus on the development of politics in Scotland and Catalonia vis-à-vis autonomy 
and secession. As discussed in the Introduction, this concluding chapter serves three 
purposes. First, it provides an overview of the thesis. Second, it summarises the findings of 
the research by revisiting the main research questions. Finally, I identify some of the 
implications and limitations of the study, as well as potential avenues for future research.  
 
7.1 Overview and Contribution of the Thesis 
In recent years the study of territorial politics has undergone a renaissance. In a new 
book published on territorial politics in 2018, the editors discuss this resurgence of interest, 
noting ‘given the territorial flux in the modern system of nation-states – with the creation of 
new states and the dissolution of others – it should not come as much surprise that the study 
of territorial politics has enjoyed something of a renaissance in the last thirty-odd years’ 
(Hepburn and Detterbeck, 2018: 2). This study, having examined the evolution of territorial 
politics in the UK and Spain, contributes to this evolving research agenda. In addition to 
this, the research also builds upon previous studies related to the nationalist movements in 
Scotland and Catalonia as well as deepens knowledge, both normatively and empirically, in 
relation to how plurinational states manage and accommodate national minorities within 
democratic political systems.  
As discussed at the beginning of this thesis, a study of the UK and Spain is not novel. 
Recent events in both cases, however, have further illuminated the evolving nature of 
territorial politics as well as the challenges plurinational states face in the management of 
national minorities within extant state structures. In this vein, this thesis has charted the 
historic development of territorial politics in both the UK and Spain, as well as analysed its 
more recent evolution, taking into account the political difficulties, potential outcomes and 
spill-over effects of seismic political events, namely EU withdrawal and Catalan demands 
for an independence referendum, that continue to be debated in the current political systems 
and whose ramifications will have lasting effects for years if not decades to come. It has 
done so through a combination of normative and empirical research, including the theories 
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of liberal nationalism and multinational federalism and interviews with the main political 
actors within the Scottish and Catalan political systems.  
Having taken stock of the different autonomy arrangements in both countries, mapped 
the evolution of territorial politics in Scotland and Catalonia as well as compared the 
different strategies employed by the UK and Spanish governments, this thesis build on and 
contributes to a number of areas of existing literature. First, the analysis offered in this thesis 
provides a detailed and in-depth assessment of the autonomy arrangements within Scotland 
and Catalonia anchored within a wider discussions regarding the territorial strategies 
employed by successive Spanish and state governments. Given the heating up of territorial 
tensions in both cases in recent years, and as discussed in the preceding chapter, such 
tensions are set to continue in the foreseeable future, a detailed account of the arrangements 
employed in both cases offers a number of pivotal insights to better understand the specific 
nuances of each case, particularly how political communities and elites envision and 
perceive institutional arrangements as well as wider implications for the management of 
self-determining aspirations, both internal and external, in plurinational states. In this vein, 
the thesis also contributes to a better understanding of the dynamics between majority and 
minority nationalisms in both cases, as well as the wider theoretical debate. As discussed in 
Chapter Two, the study of majority nationalism within plurinational contexts has yet to 
receive sustained attention. The research in this thesis thus contributes to this important area 
of study through placing the territorial strategies employed by successive Spanish and UK 
governments under the scholarly microscope.  
Third, as pointed out in Chapter Three, multinational federalism, while theoretically 
sound remains lacking in detail in terms of its application to real world political examples. 
This thesis, therefore, has contributed to this endeavour through adding empirical flesh to 
multinational federalism’s theoretical bones. It does so through developing a better 
understanding of the main limitations of autonomy strategies currently used in Spain and the 
UK to manage the autonomy and secessionist demands of their national minorities in 
Scotland and Catalonia. What is more, in drawing upon some of the discussions from the 
wider literature related to comparative politics and conflict studies, the analysis illuminates 
the importance of moving beyond prescribed models of autonomy in order to examine other 
mechanisms and avenues to offset potential limitations and thus ensure the entrenchment 
and development of a more coherent model of autonomy that satisfies both minority and 
majority communities.  
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Finally, linking the points detailed above and drawing upon the normative and 
empirical discussions in the thesis, the research posits a number of potential scenarios for 
the future evolution of territorial politics in both cases. In so doing, the thesis contributes to 
ongoing empirical discussions concerning the future trajectory of the UK and Spain, 
Scotland and Catalonia. The scenarios sketched here caution against complacency that 
plurinational states such as the UK and Spain are destined to hold together in perpetuity and 
further underline the importance in engaging in frank yet constructive discussions 
undergirded by a plurinational and federal spirt in order to ensure the development and 
entrenchment of a more accommodative and resilient territorial model. In the next section, 
I summarise the main findings of the thesis in relation to the main question and sub-questions 
of the study.  
 
7.2 Main Findings: The Research Questions Revisited 
This thesis has examined the recent evolution of territorial politics in the UK and 
Spain, with specific focus on Scotland and Catalonia. In taking stock of the autonomy 
models in these territories, I have discussed some of the principal limitations of extant 
arrangements, particularly in relation to the accommodation, empowerment and recognition 
of national minorities and their autonomy-enhancing and secessionist aspirations. Moreover, 
and drawing upon both normative and empirical discussions, I have provided some 
suggestions vis-à-vis potential reform of territorial arrangements to ensure the development 
and further entrenchment of a more coherent and accommodative plurinational model of 
autonomy.  
This section presents a summary of the findings of this study by reviewing the three 
sub-research questions of the thesis. The first sub question, ‘How have the UK and Spain 
responded to demands in Scotland and Catalonia for autonomy and secession?’ was 
addressed through analysis of both the historical and more recent approaches taken by 
successive Spanish and UK governments to deal with the autonomy and secessionist 
demands of the Scottish and Catalan movements.  
The UK is very much a state comfortable with its plurinational makeup and has used 
a combination of symbolic recognition, self-rule and shared rule to manage the evolving 
demands of the Scottish nationalist movement vis-à-vis autonomy and more recently, 
secession. Unlike Spain, symbolic recognition has been a central strategy to recognise the 
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distinctiveness of Scotland within the parameters of the UK. This is evident in state symbols, 
but also in the recognition of Scotland as a nation with a legitimate demos. The creation of 
the Scottish Office and Secretary of State for Scotland and the overrepresentation of 
Scotland in the House of Commons (until 2005) demonstrate the UK’s experience with 
shared rule, albeit this was and remains weak, particularly when compared to other 
plurinational states. Calls for improved shared rule mechanisms have thus far gone 
unheeded. The UK government sought to potentially correct this imbalance through the 
creation of the JMC, but as discussed in this thesis, this intergovernmental forum continues 
to perpetuate the hierarchical, UK-government centred approach that characterises IGR in 
the UK. Self-rule has been used by successive UK governments to not only manage the 
autonomy-associated demands of the Scottish nationalist movement, but to impede support 
for secessionism, as was the case with ‘the vow’ in the 2014 referendum campaign. The 
nature of the UK Constitution allows for a flexible approach to autonomy and as a result the 
powers of the Scottish government and Parliament have increased since the advent of 
devolution in the late 1990s.  
Spain, on the other hand, contrasts with the UK approach. There are points of 
similarity, but this is mainly limited to self-rule provisions; there is an almost complete 
absence of meaningful symbolic recognition. This is a result of the historical approach 
towards minority nationalism in the Spanish state. While the UK has long recognised the 
existence of competing nationalist movements within the state and the importance of 
recognising the distinctiveness of these different territories, the Spanish state-building 
experience sought to create an ethnically homogenous state. There have been, as discussed 
in Chapter Five, stages of decentralised rule, but until the late 1970s these were infrequent 
periods. The decentralisation programme rolled out in the aftermath of Franco’s death in the 
late 1970s has been the principal tool for successive Spanish governments to manage 
competing nationalist programmes in Spain, but these structures were designed to contain 
rather than empower what became known as the historic nationalities. A key feature in the 
management of plurinationalism in Spain that has been mostly eschewed in the UK relates 
to the role of the judiciary. The UK’s experience with devolution is characterised by 
relatively low levels of litigation while the opposite is true in Spain. This, in part, is a result 
of the open-ended model of autonomy provided for in the Constitution, but is also the 
consequence of the legalistic approach taken by the Rajoy government to manage demands 
for secession in Catalonia. Recourse to the courts, however, has not resolved the situation 
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and in fact has merely further muddied the waters, rendering any political solution to what 
is essentially a political problem a difficult objective to achieve.  
To answer the second sub-question of this thesis, ‘How effective have existing 
autonomy arrangements in the UK and Spain been in accommodating, empowering and 
recognising Scotland and Catalonia’s ethnonational diversity?, I drew upon the normative 
debates developed in Chapter Three as well as the academic literature, interview data and 
document analysis carried out specifically for this thesis.  
A number of strengths in relation to the UK’s autonomy model for Scotland were 
identified including the flexibility of the UK’s constitution which facilitates a pliable rather 
than rigid autonomy model able to evolve to deal with challenges thrown up as a result of 
devolution itself or further demands for autonomy. Accordingly, devolution for Scotland has 
indeed created a very powerful parliament and government insofar as Scotland remains one 
of the most autonomous sub-state territories among the genus of federal and regionalised 
states throughout the world. The development and consolidation of autonomy in Scotland 
has not been completely free of acrimonious debate, but has largely avoided reliance on the 
legal system to solve disputes. In this vein, different orders of government have been forced 
to work together, irrespective of their opposing constitutional visions or ideological 
underpinnings.  
At the same time, however, a number of limitations to existing autonomy 
arrangements were identified. The UK’s experience with devolution can be largely 
characterised as muddling through, dealing with issues and demands as they appear with 
very little concern for the long-term implications of decisions or what this means for the 
future existence of the devolved territories as well as the UK itself and its status as a union-
state. Muddling through, as discussed above, has been beneficial to both the Scottish and 
UK governments in terms of facilitating a flexible approach to autonomy, but concomitantly 
underlines the vulnerability of devolution arrangements, namely as a result of Brexit. The 
repatriation of powers to the UK post-withdrawal has already courted significant 
controversy, a primary consequence of the UK government’s centralist approach which 
seeks to, in true Brexit fashion, ‘take back control’ of these competences before deciding on 
their devolution, thus undermining the fundamental principles of Scotland’s retaining model 
of devolution. In light of this, the repatriation of powers will necessitate precision with 
regards to the jurisdiction of the different powers and competences; muddling through is no 
longer an option.  
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 Linked with this is the lack of shared rule and plurinational culture in the UK. On the 
former, very little attention has been paid to the absence of shared rule in the UK, masked 
by the goodwill approach to IGR and the lack of consensus over reform of the House of 
Lords. Developments in the Scotland Act 2016, which includes concurrent powers over 
social security for example, have already illuminated the need for proper consideration of 
shared rule in the UK, but this has become of increasing importance in preparation for EU 
withdrawal. Indeed, the experience of the JMC has already clearly demonstrated the inability 
of extant IGR arrangements to manage the implications of withdrawing from the EU. In this 
vein, the absence of effective shared rule procedures not only risks further complicating 
fraught relations between the Scottish and UK governments, but such unprecedented stress 
could potentially bolster the SNP’s arguments for independence, thus risking the future 
continuance of the union. This is further compounded by the absence of a plurinationally 
sensitive political culture, which based on analysis of the UK government’s approach to EU 
withdrawal hitherto, has given way to a more heightened concern with parliamentary 
sovereignty and party unity. The emboldened rhetoric in relation to parliamentary 
sovereignty is evidently rooted in the pro-Leave rhetoric of the Brexit campaign to ‘take 
back control’, but further betrays the competing constitutional interpretations at the heart of 
the UK’s constitutional debate. This, as was noted in Chapter Four, is nothing new and has 
existed as long as the union itself, but contaminates evolving debates on the constitutional 
futures of the UK and Scotland as well as centre-periphery relations.  
The Spanish decentralisation project has also been a dynamic affair, fruit of the open-
ended territorial model in the Constitution in which democracy and decentralisation became 
mutually reinforcing phenomena. For Catalonia, this involved extensive autonomous powers 
over a number of important ambits; powers that in light of quid pro quo scenarios in the 
Spanish Parliament during periods of minority government, have been expanded, most 
notably in fiscal affairs. The Spanish transition to democracy also concerned some 
cognisance in relation to shared rule, albeit the Senate remains representative of provinces 
as opposed to ACs. In addition, IGR are hierarchical structures, which despite being more 
formal and more frequent than the UK, are not designed as arenas of co-decision or to ensure 
the systematic influence of ACs in central government policy making. 
One of the biggest tensions with regards to the Catalan model of autonomy relates to 
the problem of convoluted recognition which sees only a tacit recognition of the specificity 
of Catalonia endorsed in the Constitution. Indeed, this was further underlined by the TC’s 
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judgement on the reform of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy in which the term nation was 
moved to the Preamble rather than included in the Statute itself, depriving it of legal 
significance. The denial and outright hostility of recognition of Spain’s plurinationality is 
not widely shared among all political elites, but indisputably impedes the development of a 
more sensitive and coherent model of autonomy designed to empower as opposed to just 
contain those sections of society seeking recognition as a nation. This is further underlined 
in the consistent attempts on the part of Spanish elites to symmetrise the autonomy model 
in an effort to dilute claims of distinctiveness primarily from the historic nationalities and 
their demands for further autonomy. Recourse to the courts has also been a common 
characteristic of the Spanish experience with autonomy. There is no doubt that constitutional 
courts play an essential role in policing disputes among the different orders of government 
found in multilevel states, but in Spain this has had the effect of politicising the judiciary 
and impeding the necessary bargaining and negotiations between the Catalan and Spanish 
governments to find political solutions to political problems. As a result, the model of 
autonomy enacted in Catalonia not only impedes the empowerment of Catalonia as a 
national minority within a plurinational state, but precludes recognition of political 
legitimacy, let alone of equal partnership.  
To answer the third sub-question ‘Are there other mechanisms that may be employed 
to ensure the development of a more coherent model of autonomy for Scotland and 
Catalonia?’, I drew upon some of the most important themes that emerged from the data 
analysis and examined, from both normative and empirical viewpoints, and in line with the 
theory of multinational federalism, potential reforms that would result in a more 
plurinationally sensitive, just and coherent model of autonomy for Scotland and Catalonia. 
This, as this thesis testifies, has become all the more important in light of recent events in 
both cases in which the decisions, policies and strategies of the central government are made 
and are set to continue to be made without proper consideration or understanding of their 
implications on sub-state territories.  
The UK and Spain are identifiable plurinational states, but the existence of a 
plurinational culture is lacking. This is rooted in the lack of official recognition (more so in 
Spain) and the focus on self-rule at the expense of shared rule as a territorial strategy to 
accommodate national minorities. There is, as the chapters in this thesis attest, cognisance 
of some of the values and principles that undergird a plurinational culture, but central states 
have tended to overlook the importance of these in the development of a political culture 
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that chimes with the aspirations and wishes of both minority and majority communities. In 
the UK and Spain this is undermined by the unitary and crudely majoritarian approach 
endorsed by central state elites vis-à-vis national politics, often overlooking or in some cases 
actively working against the aspirations of minority communities. To offset the perverse 
effects of the inherent monist approach pursued by UK and Spanish elites, a more open, 
deliberative and consociational approach to politics is required. At the same time, a 
commitment to, or at very least understanding of, the importance of asymmetry for national 
minorities as well as a willingness to discuss secessionism, irrespective of legal constraints 
in the Constitution, would provide for a more benign and plurinationally sensitive political 
space. Actions to the contrary are rooted in the quiescent ethnocentrism of the majority 
community. The development of a more plurinationally sensitive political culture is thus 
considered imperative, particularly with regards to managing momentous decisions such as 
leaving the EU, or, as in the case of Spain, to reduce the increasingly polarising strategies 
of the Catalan and Spanish governments vis-à-vis territorial politics, namely secession.  
The theme of empowerment was threaded throughout analysis of autonomy 
arrangements in Scotland and Catalonia, particularly as relates to the rationale behind 
decentralisation as a mechanism to contain rather than empower minority nationalism. In 
Spain, this relates to the absence of provisions, such as the Sewel Convention in the UK, to 
police the interference of the central government in sub-state territory competences, often 
invoked under the guise of the ‘national interest’. UK government encroachment on Scottish 
policy jurisdiction has been a relatively uncontroversial area between the two orders of 
government, but in the ongoing discussions on EU withdrawal, the UK government has used 
‘the national interest’ as justification for its centralising approach to managing repatriated 
powers, posing a grave risk to devolution in Scotland and thus the future existence of the 
UK itself. In both cases, therefore, there has to be increased respect for the autonomy of sub-
state territories and central government to meet the prerequisites of plurinational justice and 
to help restore and bolster the bonds of trust among different communities.  
In line with seeking to further empower national minorities within the plurinational 
state, which very much focuses on self-rule and the actions of the central government, 
increasing the voice of minorities at the centre to ensure they have a role in central 
government decision and policy making processes is also an important move. As in most 
federal states, this would require a territorially representative second chamber. Reform of 
the House of Lords in the UK and the Senate in Spain is a well-debated and researched topic, 
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but moves towards becoming a more federal and territorially representative chamber remain 
hesitant. Reform in this direction, however, would help provide a multilateral 
intergovernmental forum, thus empowering minorities through giving them a voice at the 
centre to systematically contribute to central government policy and decisions. In addition, 
and important for both cases, IGR are in need of reform. IGR in Spain are a more formal 
affair than in the UK, but the hierarchical nature of existing forums as well as the perception 
that they are talking shops as opposed to arenas of real co-decision and influence, undermine 
their legitimacy, particularly in the eyes of the historical communities. More formal 
structures in the UK would be a welcome addition to the UK’s extant intergovernmental, 
and interparliamentary furniture and would help bolster relations and redefine relationships 
between the devolved and central governments. Such intergovernmental restructuring will 
become increasingly important over the coming years as the UK navigates EU withdrawal. 
Formality, as the case of Spain and Catalonia demonstrates, is of itself not a tool to ensure 
collaboration, thus as much in Spain as in the UK, IGR require greater transparency as well 
as a willingness on all sides to work together.  
The final theme discussed relates to the notion of partnership, more specifically, 
forging a partnership of equals among the different communities within a plurinational state. 
Discussions on the absence of partnership are not unique to either the UK or Spanish cases 
but have become more pronounced in recent years as a result of the increasing attention paid 
to territorial politics and the constitutional futures of the states in question. The absence of 
partnership is rooted in the majority interpretation of the political partnership between the 
state and sub-state entities, which as well as peddling an antiquated notion that sits 
uncomfortably in a plurinational setting, fosters distrust among the different orders of 
government. Hence, employing some of the measures above, such as widening the role of 
sub-state entities in central state institutions or in central government decision-making 
processes would go a long way to demonstrate a commitment to recognising and respecting 
the plurality of the state and increasing the stake and thus loyalty of national minorities 
within it.  
 
7.3 Implications, Limitations and Avenues for Future Research 
 The final section of this chapter discusses the implications of the main findings as 
relates to the wider literature, limitations of the study and potential avenues for further 
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research. Having examined the evolution of territorial politics in the UK and Spain, this 
thesis contributes to existing literature on both empirical and theoretical levels. On a more 
empirical level, it has contributed to what was termed above as the ‘renaissance’ in studies 
on territorial politics, specifically its evolution in the UK and Spain. As two paradigmatic 
cases of plurinationalism, the study has sought a better understanding of the evolution of 
territorial strategies in managing plurinationalism in the UK and Spain, and seeks to 
contribute new knowledge on these cases, with particular focus on recent developments in 
both cases. Taking into consideration recent events, such as the referendum on EU 
withdrawal in June 2016 and the controversial independence referendum in Catalonia in 
October 2017, as well as the initial ramifications of these events, at least until the latter half 
of 2018, this thesis further develops our understanding of managing plurinationalism with 
reference to the most recent events.  
On the theoretical contribution, this work builds upon previous studies as relates to the 
theories of liberal nationalism and multinational federalism. In particular, it adds further 
empirical flesh to the theoretical bones of multinational federalism; draws upon different 
elements of power-sharing theories from comparative politics to further develop what a more 
coherent plurinational model of autonomy would look like and how this would work in the 
cases of the UK and Spain. In this vein, this research is important not only in terms of 
strengthening knowledge with regards to already established plurinational states, but 
provides important lessons for emerging and new models of political organisation in other 
plurinational states. On that note, a number of wider implications of the study can be 
identified.  
First, this thesis is testament to the evolving nature of territorial politics, but also to 
the importance of flexibility in constitutional and territorial arrangements to facilitate the 
successful management of plurinational states. This Friedrichian conception, as discussed in 
Chapter Two, is often overlooked by students of federalism, but is crucial when examining 
how to manage accommodation within plurinational settings, particularly states that opt for 
a stepping stone as opposed to a big bang approach towards federalism. As the case of Spain 
shows, a rigid, or in Friedrich’s (1968: 7) parlance ‘static’, design and conception of politics 
vis-à-vis national minorities and territorial autonomy inhibits the development of territorial 
arrangements and is ill-conceived inasmuch as it may accelerate state disintegration. At the 
same time, as the UK case demonstrates, flexibility entails benefits but also has its problems, 
particularly when short-term exigencies are prized over long-term implications or decisions 
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on devolved settlements are made without proper consideration or even understanding of 
their implications. The challenge for plurinational states, therefore, is to ensure a stable 
equilibrium between flexible and rigid constitutional arrangements, something, as this thesis 
shows, is no mean feat.  
A second implication of this study relates to research on majority nationalism and the 
management of accommodation for national minorities and majority-minority relations. The 
focus on majority nationalism, as discussed in other studies (Gagnon et al 2011; Lecours 
and Nootens 2009), is often understudied, shaped by a perception that ‘the state’s association 
with nationalism in liberal democratic societies ended at the turn of the twentieth century’ 
(Lecours and Nootens, 2011: 4). This study demonstrates, however, the importance in 
analysing the actions, interests, identity, policies and perceptions of central governments 
(mostly made up of the majority community). It highlights, for instance, that while much of 
the onus in existing studies is often placed on the actions of minority groups in precipitating 
demands for enhanced autonomy or secession, the role of central governments should not 
be understated. Indeed, the research in this thesis underlines this point. Rather than 
implementing a coherent model of autonomy which satisfies the self-determining aspirations 
of national minorities, central governments have instead chosen to create structures that 
perpetuate their domination over sub-state entities, thus intensifying intra-state tensions and 
mobilising movements demanding better autonomy structures and/or independence. 
Majority communities cannot demand nor expect loyalty from minority communities when 
extant structures institutionalise domination and contain rather than empower national 
minorities.  
Building on work by McGarry and O’Leary (2009), a third implication of this study is 
that plurinational federal political systems are a worthwhile endeavour, with the potential to 
create and maintain a democratic, durable and just state to the benefit of both minority and 
majority communities. The UK and Spain are ‘holding together’ systems whereby devolving 
power in these states was an attempt to provide an electoral and legislative arena in which 
sub-state self-determining aspirations could be contained and hence secession prevented 
(Stepan 1999). Secessionism, as the cases of the UK and Spain attest, has not been entirely 
abated but it is clear the plurinational model is the best response to managing this, albeit a 
more coherent model of autonomy is required. Important to note, however, is that, in contrast 
to the general reaction by Spanish central elites, and as astutely argued by Kymlicka (2000: 
27), the success of plurinational states should not be measured by the absence of secessionist 
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movements, but instead by the ways in which the state seeks to accommodate and recognise 
its national minorities. This, for instance, is an important implication for the cases under 
study here, but also provides an important lesson for other plurinational states currently 
examining federal models, such as Myanmar and Syria.  
Finally, not only do constitutional arrangements in plurinational states require 
flexibility, but, as developed in this thesis, they are dependent on the evolution of a 
plurinational culture as well as non-traditional mechanisms for accommodation, as found in 
power-sharing systems. The development of a plurinational culture is important not just with 
reference to the deepening and consolidation of democracy in diverse societies, but more so 
in informing how central state institutions and governments interact with minorities as well 
as think through the implications of policy decisions on sub-state territories. As discussed 
supra, this is a feature of rhetoric in the UK and Spain, but the challenge remains to translate 
this into political practice. Moves in a more consociational direction, while oft-limited to 
post-conflict societies, represent a potential solution, providing a relevant, flexible and more 
innovative model to help relieve inbuilt tensions and manage other complex challenges 
present in plurinational contexts. Autonomy, as has been shown, is an indisputably important 
tool in accommodating and empowering national minorities, but as argued by Basta and 
Simeon (2015: 325) ‘is seldom enough’. Plurinational states must move beyond current 
approaches to create more innovative, inventive and just models of accommodation and 
autonomy, bolstered by a genuine plurinational culture. 
Notwithstanding the discussion related to the contribution and implications of the 
study above, there are a number of limitations. First, the methodological approach of this 
thesis focused on only two cases which therefore inhibits the generalisability of the results. 
The analysis is specific to the cases of the UK and Spain and so cannot be generalised to 
other cases in which contextual factors will be different to the ones traced in this thesis. 
However, as pointed out by Gerring (2007: 248), limited generalisability does not mean that 
the findings of a particular study are not generalisable at all. It is hoped, therefore, that the 
analysis presented here contributes to existing studies to tell us something broader about the 
accommodation of national minorities in plurinational states, including a framework to help 
identify some of the limitations of extant autonomy models and potential solutions to create 
a more coherent and accommodative plurinational autonomy model. A second limitation 
refers to the fact that the cases in this thesis are Western liberal democracies. The use of 
autonomy as a model for the accommodation of national minorities is not circumscribed to 
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the Western hemisphere, and in fact, cases found elsewhere around the world, such as 
Bosnia, India and Iraq, are often more complicated insofar as violence has been a 
characteristic in these countries’ experience of diversity management. As a result, there is 
difficulty in generalising these results to other non-Western and democratically-questionable 
cases.  
Building on the research in this thesis, there are a number of potential avenues for 
further research. Firstly, broadening the research to include other Western and non-Western 
countries would help further flesh out some of the main nuances and factors vis-à-vis the 
accommodation of minorities in plurinational states. Indeed, an admixture of Western and 
non-Western cases would not only widen the number of factors taken into account given the 
different context-sensitive factors in each case, but would contribute to further expanding 
some of the much needed empirical evidence to bolster the theory of multinational 
federalism.  
A second avenue relates to the study of when autonomy arrangements are likely to 
succeed or fail in the accommodation of minorities as well as the prevention of state 
disintegration. As the theoretical discussion in Chapter Three shows, particularly the focus 
on the paradox of autonomy, despite the small literary industry that has emerged on the 
topic, the debate remains inconclusive. Future research is thus necessary in order to explore 
when and why autonomy works, taking into account the factors studied in this thesis, such 
as institutions, as well as other internal and perhaps even external influences.  
Finally, it is worth noting that the cases under study in this thesis continue to be at the 
forefront of debates on the management of national minorities in plurinational states. 
Notwithstanding the contribution of this thesis in analysing the evolution of territorial 
politics in the UK and Spain and advancing knowledge related to the accommodation of 
minority nations in plurinational states, like any thesis I have only been able to take a 
snapshot of a specific moment in history. The decisions taken already as well as those to be 
taken in the very near future regarding these topics will have important implications for the 
future development and existence of the UK and Scotland, Spain and Catalonia and thus 
provide plenty of scope for further research. The future constitutional trajectories of both 
the UK and Spain remain unknown. Only one thing is certain: territorial politics will remain 
in a state of flux.   
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